Duncan v. Colorado Department of Corrections

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
JUL 31 2001
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
JOHNNY DUNCAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 00-1365
(D.C. No. 97-WY-876-CB)
COLORADO DEPARTMENT OF (D. Colo.)
CORRECTIONS,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before EBEL , PORFILIO, and KELLY , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Plaintiff Johnny Duncan, proceeding pro se, appeals from the district
court’s judgment entered in favor of defendant following a five-day jury trial. We
affirm.
Mr. Duncan, an African-American, was employed by the Colorado
Department of Corrections (CDOC) from 1989 to 1992, when he was terminated.
In 1996, Mr. Duncan brought suit against the CDOC, various individual
defendants, the Department of Labor and Employment, and Employers Unity, Inc.
alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985, as well as violations of
United States Constitutional Amendments Nos. I, IV, V, XIII, and XIV. He also
alleged Title VII violations of racial discrimination, retaliation, and constructive
discharge. The district court dismissed plaintiff’s Title VII claims against the
individual defendants, the Department of Labor and Employment, and Employers
Unity, Inc. The court also dismissed the civil rights claims as time barred. Trial
proceeded on the Title VII claims only against the Department of Corrections.
On appeal, Mr. Duncan raises thirty claims challenging all aspects of this
case. We have reviewed the entire record and the transcript, which we ordered
transcribed. Mr. Duncan has failed to raise any error sufficient to warrant
reversal of the jury’s verdict and the district court’s judgment.
Mr. Duncan argues that the district court erred in dismissing his civil rights
claims as time barred. He admits he brought the claims over two years after the
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events occurred, thus warranting dismissal under Reynolds v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 69
F.3d 1523, 1532 (10th Cir. 1995) (applying Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-102(1)(i)).
However, Mr. Duncan argues that the four-year statute of limitations found at
28 U.S.C. § 1658 should apply, citing Stewart v. Coors Brewing Co. ,
No. CIV. A.97-B-1467, 1998 WL 880462 (D. Colo. Dec. 14, 1998), aff’d , 217
F.3d 1285 (10th Cir. 2000), cert. denied , 121 S. Ct. 774 (2001). We have rejected
this argument. See Laurino v. Tate , 220 F.3d 1213, 1217-18 (10th Cir. 2000).
The district court correctly applied the Colorado two-year statute of limitations to
Mr. Duncan’s civil rights claims and properly dismissed them as untimely.
Mr. Duncan asserts defense counsel should have been sanctioned for
various acts. We review for an abuse of discretion, the trial court’s decision on
whether to impose sanctions based on its inherent power. See Chambers v.
NASCO, Inc. , 501 U.S. 32, 55 (1991). The district court has the inherent power
to “levy sanctions in response to abusive litigation practices.” Roadway Express,
Inc. v. Piper , 447 U.S. 752, 765 (1980). Here, the district court found no such
abuse nor has Mr. Duncan shown how he was ultimately harmed by opposing
counsel’s alleged misrepresentations. The district court did not abuse its
discretion in denying sanctions.
Mr. Duncan contends errors occurred in the jury instructions.
[W]e review a trial court’s decisions regarding jury instructions for
abuse of discretion . . . . The instructions as a whole need only
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convey a correct statement of the applicable law. In considering the
instructions on appeal, we take into account all the jury heard, and
from the standpoint of the jury, decide not whether the charge was
faultless in every particular, but whether the jury was misled in any
way.
Nat’l Envtl. Serv. Co. v. Ronan Eng’g Co. , No. 99-5206, 2001 WL 791890, at *8
(10th Cir. Jul. 13, 2001) (citations and quotation omitted).
Mr. Duncan failed to preserve this issue for appeal by making proper
objection in the district court. See Giron v. Corrections Corp. of Am. , 191 F.3d
1281, 1288-89 (10th Cir. 1999). Nevertheless, we have reviewed the instructions
given at trial and have determined that the jury was properly instructed.
Mr. Duncan argues the district court erred in various rulings it made
concerning the discovery process and in the admission of evidence at trial. We
review discovery rulings for an abuse of discretion. See Cole v. Ruidoso Mun.
Schs. , 43 F.3d 1373, 1386 (10th Cir. 1994). Similarly, evidentiary rulings
“generally are committed to the very broad discretion of the trial judge, and they
may constitute an abuse of discretion only if based on an erroneous conclusion of
law, a clearly erroneous finding of fact or a manifest error in judgment.” Webb v.
ABF Freight Sys., Inc. , 155 F.3d 1230, 1246 (10th Cir.1998). Even if we were to
find an erroneous ruling, Mr. Duncan would be entitled to a new trial only if the
error affected his substantial rights. See id. No reversible error occurred.
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Mr. Duncan also contends the court erred in not holding defendant liable as
a matter of law. He posits that the jury should have been allowed to only
determine damages. “[I]t is the sole province of the jury to appraise credibility,
draw inferences, determine the weight to be given testimony and to resolve
conflicts in the facts.” Dugan v. EMS Helicopters, Inc. , 915 F.2d 1428, 1430
(10th Cir. 1990). “Whether the defendant was in fact motivated by discrimination
is of course for the finder of fact to decide. . . .” Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing
Prods., Inc. , 530 U.S. 133, 154 (2000) (Ginsburg, J. concurring). The
determination of defendant’s liability was properly considered by the jury.
Mr. Duncan asserts the trial judge erred by asking questions of witnesses.
A “trial judge is not a mere moderator or umpire and within reasonable bounds
has the right to participate in eliciting the truth . . . .” Glazerman v. United
States , 421 F.2d 547, 553 (10th Cir. 1970). The transcript shows the judge’s
questions were neither partisan, nor were they argumentative or accusatorial: “It
can hardly be said that the trial judge’s questions constituted extensive
participation in the trial . . . . Furthermore, the questions propounded to the
witnesses by the court shed new light on the evidence.” Id. Most tellingly, the
trial judge instructed the jury not to assume that his inquiry reflected his opinion
on issues his questions addressed and, in fact, he apprized the jury that they were
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“at liberty to disregard all comments of the Court” in reaching a verdict. Rec.
Vol. V at 548. No error occurred.
Mr. Duncan also argues that the evidence did not support the jury’s verdict.
In reviewing whether the evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s verdict for
defendant, we may only
ascertain[] whether that verdict is supported by substantial evidence
when the record is viewed in the light most favorable to the
prevailing party. Substantial evidence, while something less than the
weight of the evidence, is such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if
different conclusions also might be supported by the evidence.
Under this standard, it is not the function of the appeals court to
reverse merely if it believes the evidence might have supported a
different verdict. If there is an evidentiary basis upon which the
verdict can be supported, the jury’s determinations will be left
undisturbed, even where there is substantial contradictory evidence
that could have supported an opposite verdict. . . . [A] jury finding
based on sharply conflicting evidence is binding on appeal.
Kenworthy v. Conoco, Inc. , 979 F.2d 1462, 1468 (10th Cir. 1992) (citations and
quotations omitted). The evidence adduced here was sufficient to permit the jury
to find as it did.
We have considered Mr. Duncan’s remaining arguments. They are either
waived for failure to raise them to the district court, see Walker v. Mather (In re
Walker), 959 F.2d 894, 896 (10th Cir. 1992), or they are without merit. Further,
we reject Mr. Duncan’s effort to incorporate pleadings from the district court in
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his appellate brief. See Gaines-Tabb v. ICI Explosives, USA, Inc. , 160 F.3d 613,
623-24, 25 (10th Cir. 1998).
The judgment of the United States District Court for the District of
Colorado is AFFIRMED. The mandate shall issue forthwith.
Entered for the Court
David M. Ebel
Circuit Judge
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