United States v. Ayala-Romero

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
August 29, 2007
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
U N ITED STA TES O F A M ER ICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee, No. 06-3374
v. District of Kansas
R UBEN A Y A LA -R OM ER O, (D.C. No. 06-CR-20089-001-KHV )
Defendant-Appellant.
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before BR ISC OE, M cKA Y, and M cCO NNELL, Circuit Judges.
Defendant Ruben Ayala-Romero, a M exican citizen, has a lengthy criminal
history in the United States. His troubles began in Oregon in 2001, when he was
convicted of two felony drug charges and sentenced to fourteen months
imprisonment. After serving this sentence, he was deported to M exico on Sept. 6,
2002. He was deported a second time on April 4, 2006, after serving a twenty
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination
of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10 th Cir. R. 34.1(G). This case is
therefore submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not
binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and
collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent
with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10 th Cir. R. 32.1.
month sentence for three counts of felony drug charges. Less than three weeks
after this deportation, M r. Ayala-Romero illegally entered the United States
again. He w as apprehended on M ay 20, 2006, and charged “w ith illegal reentry
by a deported alien after being previously convicted of a felony,” in violation of 8
U.S.C. § 1326(a) and (b)(2). M r. Ayala-Romero pleaded guilty to the charge and
was sentenced to fifty-seven months imprisonment. He now appeals this
sentence. W e exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
W e review post-Booker sentences for reasonableness. United States v.
Kristl, 437 F.3d 1050, 1054–55 (10th Cir. 2006). “R easonableness includes both
procedural and substantive components.” United States v. Cage, 451 F.3d 585,
591 (10th Cir. 2006). W e review both components— the procedure used to
calculate the length of the sentence, as well as the substantive reasonableness of
the sentence, in light of the sentencing factors articulated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
Kristl, 437 F. 3d at 1055. “[W]e review factual findings for clear error and legal
determinations de novo.” Id. at 1054.
A. Procedural Reasonableness
M r. A yala-Romero argues that his sentence was procedurally unreasonable.
“In setting a procedurally reasonable sentence, a district court must calculate the
proper advisory Guidelines range and apply the factors set forth in § 3553(a).”
United States v. Atencio, 476 F.3d 1099, 1102 (10th Cir. 2007). He first argues
“that the multiplicity of ways in which his prior record was used makes the
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resulting sentence unreasonable despite the authorization of the computational
methodology by the Sentencing Guidelines.” Appellant Br. at 7. He specifically
objects to the district court’s use of his record to determine a sentence
enhancement and then again as criminal history to calculate his offense level. Id.However, where the Guidelines permit, this Court has consistently held that a
defendant’s prior record may be used in determining both sentence enhancements
and criminal history category. See United States v. Alessandroni, 982 F.2d 419,
421 (10th Cir. 1992); United States v. Florentino, 922 F.2d 1443, 1446 (10th Cir.
1990). The district court sentenced M r. Ayala-Romero under § 2L1.2 of the
Sentencing Guidelines. R. Vol. IV, at 4-5. Application note 6 to § 2L1.2 states
that “a conviction taken into account under” the sentencing enhancement
subsection “is not excluded from consideration of whether that conviction
receives criminal history points pursuant to Chapter Four, Part A (Criminal
History).” U.S. Sentencing Guidelines M anual § 2L1.2, cmt. n.6 (2005). The
district court correctly followed the application note and thus did not err in
counting M r. Ayala-Romero’s prior criminal record in determining his criminal
history category and the sentence enhancement.
M r. Ayala-Romero also claims that “the district court accorded undue
weight to a presumption of reasonableness and too little to the balance of the
sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” Appellant’s Br. 9. At the
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sentencing hearing, the district court articulated its reasoning in determining M r.
Ayala-Romero’s sentence:
I think a sentence of 57 months would be just and
reasonable and be sufficient but not more than necessary to reflect
the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and
to provide just punishment.
And also I’m giving substantial weight to the Sentencing
Guidelines here. I know the defendant disagrees. . . . but they are
what they are and I know that they do serve in proposing
uniformity and weighing the basic nature of the offense as well as
aggravating and mitigating factors in a particular situation.
R. Vol. II, Doc. 21, at 20–21. Though the district court did give “substantial
weight” to the Sentencing Guidelines, the judge explicitly stated that he analyzed
the guidelines in light of the § 3553(a) factors. His statement is substantiated by
the reasons articulated when he gave a downward variance. The district judge
sentenced below the guideline range because of “the nature and circumstances of
the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1)” and “to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities among
defendants (18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6)).” R. Vol. V, at 3. After considering both the
Guidelines and the factors set forth in § 3553(a), the district court concluded that
57 months was the proper sentence. W e have reviewed the record and find no
evidence that sentencing was procedurally unreasonable.
B. Substantive R easonableness
M r. Ayala-Romero also argues that his sentence is substantively
unreasonable because 1) the district court did not take into account the disparity
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in sentencing caused by Kansas’s lack of a fast-track program, and (again) 2) the
district court gave too much weight to the Sentencing Guidelines. “A
substantively reasonable sentence ultimately reflects the gravity of the crime and
the § 3553(a) factors as applied to the case.” Atencio, 476 F.3d at 1102. W e have
reviewed the record and conclude that the sentence reflects both the gravity of the
crime and the § 3553(a) factors.
In United States v. M artinez-Trujillo, 468 F.3d 1266 (10th Cir. 2006), this
Court rejected the argument that the sentencing disparity caused by regional fast-
track sentencing programs violated 18 U.S.C. § 3553. Id. at 1268 (“W e cannot
say that a disparity is ‘unwarranted’ within the meaning of § 3553(a)(6) when the
disparity was specifically authorized by Congress in the PROTECT Act.”). M r.
Ayala-Romero provides no persuasive arguments to change our recent precedent.
M r. Ayala-Romero also asserts that the sentence is substantively
unreasonable because the district court gave too much weight to the Sentencing
Guidelines. For the same reasons discussed above, we find that the district court
properly considered both the Sentencing Guidelines and the § 3553(a) factors.
As an appellate court, we do not review sentences de novo, but only for
“unreasonableness,” United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 261 (2005), which the
Supreme Court has equated with “abuse of discretion.” Rita v. United States, 127
S. Ct. 2456, 2470-71 (2007). M r. Ayala-Romero provides no reason to think that
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the district court’s sentence was an abuse of discretion, or unreasonable in light of
the statutory sentencing factors.
The judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Kansas
is AFFIRM ED.
Entered for the Court,
M ichael W . M cConnell
Circuit Judge
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