United States v. Stanfiel

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
DEC 21 1998
TENTH CIRCUIT
__________________________ PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 97-6422
(W.D. Okla.)
CHARLES ALBERT STANFIEL, III, (D.Ct. No. 97-CR-102)
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before SEYMOUR, BRORBY, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Mr. Stanfiel entered a guilty plea to the charge of manufacturing
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the
citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under
the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
methamphetamine and received a sentence, inter alia, of 360 months. Mr.
Stanfiel appeals the findings of the sentencing court which gave rise to his
sentence. We affirm the judgment and sentence of the district court.
This case arose when law enforcement agents executed a search warrant
and discovered a methamphetamine laboratory operated by Mr. Stanfiel and
assisted therein by his fourteen-year-old daughter.
Mr. Stanfiel originally received an indictment of one count of
manufacturing methamphetamine and two delivery counts. Mr. Stanfiel thereafter
entered into a written plea agreement, dropping the two delivery counts in
exchange for his guilty plea to the manufacturing count. Mr. Stanfiel, pursuant to
his plea agreement, entered the appropriate guilty plea.
A sentencing hearing was held to resolve Mr. Stanfiel’s objections to the
pre-sentence report. The sentencing court heard testimony from three witnesses
for the Government and from Mr. Stanfiel. As could be expected, the testimony
of the Government’s witnesses and Mr. Stanfiel conflicted. The sentencing court
credited the testimony of the Government witness, finding Mr. Stanfiel’s
testimony to be untruthful. The sentencing court further found: (1) Mr. Stanfiel
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should be charged with the equivalent of forty-eight ounces of actual
methamphetamine (yielding a base offense level of 36); (2) Mr. Stanfiel knew of
the presence of firearms that were lying in plain view on tables in the lab, and
ready for quick use (warranting a two-point increase in the offense level); (3) the
Government failed to prove Mr. Stanfiel had a leadership role; (4) Mr. Stanfiel
used his fourteen-year-old daughter and her fourteen-year-old friend to participate
in the lab; and (5) Mr. Stanfiel injected both his daughter (so they would be
“closer”) and her friend with methamphetamine on several occasions (which
increased the offense level by two points). The sentencing court denied Mr.
Stanfiel a reduction of acceptance of responsibility and added two points to the
base offense level for obstruction of justice based on Mr. Stanfiel’s specified
perjurious testimony at the sentencing hearing. The resulting offense level totaled
42 with a criminal history category of I, which collectively produced a guideline
sentencing range of 360 months to life. The court imposed the minimum sentence
of 360 months.
Mr. Stanfiel appeals these sentencing determinations, asserting the trial
court erred: (1) in calculating the amount of methamphetamine for the purpose of
setting the base offense level; (2) in enhancing the base offense level two points
for possession of a firearm; and (3) in refusing to award him three points for
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acceptance of responsibility and enhancing the base offense level two points for
obstruction of justice.
The Amount of Methamphetamine
The sentencing court made the following written findings concerning the
amount of methamphetamine involved in the crime:
The amount of methamphetamine found during searches of the labs
in Bethany and McClain County was stipulated to be 135.9 grams of
actual methamphetamine. The Court also heard testimony from
Ricky Wallgren, who testified about 55 ounces of approximate 89
percent pure methamphetamine produced by him and the defendant,
which the Court found yielded an equivalent of approximately 48
ounces of actual methamphetamine.
Mr. Stanfiel asserts the trial court erred in calculating the amount of
methamphetamine. Specifically, Mr. Stanfiel argues the sentencing court erred in
relying on the testimony of Mr. Wallgren. Mr. Stanfiel argues Mr. Wallgren’s
“testimony was shot through with contradiction and because the Trial Court
specifically stated it was going to use a conservative basis for accepting his
testimony, the Court should be bound by this self imposed requirement.” Mr.
Stanfiel continues this argument by asserting “[t]he government did not prove the
quantity of methamphetamine by a preponderance of the evidence, and ... the
evidence did not meet a minimum indicia of reliability.”
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A short review of the testimony at issue brings this contention into sharp
focus. Mr. Wallgren, who previously pled guilty to manufacturing
methamphetamine, testified pursuant to a plea agreement that he maintained a
meth lab, and that Mr. Stanfiel, on six occasions between November 1996 and
March 1997, participated with him in this manufacturing process. Mr. Wallgren
personally presided at each “cook,” and testified in detail about the method of
manufacture and quantities produced. The sentencing court found Mr. Wallgren’s
testimony credible, not only on the basis of the content of the testimony, but by
the observation of his demeanor while testifying.
We review the sentencing court’s determination of the quantity of drugs
attributable to the defendant for clear error, and we cannot disturb this finding
unless it has no support in the record or unless we are firmly convinced an error
has been made. See United States v. Morales, 108 F.3d 1213, 1225 (10th Cir.
1997). We find no such error. The credibility of any witness is for the trial court
to determine, and such a decision is not for an appellate court to make. See
United States v. Gobey, 12 F.3d 964, 967 (10th Cir. 1993). The testimony
reviewed above adequately supports the trial court’s factual determination.
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Possession of a Firearm
The sentencing court made the following written findings of fact
concerning the firearm enhancement:
Wallgren also testified about the presence of weapons at the
lab in McClain County. The Court found that firearms were
possessed close to the manufacturing facility, were in plain view and
ready for quick use. The defendant knew that the firearms were
there, because testimony was given that the weapons were sitting on
the tables in the lab. The evidence met the requirements for two
additional points pursuant to [U.S.S.G.] §2D1.1(b)(1).
Mr. Stanfiel argues “the guns in question were specifically removed from the drug
activity and were not connected therewith.”
Once again, a review of the applicable testimony brings the issue into sharp
focus. The transcript reveals the sentencing court accurately set forth Mr.
Wallgren’s testimony. He testified the handguns were lying in plain view on
tables in the garage where the manufacturing of methamphetamine took place. In
fact, Mr. Wallgren testified, in part, as follows:
Q. All right. What happened to the guns while you were
manufacturing methamphetamine?
A. They just laid around there, just laid around there on the
tables and what have you. And Bryan Callahan, I believe, and
Charles [Mr. Stanfiel] kept switching the .38 back and forth. And
then when I left down there, well, him [sic] and Charles then had the
.40 caliber Glock and the .38 Smith and Wesson.
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We review the trial court’s factual findings for clear error and its legal
interpretation of sentencing guidelines de novo. See United States v. Johnson, 42
F.3d 1312, 1320 (10th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1055 (1995). The record
is more than ample to support the sentencing court’s factual findings in regard to
the handgun, and thus, its sentencing determination is correct. See U.S.S.G.
§ 2D1.1(b)(1).
Denial of Acceptance of Responsibility, and Enhancement for Perjury
The sentencing court, after hearing the evidence adduced at the sentencing
hearing, made the following written findings:
The defendant testified in his own behalf. The Court found
that he obstructed justice in giving false testimony under oath
concerning material facts: 1) the defendant stated that he never
injected methamphetamine in Tiffany or “Angela”; 2) the defendant
testified that he was unaware of guns in the lab; 3) he denied that
Tiffany ever assisted in the manufacture of methamphetamine. The
Court found that these statements concerning material issues were
made deliberately and with knowledge of their falsity, not through
faulty memory, mistake or inadvertence. Three points previously
subtracted from the defendant’s adjusted offense level ... were not
allowed by the Court based on the defendant’s perjurious testimony.
Two points were added for obstruction of justice ....
Mr. Stanfiel argues he agreed to fully cooperate before even being charged
with any crime and did fully cooperate. He asserts he was honest, candid, and
forthcoming and demonstrated his acceptance of responsibility “by immediately
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entering a plea, admitting his crime, and cooperating.” He further argues his
sincere remorse should be rewarded for saving the Government the trouble and
expense of trial.
A defendant is not entitled to an adjustment for acceptance of responsibility
merely because he pleads guilty. See United States v. McMahon, 91 F.3d 1394,
1397 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 533 (1996). It is the defendant’s
obligation to clearly demonstrate his acceptance of responsibility. The false
denial of relevant conduct is inconsistent with his acceptance of responsibility.
See United States v. Anderson, 15 F.3d 979, 981 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 511
U.S. 1057 (1994).
The district court has broad discretion in awarding a reduction of sentence
for acceptance of responsibility, and its decision will not be disturbed on appeal
absent clearly erroneous findings. See United States v. Gassaway, 81 F.3d 920,
922 (10th Cir. 1996). A review of the sentencing transcript shows more than
enough evidence for the sentencing court to believe Mr. Stanfiel testified falsely.
Mr. Wallgren’s testimony, if believed, is more than sufficient for this purpose.
The sentencing court believed Mr. Wallgren’s testimony and we have no reason or
basis in law to upset this determination.
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The judgment and sentence of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Entered by the Court:
WADE BRORBY
United States Circuit Judge
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