Rodriguez v. Roberts

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
April 9, 2010
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
RAMON RODRIGUEZ,
Petitioner-Appellant, No. 10-3015
v. (D. of Kan.)
RAY ROBERTS, STEPHEN N. SIX, (D.C. No. 5:09-CV-3034-RDR)
Attorney General of the State of
Kansas,
Respondents-Appellees.
ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY *
Before HARTZ, ANDERSON, and TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges. **
Ramon Rodriguez, a Kansas state prisoner proceeding pro se, 1 seeks to
challenge the federal district court’s denial of his habeas petition. Rodriguez
*
This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of
the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
**
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge
panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material
assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th
Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
1
We construe Rodriguez’s “pro se pleadings and other papers liberally, but
we do not assume the role of advocate, and his pro se status does not relieve him
of his obligation . . . to comply with the fundamental requirements of the Federal
Rules of Civil and Appellate Procedure.” Merryfield v. Jordan, 584 F.3d 923,
924 n.1 (10th Cir. 2009) (internal punctuation omitted).
contends numerous errors during his state court trial and appeal require
overturning his conviction. We exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 and
2253. Because we conclude Rodriguez fails to demonstrate that reasonable jurists
would find the district court’s assessment of his constitutional claims debatable or
wrong, see Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000), we DENY a certificate
of appealability (COA) and DISMISS the petition.
I. Background
In 1997, Kansas state prosecutors charged Rodriguez with rape, aggravated
criminal sodomy, and criminal restraint. The government presented evidence at
trial that the victim, J.S., fell asleep at an acquaintance’s house after drinking at a
nearby nightclub. J.S. testified she fell asleep fully clothed but awoke naked
below the waist with Rodriguez on top of her. J.S. claimed Rodriguez threatened
her, then sexually assaulted her. J.S. emerged from the bedroom extremely
agitated and accused Rodriguez of raping her, according to J.S. and two other
witnesses who testified at trial. J.S. left the house and drove to a gas station
where she called the police. Officers recorded J.S.’s statement regarding what
had occurred and performed a rape kit procedure, although no physical evidence
implicating Rodriguez was found. A jury convicted Rodriguez on all but one
count. He was sentenced to 300 months’ imprisonment.
Rodriguez began his post-conviction litigation with a direct appeal in state
court. The Kansas Court of Appeals overturned the criminal restraint conviction
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because it held the conviction should have been subsumed in the rape offense.
The court rejected Rodriguez’s remaining claims, and the Kansas Supreme Court
denied review.
Rodriguez then filed a habeas petition in state court alleging discrimination
during jury selection, prosecutorial misconduct, insufficiency of the evidence, and
ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel, among other claims. The
state district court denied Rodriguez’s habeas petition, the state appeals court
affirmed, and the state supreme court denied review.
Rodriguez filed a federal habeas petition on grounds similar to those in his
state petition. Like the state court, the federal district court denied his petition.
Rodriguez subsequently filed this appeal.
II. Discussion
Rodriguez’s habeas petition alleges five sets of errors: (1) unconstitutional
jury selection, (2) improper admission of certain evidence, (3) insufficient
evidence to sustain his conviction, (4) ineffective assistance of trial and appellate
counsel, and (5) prosecutorial misconduct. To obtain a COA, he must show the
state court’s rulings were “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application
of, clearly established Federal law,” or were “based on an unreasonable
determination of the facts . . . .” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). We may only grant a COA
if reasonable jurists would find the district court’s merits and procedural rulings
debatable or wrong. See Slack, 529 U.S. at 484.
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A. Jury Selection
Liberally construed, Rodriguez’s appeal challenges the denial of two claims
related to jury selection. First, he argues the state trial court’s refusal to strike
two jurors during voir dire violated his right to a fair trial. Second, he claims
prosecutors discriminated on the basis of sex when they exercised their
peremptory challenges. We hold the district court’s judgment of Rodriguez’s
jury-related claims is correct and beyond reasonable debate.
Rodriguez’s first jury selection claim centers on two jurors. Rodriguez
argues the district court should have disqualified one juror because he was
preoccupied with business dealings that occurred during trial and, initially, he did
not understand the government’s burden of proof. Similarly, Rodriguez
complains that a second juror also misunderstood the appropriate burden of proof.
The Sixth Amendment provides that “a defendant has the right to be tried
by an impartial jury. Included in that right is the right to a jury capable and
willing to decide the case solely on the evidence before it.” United States v.
Brooks, 569 F.3d 1284, 1288 (10th Cir. 2009) (internal citation and punctuation
omitted). The Supreme Court has cautioned, however, that courts have “come a
long way from the time when all trial error was presumed prejudicial and
reviewing courts were considered ‘citadels of technicality.’” McDonough Power
Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 553 (1984). Indeed, Congress codified
harmless error review more than 60 years ago. See 28 U.S.C. § 2111.
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It is beyond reasonable debate that regardless of Rodriguez’s concerns
about jury selection, the jurors did not jeopardize his right to a fair trial. During
voir dire, both jurors expressed some confusion about the burden of proof.
Nonetheless, the jurors were properly instructed regarding the burden of proof.
See Instruction No. 6 (“The State has the burden to prove the defendant is guilty.
The defendant is not required to prove he is not guilty.”). “We presume jurors
will conscientiously follow the trial court’s instructions,” United States v.
Cardinas Garcia, 596 F.3d 788, 798 (10th Cir. 2010) (internal punctuation
omitted), and Rodriguez gives us no reason to depart from that presumption here.
Rodriguez’s contention that outside business preoccupied a juror during
trial has minimal support in the record. The juror admitted he had business
obligations during the trial week, but did not ask to be excused. To the contrary,
under direct questioning from Rodriguez’s counsel, the juror intimated he would
be able to put his business dealings out of his mind during trial. Nor does
Rodriguez explain how the juror’s business prejudiced his right to a fair trial.
Rodriguez’s second jury selection claim involves the government’s use of
peremptory challenges. Rodriguez argues the government committed sex
discrimination when it used its peremptory challenges disproportionately to strike
male veniremen. 2
2
In passing, Rodriguez’s habeas appeal attempts to state a racial
discrimination claim, as well. This argument was not made in his habeas
(continued...)
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The Equal Protection Clause prohibits “[p]urposeful racial discrimination in
selection of the venire . . . .” Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 86 (1986). The
Supreme Court later extended equal protection to prohibit peremptory challenges
based on sex. See J.E.B. v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 130–31 (1994). Batson
challenges based on race or sex are analyzed using a three-step, burden-shifting
process. First, the defendant must show “the totality of the relevant facts gives
rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.” United States v. Barrett, 496
F.3d 1079, 1104 (10th Cir. 2007). If the defendant is successful, the government
must provide gender-neutral reasons for its peremptory strikes. See id. “Finally,
if the government tenders a []neutral explanation, the trial court must then
decide . . . whether the opponent of the strike has proved purposeful []
discrimination.” Id. (internal punctuation omitted).
The district court’s denial of Rodriguez’s Batson challenges is correct and
beyond reasonable debate. The government presented gender-neutral
explanations for its peremptory strikes, including intelligence, demeanor,
aggressiveness, and age. Rodriguez disputed the legitimacy of the government’s
reasons, but the trial judge credited the government. “The district court’s answer
to the ultimate question of discriminatory intent represents a finding of fact of the
sort accorded great deference on appeal, because such a finding largely turns on
2
(...continued)
petition—nor in his direct appeal—and therefore we decline to address it. See
Cummings v. Norton, 393 F.3d 1186, 1190–91 (10th Cir. 2005).
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the trial court’s evaluation of the prosecutor’s credibility.” United States v.
Nelson, 450 F.3d 1201, 1207 (10th Cir. 2006) (internal punctuation omitted). On
appeal, Rodriguez only makes conclusory allegations concerning the
government’s motives. The voir dire record gives us no additional reasons to
overturn the trial court’s considered judgment.
B. Admission of Evidence
Rodriguez also alleges the state trial court committed numerous evidentiary
errors. Liberally construed, Rodriguez contends the victim’s out-of-court
statements were improper hearsay, an officer’s testimony about bedroom lighting
was based on improper hearsay, the victim impact statement was unfairly
prejudicial, evidence related to the restraint charge should have been barred as it
related to the other charges, and the trial court admitted cumulative evidence.
Ordinarily, state courts’ evidentiary rulings cannot be challenged in a
federal habeas petition because they do not involve “clearly established Federal
law.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see also Smallwood v. Gibson, 191 F.3d 1257,
1275 (10th Cir. 1999) (“Federal habeas review is not available to correct state law
evidentiary errors; rather it is limited to violations of constitutional rights.”). In
extreme cases, however, if “evidence is introduced that is so unduly prejudicial
that it renders the trial fundamentally unfair, the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment provides a mechanism for relief.” Payne v. Tennessee,
501 U.S. 808, 825 (1991).
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The federal district court concluded that the state trial court’s evidentiary
rulings did not violate Rodriguez’s due process rights. The district court’s ruling
is correct and beyond reasonable debate. The victim testified extensively at trial,
and her testimony related to the allegedly improper out-of-court statements, the
lighting and other conditions in the bedroom, and how the rape disturbed her.
Although we do not pass on the state law evidentiary ruling, we are confident
given the victim’s testimony that even if the trial court had erred in admitting
certain evidence, the errors did not render the trial unconstitutionally unfair.
Similarly, even assuming the government’s evidence was cumulative, Rodriguez
does not explain how its admission was so egregious as to violate his due process
rights.
Finally, the Kansas Court of Appeals’ ruling that the restraint charge was
duplicative does not require that Rodriguez be given a new trial. The state court
merely held that the restraint was part of the rape. Thus, the restraint evidence
was evidence of the rape, and the state court’s ruling did not require a new trial.
C. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Rodriguez claims there was insufficient evidence to support a verdict of
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Rodriguez’s primary argument seems to be that
there was no physical evidence linking him to the crime. “When reviewing the
sufficiency of the evidence on a habeas corpus petition, the relevant question is
‘whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
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prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Turrentine v. Mullin, 390 F.3d 1181, 1197
(10th Cir. 2004) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)).
Circumstantial evidence alone may support a criminal conviction. See Desert
Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 100 (2003) (“[W]e have never questioned the
sufficiency of circumstantial evidence in support of a criminal conviction, even
though proof beyond a reasonable doubt is required.”).
The district court held there was sufficient evidence to support Rodriguez’s
conviction. We agree, and the district court’s ruling is beyond reasonable debate.
The victim testified extensively at trial, and other witnesses corroborated parts of
her testimony. She reported the crime almost immediately to police, and her
description of events at that time was largely consistent with her testimony. In
short, there was sufficient evidence to convict Rodriguez.
D. Effective Assistance of Counsel
Rodriguez argues that both his trial and appellate counsel were
unconstitutionally ineffective. Among other claims, Rodriguez contends his trial
counsel should have impeached the victim by introducing various tax information,
ordered DNA tests of hair at the crime scene, provided an English-Spanish
interpreter, and advised Rodriguez to testify. Rodriguez contends his appellate
counsel should have argued the voir dire issues relating to the two jurors
discussed above.
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The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants “Assistance of
Counsel” that is “effective.” See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 685–86
(1984). To show counsel was ineffective in violation of the Sixth Amendment, a
criminal defendant must demonstrate both that “counsel’s performance was
deficient” and “the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” Id. at 687.
Elaborating on the prejudice requirement, the Supreme Court explained the
“defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”
Id. at 694.
The district court held Rodriguez’s trial and appellate counsel were not
unconstitutionally ineffective. The district court’s ruling is correct and beyond
reasonable debate. Rodriguez alleges his trial counsel committed numerous
errors, but he does not provide any reason to suspect he would have been
acquitted had any of the alleged errors—individually or collectively—not been
committed. Mere speculation about a different outcome cannot satisfy
Strickland’s prejudice requirement. See United States v. Boone, 62 F.3d 323, 327
(10th Cir. 1995) (holding “speculation, not a reasonable probability that the
outcome would have been different[,] . . . cannot establish prejudice”). In Part
II.A. of this Order, we addressed the jury voir dire. Because we held voir dire did
not jeopardize Rodriguez’s right to a fair trial, appellate counsel’s failure to argue
the issue did not prejudice Rodriguez’s defense.
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E. Prosecutorial Misconduct
Finally, Rodriguez alleges numerous instances of prosecutorial misconduct.
Some of Rodriguez’s allegations, such as one concerning peremptory strikes, are
restatements of his other habeas claims. Others, such as Rodriguez’s allegation
that the prosecutor fabricated evidence, are speculation. The remaining
allegations concern statements the government made during its opening and
closing arguments. Rodriguez essentially conceded that he did not raise
prosecutorial misconduct claims on direct appeal, and therefore the state court
held the claims were waived. A state procedural bar will be upheld unless “cause
and prejudice” excuses the bar or refusing to consider the defaulted claims
“result[s] in a fundamental miscarriage of justice.” Neill v. Gibson, 278 F.3d
1044, 1057 (10th Cir. 2001).
The district court held the state procedural bar was valid. The district
court’s decision is correct and beyond reasonable debate. Liberally construed, the
only cause for the procedural default Rodriguez alleges is the ineffective
assistance of his counsel. However, assuming arguendo that his counsel
performed deficiently, Rodriguez has not demonstrated “there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
Rodriguez is left with the argument that enforcing the default would work a
fundamental miscarriage of justice. That argument fails because nothing in
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Rodriguez’s petition or brief lead us to believe, more likely than not, he is
actually innocent. See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 748 (1991)
(describing a fundamental miscarriage of justice as when “a constitutional
violation has probably resulted in the conviction of one who is actually
innocent”).
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we DENY a certificate of appealability (COA)
and DISMISS the petition.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Timothy M. Tymkovich
Circuit Judge
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