Russell v. United States Parole Commission

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
JUL 18 2001
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
DONALD R. RUSSELL,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v.
No. 01-1002
UNITED STATES PAROLE
(D.C. No. 99-Z-1625)
COMMISSION; WARDEN, USP
(D. Colo.)
FLORENCE; FEDERAL BUREAU OF
PRISONS; UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondents - Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before EBEL, KELLY and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
Donald Russell, a United States citizen, pleaded guilty to several crimes in
a Canadian court and was sentenced to serve fifteen years. (Doc. 19, exh. A
(sealed), at 2-3.) Canada and the United States are parties to a treaty that allows
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This Order and Judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and
judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and
conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
certain consenting prisoners to serve their sentences in their countries of
citizenship. As required by 18 U.S.C. § 4108, a magistrate met with Russell
before the transfer to ensure his consent was knowing and voluntary. (Doc. 2, at
5.)
Upon Russell’s arrival in this country, the United States Parole Commission
was required to determine “a release date and a period and conditions of
supervised release . . . as though the offender were convicted in a United States
district court of a similar offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 4106A(b)(1)(A). We have
previously ruled that the “release date” referred to in this section is in reality a
“sentence” analogous to those imposed by the district courts on domestic
offenders. Bennett v. United States Parole Comm’n, 83 F.3d 324, 327 (10th Cir.
1996). The combined periods of imprisonment and supervised release could not
exceed Russell’s Canadian sentence of fifteen years. See id. § 4106A(b)(1)(C).
In accordance with these statutory requirements, the Commission imposed a
“sentence” of the full fifteen years. (Doc. 19, exh. G (red tab A).) Recognizing
that Russell would be released before the end of this term because of good-time
credits, the Commission also imposed a term of supervised release until the end of
the full fifteen years. (Id.) Although Russell had a right to appeal the
Commission’s determination to this court within forty-five days after receiving
notice of it, see 18 U.S.C. § 4106A(2)(A), he did not do so.
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Russell brought this petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241, alleging that (1) the transfer was invalid because he did not voluntarily
consent to it and (2) the Commission improperly imposed a term of supervised
release. (Doc. 2.) The district court adopted a magistrate judge’s
recommendation that the voluntariness claim be dismissed on the merits and the
supervised-release claim be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. (Docs. 31, 32.)
Russell appeals the disposition of both issues.
The district court had jurisdiction over Russell’s challenge to the validity of
the transfer under 18 U.S.C. § 3244(5). As we discuss below, it did not have
jurisdiction over his supervised-release claim. We have appellate jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291 & 2253. We review the district court’s decision de
novo. U.S. West, Inc. v. Tristani, 182 F.3d 1202, 1206 (10th Cir. 1999) (lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction); Sutton v. Utah State Sch. for the Deaf & Blind, 173
F.3d 1226, 1236 (10th Cir. 1999) (failure to state a claim).
Russell did not file timely objections to the magistrate judge’s
recommendations. Ordinarily, this failure to object would amount to a waiver of
Russell’s arguments. See Moore v. United States, 950 F.2d 656, 659 (10th Cir.
1991). Russell states, however, that he did not receive the magistrate judge’s
recommendations and therefore did not have notice of the need to file objections.
(Doc. 33.) If this is true, Russell’s failure to object would not amount to a
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waiver. Cf. Moore, 950 F.2d at 659 (declining “to apply the waiver rule to a pro
se litigant’s failure to object when the magistrate’s order does not apprise the pro
se litigant of the consequences of a failure to object to findings and
recommendations”). Because, as we discuss below, one of Russell’s claims may
have merit, we remand this case to the district court to determine whether Russell
had notice of the objection requirement. We affirm the dismissal of Russell’s
other claim.
A. Voluntariness of Consent to Transfer
Russell asserts that he was misinformed about the federal parole system by
the magistrate at the time he consented to the transfer. Although he admits he
was properly informed, as provided by 18 U.S.C. § 4108(b)(2), that “the sentence
shall be carried out according to the laws of the United States and that those laws
are subject to change” (Doc. 2, at 5), he asserts he was also told that the “usual
requirement” is that an offender is released on parole after serving one-third of
the total sentence imposed and at most he would serve two-thirds of the sentence
before being released. (Doc. 25, at 5.) While this may have been a correct
representation of federal law before 1987, it was incorrect at the time it was made
in 1990 with respect to Russell’s offense, which was committed in 1989. See 18
U.S.C. §§ 4205-4206 (repealed effective Nov. 1, 1987).
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Russell’s challenge to the voluntariness of his consent to the transfer is
analyzed under the standards that apply to defendants challenging the
voluntariness of their guilty pleas. See Rosado v. Civiletti, 621 F.2d 1179, 1190
(2d Cir. 1980). The magistrate judge in this case cited Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S.
52, 56 (1985), for the proposition that “[e]ven though Mr. Russell may not have
understood the details concerning when he might be eligible for parole, how his
good time credits might be applied, and how long he might be on supervised
release, this lack of understanding does not render his consent to transfer invalid.”
(Doc. 31, at 4.) In other words, the magistrate judge appeared to hold that a
defendant’s misunderstanding of the parole system could never render his consent
involuntary.
This is an incorrect reading of Hill. There is dictum in Hill suggesting that
the courts and other state officials are not required to inform a defendant of his
parole eligibility. See 474 U.S. at 56 (“We have never held that the United States
Constitution requires the State to furnish a defendant with information about
parole eligibility in order for the defendant’s plea of guilty to be voluntary
. . . .”). That does not mean, however, that these state officials may give the
defendant erroneous information without calling the voluntariness of his consent
into question. As a number of federal appellate courts have recognized, “[W]here
parole eligibility information is provided to a defendant by the state or the
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defendant’s attorney and that information is grossly erroneous, a defendant may
be entitled to habeas relief where he can show that he would not have pleaded
guilty had accurate information been provided.” Meyers v. Gillis, 93 F.3d 1147(3d Cir. 1996) (collecting cases); see also, e.g., Holmes v. United States, 876 F.2d
1545, 1549 n.5 (11th Cir. 1989) (“[I]f a trial court provides the defendant
information regarding parole eligibility that is materially incorrect, the defendant
may be entitled to withdraw his plea on voluntariness grounds . . . .”); Czere v.
Butler, 833 F.2d 59, 63 n.6 (5th Cir. 1987) (same). It is at least possible that
Russell’s consent to the transfer was rendered involuntary by the misinformation
he received from the magistrate.
It is less clear that Russell has alleged he was prejudiced by this
misinformation – that he would not have consented to the transfer had he not
received the misinformation. At the very least, however, it is appropriate to give
him a chance to amend his petition to cure this defect. See Perkins v. Kan. Dep’t
of Corrections, 165 F.3d 803, 806 (10th Cir. 1999) (“Dismissal of a pro se
complaint for failure to state a claim is proper only where it is obvious that the
plaintiff cannot prevail on the facts he has alleged and it would be futile to give
him an opportunity to amend.”).
If on remand the district court determines that Russell has not waived his
objections, the court should then consider (1) whether he received such grossly
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erroneous misinformation from the magistrate that his consent to transfer was
involuntary, and (2) whether he was prejudiced by this misinformation.
B. Supervised Release
Russell challenges the Parole Commission’s imposition of a term of
supervised release on the grounds that it has the practical effect of depriving him
of his earned good-time credits. We have previously held that such a claim is not
cognizable under § 2241 because it attacks the imposition of the sentence, not its
execution. See Bennett v. United States Parole Comm’n, 83 F.3d 324, 327-28
(10th Cir. 1996). The district court properly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction
over this claim. We affirm for substantially the reasons stated by the magistrate
judge and the district court.
C. Permission to File an Out-of-Time Appeal
Russell also seeks to file an out-of-time appeal of the Parole Commission’s
original determination. (Doc. 37.) His notice of appeal should have been taken
within forty-five days of his receipt of notice of the Commission’s determination.
See 18 U.S.C. § 4106A(b)(2)(A). The timely filing of a notice of appeal is
mandatory and jurisdictional. United States v. Robbins, 179 F.3d 1268, 1269
(10th Cir. 1999). Even accepting Russell’s assertion that he did not receive such
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notice until September 2, 1995 (Doc. 2, at 4 n.3), his notice of appeal was due
more than five and a half years ago. Russell’s only explanation for the delay is
that he was not told at that time about the possibility of a direct appeal or the time
limits. That contention is belied by the record, which shows that Russell was
told, “You have the right to appeal the Commission’s determination to the United
States Court of Appeals that has jurisdiction over your place of confinement
within 45 days of when you receive notice of the determination.” (Doc. 19, Exh.
E-2, at 2; see also id. Exh. E, at 1; id. Exh. F, at 2.) We deny the petition.
D. Conclusion
We AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of Russell’s challenge to his term
of supervised release and DENY Russell’s petition to file a late notice of appeal.
We REVERSE the district court’s dismissal of his challenge to the transfer and
REMAND for the court to determine whether he waived the issue by failing to
file objections to the magistrate judge’s recommendations.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
David M. Ebel
Circuit Judge
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