Breedlove v. Costner

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
December 16, 2010
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALSElisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
LAWRENCE BREEDLOVE,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 10-6043
(D. Ct. No. 5:08-CV-01065-D)
DENNIS COSTNER; JIM RABON; (W.D. Okla.)
DEBBIE MORTON; JUSTIN JONES; J.
MARLAR; CHESTER MASON;
MARTY SIRMONS; KARMEON
HARVONECK,
Defendants - Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before BRISCOE, Chief Circuit Judge, TACHA, and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge panel has
determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material assistance in the
determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The
case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Lawrence Breedlove, an Oklahoma state prisoner proceeding pro se, filed this
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
U.S.C. § 12132 et seq., against eight Oklahoma Department of Corrections (“ODOC”)
employees (“Defendants”). Among other things, Mr. Breedlove alleged that he was
wrongfully terminated from a prison job, improperly placed in disciplinary segregation,
given inadequate medical care, and retaliated against for complaining about prison
conditions. In separate orders, the district court dismissed several of Mr. Breedlove’s
claims and granted summary judgment to Defendants on the remaining claims. Mr.
Breedlove now appeals those orders. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we
AFFIRM.
I. BACKGROUND
Mr. Breedlove filed suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and damages
under § 1983 and the ADA on numerous claims concerning the conditions of his
confinement in the Oklahoma State Penitentiary in McAlester, Oklahoma. Defendants
filed a motion to dismiss or in the alternative for summary judgment. Mr. Breedlove
opposed the motion and filed his own motion for summary judgment. The magistrate
judge issued an extensive report and recommendation, recommending that the district
court grant in part Defendants’ motion to dismiss and grant Defendants’ summary
judgment on the remaining claims. Mr. Breedlove filed objections to the magistrate’s
report. After considering the magistrate’s report and recommendation and Mr.
Breedlove’s objections, the district court issued multiple orders disposing of Mr.
Breedlove’s claims.
In its first order, the district court addressed Mr. Breedlove’s ADA claim,
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concluding that he had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted and
dismissing with prejudice. In a subsequent order, the district court addressed Mr.
Breedlove’s § 1983 claims. The court dismissed Mr. Breedlove’s claims against ODOC
personnel in their official capacity as barred by the Eleventh Amendment and dismissed
his claims for declaratory and injunctive relief because they must be brought pursuant to a
petition for habeas corpus. It also dismissed other claims against two defendants because
Mr. Breedlove had not pleaded sufficient facts to impose supervisory liability. Finally,
the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants on Mr. Breedlove’s
claims concerning actions allegedly taken against him in 2004 and 2005 as barred by the
applicable statute of limitations and his retaliation, destruction of property, and denial of
medical treatment claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Mr. Breedlove
now appeals both of the district court’s orders.1
We review de novo the grant of a motion to dismiss and the grant of a motion for
summary judgment, applying the same standards as the district court. See Russell v.
United States, 551 F.3d 1174, 1178 (10th Cir. 2008) (motion to dismiss); Baca v. Sklar,
398 F.3d 1210, 1216 (10th Cir. 2005) (motion for summary judgment). Because Mr.
Breedlove is proceeding pro se, we construe his pleadings liberally. See Hall v. Bellmon,
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In an additional order, the district court dismissed Mr. Breedlove’s claims against
Defendant Dennis Cotner because Mr. Breedlove failed to effect service on Mr. Cotner.
Mr. Breedlove listed that order in his notice of appeal, but he does not assert any error by
the district court in his opening brief. Accordingly, we do not address this issue. See City
of Colo. Springs v. Solis, 589 F.3d 1121, 1135 n.5 (10th Cir. 2009) (“[A]rguments not
raised in the opening brief are waived.”).
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935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).
II. DISCUSSION
A. ADA Claim
The district court dismissed Mr. Breedlove’s ADA claim for failure to state a claim
for relief. Mr. Breedlove now contends that the district court erred by concluding that he
is not a “qualified individual with a disability.” He argues that he established a prima
facie case that he was a qualified individual by “mov[ing] to pay the trial court ‘50 dollars
a month from his disability awards’” and by “clearly stat[ing] that he is ‘a disabled
American veteran.’”
The district court’s reasoning, however, did not depend on whether Mr. Breedlove
was a qualified individual. Although the district court noted in a footnote that Mr.
Breedlove had failed to allege that he was a qualified individual within the meaning of the
ADA, it dismissed his claim because he complained only about the quality and extent of
medical services he received. Fitzgerald v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 403 F.3d 1134, 1144
(10th Cir. 2005) (allegedly negligent medical decisions do not ordinarily fall within the
ambit of the ADA); see also Rashad v. Doughty, 4 F. App’x 558, 560 (10th Cir. 2001)
(“[T]he failure to provide medical treatment to a disabled prisoner, while perhaps raising
Eighth Amendment concerns in certain circumstances, does not constitute an ADA
violation.”). Because Mr. Breedlove did not allege that he had been denied services that
have been provided to other prisoners or otherwise allege discrimination solely based on
his asserted disability, he did not state a claim under the ADA and the district court
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properly dismissed his claim.
B. Civil Rights Claims
1. Failure to Exhaust
In his report and recommendation, the magistrate judge recommended dismissal of
Mr. Breedlove’s February 2007 and April 2008 property damage claims, his retaliation
claim, and his claim of denial of medical treatment for hepatitis C, hypertension, and
diabetes for failure to exhaust. The district court adopted the magistrate’s
recommendation, finding that Mr. Breedlove had waived additional review of the issues
by failing to make specific objections.
Mr. Breedlove maintains that the district court erred because its dismissal order
was predicated on the fact that he “failed to address the Magistrate’s finding” that he had
not exhausted his administrative remedies. We do not agree. The district court’s order
recognized that Mr. Breedlove objected to the magistrate’s report and recommendation
and that he claimed he had filed “numerous pages of paperwork . . . such as requests to
staff and grievances.” It noted, however, that Mr. Breedlove failed to articulate specific
objections to the magistrate’s thorough review of his administrative filings. Our review
of the record confirms this. Mr. Breedlove did not show how the magistrate’s report was
flawed; instead, he claimed that prison employees interfered with his attempts to exhaust
the administrative process. In support of his claim of interference, he offered only his
conclusory and self-serving statements, failing to cite any specific instances.
Accordingly, the district court properly granted summary judgment to the Defendants on
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these claims.
2. Statute of Limitations
The district court dismissed Mr. Breedlove’s claims concerning various alleged
actions taken against him in 2004 and 2005 as time-barred by the applicable statute of
limitations. Mr. Breedlove contends that this was error because the Oklahoma savings
statute, Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 100, operated to extend the limitations period on such claims.
Specifically, he argues that he had filed claims in Washington federal courts which the
magistrate and district court erred in disregarding. Complaints filed in other states,
however, cannot trigger the Oklahoma savings statute. Morris v. Wise, 293 P.2d 547, 550
(Okla. 1957).
Alternatively, Mr. Breedlove argues that equitable tolling is warranted in this case
because he “accused defendants of personally meddling in his affairs . . . and wrongfully
confiscating his legal materials and properties.” “State law governs the application of
tolling in a federal civil rights action.” Young v. Davis, 554 F.3d 1254, 1258 (10th Cir.
2009) (quotations and alterations omitted). Under Oklahoma law, equitable tolling is
appropriate when: (1) there is a legal disability because the plaintiff’s competency is
impaired or the plaintiff has not yet reached the age of majority; or (2) when “defendants
engage in false, fraudulent or misleading conduct calculated to lull plaintiffs into sitting
on their rights.” Id. (quotations omitted). This court has also noted that “‘exceptional
circumstances’” may justify equitable tolling. Id. (quoting Alexander v. Oklahoma, 382
F.3d 1206, 1217 (10th Cir. 2004)).
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None of the grounds for equitable tolling exist in this case. Mr. Breedlove has
never claimed that he is incompetent or that Defendants engaged in false, fraudulent or
misleading conduct calculated to lull him into sitting on his rights. Moreover, although
Mr. Breedlove alleges improprieties by Defendants, he has not articulated specific
circumstances warranting tolling for exceptional circumstances. Accordingly, the district
court correctly granted summary judgment for Defendants on these claims.
3. Martinez Report
Finally, Mr. Breedlove argues that the district court improperly relied upon the
Defendants’ Martinez report to decide contested issues of fact and grant summary
judgment in their favor. He contends that the district court overlooked the “mountain of
affidavits, medical reports and entries, requests to staff, grievances, letters and other
ODOC policy statements” he presented, instead “taking defendants [sic] unsupported
assertions . . . in the [] Martinez report to be factual.” We disagree.
The purpose of a Martinez report is to “develop a record sufficient to ascertain
whether there are any factual or legal bases for the prisoner’s claims.” Hall, 935 F.2d at
1109. “On summary judgment, a Martinez report is treated like an affidavit, and the court
is not authorized to accept its fact findings if the prisoner has presented conflicting
evidence.” Northington v. Jackson, 973 F.2d 1518, 1521 (10th Cir. 1992). Accordingly,
a court may not rely on a Martinez report to resolve material disputed facts. Hall, 935
F.2d at 1109.
Here, however, the district court did not resolve any disputed material facts in
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granting summary judgment. As shown above, summary judgment was proper as to each
and every claim which was not dismissed. Although the court may not rely on a Martinez
report to decide contested issues of material fact, Mr. Breedlove has not shown any
conflicting evidence regarding his failure to exhaust or the timeliness of his 2004 and
2005 claims.
4. Supervisory Liability
The magistrate recommended that Mr. Breedlove’s claim against Defendants
Harvoneck, Sirmons, Jones, and Morton be dismissed because he had failed to allege an
“affirmative link” sufficient to support a claim of supervisory liability. Mr. Breedlove
objected, noting that Defendant Harvoneck was the acting warden when he filed a
grievance based on January 2007 discipline and that Defendant Morton affirmed the
decision. The district court construed his objection as a request to amend his complaint to
add additional factual allegations against Defendants. Mr. Breedlove now contends that
the district court erred by denying him leave to amend his complaint.
Mr. Breedlove misconstrues the district court’s order. The court did not deny him
leave to amend; indeed, the court considered his complaint as amended by his objection
to the magistrate’s report and recommendation. Despite granting Mr. Breedlove leave to
amend, however, the court ruled that he had “fail[ed] to identify any misconduct by these
defendants” and had not stated “what, if any, due process violation occurred as a result of
their actions or inactions regarding any grievance [he] filed concerning his January 2007,
discipline.” Accordingly, the district court appropriately granted Mr. Breedlove’s motion
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to amend and his argument is without merit.
C. Additional Arguments
In addition to the arguments addressed above, Mr. Breedlove contends that the
court improperly divided his “one allegation of ‘retaliation’ into 5 or 6 separate issues,”
undermining his complaint such that it resulted in dismissal and summary judgment. We
disagree. Mr. Breedlove’s complaint itself alleges separate causes of action, and the
district court correctly addressed each in turn.
Mr. Breedlove also contends that the district court’s construction of his pro se
complaint was “more strict than liberal” and thus denied him due process under the
Fourteenth Amendment. We find no merit in this argument. Although a district court
must construe pro se pleadings liberally, a pro se plaintiff must still allege sufficient facts
on which a recognized legal claim can be based. Hall, 935 F.2d at 1110. The district
court correctly held Mr. Breedlove to that standard.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s orders dismissing and
denying all of Mr. Breedlove’s claims. Additionally, we DENY Mr. Breedlove’s pending
motions for the appointment of counsel, an independent medical examination, a
preliminary injunction, and to overrule defense objection. Finally, we remind Mr.
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Breedlove of his obligation to make partial payments until his appellate filing fee has
been paid in full.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT,
Deanell Reece Tacha
Circuit Judge
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