Stewart v. The Kansas City

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FEB 9 2005
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
JOE N. STEWART; OZZIE REE
STEWART,
Plaintiffs,
v.
EARLE M. JORGENSEN
CORPORATION; LARRY R.
PITTMAN,
No. 03-7133
Defendants-Cross-Claimants -
(E.D. Oklahoma)
Appellees,
(D.C. No. CIV-00-448-P)
v.
THE KANSAS CITY SOUTHERN
RAILWAY COMPANY,
Defendant Cross-Defendant -
Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgment; nevertheless, an order and
judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of the 10 th Cir. R. 36.3.
Before EBEL, O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges, and STEWART, District Judge. **
SUMMARY
The Kansas City Southern Railway Company (“the Railroad”) appeals a
ruling from the Eastern District of Oklahoma. One of the Railroad’s trains
collided with a tractor-trailer rig driven by Larry P. Pittman (“Pittman”) and
owned by the Earle M. Jorgenson Corporation (“EMJ”) (collectively “the EMJ
Parties”). Jon Stewart (“Stewart”) was a conductor on the train and was injured
in the collision. He brought claims against the EMJ Parties and against the
Railroad, his employer. He settled his claims first with the Railroad and then
with the EMJ Parties. After settling with Stewart, the Railroad amended its
complaint and sought reimbursement of the funds it expended in settlement from
the EMJ Parties under the theory of indemnity or, in the alternative, contribution.
The district court granted declaratory judgment in favor of the EMJ Parties
pursuant to Title 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a). Applying Arkansas law, the district court
found that the Railroad and the EMJ Parties were joint tortfeasors. On this basis,
the district court found that indemnity did not apply. Because the Railroad had
**
The Honorable Ted Stewart, District Judge, District of Utah, sitting
by designation.
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settled with Stewart prior to the EMJ Parties doing the same, the district court
also found that Arkansas law barred the Railroad’s claim for contribution.
On appeal, the Railroad brings two challenges to the decisions of the
district court. The Railroad avers that the district court abused its discretion
when it considered the EMJ Parties’ motion for declaratory judgment. It also
argues that the court erred in its determination that the Railroad and the EMJ
Parties were joint tortfeasors, thus barring its claims for contribution and
indemnity. 1
We AFFIRM.
BACKGROUND
On December 5, 1997, a tractor-trailer rig, owned by EMJ and driven by
Pittman, collided with one of the Railroad’s trains at a railroad crossing in Mena,
Arkansas. The train was en route to Oklahoma from Louisiana. Pittman had
driven through a railroad crossing and into the path of the train. Stewart, the
1
The EMJ Parties argue that the Railroad’s appeal to this court was
not timely because the clock for the appeal began to run once the district court
made its declaratory judgment. However, it was not until the district court
disposed of the remaining cross-claims that its judgment became final and the
appeal period began to run. Albright v. UNUM Life Ins. Co. of Am., 59 F.3d
1089, 1092 (10th Cir. 1995). Therefore, the appeal was timely.
Additionally, while the EMJ Parties ask us to affirm the district
court’s decision based on Arkansas law, they make an argument in the alternative,
that California indemnity law should apply rather than that of Arkansas.
However, because we find that the EMJ Parties have no obligation to indemnify
the Railroad under Arkansas law, we do not reach this issue.
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train’s conductor, was injured in the collision. Stewart sued the Railroad under
the Federal Employer Liability Act (“FELA”), 45 U.S.C. § 51 et seq. He based
his FELA claim on the allegation that the Railroad was negligent in failing to
maintain a safe working environment. Stewart also sued the EMJ Parties for
negligence under Arkansas state law. The Railroad and EMJ Parties denied
liability and, additionally, brought cross claims against each other for their
respective property damage resulting from the collision.
The Railroad settled with Stewart. The Railroad then amended its cross-
complaint to demand that the EMJ Parties compensate it for the expenditures it
made in settling with Stewart based on theories of indemnity or, in the alternative,
contribution. 2
2
The parties use the terms “contribution” and “subrogation”
interchangeably. However, these doctrines are distinct. Under Arkansas law, the
law that governs this case, “subrogation is an equitable remedy that rests upon
principles of unjust enrichment and attempts to accomplish complete and perfect
justice among the parties.” St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Murray Guard,
Inc., 37 S.W.3d 180, 183 (Ark. 2001) (citations omitted).
[T]he elements of subrogation are as follows: 1) a party pays in full a
debt or an obligation of another or removes an encumbrance of
another, 2) for which the other is primarily liable, 3) although the
party is not technically bound to do so, 4) in order to protect his own
secondary rights, to fulfill a contractual obligation, or to comply with
the request of the original debtor, 5) without acting as a volunteer or
an intermeddler.
Id. (citations omitted). Based on undisputed facts, the Railroad cannot meet the
fourth and fifth prongs of this test: the Railroad entered into settlement as a
volunteer and not to protect its secondary rights, to fulfill a contract, or to comply
(continued...)
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Subsequently, the EMJ Parties also settled with Stewart. The EMJ Parties’
insurance policy, held by Reliance National Indemnity Company (“Reliance”),
covered a portion of their settlement with Stewart. The EMJ Parties paid Stewart
the uncovered share of the settlement. Apparently, however, Reliance became
insolvent before paying Stewart. The California Insurance Guaranty Association
(“CIGA”), an entity created by the State of California to pay the claims against
insolvent insurers, paid Reliance’s portion of the settlement to Stewart. After
making this payment, the CIGA had $325,000 of coverage that the EMJ Parties
had not used; however, the CIGA apparently refused to cover the Railroad’s
indemnity and contribution claims.
The EMJ Parties later sought declaratory relief under the Declaratory
Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a). The EMJ Parties argued that the district
court should resolve that the Railroad could not seek indemnity from them. The
EMJ Parties’ rationale was that since the EMJ Parties paid the amount it owed
under the Reliance insurance contract, that the Railroad must then look to CIGA,
the entity standing in place of the now defunct Reliance, to pay any indemnity
claim. The EMJ Parties noted that California law prohibited CIGA from paying
any indemnity claim against Reliance. The EMJ Parties reasoned that this
2
(...continued)
the EMJ Parties’ request. Subrogation is inapplicable to this case. In formulating
our decision, we rely on the doctrine of contribution, as did the district court.
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prohibition, therefore, shielded the EMJ Parties from the Railroad’s indemnity
claim.
The Railroad contended that declaratory judgment was improper and that
Arkansas law of indemnity allowed the Railroad to pursue its claims against the
EMJ Parties. The Railroad argued that despite the CIGA’s coverage of a portion
of the EMJ Parties’ settlement, the California law relied upon by the EMJ Parties
was inapplicable to its claims for indemnification in the present action.
On October 23, 2002, the district court entered a declaratory judgment in
favor of the EMJ Parties. It did so, however, on grounds other than those the
EMJ Parties requested. The court determined that because the accident arose in
Arkansas and because the parties agreed that Arkansas law controlled other issues
in the case, Arkansas law controlled the issue of indemnity as well. It found that
the Railroad and the EMJ Parties were joint tortfeasors, as defined by the
Arkansas Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, currently codified at
Ark. Code Ann. § 16-61-201 et seq. Because the parties were joint tortfeasors,
the district court determined that the law of indemnity was inapplicable.
Additionally, it found that Arkansas law prohibited one joint tortfeasor from
recovering contribution from another joint tortfeasor if a settlement terminated
the former tortfeasor’s liability but not that of the latter, which is what it found
happened when the Railroad settled with Stewart prior to the EMJ Parties doing
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the same. As a result, the court granted declaratory relief and found that the
Railroad was not entitled to recover on its indemnification or contribution claims.
The parties continued to pursue their remaining cross-claims for property
damage. On November 14, 2002, however, the district court determined that it
did not have jurisdiction over the parties’ remaining property damage claims
because the damage asserted for the remaining claims fell below the amount
required for the court to invoke diversity jurisdiction. The court, therefore,
involuntarily dismissed the remaining claims, without prejudice.
The Railroad brings two challenges to the decisions of the district court.
First, the Railroad avers that the district court abused its discretion when it
considered the EMJ Parties’ motion for declaratory judgment. Second, the
Railroad argues that the court erred in its determination that the Railroad and the
EMJ Parties acted as joint tortfeasors and, thus, that its contribution and
indemnity claims could not survive.
We AFFIRM the district court.
DISCUSSION
A. Discretion to Consider the EMJ Parties’ Motion for Declaratory Relief
The Railroad argues that the district court erred in considering the EMJ
Parties’ motion for declaratory relief. The Declaratory Judgment Act provides
federal courts the discretion to grant declaratory relief. Kunkel v. Continental
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Cas. Co., 866 F.2d 1269, 1273 (10th Cir. 1989). Provided that the challenge to
declaratory relief is not on a jurisdictional basis, “[w]hether to entertain a
justiciable declaratory judgment action is a matter committed to the sound
discretion of the trial court.” Id. citing Alabama State Fed’n of Labor v.
McAdory, 325 U.S. 450, 462 (1945).
In previous cases, this circuit has provided specific guidance regarding how
district courts should use the discretion provided by the Declaratory Judgment
Act. In considering whether to enter a declaratory judgment, a district court
should weigh the following factors:
(1) whether a declaratory action would settle the controversy; (2)
whether it would serve a useful purpose in clarifying the legal
relations at issue; (3) whether the declaratory remedy is being used
merely for the purpose of “procedural fencing” or “to provide an
arena for a race to res judicata”; (4) whether use of a declaratory
action would increase friction between our federal and state courts
and improperly encroach upon state jurisdiction; and (5) whether
there is an alternative remedy which is better or more effective.
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Mhoon, 31 F.3d 979, 983 (10th Cir. 1994) citing
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Green, 825 F.2d 1061, 1063 (6th Cir. 1987). While the district
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court must consider these factors, we review the district court’s review of these
factors only for abuse of discretion. See id.The district court considered these factors. In weighing them, it found that
the most important of these were whether declaratory relief would settle the
controversy and clarify the legal relations at issue. It found that declaratory
judgment would resolve and clarify important issues before the district court. On
this basis, it determined that it should use its discretion and consider the EMJ
Parties’ motion for declaratory relief.
However, it appears that the Railroad’s argument is not that the district
court failed to weigh these factors or somehow erred in doing so, but rather that it
based its declaratory judgment on what the Railroad alleges is a matter of
disputed fact. Despite the Railroad’s argument to the contrary, its objection is
based on the district court’s ruling rather than its mere consideration of the EMJ
Parties’ motion for declaratory relief. We find the district court properly
considered the relevant factors and did not err in deciding to consider the EMJ
Parties’ motion for declaratory relief.
B. Dispute Regarding Whether the Railroad Was a Joint Tortfeasor
When considering a motion seeking declaratory relief at the summary
judgment stage, which was the case here, a district court’s role is not to make
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factual findings but to determine whether any material factual dispute exists. 3
“We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the
same legal standard used by the district court.” Simms v. Oklahoma ex rel. Dep’t
of Mental Health & Substance Abuse Servs., 165 F.3d 1321, 1326 (10th Cir.
1999). We must determine whether in viewing the record in the light most
favorable to the non-moving party, there exists any genuine issue of material fact.
Id.; Wolf v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 50 F.3d 793, 796 (10th Cir. 1995).
The Railroad argues that it was inappropriate for the district court to rely
on the finding that the Railroad and the EMJ Parties were joint tortfeasors. The
Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act defines “joint tortfeasors” to mean
“two (2) or more persons jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury to
person or property, whether or not judgment has been recovered against all or
some of them.” Ark. Stat. Ann. § 16-61-201. The nub of the Railroad’s argument
is that the district court’s factual finding that the Railroad was jointly negligent
with the EMJ Parties is disputed because the Railroad contends it was free of any
negligence. On this basis, it asserts that the resolution of this disputed claim
should have properly been reserved for a finder of fact.
3
The district court was not explicit as to whether its judgment was
based on the facts alleged in the Railroad’s complaint or on undisputed facts.
However, because it is clear that the district court relied on facts outside of the
Railroad’s amended complaint, the district court necessarily relied on undisputed
facts or, as the Railroad alleges, erred in relying on disputed allegations.
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In weighing the Railroad’s argument, we begin with the proposition that
only facts necessarily relied upon in making a judgment as a matter of law need to
be undisputed. Reed v. Bennett, 312 F.3d 1190, 1195 (10th Cir. 2002).
Therefore, we turn to the question of whether the finding that the Railroad was a
joint tortfeasor is material to the determination that the Railroad was barred from
seeking indemnity and contribution from the EMJ Parties.
Under Arkansas law, indemnity and contribution are mutually exclusive
remedies. Contribution acts to equitably distribute the loss among joint
tortfeasors according to their relative degree of fault. Boatmen’s Nat. Bank of
Arkansas v. Cole, 947 S.W.2d 362, 366 (Ark. 1997). In the absence of
contractual provisions, indemnity is an equitable remedy that shifts the entire loss
from one party to a tortfeasor who should rightfully bear it in its entirety. Mosley
Machinery Co., Inc. v. Gray Supply Co., 833 S.W.2d 772, 775 (Ark. 1992).
1. Contribution
Under Arkansas law, contribution in tort is dependent on a finding that the
party seeking contribution and the party from which contribution is sought are
joint tortfeasors. Scalf v. Payne, 583 S.W.2d 51, 53 (Ark. 1979). If parties do
not have a potential liability as joint tortfeasors, no right of contribution exists.
Id. Additionally, “[a] joint tortfeasor who enters into a settlement with [an]
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injured person is not entitled to recover contribution from another joint tortfeasor
whose liability to the injured person is not extinguished by the settlement.” Ark.
Code Ann. § 16-61-202(3).
The district court found that the Railroad’s right to contribution was
extinguished because it settled with Stewart prior to Stewart settling with the EMJ
Parties. The Railroad does not dispute this. Nevertheless, it asserts that it was
not a joint tortfeasor. However, if the Railroad was not a joint tortfeasor, as it
contends, it would have no right to contribution under Arkansas law. The only
hope that the Railroad had to recover under a theory of contribution hinges on the
determination that it was a joint tortfeasor. Thus, the district court did not need
to rely on the determination that the Railroad was a joint tortfeasor in finding that
it had no right to contribution: if the Railroad was not a joint tortfeasor, it had no
right to seek contribution. Regardless of whether the Railroad was a joint
tortfeasor, judgment against the Railroad’s contribution claim was proper.
2. Indemnity
The Railroad argues that the district court erred in looking to contribution
law rather than to that of indemnity. The significance of the Railroad’s argument
is that unlike contribution law, under indemnity law, there is no procedural
requirement that would bar the Railroad from pursuing its claim simply because it
settled with Stewart prior to the EMJ Parties doing the same.
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Under Arkansas law, “the right to indemnity, where one of the parties is not
liable to the injured party for a joint wrong, must be based upon a relationship
other than that of joint tortfeasors.” Larson Mach., Inc. v. Wallace, 600 S.W.2d
1, 13 (Ark. 1980); Welter v. Curry, 539 S.W.2d 264, 272 (Ark. 1976); Jack
Morgan Construction Co. v. Larkan, 496 S.W.2d 431 (Ark. 1973). However, only
a person who was compelled to pay another party due to a legal obligation is
eligible to seek indemnification. Jean-Pierre v. Plantation Homes of Crittenden
County, Inc., 89 S.W.3d 337, 341 (Ark. 2002).
Assuming that the Railroad sought indemnification from the EMJ Parties
under the theory that the Railroad and the EMJ Parties were joint tortfeasors,
Arkansas law would not permit it. As discussed above, the relationship between
the Railroad and the EMJ Parties must be based on a relationship other than that
of joint tortfeasors to allow the Railroad to seek indemnification. Larson Mach.,
Inc., supra; Welter, supra; Jack Morgan Construction Co., supra.
The Railroad argues that it was not negligent and that the EMJ Parties are
the sole tortfeasors. This argues for the finding of an alternative relationship,
namely that of victim (i.e., the Railroad) and tortfeasors (i.e., the EMJ Parties).
Even if this alternative relationship were assumed to be the case, the question
remains, however, whether its settlement with Stewart was compelled by a legal
obligation or whether the Railroad settled as a mere volunteer. Stewart’s claim
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against the Railroad was that the Railroad violated FELA by negligently failing to
provide him a safe workplace. The Railroad could have legally resisted this
claim; it had no unescapable liability to pay Stewart’s FELA claim. The Railroad
did not pay Stewart as a result of a judgment or due any legal compulsion, but
rather it voluntarily entered into settlement. Whether or not the Railroad was a
joint tortfeasor, it was not eligible to seek indemnification because it voluntarily
settled rather than being compelled to pay Stewart due to a legal obligation.
Jean-Pierre, supra.CONCLUSION
We AFFIRM the judgment of the district court granting declaratory relief
to the EMJ Parties as to the Railroad’s contribution and indemnity claims. The
district court correctly applied Arkansas law and found that when the Railroad
voluntarily settled with Stewart prior to the EMJ Parties doing the same, the
Railroad extinguished any possibility it had to recover contribution or indemnity
from the EMJ Parties. The Railroad’s assertion that it was not a joint tortfeasor is
irrelevant because it does not raise a material fact as to the determination to grant
judgment against the Railroad’s indemnity and contribution claims.
Entered for the Court
Ted Stewart
District Judge
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