United States v. Locke

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
OCT 14 1998
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 97-1456
(D. Ct. No. 96-CR-418-Z)
ANTHONY LOCKE, also known as (D. Colo)
SEALED,
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA, HENRY, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
Defendant appeals from the final judgment and conviction entered by the
district court on December 23, 1997, pursuant to a jury verdict of guilty. He
asserts on appeal that this court should reverse his conviction for any one of three
reasons: 1) the district court violated his Sixth Amendment right of self-
representation; 2) the trial court erred in allowing expert testimony regarding the
typical demarcation between the amount of crack cocaine bought for usage or
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. This court generally disfavors the
citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under
the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
distribution; and 3) the government’s closing argument prejudiced the defense.
We affirm.
Background
The six-count indictment against defendant charged that he had conspired
to distribute crack cocaine and had, on five specific occasions, used a
communication facility (telephone) to distribute drugs in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 843(b). Following a five-day trial, the jury found the defendant guilty on all six
counts.
Discussion
I. Sixth Amendment Right of Self-Representation
“A criminal defendant is both constitutionally and statutorily entitled to
waive his Sixth Amendment right to counsel and proceed pro se in a federal
criminal trial.” United States v. McKinley, 58 F.3d 1475, 1480 (10th Cir. 1995);
see also, e.g., Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834-35 (1975). However, to
invoke this right, the defendant must timely assert his intention “clearly and
unequivocally,” McKinley, 58 F.3d at 1480, and the decision must be voluntary,
intelligent, and knowing, see Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835; United States v. Treff, 924
F.2d 975, 978 (10th Cir. 1991). Moreover, no constitutional right to a hybrid
form of representation exists. See McKinley, 58 F.3d at 1480; Treff, 924 F.2d at979 n.6.
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The parties in this case do not dispute the law. Instead, their arguments
center upon whether Mr. Locke properly asserted his intention to proceed pro se.
Relying primarily on defendant’s “Motion of [I]neffective Counsel” and
“Defendant’s Affidavit in Support of Motion to Act as Co-Counsel,” defendant
argues that he made a clear and unequivocal request to represent himself. The
government, however, asserts that he simply requested permission to act as co-
counsel. We agree with the government.
In his “Motion of [I]neffective Counsel” defendant states, “If effective
counsel cannot be appointed, defendant request[s the] Court to find defendant
standing Pro Se.” He later agreed to retain his current counsel. Further, in
“Defendant’s Affidavit in Support of Motion to Act as Co-Counsel,” he declares:
7. Your deponent[] will be represented at this trial by [a] practicing
attorney. It is my intention to fully cooperate with this attorney regarding
the exercise of any co-counsel role granted me by the Court. . . .
8. That at the present time, your deponent conceive[s] of his co-counsel
role as embracing the following: participation in the process of jury
selection; participating in opening and closing statements; and[]
participation in cross-examination of any witness the government may
offer.
These representative statements do not clearly and unequivocally state
defendant’s desire to represent himself. They merely indicate that he would like
to somewhat participate in his defense as co-counsel. Moreover, nowhere in
either of these motions or during the pretrial hearing does defendant clarify his
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desire to represent himself. Thus, because defendant has no constitutional right
to a form of hybrid representation and did not clearly and unequivocally indicate
his desire to proceed pro se, no violation of the Sixth Amendment occurred.
II. Expert Testimony Regarding Distribution Amounts of Crack Cocaine
During the testimony of Detective Herrera, an expert witness regarding
street sales, distribution, and use of crack cocaine in the Denver or Aurora area,
defendant objected to Herrera giving his opinion regarding the amount of crack
that indicates distribution rather than mere personal usage. We review the trial
court’s decision to admit or exclude expert testimony for abuse of discretion, see
United States v. Markum, 4 F.3d 891, 895 (10th Cir. 1993); United States v.
McDonald, 933 F.2d 1519, 1522 (10th Cir. 1991), and find none here. Detective
Herrera made a general observation and did not cross the line of making a
determination that should be left to the jury. He did not offer an opinion
regarding the cocaine purchased specifically by Mr. Locke.
III. Prejudicial Closing Argument by Prosecution
This court reviews a prosecutor’s remarks during closing argument for
plain error and will reverse only to correct particularly egregious wrongs. See
United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1985); United States v. Hooks, 780
F.2d 1526, 1532 (10th Cir. 1986). Prior to closing arguments in this case, the
district court cautioned:
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[A]ttorneys are not supposed to state their own personal feelings
about credibility of witnesses or the justness of a cause, so I don’t
want to hear the attorneys saying: I really believe that so and so is
credible, or I really think that he isn’t – that he’s innocent or
anything like that. You can’t do it.
During the government’s closing argument, its attorney stated, “I’m not going to
talk to you about things that I don’t think need any more explanation. And the
reason is because I think there is a lot of the evidence in this case that is just
absolutely beyond any doubt at all.” We find that this comment constituted, at
most, de minimis error and certainly does not rise to the level of plain error
needed for reversal. See United States v. Kapnison, 743 F.2d 1450, 1460 (10th
Cir. 1984) (“Every slight excess of the prosecution does not require that a verdict
be overturned and a new trial ordered.”).
Conclusion
In accordance with the above determinations, we find no error that warrants
reversal. All pending motions are denied. AFFIRMED.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT,
Deanell Reece Tacha
Circuit Judge
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