Bloom v. Social Security Administration

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
JUL 3 2003
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
STEVEN KENT BLOOM,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 02-3362
(D.C. No. 01-CV-3382-GTV)
SOCIAL SECURITY (D. Kan.)
ADMINISTRATION,
Defendant-Appellee.
STEVEN KENT BLOOM,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 02-3431
(D.C. No. 02-CV-3224-GTV)
MARY KOCH, Forensic Scientist, (D. Kan.)
KS B.I.; ELLEN HAWKS, Sgt.,
Records Clerk at Shawnee County
DOC; KENDA FALLEY, Court
Reporter, Shawnee County; KEVIN
MILLER, Sgt., Topeka Police
Department; CITY OF TOPEKA,
KANSAS; SHAWNEE COUNTY,
KANSAS; KANSAS BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION; KEVIN COOK;
F.G. MANZANARES;
DR. F.N. PETERSON, MD, Doctor of
Psychiatry,
Defendants-Appellees.
STEVEN KENT BLOOM,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 02-3439
(D.C. No. 02-CV-3058-GTV)
DISCIPLINARY ADMINISTRATOR, (D. Kan.)
of the State of Kansas; STATE OF
KANSAS; FRANK D. DIEHL, Deputy
Disciplinary Administrator; PAMELA
J. MCKIMENS, Assistant Regional
Counsel; PAULA WERTS, Service
Representative; SOCIAL SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION; ROBIN B.
MOORE, Assistant United States
Attorney,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before SEYMOUR , HENRY , and BRISCOE , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
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these appeals. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cases are
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
With some variation, these appeals stem from the suspension by the
Department of Social Security Administration (SSA) of plaintiff Steven Kent
Bloom’s Title II benefits based on an erroneous report that Mr. Bloom had been
convicted of a felony. We will address each appeal separately, noting the relevant
facts.
Case No. 02-3362
Mr. Bloom, a prisoner in the custody of the State of Kansas, filed a pro se
complaint under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), and the Privacy Act,
5 U.S.C. §§ 552 and 552a, attempting to procure information relating to the
temporary discontinuance of his Title II benefits. The SSA moved to dismiss,
arguing that the case was moot because SSA had already turned over all requested
documents to Mr. Bloom. The district court agreed and dismissed the case as
moot. The court further denied Mr. Bloom’s motion for sanctions against
opposing counsel and his motion for attorney fees and costs. 1
1
In granting SSA’s motion to dismiss the case as moot, the district court
noted that the documents released by SSA appeared to support Mr. Bloom’s
contention that erroneous information had indeed been submitted to the agency.
While Mr. Bloom had been charged with felony counts, he had entered guilty
pleas to two misdemeanor battery counts. The SSA acknowledged the error and
(continued...)
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On appeal, Mr. Bloom argues that the district court misconstrued the
evidence, erred in dismissing the case as moot and in denying the motion for fees
and costs, and abused its discretion in denying his motions for sanctions and
discovery. Mr. Bloom further claims that the court attempted to “buy off” his
complaint and displayed bias against him through its “order.” He also charges
that the Kansas Department of Corrections has violated his right to free speech.
We review a dismissal under Fed. Civ. P. Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction de novo. U.S. West, Inc. v. Tristani , 182 F.3d 1202, 1206
(10th Cir. 1999). After reviewing the record, the parties’ submissions and the
relevant law, we affirm for substantially the reasons stated by the district court.
After SSA released the documents to Mr. Bloom, there existed no “case or
controversy” sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the federal court.
See Iron Arrow Honor Soc’y v. Heckler , 464 U.S. 67, 70 (1983).
As for the matters committed to the discretion of the district court, we find
no abuse of that discretion. There are no grounds upon which Mr. Bloom could
be awarded fees and costs. There is nothing in the record to suggest bias on the
part of the district court, and we specifically note that handing down an adverse
judgment does not demonstrate bias against the losing party. Willner v. Univ. of
1
(...continued)
remitted the underpayment to Mr. Bloom.
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Kan. , 848 F.2d 1023, 1028 (10th Cir. 1988). Mr. Bloom’s claim that the district
court attempted to “buy off” his complaint is totally unsubstantiated and
conclusory. Claims against the Kansas Department of Corrections are not within
the ambit of this lawsuit because Mr. Bloom’s complaint names only the SSA as a
defendant.
Case No. 02-3431
In this case, Mr. Bloom filed a complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983and 1985(3) against various state and county officials alleging constitutional
infirmities and conspiracy in connection with his criminal conviction and
resulting sentence in a Kansas state court. Mr. Bloom also reiterated his claim
regarding the improper suspension of his Social Security benefits, the subject of
his complaint in case No. 02-3362, discussed above.
In Heck v. Humphrey , 512 U.S. 477, 486-87 (1994), the Supreme Court
held that
in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction
or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose
unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983
plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed
on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a
state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into
question by a federal court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus,
28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a
conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not
cognizable under § 1983 (footnote omitted).
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Other than his complaint about his Social Security benefits, all of Mr. Bloom’s
allegations identify “harms caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render
his conviction and sentence invalid.” The district court properly dismissed these
claims without prejudice. 2
As for the claim relating to the wrongly withheld Social Security benefits,
the district court correctly concluded that the claim did not rise to constitutional
significance. Other than Mr. Bloom’s unsupported and conclusory allegation that
the county clerk “maliciously” falsified records regarding him, the complaint
reveals nothing more than negligence and, as such, is insufficient to implicate
constitutional protections. See Daniels v. Williams , 474 U.S. 327, 330-31 (1986).
Mr. Bloom alleges that the clerk admitted her mistake to the Veterans’
Administration but continued to maintain that he was a felon to the SSA. Even if
2
In his opening brief, Mr. Bloom argues that the substance of his complaint
concerns the alleged conspiracy to prevent him from pleading not guilty to the
state charges. Apparently the actors in this alleged conspiracy are two attorneys
retained by Mr. Bloom and a psychiatrist who examined him. As the district court
correctly observed, defense attorneys serve the interests of their clients and do not
act “under color of state law” for purposes of stating a cause of action under
§ 1983. See R. Vol. I tab 8 at 2.
As for the examining psychiatrist, the doctor apparently offered his opinion
regarding Mr. Bloom’s mental state and that information was eventually
forwarded to the Kansas Supreme Court. Again, the district court correctly
advised Mr. Bloom that witnesses such as this doctor are absolutely immune for
liability in damages for such testimony. See Briscoe v. LaHue , 460 U.S. 325,
329-30 (1983).
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this claim was sufficient to meet the Daniels standard, the district court further
correctly observed that the claim was not brought within the requisite two-year
statute of limitations. See Hamilton v. City of Overland Park , 730 F.2d 613, 614
(10th Cir. 1984). Contrary to Mr. Bloom’s contention, there was nothing to toll
the statute of limitations on this claim.
Case No. 02-3439
In this matter, Mr. Bloom filed a § 1983 claim against the State of Kansas,
the Office of the Disciplinary Administrator, and the Deputy Disciplinary
Administrator for their alleged denial of his right to equal protection stemming
from their refusal to discipline an Assistant United States Attorney (AUSA).
Mr. Bloom alleged that the AUSA filed false pleadings in his FOIA case against
the SSA, discussed above as case No. 02-3362. In an amended complaint,
Mr. Bloom added two SSA employees and the AUSA as defendants and alleged a
broad conspiracy to deny him his Social Security benefits.
The district court dismissed the § 1983 complaint against the disciplinary
board officials and the State for lack of standing, citing Doyle v. Okla. Bar Ass’n ,
998 F.2d 1559, 1566 (10th Cir. 1993). The court further termed the conspiracy
claims conclusory, frivolous, and malicious and dismissed them pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a) and (b).
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We review a dismissal for lack of standing de novo. Higganbotham v.
Okla. ex rel. Okla. Transp. Comm’n, 328 F.3d 638, 641 (10th Cir. 2003). We
have “not yet determined whether a dismissal pursuant to § 1915A on the ground
that the complaint is legally frivolous is reviewed de novo or for abuse of
discretion.” Plunk v. Givens , 234 F.3d 1128, 1130 (10th Cir. 2000). As in Plunk ,
however, we “need not resolve that question at this juncture” based on our review
of the entire record in this case, which reveals no reversible error under either
standard. See id. We therefore affirm for substantially the reasons stated by the
district court.
The judgments are AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Mary Beck Briscoe
Circuit Judge
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