James v. Ward

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
APR 21 2003
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TREVOR DUKE JAMES,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v. No. 02-6289
(D.C. No. CIV-02-733-M)
RON WARD, Director; STATE OF (W.D. Okla.)
OKLAHOMA,
Respondents - Appellees.
ORDER *
Before EBEL, HENRY and HARTZ, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner Trevor Duke James, appearing pro se, brings this petition for a
writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. James was convicted in
Oklahoma state court of unlawfully manufacturing a controlled drug, and was
sentenced to forty-nine years of imprisonment and a $150,000 fine. He raises five
*
After examining appellant’s brief and the appellate record, this panel has
determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the
determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2) and 10th Cir. R.
34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This
Order is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res
judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of
orders; nevertheless, an order may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th
Cir. R. 36.3.
issues on appeal: prosecutorial misconduct, improper admission of evidence
regarding other crimes, improper admission of the testimony of accomplices,
ineffective assistance of counsel, and denial of his right to a bifurcated trial. He
requests a certificate of appealability (COA) and permission to proceed in forma
pauperis (IFP). Both the magistrate judge and the district court judge found
James’s petition to be untimely. We agree that James’s petition is untimely. We
therefore DENY COA, and DENY James’s motion to proceed IFP.
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)
created a one-year period of limitation on the filing of a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to a state court judgment. 28
U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). Because James does not allege that a procedural impediment
to his petition was removed, that a new constitutional right was recognized by the
Supreme Court, or that a new factual predicate was discovered, the one-year
period of limitation in his case begins to run from the “date on which the [state
court] judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration
of the time for seeking such review.” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A). Under Tenth
Circuit precedent, we do not consider state court judgments final under the
provision for direct appeals until after the United States Supreme Court has
denied review, or, if no petition for certiorari is filed, until the 90 days in which
the petitioner could have filed his petition for certiorari has passed. Locke v.
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Saffle, 237 F.3d 1269, 1272 (10th Cir. 2001); see also Rhine v. Boone, 182 F.3d
1153, 1155 (10th Cir. 1999).
We additionally toll the one-year limitation period for the time in which a
properly filed application for state post-conviction or other collateral review is
pending in state courts. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2). We do not toll the limitations
period in the post-conviction, as opposed to direct appeal, process for appeals or
potential appeals to the United States Supreme Court. Rhine, 182 F.3d at 1156.
On February 16, 1999, James received his criminal sentence from the state
trial court. On February 4, 2000, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals
(OCCA) affirmed his conviction and sentence. James did not pursue further
direct appeal. Accounting for the 90 days in which James could have filed his
petition for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court on direct appeal, we agree with
the magistrate judge and district court that James’s state court judgment became
final on May 4, 2000.
On March 29, 2001, James filed his application for post-conviction relief in
the state courts. This tolled his limitations period thirty-six days before its
expiration. But the limitations period began to run again on February 15, 2002,
when the OCCA denied James’s application. He did not pursue further post-
conviction relief. James then had thirty-six days to file his petition for habeas
corpus relief in federal court after February 15, 2002.
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Those thirty-six days expired on March 23, 2002. James did not file the
instant petition for habeas corpus relief in federal court until May 31, 2002, two
months and eight days after the expiration of his limitations period.
Although James does not mention an argument for equitable tolling in his
brief on appeal, he does attach a copy of his objections to the Magistrate Judge’s
Report and Recommendation. Because James is a pro se petitioner, we will
consider the argument for equitable tolling contained there. See generally
Cummings v. Evans, 161 F.3d 610, 613 (10th Cir. 1998) (construing liberally the
form of pro-se filings).
Equitable tolling for habeas corpus relief may be available in extraordinary
circumstances such as when “a constitutional violation [will] result[] in the
conviction of one who is actually innocent or incompetent.” Miller v. Marr, 141
F.3d 976, 978 (10th Cir. 1998). James’s argument for equitable tolling is based
on limited access to typewriter ribbons and typing paper, and on insufficient
funds to hire a private attorney until January of 2001. (Objections to Report and
Rec. of the Mag. Judge at 1.) He provides no detail about how these resource
constraints may be related to his actual innocence or incompetence. Accordingly,
we find that James’s argument for equitable tolling does not rise to the level of
constitutional violation contemplated in Miller.
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In sum, for substantially the reasons stated by the magistrate judge and
district court, we agree that James’s petition for habeas corpus relief is untimely
and DISMISS his appeal. We DENY issuance of a COA, and DENY petitioner’s
motion to proceed in IFP.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
David M. Ebel
Circuit Judge
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