United States v. Browne

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
APR 22 2003
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee, No. 02-6135
(D.C. No. CIV-01-606-A
v. and CR-96-108-A)
(W.D. Oklahoma)
ERIK LAMONT BROWNE,
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before SEYMOUR , KELLY , and LUCERO , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination
of the appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Defendant Erik Lamont Browne timely appeals from an adverse district
court order in this 28 U.S.C. § 2255 proceeding. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1(B).
We affirm.
Browne was convicted of conspiracy to distribute cocaine base, 21 U.S.C.
§ 846, possession with intent to distribute cocaine base (and aiding and abetting),
21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) & 18 U.S.C. § 2, and use of a telephone to facilitate the
distribution of cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. § 843(b). He was sentenced to 324
months’ imprisonment with 5 years’ supervised release on each of the first two
counts and 48 months’ imprisonment with 1 year’s supervised release on the third,
all terms of imprisonment to run concurrently. On direct appeal, he argued that
certain drug quantities relied on to support his sentence had been calculated
incorrectly. Specifically, he contended that (1) one kilogram of cocaine, seized in
May 1995, lacked any nexus to him and should not have been counted; (2) the
same kilogram should, in any event, have been treated as powder rather than crack
cocaine; and (3) there were no findings to tie him to another half kilogram seized
in June 1995. This court rejected the latter two contentions as waived in the
district court, but remanded for additional findings as to whether the kilogram
seized in May 1995 was in fact within the scope of Browne’s conspiratorial
agreement and foreseeable to him. United States v. Green , 175 F.3d 822, 836-38
(10 th Cir. 1999).
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On remand, the district court made the necessary findings and did not alter
Browne’s sentences. On appeal, this court affirmed. United States v. Browne ,
No. 99-6277, 2000 WL 376626 (10 th Cir. April 13, 2000). Moreover, we
specifically approved, as a proper application of the mandate rule, the district
court’s rejection of Mr. Browne’s attempt to revisit the issues rejected on waiver
grounds on his initial appeal. See id. at **2.
Browne then filed this § 2255 proceeding, asserting that (1) his sentences
were illegal under Apprendi v. New Jersey , 530 U.S. 466 (2000), and (2) his trial
counsel had rendered ineffective assistance in waiving the drug quantity/quality
issues noted above and in failing to challenge his sentences on the constitutional
basis later recognized in Apprendi . The district court denied the ineffective
assistance claims, but held that Apprendi applied retroactively to this collateral
proceeding and required reduction of Browne’s 324-month sentences to the
twenty-year statutory maximum applicable to offenses involving unspecified drug
quantities. However, pursuant to the mandatory directive in U.S.S.G § 5G1.2(d),
recognized by United States v. Price , 265 F.3d 1097, 1108-09 (10 th Cir. 2001),
cert. denied , 122 S. Ct. 2299 (2002), the district court restructured the sentences
to run consecutively in part and concurrently in part, so that the total punishment
remained the same. See also United States v. Lott , 310 F.3d 1231, 1242-43 (10 th
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Cir. 2002), petition for cert. filed (U.S. Feb. 3, 2003) (No. 02-8948). Upon the
entry of judgment, Browne commenced this appeal.
Browne’s contentions regarding ineffective assistance of trial counsel were
properly rejected by the district court. He complained that counsel should have
argued that the cocaine had not been shown to be crack, specifically because there
was no evidence of any trace of sodium bicarbonate. The district court noted that
the presence of sodium bicarbonate is not necessary, see United States v. Brooks ,
161 F.3d 1240, 1248 (10 th Cir. 1998); accord United States v. Waters , 313 F.3d
151, 155 (3d Cir. 2002) (collecting cases), and then went on to cite trial testimony
sufficient to prove the substance was indeed crack. Dist. Ct. Order at 3.
Browne’s complaint that counsel failed to challenge drug quantities attributed to
him was rejected based on record evidence tying him to the drugs through his
participation in the conspiracy. Id. at 4-6. Finally, the court held counsel was not
ineffective for lacking the “clairvoyance” to predict the abrupt change in law
effected by the Supreme Court’s decision in Apprendi . Id at 9; see Valenzuela v.
United States , 261 F.3d 694, 700 (7 th Cir. 2001) (holding that “an [ineffective
assistance of counsel] argument premised on counsel’s failure to anticipate
Apprendi would be untenable”).
Turning to the Apprendi claim itself, however, we note that, lacking the
guidance subsequently provided by this court in United States v. Mora , 293 F.3d
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1213, 1219 (10 th Cir.), cert. denied , 123 S. Ct. 388 (2002), the district court
incorrectly held Apprendi applied retroactively to this collateral proceeding and
required a mechanical reduction of Browne’s individual drug sentences to the
lowest statutory maximum specified in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C)–though with the
compensatory restructuring of the total punishment under U.S.S.G. § 5G1.2(d)
explained above. The improper retroactive application of Apprendi , inuring to
Browne’s benefit, was not appealed by the government. 1
Instead, the only matter
before us is Browne’s objection that in relying on drug quantities never found by
the jury to arrive at the “total punishment” benchmark used in connection with
§ 5G1.2(d), the district court actually violated Apprendi in the course of applying
it to reduce his sentence in the manner prescribed by Price and Lott . Even
assuming we could consider such an argument–regarding the correct application
of Apprendi in a collateral proceeding in which the defendant was not entitled to
invoke Apprendi in the first place–this circuit’s prior decisions in Price and Lott ,
interpreting § 5G1.2(d) and explaining its implementation, are binding on this
panel and foreclose Browne’s claim.
1
Because the windfall to Browne did not result in an illegal sentence, i.e., a
sentence that transgressed statutory limits, no sua sponte plain-error correction is
warranted here. See generally United States v. Brown , 316 F.3d 1151, 1159-60 &
n.4 (10 th Cir. 2003) (distinguishing United States v. Moyer , 282 F.3d 1311, 1319
(10 th Cir. 2002), which held that “imposition of an illegal sentence constitutes
plain error even if the sentence favors the defendant” and ordered correction of
sentence even though only defendant had appealed).
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The judgment of the United States District Court for the Western District of
Oklahoma is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
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