Cooks v. Ward

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
DEC 15 1998
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
CORNEL COOKS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 97-6105
RON WARD, Warden, Oklahoma State
Penitentiary, McAlester, Oklahoma,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER ON REHEARING
Before BRORBY, BRISCOE and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
This matter is before the court on Appellant’s petition for rehearing. The
original panel has voted to deny rehearing. The petition therefore is denied. The
original opinion has been amended, however, to clarify our holding that Mr.
Cooks waived his right to counsel under both the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.
The amended opinion is attached to this order; all revisions are found under the
heading “I. Admissibility of Post-Arrest Statements.” The attached opinion is
substituted for the one previously filed on October 28, 1998. The amended
opinion will reissue this date.
The suggestion for rehearing en banc was transmitted to all the judges of
the court who are in regular active service as required by Fed. R. App. P. 35. As
no member of the panel and no judge in regular active service on the court
requested the court be polled, the suggestion is also denied.
Entered for the Court
WADE BRORBY
United States Circuit Judge
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F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
DEC 15 1998
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
CORNEL COOKS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 97-6105
RON WARD, Warden, Oklahoma State
Penitentiary, McAlester, Oklahoma,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Oklahoma
(D.C. No. 87-CV-1538)
Vicki Ruth Adams Werneke, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Oklahoma City,
Oklahoma, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Sandra D. Howard (W.A. Drew Edmondson, Attorney General, with her on the
brief), Assistant Attorney General, Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Defendant-
Appellee.
Before BRORBY, BRISCOE and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
BRORBY, Circuit Judge.
Petitioner Cornel Cooks appeals the denial of his petition for a writ of
habeas corpus seeking to overturn his capital murder conviction and death
sentence. We affirm both the conviction and sentence.
BACKGROUND
In March 1983, Mr. Cooks and a co-defendant, Rodney Madson Masters,
a/k/a William Wallace Troxell, were tried together in Oklahoma state court on an
information alleging (1) murder with malice aforethought, (2) felony murder
while in the commission of first degree rape, and (3) felony murder while in the
commission of first degree burglary. A jury convicted both men for the murder of
Mr. Cooks’ disabled, eighty-seven-year-old neighbor, Jennie Ridling. Mrs.
Ridling suffocated to death after a piece of gauze-like material had been tightly
wrapped around her head. The evidence indicated Mrs. Ridling was raped, and
her home ransacked and burglarized.
After the sentencing stage of trial, the jury found three aggravating
circumstances as to Mr. Cooks: (1) he previously was convicted of a felony
involving the use or threat of violence; (2) Mrs. Ridling’s murder was especially
heinous, atrocious or cruel; and (3) he represented a continuing threat to society.
Based on these aggravators, the jury sentenced Mr. Cooks to death. Mr. Masters
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was sentenced to life imprisonment.
Mr. Cooks took a direct appeal to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals,
represented by the same attorney who represented him at trial, Mr. Stephen
Hilliary. That court affirmed his conviction and sentence. Cooks v. State, 699
P.2d 653 (Okla. Crim. App.), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 935 (1985). Represented by
new counsel, Mr. Cooks filed an application for post-conviction relief in the
District Court of Comanche County. The district court denied relief and was
affirmed on appeal to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals. Cooks v. State,
Case No. PC-86-613 (Okla. Crim. App. Jan. 13, 1987), cert. denied, 481 U.S.
1072 (1987).
Mr. Cooks first filed a habeas petition in the United States District Court
for the Western District of Oklahoma in July 1987, whereupon the district court
held the petition in abeyance and ordered Mr. Cooks to exhaust his state remedies
on the issue of whether his jury was instructed properly on the heinous, atrocious,
or cruel aggravating circumstance in light of Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S.
356 (1988). The Oklahoma trial court denied Mr. Cooks’ second application for
post-conviction relief. That decision was affirmed in Cooks v. State, Case No.
PC-89-131 (Okla. Crim. App. Jan. 11, 1993), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 851 (1993).
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The district court ordered the federal case reopened in February 1994. Mr.
Cooks filed an amended habeas petition in May 1994. The court conducted an
evidentiary hearing on the ineffective assistance of counsel issue in August 1995
and allowed the parties to brief the issues raised in the amended petition. In
February 1997, the district court denied Mr. Cooks’ petition. Pursuant to the
then recently enacted provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996 (AEDPA), the district court granted Mr. Cooks a certificate of
appealability on certain issues.
Subsequent to the district court’s ruling, Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320,
___, 117 S. Ct. 2059, 2068 (1997), held that § 2253(c) of the AEDPA (pertaining
to the certificate of appealability) applies only to cases filed after April 24, 1996.
Because Mr. Cooks’ amended petition was filed before that date, the certificate of
appealability is not a jurisdictional requirement in this case; rather, the district
court or this court must issue a certificate of probable cause. Because we
conclude Mr. Cooks has made a “substantial showing of the denial of [a] federal
right,” Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 (1983) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted), we grant a certificate of probable cause and proceed to
consider all Mr. Cooks’ issues, applying pre-AEDPA law.
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DISCUSSION
Mr. Cooks raises four primary issues on appeal from the denial of his
habeas petition: (1) his post-arrest statements were involuntary and therefore
inadmissible; (2) the “continuing threat” and “heinous, atrocious, or cruel”
aggravating circumstances are unconstitutional and unsupported by sufficient
evidence; (3) certain jury instructions concerning mitigating circumstances
confused the jury and thus rendered his death sentence unconstitutional; and (4)
he received ineffective assistance of counsel during both the guilt and sentencing
stages of trial, as well as on direct appeal.
We review the district court’s legal conclusions concerning these issues de
novo and its factual findings for clear error. Hill v. Reynolds, 942 F.2d 1494,
1495 (10th Cir. 1991). Habeas relief must be granted only if the claimed
constitutional error “‘had substantial and injurious effect or influence in
determining the jury’s verdict.’” Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 435-36 (1995)
(quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 776 (1946)). If we are in
“grave doubt” about whether an error satisfies that standard, then the error cannot
be treated as harmless and the petitioner must prevail. O’Neal v. McAninch, 513
U.S. 432, 437-38 (1995).
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I. Admissibility of Post-Arrest Statements
Mr. Cooks was arrested in the early morning of October 29, 1982. Police
advised him of his Miranda 1 rights upon arrest. Detectives attempted to question
Mr. Cooks later that same day; Mr. Cooks refused to answer questions, however,
and requested a lawyer. The following evening, October 30, a jailer informed
Detective Belcher that Mr. Cooks wanted to speak to him. Detective Belcher
again advised Mr. Cooks of his Miranda rights. Mr. Cooks signed a form
acknowledging those rights and stating he had voluntarily summoned the
detective and wished to provide information concerning Ms. Ridling’s murder.
Mr. Cooks then proceeded to make self-incriminating statements. Two days later,
November 1, Mr. Cooks made additional statements after detectives questioned
him regarding differences between his and Mr. Masters’ initial statements.
Again, Mr. Cooks affirmatively stated he understood his rights prior to providing
additional information without legal representation. 2
In his habeas petition and brief on appeal to this court, Mr. Cooks claims
his post-arrest statements were involuntary and acquired in violation of his
1
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2
We note Mr. Cooks did not receive his court-appointed lawyer, Mr.
Hilliary, until November 12, 1982.
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constitutional right to counsel. He argues, without elaboration, his mental
impairment and intellectual limits prevented him from comprehending the
“abstract concepts thrown at him by the detectives.” He further asserts “the
detectives initiated an interrogation, promised him leniency, and threatened him
with ‘the needle’ when he refused to talk.”
The district court concluded Mr. Cooks’ post-arrest statements were
voluntary, and found, “[b]ased upon a review of the particular facts and
circumstances of this case, including [Mr.] Cooks’ background and experience,”
Mr. Cooks “knowingly waived his right to remain silent.” We review the district
court’s findings of fact for clear error. See United States v. Bautista, 145 F.3d
1140, 1146 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 1998 WL 480103 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1998) (No.
98-5584). However, the ultimate issue of voluntariness is subject to de novo
review, considering the entire record and the totality of the circumstances. Id. at
1149.
Mr. Cooks’ Fifth Amendment right to counsel attached the moment he
requested an attorney. United States v. Johnson, 42 F.3d 1312, 1318 (10th Cir.
1994) (citing Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444-45 (1966)), cert. denied, 514
U.S. 1055 (1995). However, if Mr. Cooks subsequently voluntarily initiated
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further communication with law enforcement officials, the law recognizes he
effectively waived his previously invoked right to counsel. Edwards v. Arizona,
451 U.S. 477, 484-86 (1981); Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1045-46
(1983). This same rule applies in the Sixth Amendment context to evaluate a
waiver of right to counsel after arraignment. Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625,
635-36 (1986). A waiver is voluntary if the record demonstrates it “(1) ... was a
product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or
deception, and (2) ... was made in full awareness of the nature of the right being
waived and the consequences of waiving.” Bautista, 145 F.3d at 1149.
By any account, the police Mirandized Mr. Cooks upon his arrest. Police
officers testified they repeated Mr. Cooks’ Miranda rights later that same day,
prior to attempting to interrogate him at the police station. The officers recalled
that Mr. Cooks refused at that time to make a statement and requested a lawyer.
Detective Belcher ceased the interrogation at that point. This exercise of rights
indicates Mr. Cooks understood from the beginning both the nature and
consequences of his right to remain silent and his right to counsel.
It is also undisputed that approximately twenty-four hours after police first
attempted to question Mr. Cooks, after Detective Mahamed allegedly suggested
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Mr. Cooks would “get the needle” if he did not cooperate, and after he had been
formally arraigned, Mr. Cooks told a jailor he wished to speak to Detective
Belcher. Nothing in the record suggests police further pressured Mr. Cooks into
giving a statement without a lawyer present, or that Mr. Cooks was intimidated by
Detective Mahamed’s alleged statements. Indeed, a full day had passed with no
further attempt to speak to Mr. Cooks. When Detective Belcher came to the jail
at Mr. Cooks’ request, he carefully advised Mr. Cooks of his rights prior to any
conversation. Mr. Cooks signed an Advice of Rights form indicating he had an
eleventh grade education and affirming (1) he understood each component of his
Miranda rights, (2) no pressure or coercion had been used against him, and (3) he
nevertheless desired to make a statement and answer questions without an
attorney present. Mr. Cooks does not claim Detective Belcher or anyone else
made any promises, threats, or any further comments regarding “the needle” at
this time. After Detective Belcher typed Mr. Cooks’ responses to his questions,
Mr. Cooks signed the two-page statement, attesting it was a “true and accurate
account” of events and was given to the police “freely and voluntarily, without
fear of threat or promise of reward.” Mr. Cooks signed another Advice of Rights
form and typed statement after he spoke to Detectives Belcher and Mahamed on
November 1. Detective Belcher testified that on both occasions Mr. Cooks
appeared to understand his rights and did not appear to be under the influence of
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intoxicants.
Having independently reviewed the entire record and totality of the
circumstances, we find no clear error in the district court’s finding Mr. Cooks
initiated his post-arrest, post-arraignment conversation with Detective Belcher,
and there was no deception, intimidation or coercion sufficient to taint Mr.
Cooks’ waiver of rights under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments.
Accordingly, we hold Mr. Cooks’ waiver of counsel and post-arrest statements
were voluntary, knowing and intelligent, and therefore deny habeas relief on this
ground.
II. Constitutionality of Aggravating Circumstances
“The constitutional validity of aggravating [circumstances] is a question of
law subject to de novo review.” United States v. McCullah, 76 F.3d 1087, 1107
(10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1699 (1997).
A. Continuing Threat to Society
Mr. Cooks claims the “continuing threat to society” aggravator is
unconstitutionally applied in Oklahoma because it “functions as a catch-all
circumstance that fails completely to narrow the class of individuals eligible for
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death.” He further claims the “continuing threat” aggravator unconstitutionally
overlaps the “prior conviction” aggravator in this case.
This court already has upheld the constitutionality of Oklahoma’s
“continuing threat to society” aggravator inasmuch as Mr. Cooks claims it is
vague and fails to narrow the class of individuals eligible for death. Nguyen v.
Reynolds, 131 F.3d 1340, 1352-54 (10th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 128
(1998). That resolution binds this panel. United States v. Foster, 104 F.3d 1228,
1229 (10th Cir. 1997).
Mr. Cooks’ argument the “continuing threat” aggravator impermissibly
overlaps the “prior conviction” aggravator is likewise unavailing. It is true we
have held certain aggravating circumstances may impermissibly overlap and
therefore unconstitutionally skew the process of weighing aggravating and
mitigating circumstances. See McCullah, 76 F.3d at 1111-12. Such precedent
does not, however, stand for the proposition that any time evidence supports more
than one aggravating circumstance, those circumstances impermissibly overlap,
per se. The test we apply is not whether certain evidence is relevant to both
aggravators, but rather, whether one aggravating circumstance “necessarily
subsumes” the other. Id. at 1111. Under the facts and circumstances of this case,
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there are two reasons the “continuing threat” aggravator did not subsume the
“prior conviction” aggravator.
First, although Mr. Cooks’ jury may have considered evidence of his prior
conviction of a violent crime in the context of determining the presence of both
the “prior conviction” and “continuing threat” aggravators, the “prior conviction”
circumstance focused the jury’s attention on the particular nature and
consequences of his past conduct, while the “continuing threat” aggravator
focused attention on the likelihood of future violent conduct. Second, under
Oklahoma law, evidence regarding the callous nature of a crime, alone, is
sufficient to support a jury’s finding a defendant poses a continuing threat to
society. See Coleman v. Saffle, 869 F.2d 1377, 1390 (10th Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 494 U.S. 1090 (1990); Pennington v. State, 913 P.2d 1356, 1371 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1995), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 121 (1996). The record here is replete
with evidence that supports a finding Ms. Ridling’s murder was, indeed, callous.
Ms. Ridling was both elderly and disabled. Nevertheless, Mr. Cooks and Mr.
Masters broke into her home, held her down, and then gagged her with sufficient
force to lay her nose over to one side. The record further indicates that after
binding and gagging Ms. Ridling, Mr. Cooks raped her and then proceeded to
ransack her home and steal her possessions. Mr. Cooks and Mr. Masters then left
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Ms. Ridling, immobilized on her bed, to die from asphyxiation. This evidence
invalidates any argument the jury’s finding that Mr. Cooks posed a continuing
threat to society was dependent on evidence he had committed a prior violent
crime. Because the “continuing threat” aggravator did not subsume the “prior
conviction” aggravator in this case, we find no constitutional error that warrants
habeas relief.
B. Heinous, Atrocious or Cruel
Mr. Cooks argues “Oklahoma has no genuinely meaningful or principled
narrowing construction for its ‘especially heinous, atrocious or cruel’ aggravating
circumstance,” as required by the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments and
recognized by this court in Cartwright v. Maynard, 822 F.2d 1477 (10th Cir.
1987), aff’d 486 U.S. 356 (1988). More specifically, he claims the second
paragraph of Jury Instruction No. 51 failed to sufficiently narrow the
circumstances within which this aggravator could be applied. 3 Even if we deem
3
Jury Instruction No. 51 read:
As used in these instructions, the term “heninous” [sic] means
extremely wicked or shockingly evil; “atrocious” means outrageously
wicked and vile; “cruel” means pitiless, or designed to inflict a high
degree of pain, utter indifference to, or enjoyment of, the sufferings
of others.
The phrase “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel” is directed
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the instruction sufficient, Mr. Cooks asserts “the State failed to prove the
‘heinous, atrocious, or cruel’ aggravating circumstance beyond a reasonable
doubt.”
We considered and rejected this same constitutional argument concerning
the same jury instruction in Duvall v. Reynolds, 139 F.3d 768, 792-93 (10th Cir.
1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 345 (1998). Oklahoma’s narrowed interpretation
of the “especially heinous, atrocious, or cruel” aggravator as articulated in the
second paragraph of the standard jury instruction was held to satisfy the
Cartwright standard in Hatch v. Oklahoma, 58 F.3d 1447, 1468-69 (10th Cir.
1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1235 (1996). The Duvall decision extended Hatch
by opining that the Oklahoma courts consistently have “interpreted the ‘especially
heinous, atrocious, or cruel’ aggravator to require ‘torture’ and ‘serious physical
abuse’ as evidenced by proof of conscious physical suffering.” Duvall, 139 F.3d
at 793. Equally important, Duvall held Oklahoma courts consistently have
applied that standard when evaluating whether the evidence justifies a finding of
the “heinous, atrocious or cruel” aggravator. Id. Duvall therefore is dispositive
on this issue. Foster, 104 F.3d at 1229.
to those crimes where the death of the victim was preceded by torture
of the victim or serious physical abuse.
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Furthermore, we conclude the record supports the jury’s finding that Ms.
Ridling experienced conscious physical suffering sufficient to establish torture or
serious physical abuse as interpreted by the Oklahoma courts. The record reveals
Ms. Ridling suffered injury to the urethral opening, as well as a “significant blow
to the head,” bruises on both sides of her face, over the knuckles, and on the top
of her left foot. Dr. Robert Dix, the state’s medical examiner, testified the
bruised knuckles and foot indicated she had hit and kicked her attacker. The
autopsy report likewise cited the fresh bruises as “evidence of a struggle.” With
regard to his findings concerning “asphyxiation due to gag” as the specific cause
of death, Dr. Dix testified there was evidence of a gag that left Ms. Ridling’s face
“quite distorted.” The upper part of her face was “very swollen” and, while the
indentations in the swollen tissue were not necessarily caused by force, the gag
was tied with sufficient pressure to lay Ms. Ridling’s nose “over to one side.” It
was Dr. Dix’s opinion Ms. Ridling “was alive for some time in order for that
swelling to take place in the face.” On cross-examination, Dr. Dix estimated it
took “more than an hour or two” for her death to occur. This evidence amply
supports application of the “heinous, atrocious or cruel” aggravator. Because we
hold that aggravator is not unconstitutional on its face or as applied in this case,
we deny Mr. Cooks’ request for habeas relief on this ground.
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III. Jury Instructions Concerning Mitigating Circumstances
A. Jury Instruction No. 55 - Jury Discretion to Impose a Life
Sentence
Mr. Cooks asserts the trial court erroneously failed to inform the jury it had
the option to return a life sentence even if it found the aggravating circumstances
to outweigh the mitigating circumstances. He claims Jury Instruction No. 55
“misled the jury by implying it was required to find the existence of specific
mitigating circumstances before it could sentence [him] to life imprisonment.”
Jury Instruction No. 55 advised the jury:
If you unanimously find that one or more of the aggravating
circumstances existed beyond a reasonable doubt, unless you also
unanimously find that any such aggravating circumstance or
circumstances out weigh [sic] the finding of one or more mitigating
circumstances, the death penalty shall not be imposed.
It is important to note Jury Instruction No. 55 was not the only instruction
concerning aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The court also instructed
the jury, in pertinent part:
Instruction No. 52
...
Should you unanimously find that one or more aggravating
circumstances existed beyond a reasonable doubt, you would be
authorized to consider imposing a sentence of death.
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If you do not unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt that
one or more of the aggravating circumstances existed, you are
prohibited from considering the penalty of death. In that event, the
sentence must be imprisonment for life.
Instruction No. 53
Mitigating circumstances are those which, in fairness and
mercy, may be considered as extenuating or reducing the degree of
moral culpability or blame. The determination of what are mitigating
circumstances is for you as jurors to resolve under the facts and
circumstances of this case.
We considered, but rejected, the same argument Mr. Cooks makes here,
concerning a substantially similar set of jury instructions, in Duvall, 139 F.3d at
789-92. We reach the same result here. Mr. Cooks is correct that under
Oklahoma law a jury may avoid the death penalty even if it finds aggravating
circumstances to outweigh mitigating circumstances. Duvall, 139 F.3d at 789-90.
However, state courts are not constitutionally bound to “‘affirmatively structure
in a particular way the manner in which juries consider mitigating evidence.’” Id.
at 790 (quoting Buchanan v. Angelone, ___ U.S. ___, 118 S. Ct. 757, 761
(1998)). Thus, so long as the court does not preclude the jury from giving effect
to any relevant mitigating evidence, it need not separately instruct the jury of its
option to return a life sentence regardless of its finding the aggravating
circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances. Id. at 790-91. On review,
we need only ensure there is no reasonable likelihood the jury applied the
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challenged instruction in a way that prevented the consideration of relevant
evidence. Id. at 790; see also Castro v. Ward, 138 F.3d 810, 824 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 119 S. Ct. 422 (1998).
In this case, the instructions, read as a whole, did not preclude the jurors
from considering and giving effect to any mitigating circumstances in Mr. Cooks’
favor. Nor did they suggest the jury’s discretion to avoid the death penalty was
limited in any way. Instruction No. 53 expressly permitted the jury to consider
any evidence as mitigating evidence. We see no likelihood the jury would have
understood they were required to find a particular mitigating circumstance.
Instructions Nos. 54 and 55 merely authorized the jury to consider the death
penalty if, and only if, it unanimously found one or more aggravating
circumstances to outweigh any mitigating circumstances. These instructions
cannot fairly be read to have mandated imposition of the death penalty.
Accordingly, Mr. Cooks is not entitled to habeas relief on this ground.
B. Jury Instruction No. 54 - Minimum Mitigating Circumstances
Jury Instruction No. 54 advised the jury:
Evidence has been offered as to the following minimum
mitigating circumstances:
1. The defendant has no significant history of prior criminal
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activity;
2. The age of the defendant at the time of the crime.
Whether these circumstances existed, and whether these
circumstances are mitigating, must be decided by you.
Mr. Cooks argues this jury instruction misled the jury into believing these
were the only mitigating circumstances that could support a life sentence.
Further, because Mr. Cooks claims these circumstances applied only to his co-
defendant, he argues the jury effectively was instructed there was no mitigating
evidence to support him. According to Mr. Cooks, the prejudice he suffered as a
result of Jury Instruction No. 54 was exacerbated by his co-defendant’s counsel’s
closing statements that Jury Instruction No. 54 “stated the law” and that his client
was “a young, inexperienced gentleman, led into crime by an older, convicted
criminal.”
As stated above, we review jury instructions pertaining to mitigating
evidence only to ensure there is no reasonable likelihood the jury applied the
challenged instruction in a way that prevented the consideration of relevant
evidence. Duvall, 139 F.3d at 790. While we appreciate Mr. Cooks’ concern Jury
Instruction No. 54 specified mitigating evidence that arguably did not apply to
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him, 4 and referred to “the defendant” in the singular when in fact the case was
being tried against two defendants, we do not believe the instructions, read as a
whole, prevented the jury from considering any and all mitigating evidence that
might support either defendant.
Despite Jury Instruction No. 54's infirmities, the fact remains Instruction
No. 53 broadly defined mitigating circumstances as any circumstances that, “in
fairness and mercy, may be considered as extenuating or reducing the degree of
moral culpability or blame,” and then left the determination of what constituted
mitigating circumstances in this case to the jury’s sound discretion. We fail to see
how the specificity of Jury Instruction No. 54 in any way undermined the general
directives of Instruction No. 53. Moreover, we see nothing patently erroneous or
inappropriate in the closing comments of Mr. Masters’ counsel – certainly nothing
that rises to the constitutional level necessary to support Mr. Cooks’ habeas
petition. Consequently, relief is denied on this ground.
Mr. Cooks’ concerns with Jury Instruction No. 54 appear to stem not so
4
The instruction referred to evidence to the effect “[t]he defendant has no
significant history of prior criminal activity”; however, the jury had received
evidence regarding Mr. Cooks’ prior criminal activity.
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much from the instructions themselves or the remarks of his co-defendant’s
counsel, but from his own attorney’s failure to present mitigating evidence on his
behalf, or to offer any alternative or supplemental instructions. We thus proceed
to consider Mr. Cooks’ ineffective assistance of counsel claims.
IV. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Mr. Cooks claims he received ineffective assistance of counsel at both the
guilt and sentencing stages of trial, as well as on direct appeal. An ineffective
counsel claim presents a mixed question of fact and law we review de novo.
Williamson v. Ward, 110 F.3d 1508, 1513 (10th Cir. 1997).
To prevail on this claim, Mr. Cooks must first demonstrate his counsel
“committed serious errors in light of ‘prevailing professional norms’” such that
his legal representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. 5
5
Mr. Cooks bases his ineffective assistance claim in large part on his
counsel’s relative inexperience and the failure of the Oklahoma court system to
appoint more qualified and experienced attorneys in capital cases. He asserts
these are crucial factors to consider when determining ineffectiveness of counsel.
Such reliance on inexperience and the imperfections of the court appointment
system is misplaced. When considering an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim, this court must focus on the attorney’s performance, not his experience.
An attorney with little or no prior experience certainly can render effective
assistance. Mr. Cooks therefore must demonstrate specific instances of deficient
conduct, not simply allege inexperience. See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S.
648, 665 (1984); LaGrand v. Stewart, 133 F.3d 1253, 1275 (9th Cir.), cert.
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United States v. Haddock, 12 F.3d 950, 955 (10th Cir. 1993) (quoting Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984)). If Mr. Cooks demonstrates
constitutionally deficient performance, he must then show prejudice – “a
‘reasonable probability’ that the outcome would have been different had those
errors not occurred.” Id. at 955 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). This court
may address the performance and prejudice components in any order, but need
not address both if Mr. Cooks fails to make a sufficient showing of one.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.
A. Trial Stage
According to Mr. Cooks, Mr. Hilliary failed to adequately investigate and
prepare for the guilt/innocence stage of trial, particularly with regard to
presentation of an intoxication defense. He asserts Mr. Hilliary’s defense strategy
“to hold the State to their burden of proof on each and every element of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt, hoping ... that during the course of the trial there
would be some substantial errors ... and that the State would just not be able to
meet their burden of proof in the case,” amounted to no coherent defense strategy
at all. In support of this claim, Mr. Cooks relies in part on the testimony of Mr.
denied, 119 S. Ct. 422 (1998).
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David Autry, an attorney with experience litigating capital offenses, who testified
as an “expert” during the 1995 evidentiary hearing in federal district court
concerning Mr. Cooks’ ineffective assistance of counsel claims. Mr. Autry
opined that Mr. Hilliary was ineffective during the guilt stage of trial, and that
Mr. Cooks was substantially prejudiced by his counsel’s errors and omissions.
Under the circumstances, we need express no opinion whether Mr.
Hilliary’s performance fell below the prevailing professional standard. Since Mr.
Cooks fails to prove he was in any way prejudiced by Mr. Hilliary’s performance,
we proceed directly to our analysis of that issue. See Castro, 138 F.3d at 832.
In evaluating prejudice during the guilt/innocence stage of trial, “the
question is whether there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the
factfinder would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt.” Strickland, 466
U.S. at 695. To answer this question we must look at the totality of the evidence,
not just evidence that would have been helpful to Mr. Cooks’ case. See Brewer v.
Reynolds, 51 F.3d 1519, 1527 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1123
(1996); see also Robison v. Maynard, 829 F.2d 1501, 1510 (10th Cir. 1987).
Perhaps as Mr. Cooks suggests, Mr. Hilliary could have gathered and
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presented further evidence of Mr. Cooks’ state of intoxication immediately prior
to the crime. The record demonstrates, however, the jury was generally aware
Mr. Cooks had been drinking for some time prior to entering Mrs. Ridling’s
home. In addition, during closing arguments, Mr. Hilliary told the jury Mr.
Cooks’ judgment had been impaired by his drinking. Mr. Cooks offers no cogent
argument the law provided an intoxication defense to the felony murder charges,
or that if an intoxication defense was available, he was intoxicated to the extent
he was incapable of forming the necessary criminal intent. Under these
circumstances, we fail to see how additional, more specific evidence of
intoxication would have had any bearing on the jury’s determination of Mr.
Cooks’ guilt.
Even more important to our analysis here is the fact the record is replete
with evidence of Mr. Cooks’ guilt, not the least of which is Mr. Cooks’ own
statements admitting he bound, gagged, raped, and robbed Mrs. Ridling. Mr.
Cooks’ admissions were corroborated by the post-arrest statements and trial
testimony of his co-defendant, Mr. Masters. For these reasons, we conclude there
is no reasonable probability Mr. Cooks would have avoided the murder conviction
had his counsel performed differently. Accordingly, Mr. Cooks was not
prejudiced by Mr. Hilliary’s performance during the guilt stage of trial, and he is
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not entitled to habeas relief on this ground.
B. Sentencing Stage
Here again, the essence of Mr. Cooks’ claim is Mr. Hilliary’s alleged
failure to adequately investigate and prepare. With regard to the sentencing stage,
Mr. Cooks focuses primarily on mitigating evidence he claims was available at
trial, but which Mr. Hilliary, for no apparent strategical reason, failed to develop
and present to the jury as a reasonable explanation for Mr. Cooks’ criminal
conduct. Mr. Cooks identifies the following mitigating evidence in support of his
claim:
1. Mr. Cooks was a person of limited intellectual capacity;
2. he had endured an unhappy and deprived childhood;
3. he had a severe drinking problem, which began at an early age;
4. he had severe psychological and mental problems at the
time of the offense;
5. his mental problems were compounded at the time of the
offense by excessive drinking and use of the drug
commonly called PCP, which altered his ordinarily
peaceful, nonviolent disposition;
6. he was a good worker during intermittent periods of sobriety;
7. during periods when he was drug free and sober, he was
a responsible, caring and nonviolent person;
8. he repeatedly expressed remorse and shame in
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connection with the incident that resulted in the death of
Ms. Ridling;
9. he had enlisted in the Navy at the age of eighteen, but
was honorably discharged after four months and twenty
days because of ineptitude.
Mr. Cooks argues such evidence would have presented “[a] powerful case in
mitigation ... that ... could have resulted in a life sentence, just as Mr. Masters,
the codefendant, received.”
The obligation to provide effective assistance of counsel unquestionably
extends to a capital sentencing hearing. Davis v. Executive Director of Dep’t of
Corrections, 100 F.3d 750, 756 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1703
(1997); Brecheen v. Reynolds, 41 F.3d 1343, 1365 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied,
515 U.S. 1135 (1995). Indeed, we have recognized a need to apply even closer
scrutiny when reviewing attorney performance during the sentencing phase of a
capital case. “‘[T]he minimized state interest in finality when resentencing alone
is the remedy, combined with the acute interest of a defendant facing death,
justify a court’s closer scrutiny of attorney performance at the sentencing phase.’”
Moore v. Reynolds, 153 F.3d 1086, 1116 n.1 (10th Cir. 1998) (Brorby, J
dissenting) (quoting Osborn v. Shillinger, 861 F.2d 612, 626 n.12 (10th Cir.
1988)). Having carefully reviewed the trial and 1995 evidentiary hearing
transcripts with these principles in mind, we agree with Mr. Cooks his attorney
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was ineffective at the sentencing stage.
Mr. Hilliary waived his opportunity to make an opening statement at the
outset of the sentencing hearing, called no witnesses, and presented no evidence
on Mr. Cooks’ behalf. Although he briefly cross-examined the prosecution’s two
witnesses, Mr. Hilliary did not cross-examine Mr. Cooks’ co-defendant, Mr.
Masters, who told the jury he did not strike Mrs. Ridling, tie her up or participate
in raping her. Mr. Masters nevertheless expressed remorse over Mrs. Ridling’s
death and testified he had no prior felony convictions, had trouble in school and
an unstable home life, and had consumed a case of beer and about four pints of
rum prior to breaking into Mrs. Ridling’s home. Mr. Masters characterized
himself as a follower rather than a leader. At the end of his testimony, Mr.
Masters told the jury he thought some useful purpose could be served if he was
given life imprisonment and asked the jury to spare him from the death penalty.
Aside from the limited cross-examination of the State’s witnesses, Mr. Cooks’
sentencing stage defense consisted solely of Mr. Long’s 6 brief (three transcript
pages) and generic closing argument reminding the jury of the seriousness and
finality of their sentencing decision and asking them to impose a sentence of life
6
Mr. Long was an older, more experienced attorney, who volunteered to
help his friend, Mr. Hilliary, defend Mr. Cooks.
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imprisonment.
When invited to explain his sentencing stage strategy during the 1995
evidentiary hearing, Mr. Hilliary stated he understood the importance of the
sentencing stage and “attempted to develop a second stage strategy.” Mr. Hilliary
further testified he and Mr. Long attempted to “gather and glean evidence that
would have been helpful to Mr. Cooks in the second stage of the trial.” Notably,
however, Mr. Hilliary never articulated a strategy and later admitted “there was
not much second[] stage defense put on.”
Indeed, we are unable to glean from the record any second stage strategy
developed to defend Mr. Cooks against the death penalty. What is more, by all
accounts, Mr. Hilliary’s investigative efforts were minimal. Mr. Hilliary spoke to
Mr. Cooks’ wife on several occasions before and during trial, and to Mr. Cooks’
mother and two of his brothers during trial recesses. However, by Mr. Hilliary’s
own admission, he did not speak to Mr. Cooks’ stepfather; did not investigate Mr.
Cooks’ school records or speak to Mr. Cooks’ teachers; did not investigate Mr.
Cooks’ military records; and, because he was aware the Department of
Corrections questioned the credibility of the state hospital’s mental evaluations,
did not review any records concerning Mr. Cooks’ mental evaluation or introduce
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as evidence a letter from the state hospital stating Mr. Cooks was not considered
dangerous to himself or society. Mr. Hilliary further admitted he was not aware
of Mr. Cooks’ abusive childhood environment prior to trial. Mr. Hilliary testified
he and Mr. Long discussed the possibility Mr. Cooks’ documented good behavior
during a prior incarceration could be used as mitigating evidence, but he left the
decision whether to present such evidence to Mr. Long. On cross-examination,
Mr. Hilliary admitted he should have used that evidence during the sentencing
stage. Perhaps most troubling is the fact Mr. Hilliary stated he knew Mr. Cooks
was remorseful, but offered no reason, strategic or otherwise, to explain why he
did not consider putting Mr. Cooks on the witness stand during the sentencing
stage.
This is not a case in which the defendant refused to testify or otherwise
influenced the reasonableness of counsel’s actions. See Brecheen, 41 F.3d at
1369-70. Nor could counsel argue the available mitigating evidence conflicted
with the trial defense. See Stafford v. Saffle, 34 F.3d 1557, 1563 (10th Cir. 1994),
cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1099 (1995). This also is not a case in which counsel
reasonably investigated the defendant’s background, but found no one willing to
testify, see, e.g., Nguyen, 131 F.3d at 1348-49, or determined the mitigating
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evidence Mr. Cooks now relies on could do more harm than good. 7 See Burger v.
Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 790-91 (1987); Brecheen, 41 F.3d at 1367. Rather, this is a
case in which counsel admitted his investigation was limited, admitted he should
have presented certain mitigating evidence and, most important, offered no
strategy, reasonable or otherwise, to explain his performance during the
sentencing stage. Even applying the presumption of adequate performance, we
cannot help but conclude counsel failed under these circumstances to satisfy his
“duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that
makes particular investigations unnecessary.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691.
Accordingly, we hold Mr. Cooks was denied effective assistance of counsel
during the sentencing stage of his trial.
We must now determine whether Mr. Hilliary’s substandard performance
prejudiced Mr. Cooks at the sentencing stage. Mr. Cooks seems to argue the
circumstances of his case warrant application of the presumption of prejudice
acknowledged in United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 658-60 (1984).
According to Mr. Cooks, his counsel’s inaction during the sentencing stage
7
Mr. Hilliary did determine the testimony of Mr. Cooks’ mother and
brothers could have done more harm than good; however, there were numerous
other sources of mitigating evidence Mr. Hilliary did not similarly evaluate.
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transformed that phase of trial “into a proceeding dominated exclusively by the
State,” and thus failed “to subject the prosecution’s case to meaningful
adversarial testing.” If the adversary process during the penalty phase failed, Mr.
Cooks argues his death sentence was rendered presumptively unreliable.
The Supreme Court in Cronic recognized that in rare instances it may be
appropriate to presume prejudice “without inquiry into counsel’s actual
performance at trial,” because the circumstances “are so likely to prejudice the
accused that the cost of litigating their effect in a particular case is unjustified.”
Cronic, 466 U.S. at 658, 662. Circumstances that justify a presumption of
prejudice include the absence of counsel at a critical stage of trial, the denial of
the right to effective cross-examination, and the complete failure to subject the
prosecution’s case to adversarial testing; but, as the Supreme Court points out, a
presumption of prejudice is the exception, not the rule. Id. at 659.
Although we agree Mr. Hilliary was ineffective during the sentencing stage,
his failures do not amount to the kind of actual or constructive denial of counsel
necessary to trigger a presumption of prejudice. Mr. Hilliary was present in the
courtroom. He conducted limited cross-examination, made evidentiary objections,
and gave a closing argument. Hence, this case falls outside the narrow Cronic
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exception.
Since Cronic does not apply, Mr. Cooks must affirmatively prove actual
prejudice by demonstrating “a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.”
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693-94. As applied to the sentencing stage of his trial,
Mr. Cooks must demonstrate “a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the
sentencer ... would have concluded that the balance of aggravating and mitigating
circumstances did not warrant death.” Id. at 695. Mr. Cooks has not met this
standard.
“In evaluating prejudice, we must keep in mind the strength of the
government’s case and the aggravating [circumstances] the jury found as well as
the mitigating factors that might have been presented.” Castro, 138 F.3d at 832
(internal quotations omitted). Here the jury found three aggravating
circumstances to support Mr. Cooks’ death sentence: (1) his previous conviction
of a felony involving the use or threat of violence; (2) the heinous, atrocious or
cruel nature of Mrs. Ridling’s murder; and (3) the continuing threat Mr. Cooks
presented to society. As discussed above, the government presented abundant
evidence to support each of these circumstances. The mitigating evidence Mr.
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Hilliary could have presented to counterbalance these aggravating circumstances
centered on Mr. Cooks’ troubled childhood, borderline I.Q., and history of
alcohol and drug abuse. The jury also would have learned Mr. Cooks was
nonviolent when sober, but was intoxicated on the night of the crime, and he was
remorseful over Mrs. Ridling’s death.
While we are troubled by Mr. Hilliary’s failure to discover and/or present
available mitigating evidence without good reason, the benchmark for evaluating
Mr. Cooks’ ineffectiveness claim during the sentencing stage remains “whether
counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process
that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.” Strickland,
466 U.S. at 686. Applying this standard, we conclude there is no reasonable
probability the available mitigating evidence would have led the jury to a
different result. Mr. Cooks’ background, together with the nature and
circumstances of Mrs. Ridling’s death, presented a strong case in support of the
three determinative aggravating circumstances. Mr. Cooks was a convicted felon
who, by his own admission, broke into the home of a handicapped, elderly
woman, bound and gagged her, raped her, robbed her, and left her lying on her
bed, partially clothed, to slowly suffocate. The available mitigating evidence
simply did not outweigh these aggravating circumstances. Consequently,
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counsel’s substandard performance did not so undermine the proper functioning
of the adversarial process that the sentencing proceeding cannot be relied on as
having produced a just result. Mr. Cooks’ request for habeas relief on this ground
fails.
C. Direct Appeal
Mr. Cooks asserts his counsel failed on direct appeal to raise “several
critical issues” that would have required reversal of his conviction, or, at a
minimum, vacation of the death sentence. Notably, however, Mr. Cooks
identifies only two issues he suggests are “dead-bang winners” – issues which, if
not raised on direct appeal, demonstrate ineffective representation, see Banks v.
Reynolds, 54 F.3d 1508, 1515 n.13 (10th Cir. 1995): (1) the unconstitutionality
of aggravating circumstances, and (2) the inadmissibility of his post-arrest
statements. Because we have denied habeas relief on the merits of both these
issues, Mr. Cooks’ counsel cannot be said to have been ineffective for failing to
raise them on direct appeal, and Mr. Cooks’ conviction cannot be reversed on this
ground.
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CONCLUSION
We are forever mindful that “‘[o]ur duty to search for constitutional error
with painstaking care is never more exacting than it is in a capital case.’”
Brecheen, 41 F.3d at 1370 (quoting Burger, 483 U.S. at 785)). We thus have
given careful consideration to each of Mr. Cooks’ claims. Finding no
constitutional error for the reasons stated, we AFFIRM Mr. Cooks’ conviction
and sentence.
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