United States v. Kulik

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
JUL 30 1998
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 97-7092
STANISLAW KULIK, (D.C. No. CR-97-11-01)
(E.D. Okla.)
Defendant-Appellant.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 97-7094
ALEXSANDER SMEKTALA, (D.C. No. CR-97-11-02)
(E.D. Okla.)
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before BALDOCK, BRORBY, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the
citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under
the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
On February 7, 1997, Defendant Alexsander Smektala, accompanied by Defendant
Stanislaw Kulik, was driving his white cab-over tractor/trailer rig north on the Indian
Nation Turnpike near McAlester, Oklahoma when a van traveling a short distance ahead
of his rig attempted to make a u-turn. Smektala swerved to avoid a collision. Unable to
maintain control of his rig, Smektala ran off the road and the rig overturned in the ditch.
On impact, the rig’s trailer broke open and numerous bales of marijuana along with
several bags of onions spilled out. The total weight of the marijuana which authorities
seized from the scene exceeded 11,000 pounds.
A grand jury indicted Defendants Kulik and Smektala together on one count of
possession with intent to distribute in excess of 1000 kilograms of marijuana and one
count of conspiracy to commit the same in respective violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 &
846. Following a joint trial, a jury found Defendants guilty on both counts. The district
court sentenced each Defendant to two concurrent terms of 188 months imprisonment.
Defendants appeal their convictions. Our jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We
affirm.
On appeal, both Defendants claim the district court improperly admitted into
evidence eleven samples of marijuana taken from the bales which spilled from Smektala’s
truck. According to Defendants, the government failed to authenticate the samples by
establishing a proper chain of custody prior to their admission. Additionally, Defendants
raise several separate claims. Kulik claims the district court improperly admitted
2
prejudicial character and co-conspirator hearsay testimony against him. Smektala claims
the district court improperly admitted prejudicial testimony regarding a canine alert on
Kulik’s truck; improperly failed to sever the trials, or in the alternative, give the jury
limiting instructions on evidence he claims pertained solely to his co-defendant; and
improperly informed the jurors that an appellate court would carefully review their verdict
for error. Lastly, Smektala claims the evidence against him on the conspiracy count was
insufficient. We address Defendants’ contentions in turn.
I.
Both Defendants claim that the district court erred when, without a sufficient
showing of the chain of custody, it admitted into evidence eleven samples of the
marijuana, Government exhibits 44-54, seized from Smektala’s truck. We review the
district court’s ruling on the admission of real evidence for abuse of discretion. United
States v. Washington, 11 F.3d 1510, 1514 (10th Cir. 1993). Under Fed. R. Evid. 901(a),
“[t]he requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to
admissibility is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in
question is what its proponent claims.”
When evidence such as a controlled substance is not readily identifiable and is
susceptible to alteration by tampering or contamination, courts require a foundation
“entailing a chain of custody of the item with sufficient completeness to render it
improbable that the original item has either been exchanged with another or been
3
contaminated or tampered with.” United States v. Johnson, 977 F.2d 1360, 1367 (10th
Cir. 1992) (internal quotations omitted) (emphasis in original). The chain of custody,
however, need not be perfect for the evidence to be admissible. If, after considering the
nature of the evidence and the surrounding circumstances, including presentation,
custody, and probability of tampering or alteration, the district court determines that the
evidence is substantially in the same condition as when the crime was committed, the
court may admit it. United States v. Cardenas, 864 F.2d 1528, 1531 (10th Cir. 1989).
Once the court properly decides that the evidence is admissible, “deficiencies in the chain
of custody go to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility; the jury evaluates the
defects and, based on its evaluation, may accept or disregard the evidence.” United States
v. Brandon, 847 F.2d 625, 630 (10th Cir. 1988).
In this case, DEA Agent Waters testified that he took eleven random samples from
the marijuana seized from Smektala’s truck and labeled them A thru K. He then sent
them to the DEA lab in Dallas for analysis. The agent testified that the samples, which
the Government introduced at trial, were in the same condition as when he took them
except that the DEA chemist had opened the bottom of the sealed bags containing the
samples and resealed them after analysis. DEA chemist Coffey also testified that the
samples at trial were in the same condition as when he received them at and returned
them from the lab.
Based upon our review of the record, we conclude that the district court did not
4
abuse its discretion in admitting the marijuana samples into evidence because the
Government presented a sufficient chain of custody to justify their admission. While
Defendants raised some doubts about the reliability of the evidence at trial, namely the
weight differential between the samples when they were sent to and returned from the lab,
and the discrepancy of the certified mail number in the DEA reports, we cannot agree that
such problems required exclusion of the samples at trial. The district court properly
found that the samples had not been altered in any material respect. Thus, any problems
in the chain of custody went to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility.
II.
Defendant Kulik next claims the district court erred when it permitted a
Government witness to testify regarding Kulik’s veracity and his listing on the
Government’s Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs Information System (NADIS). According
to Kulik, the testimony violated both Fed. R. Evid. 402 because it was irrelevant, and Fed.
R. Evid. 404(b) because it reflected upon his character. Because Kulik did not object to
the introduction of this testimony at trial, however, we review it only for plain error. Fed.
R. Crim. P. 52(b). Absent a timely objection at trial, an alleged evidentiary error is
waived “except when it constitutes plain error resulting in manifest injustice.” United
States v. Mendoza-Salgado, 964 F.2d 993, 1008 (10th Cir. 1992).
In this case, DEA Agent Wolf testified that Kulik was an independent trucker who
worked part time for Sun Eagle Transport out of Chicago. On cross-examination,
5
Smektala’s counsel asked the agent if he had obtained information on Kulik through
NADIS. The agent answered yes. The Government objected to the question as outside
the scope of direct examination, but the district court overruled the objection. We find
nothing in this line of testimony, which the Government tried to preclude, that resulted in
a manifest injustice. Nothing in Agent Wolf’s testimony indicated that Kulik personally
had a NADIS number. Rather, the agent’s testimony inferred that he obtained
information about Kulik through Sun Eagle Transport which did have a NADIS number.
Similarly, we find nothing improper regarding the Government’s inquiry of Agent
Wolf on redirect examination about Kulik’s truthfulness because Kulik’s counsel brought
his client’s truthfulness into question on cross-examination. Counsel asked Agent Wolf if
he thought Kulik was telling the truth when Kulik told the agent that he was an
independent trucker. Agent Wolf stated that was what Kulik told him. The government’s
question on redirect examination related directly to the opinion of Agent Wolf into which
Kulik’s counsel previously had inquired. Because Kulik’s counsel solicited Agent Wolf’s
opinion about Kulik’s truthfulness, surely the Government could inquire as to the same on
redirect examination. See Fed. R. Evid. 404(a) & 405(a).
III.
Defendant Kulik also claims the district court erred when it admitted into evidence
against him statements of his purported co-conspirators. Under Fed. R. Evid.
801(d)(2)(E), a statement made by a co-conspirator of a party may be admissible as
6
non-hearsay. Under Rule 801(d)(2)(E), statements of a defendant’s alleged
co-conspirators may be admitted over a hearsay objection if the district court finds by a
preponderance of the evidence that (1) a conspiracy existed, (2) the declarant and the
defendant were both members of the conspiracy, and (3) the statements were made in the
course of and in furtherance of the conspiracy. United States v. Sinclair, 109 F.3d 1527,
1533 (10th Cir. 1997). We review a decision of the district court to admit evidence under
Rule 801(d)(2)(E) for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Wolf, 839 F.2d 1387, 1393
(10th Cir. 1988).
Based on the testimony of Deputy Sheriff Fullbright and Jorge Ruiz, the district
court overruled Kulik’s objection and allowed the Government to introduce testimony
concerning an alleged conspiracy between Kulik and three unindicted co-conspirators.
Deputy Fullbright testified that in September 1996, he observed the four men over a
period of days in the Houston, Texas area preparing for the arrival of a shipment of drugs.
Ruiz testified that he allowed the men to park a trailer at his home while they waited for a
shipment of marijuana. Ruiz also agreed to allow the men to load the marijuana into the
trailer’s false compartment while the trailer was still at his residence. Although the
marijuana never arrived while the trailer was at Ruiz’ residence, the testimony of both
Deputy Fullbright and Ruiz clearly established Kulik’s participation in a conspiracy to
possess and transport marijuana. Accordingly, we conclude the district court did not
abuse its discretion in admitting this testimony.
7
IV.
In addition to joining Kulik’s chain of custody argument, Defendant Smektala
claims the district court erred in admitting testimony regarding a canine alert on Kulik’s
truck as unduly prejudicial. See Fed. R. Evid. 403. We review a defendant’s challenge to
the admissibility of witness testimony under Rule 403 for an abuse of discretion. United
States v. Reddeck, 22 F.3d 1504, 1508 (10th Cir. 1994).
The evidence revealed that Kulik left his truck and trailer at a repair shop in San
Antonio, Texas so that he could join Smektala for the trip to Chicago. Prior to leaving his
truck, employees at the repair shop witnessed Kulik and a man with a beard in a remote
area near the shop moving “a load” from Kulik’s trailer to the other man’s trailer. After
the Defendants’ accident, San Antonio Police Officer Villareal performed a search of
Kulik’s trailer with a dog. Although the trailer was empty, the dog alerted for an illegal
substance near the middle of the trailer. The officer also located evidence of cocaine in
the cab area of Kulik’s truck.
Prior to trial, the Government agreed not to introduce evidence of the cocaine, but
made no such agreement regarding the dog alert on Kulik’s trailer because such evidence
supported the reasonable inference that Kulik and Smektala had moved the marijuana
from Kulik’s trailer into Smektala’s trailer before journeying north. The evidence was
certainly relevant to the Government’s theory of the case and the district court did not
abuse its discretion in admitting it.
8
V.
Defendant Smektala next claims the district court erred in failing to sever his trial
from Kulik’s or, in the alternative, erred in failing to provide the jury with limiting
instructions regarding evidence which he claims pertained solely to his co-defendant.
Because there is a “preference in the federal system for joint trials of defendants who are
indicted together,” Zafiro v. United States, 506 U.S. 534, 537 (1993), we review the
district court’s denial of a severance motion under Fed. R. Crim. P. 14 only for an abuse
of discretion. United States v. Durham, 139 F.3d 1325, 1333 (10th Cir. 1998), petition
for cert. filed June 22, 1998. “[T]he burden on defendant to show an abuse of discretion
in this context is a difficult one.” United States v. Johnson, 130 F.3d 1420, 1427 (10th
Cir. 1997) (internal quotations omitted).
The district court’s decision to deny Smektala’s motion for severance suggests the
court determined that the possible prejudice of a joint trial did not outweigh the expense
and inconvenience of separate trials. Nothing Smektala has presented convinces us this
decision constituted an abuse of discretion. The evidence against Smektala on the
possession count was overwhelming, and as we discuss infra, the evidence on the
conspiracy count was more than sufficient. To the extent that some of the proof of a
conspiracy against Kulik would not have been admitted against Smektala had he been
tried alone, Smektala can do no more than speculate that the jury may have inferred his
guilt from this evidence. “Such conclusory ‘spillover’ claims alone do not warrant
9
severance so long as there is [otherwise] sufficient evidence in the record” to support the
conviction. Durham, 139 F.3d at 1334.
To be sure, the district court could have given a limiting instruction to the jury
concerning the evidence about which Smektala complains. Smektala, however, did not
tender such an instruction as part of the jury charge. Rather, when the district court asked
if Smektala had any objection to the jury instructions, he responded no. Any objection to
error that is not timely raised in the district court is normally forfeited unless the error is
obvious and prejudicial. United States v. Rodriguez-Aguirre, 108 F.3d 1228, 1235 (10th
Cir. 1997). For an error to be prejudicial means that in most cases, “it must have affected
the outcome of the district court proceedings.” United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 734
(1993). Viewing the evidence presented, we are unable to conclude that the failure to
give a limiting instruction affected the outcome of the trial or substantially prejudiced
Smektala.
VI.
Defendant Smektala also claims that the district court improperly informed the jury
that an appellate court would review their verdict for error. What the district judge
actually did, however, was to explain to the jury that his evidentiary rulings would be
reviewed by an appellate court. The judge then concluded by stating, “I take great
comfort in the fact that I’m being reviewed, and you ought to, too, and agree with my
rulings and go ahead.”
10
A district court’s comments to a jury about the possibility of appeal are improper
because they tend to shift the jury’s sense of responsibility to the appellate court. See
United States v. Baker, 63 F.3d 1478, 1497-98 (9th Cir. 1995). In this case, however, a
review of the judge’s comments indicates that they were directed towards review of his
rulings, not the jury’s. Moreover, the judge instructed the jurors that they were the sole
and final judges of the facts. While the district court’s discussion of the appellate process
may have been unwise, under these circumstances we cannot conclude that such
discussion was reversible error.
VII.
Finally, Defendant Smektala challenges the sufficiency of the evidence against him
on the conspiracy count. In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we
review the record de novo and ask whether the evidence–both direct and circumstantial,
together with the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom–viewed in a light most
favorable to the government, is such that a reasonable jury could find defendant guilty of
all elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Voss, 82 F.3d
1521, 1524-25 (10th Cir. 1996).
To obtain a conviction under the drug conspiracy statute, 18 U.S.C. § 846, the
government need not prove an overt act. United States v. Johnson, 42 F.3d 1312, 1319
(10th Cir. 1994). Instead, the government must prove that “the defendant knew at least
the essential objectives of the conspiracy and knowingly and voluntarily became a part of
11
it.” Id. As we recently stated in United States v. Johnston, F.3d , , 1998 WL
293323 at *2 (10th Cir. 1998):
The jury may infer an agreement constituting a conspiracy [under § 846] from
the acts of the parties and other circumstantial evidence indicating concert of
action for the accomplishment of a common purpose. Furthermore, the jury may
presume that a defendant is a knowing participant in the conspiracy when he acts
in furtherance of the objective of the conspiracy. The defendant’s participation in
or connection to the conspiracy need only be slight, so long as sufficient evidence
exists to establish the defendant’s participation beyond a reasonable doubt.
(internal citations and quotations omitted).
In this case, the most damaging evidence against Smektala was the fact that he
owned and drove the truck which was hauling a trailer containing more than 11,000
pounds of marijuana. Both Smektala and his passenger Kulik were Polish immigrants
from the Chicago area employed as truckers. In addition, Smektala indicated to an officer
at the scene of the accident that he had left Chicago around February 4 in route to Texas
to pick up a load of onions. Smektala’s log book, however, showed down time in south
Texas from February 2 at 6:15 a.m. until February 6 at 4:15 p.m., just one day before the
accident. From this evidence the jury could draw the reasonable inference that Smektala
was waiting in Texas for the marijuana.
The evidence further indicated that a man named Alex from Central States
Trucking, presumably Alex Smektala, picked up a load of onions in south Texas during
the early evening of February 5. Sun Eagle Transport owned both Smektala’s and Kulik’s
trailers. Employees of the repair shop in San Antonio at which Kulik left his truck and
12
trailer further testified that around 11:30 p.m. on February 6, Kulik and a man with a
beard were at a remote area near the west side of the shop moving the load from Kulik’s
trailer into another trailer which matched the description of the trailer on Smektala’s
truck. The trailers were back to back, door to door. The two men left for Chicago
together although the repairs to Kulik’s truck were to take no more than five hours.
Numerous witnesses at the scene of the accident described Smektala as having a beard.
We believe the jury could reasonably infer from this evidence, albeit much of it
circumstantial, that Smektala was part of a conspiracy along with Kulik to possess the
marijuana in his trailer with an intent to distribute it once he arrived in Chicago.
Admittedly, the evidence against Smektala was not as strong as that against Kulik, but
nevertheless sufficient to establish his participation in the conspiracy beyond a reasonable
doubt. Accordingly, the district court did not err in denying Smektala’s Fed. R. Crim. P.
29 motion for a judgment of acquittal.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgments of the district court are
AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court,
Bobby R. Baldock
Circuit Judge
13