United States v. Rodriguez-Herrera

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
DEC 1 2004
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 03-2310
JULIAN RODRIGUEZ-HERRERA, (D.C. No. CR-03-1683-RB)
(D. N.M.)
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before EBEL, BALDOCK, and HARTZ, Circuit Judges. **
Law enforcement arrested Defendant Julian Rodriguez-Herrera in New
Mexico on June 24, 2003. Defendant thereafter pled guilty to illegally re-entering
the United States after deportation following a conviction for unlawfully
transporting illegal aliens in the Northern District of Texas. 8 U.S.C.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
**
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has
determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the
determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G).
The case therefore is ordered submitted without oral argument.
§ 1326(a)(1)-(2), (b)(2). The district court sentenced Defendant to forty-six
months incarceration. Defendant appeals the district court’s sixteen-level upward
adjustment of his base offense level under the United States Sentencing
Guidelines (U.S.S.G. or Guidelines) § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) (2002). 1 We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). We review the
district court’s legal interpretation of the Guidelines de novo and factual findings
for clear error, United States v. Vaziri, 164 F.3d 556, 568 (10th Cir. 1999), and
affirm Defendant’s sentence. 2
I.
The United States Probation Office prepared a presentence report (PSR)
after Defendant pled guilty to violating § 1326(a), (b). According to the
probation officer, the base offense level for illegal re-entry was eight pursuant to
U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(a). The probation officer also recommended a sixteen-level
upward adjustment to Defendant’s base offense level pursuant to U.S.S.G.
§ 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) because Defendant’s previous conviction in 1998 for unlawfully
1
Unless otherwise noted, all citations to the Guidelines are to the 2002
Guidelines Manual.
2
Defendant also raised a second issue, arguing a district court may not
review the underlying facts of a prior conviction in illegal re-entry cases when the
underlying statute is unambiguous. Defendant fully admits, however, that our
holding in United States v. Manuel Martinez-Candejas, 347 F.3d 853 (10th Cir.
2003), forecloses his argument. Thus, we summarily reject Defendant’s claim of
error on this issue.
2
transporting aliens had been “for profit.”
Defendant objected to the adjustment. Specifically, Defendant disputed the
PSR’s characterization of his 1998 alien smuggling conviction as having been
“for profit.” The probation officer, in an addendum to the PSR, explained the
“for profit” characterization rested on a previous PSR prepared in the Northern
District of Texas (1998 PSR). The addendum stated:
The Court adopted the [1998] presentence report, [] which indicates
on page 2 paragraph 5(c) of the offense conduct that the defendant
along with the co-defendant’s (sic) were in the process of
transporting the load of aliens to Dallas, Texas. The fees for each
alien upon delivery ranged from $600 to $850. The total amount of
aliens that were being transported was seventeen. Pursuant to United
States Sentencing Guidelines §2L1.1(b)(2)(A), a three level increase
was applied.
At the sentencing hearing in this case, Defendant reiterated his objections
to the sixteen-level adjustment. Defendant argued no evidence existed that
proved he would have received pecuniary gain for smuggling aliens in 1998.
Further, Defendant argued the information contained in the 1998 PSR was
ambiguous and unreliable. The probation officer, however, explained:
The offense conduct, itself, came out of the [1998] Presentence
Report prepared by the Northern District of Texas. And attached to
that Presentence Report was the Criminal Complaint, which indicated
. . . this defendant was to be paid between $600 and $850 upon
delivery of each alien. The second thing that stood out [was that]
when . . . the Northern District applied [U.S.S.G. § 2L1.1], [it]
applied a Level 12 on the Base Offense Level. And then, right after
that, it says ‘if the offense [] was committed other than for profit,
decrease by three levels.’ [The court] didn’t decrease. . . . which is
3
telling us that it was for profit.
The district court overruled Defendant’s objection. According to the court,
the 1998 PSR provided the probation officer a reliable basis for his
recommendations because: (1) the “for profit” language was specifically included
in the 1998 PSR; (2) the Northern District of Texas “adopt[ed] the factual
findings of the [1998] PSR as part of its sentencing”; and (3) the Texas district
court’s failure to decrease Defendant’s offense level under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.1(b)(1)
implied Defendant smuggled aliens for profit.
II.
A.
Generally, a district court may rely on facts in a PSR when making
sentencing determinations unless the defendant objects. See United States v.
Shinault, 147 F.3d 1266, 1277-78 (10th Cir. 1998). A defendant’s “[f]ailure to
object to a fact in a presentence report, or failure to object at the hearing, acts as
an admission of fact.” Id. (internal quotation and citation omitted). If a
defendant objects to a fact in the PSR, however, the government must prove that
fact by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. Conclusions in a PSR, unsupported
by reliable facts, do not constitute a preponderance of the evidence. See United
States v. Pantelakis, 58 F.3d 567, 568 (10th Cir. 1995).
“The Sentencing Guidelines do not set a high threshold of reliability.”
4
United States v. Fennell, 65 F.3d 812, 813-14 (10th Cir. 1995). District courts
are free to consider any relevant information when sentencing if the information
has a sufficient indicia of reliability. See 18 U.S.C. § 3661; United States v.
Padilla, 947 F.2d 893, 896 (10th Cir. 1991). A district court may generally treat
factual information contained within a PSR as reliable, but it cannot accept the
PSR’s conclusions if they lack any factual underpinning. See United States v.
Hershberger, 962 F.2d 1548, 1555 (10th Cir. 1992); United States v. Gomez-
Arellano, 5 F.3d 464, 466 (10th Cir. 1993); see also Fennell, 65 F.3d at 813.
B.
The district court correctly adjusted Defendant’s base offense level upward
sixteen-levels in this case. Section 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(vii) provides for a sixteen-
level upward adjustment “[i]f the defendant previously was deported, or
unlawfully remained in the United States, after . . . a conviction for a felony that
is . . . an alien smuggling offense committed for profit.” 3 “For profit” is defined
as “committed for payment or expectation of payment.” U.S.S.G.
§ 2L1.2(b)(1)(A) comment n.1(B)(i). Here, Defendant’s 1998 PSR indicated
Defendant smuggled aliens for an expected profit of $600 to $850 per alien.
3
The Sentencing Commission revised the Guidelines in November 2003
to eliminate the distinction between alien smuggling “for profit” and alien
smuggling for other reasons. Accordingly, any prior conviction for alien
smuggling now warrants a sixteen-level upward adjustment under U.S.S.G.
§ 2L1.2(b)(1)(A)(vii) (2003).
5
The district court properly relied upon the 1998 PSR as a reliable source of
information. See United States v. Brown, 52 F.3d 415, 424-25 (2d Cir. 1995)
(holding the district court had “justifiable confidence” in the reliability of a
previous PSR because a probation officer had prepared the PSR and the prior
court adopted the PSR). Here, a probation officer prepared the 1998 PSR and
probation officers may generally be considered a reliable source. Hershberger,
962 F.2d at 1555. Further, a district court in the Northern District of Texas
adopted, without objection, the findings of the 1998 PSR in making its sentencing
determinations. See Shinault, 147 F.3d at 1278 (noting the “[f]ailure to object to
a fact in a presentence report . . . acts as an admission of fact”). Thus, reliable
evidence in the 1998 PSR showed Defendant had previously expected to receive
payment for alien smuggling. He therefore smuggled “for profit” under the
Guidelines. 4
The district court properly based its sentencing determination on facts
having a “sufficient indicia of reliability.” Accordingly, the district court
4
Moreover, the district court did not err when it stated the absence of an
offense level decrease under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.1(b)(1) in the 1998 PSR was
probative of whether Defendant smuggled aliens for profit. The Guidelines
specifically provide for a three-level decrease if “the offense was committed other
than for profit.” Id. (emphasis added). Defendant’s 1998 PSR, however, did not
apply this provision and instead skipped over the provision entirely. Although not
dispositive, the absence of the three-level decrease certainly provides some
indication that Defendant may not have qualified for the “other than for profit”
exception under the Guidelines during his 1998 sentencing.
6
correctly applied U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2(b)(1)(A).
AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court,
Bobby R. Baldock
United States Circuit Judge
7