Kamplain v. Curry County Board of Commissioners

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
OCT 27 1998
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
GARY KAMPLAIN,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 97-2144
CURRY COUNTY BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS; FRANK H.
BLACKBURN; PAUL D. BARNES;
DARREL BOSTWICK; JOHNNY
CHAVEZ; and JOEL DAVID
SNIDER,
Defendants - Appellants,
and
MIKE JACKSON, Sheriff, and MATT
MURRAY, Chief Deputy,
Defendants.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
(D.C. No. CIV-96-1298-M)
Emily A. Franke (James P. Lyle with her on the briefs) of Butt, Thornton &
Baehr, P.C., Albuquerque, New Mexico, for Defendants-Appellants.
Kenneth C. Downes of Kenneth C. Downes & Associates, P.C., Albuquerque,
New Mexico, and Stephen G. French, Albuquerque, New Mexico (Christopher L.
Harlos of Kenneth C. Downes & Associates, P.C., Albuquerque, New Mexico,
with them on the brief), for Plaintiff-Appellee.
_________________________
Before PORFILIO, McKAY, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges.
McKAY, Circuit Judge.
This civil rights action arose from the actions taken by the Curry County
Board of Commissioners in August 1996. Plaintiff Mr. Gary Kamplain attended a
Curry County Commission public hearing on August 6, 1996, at which he
represented his employer, Tom Growney Equipment, Inc., in the awarding of bids.
Plaintiff was removed from the public hearing after he protested the Board’s
award of a bid to a competitor of his employer. At the regularly scheduled Board
meeting on August 20, 1996, the Board voted to ban Plaintiff from all future
Commission meetings. The Board notified Plaintiff and his employer of its action
by letter. After receiving a letter of complaint from Plaintiff’s attorney, the Curry
County Attorney sent a letter dated August 27, 1996, to Plaintiff’s attorney
informing Plaintiff that, while he could attend Commission meetings, he would
not be permitted to speak before or participate in discussions with the Board.
Plaintiff filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action for injunctive relief and
damages in which he alleged that his First Amendment right to free speech was
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violated. 1 Defendants, the Board and individual members of the Board, 2 filed a
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss on grounds of
absolute legislative immunity. Defendants appeal the district court’s denial of
their motion to dismiss. In addition, the district court retained jurisdiction
pending this appeal after certifying that the appeal was frivolous. See United
States v. Hines, 689 F.2d 934, 936-37 (10th Cir. 1983). Citing the district court’s
certification of Defendants’ appeal as frivolous, Plaintiff moves this court for
damages and costs pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.
We have jurisdiction to address whether Plaintiff’s claims are barred by
absolute legislative immunity because the district court’s denial of immunity
“turns on an issue of law,” and, therefore, it “is an appealable ‘final decision’
within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1291.” Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530
(1985). We review de novo the decision of the district court denying a motion to
dismiss based on absolute immunity. See id.; Gagan v. Norton, 35 F.3d 1473,
1475 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied sub nom. Ritz v. Gagan, 513 U.S. 1183(1995). Because the district court denied a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, we
Plaintiff also alleged violations of the New Mexico Tort Claims Act and
1
the New Mexico Open Meeting Act, pendent state claims which we do not address
here.
2
The individual members of the Board are Frank H. Blackburn, Paul D.
Barnes, Darrel Bostwick, Johnny Chavez, and Joel David Snider. Although the
sheriff and the deputy sheriff who removed Plaintiff from the meeting were also
sued, they do not appeal the immunity issue before us.
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confine our review to the allegations set forth in the complaint, accept all well-
pleaded allegations in the complaint as true, and draw all reasonable inferences in
Plaintiff’s favor. See Gagan, 35 F.3d at 1475.
The concept of legislative immunity is well established in this circuit, see,
e.g., Fry v. Board of County Comm’rs, 7 F.3d 936, 942 (10th Cir. 1993), and the
Supreme Court recently confirmed that, like their federal, state, and regional
counterparts, “[l]ocal legislators are entitled to absolute immunity from § 1983
liability for their legislative activities.” Bogan v. Scott-Harris, U.S. , 118
S. Ct. 966, 972 (1998); see also U.S. Const. art. 1, § 6 (Speech or Debate Clause);
Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 440 U.S. 391, 404-
05 (1979) (extending immunity rule to regional legislators); Tenney v. Brandhove,
341 U.S. 367, 378-79 (1951) (holding that state legislators were absolutely
privileged in their legislative acts). The Supreme Court, however, “has been
careful not to extend the scope of [legislative immunity] protection further than
its purposes require,” Forrester v. White, 484 U.S. 219, 224 (1988), and the
government official seeking immunity bears the burden of showing that an
exemption from personal liability is justified. See id. Legislative immunity thus
extends to legislators only when they are acting “in the sphere of legitimate
legislative activity.” Tenney, 341 U.S. at 376.
In order to determine whether Defendants should be cloaked in legislative
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immunity, we look to the function that the Board members were performing when
the actions at issue took place, see Forrester, 484 U.S. at 224, and we examine the
nature of those actions. See Bogan, 118 S. Ct. at 973 (“Whether an act is
legislative turns on the nature of the act, rather than on the motive or intent of the
official performing it.”); see also Cinevision Corp. v. City of Burbank, 745 F.2d
560, 579 (9th Cir. 1984) (“The critical concern in our inquiry [is] the nature of
the action on which the vote was taken.”), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1054 (1985).
“‘The essentials of the legislative function are the determination of the legislative
policy and its formulation and promulgation as a defined and binding rule of
conduct.’” Cinevision, 745 F.2d at 580 (quoting Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S.
414, 424 (1944) (holding that Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 did not
unconstitutionally delegate the legislative power of Congress)); see also Prentis v.
Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210, 226 (1908) (“Legislation . . . looks to the
future and changes existing conditions by making a new rule, to be applied
thereafter to all or some part of those subject to its power.”). Further, legislative
actions must be done “‘in relation to the business before’” the legislative body.
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 502 (1969) (quoting Kilbourn v. Thompson,
103 U.S. 168, 204 (1881)); see also Fry, 7 F.3d at 942 (upholding district court
finding that “‘the legislative process was at work’” in the challenged action).
Thus, the Supreme Court has instructed us, in admittedly differing contexts, that,
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at its core, the legislative function involves determining, formulating, and making
policy.
We are not persuaded by the approach taken by some of our sister circuits
in determining legislative capacity or function. These courts rest their analysis on
the number of persons affected by a legislative body’s decision. See Ryan v.
Burlington County, N.J., 889 F.2d 1286, 1291 (3d Cir. 1989) ( “Where the
decision affects a small number or a single individual, the legislative power is not
implicated, and the act takes on the nature of administration.”); Haskell v.
Washington Township, 864 F.2d 1266, 1278 (6th Cir. 1988) (noting, in the
context of a zoning action, that if “‘the action single[s] out specifiable individuals
and affect[s] them differently from others, it is administrative’” (citations
omitted)). But see Acierno v. Cloutier, 40 F.3d 597, 610 (3d Cir. 1994) (stating
that numbers inquiry in Ryan is not conclusive test for determining what is
legislative or administrative). Other courts have limited immunity to functions
involving legislative speech and debate, voting, preparing committee reports,
conducting committee hearings, and other “integral steps in the legislative
process.” Bogan, 118 S. Ct. at 973; see, e.g., Hansen v. Bennett, 948 F.2d 397,
402 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 504 U.S. 910 (1992).
Not all actions taken at a legislative meeting by a local legislator are
legislative for purposes of immunity. See Roberson v. Mullins, 29 F.3d 132, 134
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(4th Cir. 1994); accord Brown v. Griesenauer, 970 F.2d 431, 437 (8th Cir. 1992)
(holding that impeachment proceedings are essentially judicial or adjudicatory in
nature despite legislative decision-making body and form of proceedings);
Hansen, 948 F.2d at 402-03 (holding that mayor was not acting in a legislative
capacity when he restored order and regulated discussions at a public meeting);
Cinevision, 745 F.2d at 580 (holding that city councilperson’s vote to disapprove
plaintiff’s proposed concerts at city amphitheater was an executive, not a
legislative act); Detz v. Hoover, 539 F. Supp. 532, 534 (E.D. Pa. 1982) (holding
that a municipality’s employment decisions are “essentially administrative in
nature” (emphasis omitted)). Nor does voting on an issue, in and of itself,
determine that the act is legislative in nature. See Smith v. Lomax, 45 F.3d 402,
406 (11th Cir. 1995); Roberson, 29 F.3d at 134 n.3; Cinevision, 745 F.2d at 580.
“Whether actions . . . are, in law and fact, an exercise of legislative power
depends not on their form but upon ‘whether they contain matter which is
properly to be regarded as legislative in its character and effect.’” INS v. Chada,
462 U.S. 919, 952 (1983) (citation omitted); accord Roberson, 29 F.3d at 135;
Chicago Miracle Temple Church, Inc. v. Fox, 901 F. Supp. 1333, 1343-44 (N.D.
Ill. 1995).
At issue here is not the Board’s ejection of Plaintiff from the public
meeting but its vote to ban Plaintiff from all future Commission meetings and its
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subsequent decision to prohibit Plaintiff from participating in or speaking before
the Board at Curry County Commission meetings. 3 After considering the function
and character of the Board’s actions, we conclude that its ban of Plaintiff from
attending Commission meetings and its subsequent decision to prohibit Plaintiff
from speaking at or participating in meetings were administrative acts. Because
the circumstances of this case did not concern the enactment or promulgation of
public policy, we cannot say that the bans were related to any legislation or
legislative function. The Board’s decisions to ban Plaintiff were simply efforts to
monitor and discipline his presence and conduct at future Commission meetings.
In voting to censure Plaintiff and prevent him from disrupting future public
meetings, 4 the Board members were not voting on, speaking on, or investigating a
3
It is unclear from the record whether the Board’s decision to allow
Plaintiff to attend the Commission meetings while prohibiting his participation or
speech at those meetings was the result of a separate Board meeting and vote.
The record also does not indicate whether the Board conducted any legislative
business at the meeting in which it decided to ban Plaintiff’s attendance. Even if
the meeting or meetings were partially legislative in nature, that fact alone does
not determine whether the decisions to ban Plaintiff from attending, participating,
and speaking at Commission meetings were legislative in nature. See Forrester,
484 U.S. at 223-24; see also Hansen, 948 F.2d at 402 n.12, 404 (relying on fact
that city council meeting included mixture of legislative, executive, and
administrative functions to determine that mayor was not entitled to legislative
immunity).
4
We point out that our inquiry into the nature of the acts at issue in this
case, and the function of the Board members in committing those acts, does not
conflict with the long-held principle that a legislator’s or legislature’s motive is
not a proper consideration for legislative immunity. See United States v.
(continued...)
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legislative issue. See Hansen, 948 F.2d at 403. Even though the Board may have
acted during a “regularly scheduled meeting,” we hold that the Board did not
commit these acts in a legislative capacity; the acts were of an administrative
nature.
Further, even if we accept Defendants’ claim that the Board acted in
relation to the business of awarding bids, 5 we believe that the function of
awarding of bids is essentially an administrative or executive function. Awarding
bids and purchasing county property are actions whereby the Board applies known
rules and legislation to make an administrative business decision. Accord
Cinevision, 745 F.2d at 580 (holding that city councilperson’s voting on proposed
concerts constituted administration of its contract with Cinevision); Fox, 901 F.
Supp. at 1343-44 (holding that village board vote to authorize purchase offer for
property was not legislative act because it was not an enactment or promulgation
of public policy); Lacorte v. Hudacs, 884 F. Supp. 64, 70-71 (N.D.N.Y. 1995)
4
(...continued)
Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 526 (1972); Tenney, 341 U.S. at 378; accord Fry, 7 F.3d
at 942. Moreover, we do not express an opinion on whether the Board’s actions
to prevent or curtail Plaintiff’s actions or speech during a public Commission
meeting are constitutionally valid.
5
We doubt that the Board’s actions were more than incidentally related to
legislative business, see Hansen, 948 F.2d at 403, and we emphasize that
legislative immunity “does not prohibit inquiry into activities that are casually or
incidentally related to legislative affairs but not a part of the legislative process
itself.” Brewster, 408 U.S. at 528.
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(concluding that adoption of resolution denying contract to alleged low-bidders
was more properly characterized as an administrative act); Three Rivers
Cablevision, Inc. v. City of Pittsburgh, 502 F. Supp. 1118, 1136 (W.D. Pa. 1980)
(holding that city council vote to award competitively bid contract “was clearly an
administrative act”); cf. Rateree v. Rocket, 852 F.2d 946, 951 (7th Cir. 1988)
(holding that vote on city budget constituted act in commissioners’ legislative
capacity).
Thus, because Defendants were acting in an administrative capacity when
they banned Plaintiff’s attendance, participation, and speech at Commission
meetings, they are not entitled to absolute legislative immunity. “[W]e cannot see
how [Defendants’] independence as . . . legislator[s]–[their] ability to vote and
speak freely on legislative matters–is implicated” by the decision to ban an
individual from participating and speaking in a Curry County Commission public
meeting. Hansen, 948 F.2d at 404. For these reasons, we affirm the district
court’s denial of the motion to dismiss. 6
AFFIRMED.
6
We also deny Plaintiff’s motion for costs and damages pursuant to Federal
Rule of Appellate Procedure 38. An appeal is not frivolous where the issue of
absolute legislative immunity, together with the particular facts and context of the
case, has not been previously analyzed by this court. Defendants have not
appealed the district court’s frivolousness certification and retention of
jurisdiction.
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