Pettis v. U.S. West

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
JUL 28 1998
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
ELLA PETTIS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
U. S. WEST COMMUNICATIONS,
No. 97-2210
INC.,
(D.C. No. CIV-95-1549-JC)
(District of New Mexico)
Defendant-Appellee,
GRETCHEN HEDGE,
Defendant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before BRISCOE, Circuit Judge, MURPHY, Circuit Judge, and McWILLIAMS,
Senior Circuit Judge.
In 1991 and 1992, U. S. West Communications, Inc. (“U. S. West”), a Colorado
corporation doing business in New Mexico, instituted a reduction-in-force (“RIF”)
program for its operation in New Mexico, which program ultimately affected hundreds of
its employees. As a result thereof, Ella Pettis, who had been employed by U. S. West and
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the
citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under
the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3
its predecessor since 1963, lost her job as an Equal Employment Opportunity (“EEO”)
Consultant and her employment with U. S. West was terminated. She later brought suit
against U. S. West for unlawful termination of her employment. The district court
thereafter granted U. S. West’s motion for summary judgment and Pettis now appeals the
judgment entered.
On December 19, 1995, Pettis filed a complaint in the United States District Court
for the District of New Mexico, naming as defendants U. S. West and two of its
employees, Gretchen Hedge and Darlene Siedschlaw, individually. Pettis identified
herself in the complaint as a Hispanic female citizen of the United States who, at the time
of her discharge, had “credited service” with U. S. West of over 26 years and that she was
then 47 years of age. Hedge and Siedschlaw were described in the complaint as
employees of U. S. West, each of whom “performed most or all of the actions that form
the basis for this complaint . . . .” Under the heading “Factual Allegations” Pettis set forth,
in considerable detail, the chronology leading up to her discharge, including U. S. West’s
decision in 1991 and 1992 to institute a RIF program, which involved, inter alia,
declaring her as “surplus,” and performing a subsequent “evaluation” to determine
whether she should be retained in her then current position as an EEO Consultant or be
offered another position with the company, which “evaluation” was conducted, in the
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main, by Hedge and Siedschlaw.1
Based on the “Factual Allegations” in her complaint, Pettis alleged five claims for
relief: (1) U. S. West intentionally interfered with her right to enhanced retirement benefits
and, in so doing, violated 29 U.S.C. § 1001, et seq. (“ERISA”); (2) the defendants,
apparently all three, violated the provisions of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621, et seq.; (3) U. S. West terminated her employment based on
her race, Hispanic, in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §
2000(e), et seq.; (4) Hedge and Siedschlaw conspired with “discriminatory animus” based
on age and race to deprive her of her constitutional right to equal protection in violation of
42 U.S.C. § 1985; and (5) U. S. West under New Mexico law breached its contract with
her.
On or about April 15, 1996, a joint answer was timely filed on behalf of U. S. West
and Hedge.2 Although it is not in the record before us, it would appear that U. S. West and
Hedge, on July 10, 1996, filed a motion to dismiss claims made against each of them. On
August 29, 1996, the district court granted Hedge’s motion to dismiss and dismissed with
prejudice claims 1, 2, 3 and 5 in the complaint against Hedge in her individual capacity
A part of U. S. West’s RIF program was to reduce the number of EEO
1
Consultants from twelve to seven. Seventy-eight U. S. West employees applied for the
seven EEO Consultant positions, and Pettis was one of the applicants.
We are advised that defendant Siedschlaw was never served with process.
2
Accordingly, Siedschlaw is not a party to the present appeal.
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and, at the same time, dismissed with prejudice claim 4 of the complaint against both
Hedge and U. S. West. Claims 1, 2, 3 and 5 against U. S. West remained unresolved.
On or about March 10, 1997, U. S. West filed a motion for summary judgment,
supported by a memorandum brief with various attachments thereto, which included
excerpts from numerous depositions. Pettis apparently filed a response to U. S. West’s
motion for summary judgment, but, again, we cannot find it in the record before us.
In any event, on June 3, 1997, the district court, in an unpublished memorandum
opinion, granted U. S. West’s motion for summary judgment on the remaining claims
against U. S. West, i.e., claims l, 2, 3 and 5. Specifically, the district court held that on the
record before it, U. S. West was entitled to summary judgment on Pettis’ claims based on
ERISA, age and race discrimination, as well as Pettis’ claim based on implied contract
under New Mexico state law.
As concerns Pettis’ ERISA claim, the district court held that Pettis had not made a
sufficient showing that in not rehiring Pettis U. S. West had a specific intent to interfere
with her pension benefits. In this regard, Pettis, though terminated, still had certain
pension benefits, though she, of course, no longer had a right to enhance those benefits by
continued employment with U. S. West. See Babich v. Unisys Corp., 859 F. Supp. 454,
457-58 (D. Kan. 1994); Clark v. Resistoflex Co., 854 F.2d 762, 771 (5th Cir. 1988).
As concerns Pettis’ claim based on age and race discrimination, the district court
concluded that Pettis had not made a sufficient showing that she was treated less favorably
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than other employees who were not within the age or race protected classes as she was
required to do under Rea v. Martin Marietta Corp., 29 F.3d 1450 (10th Cir. 1994). In this
connection, the district court noted that of the 17 applicants who ranked higher than Pettis,
nine were 40 years of age or older, and that of four Hispanic applicants, two were offered
EEO Consultant positions.
In connection with Pettis’ claim of breach of implied contract, the district court held
that under New Mexico law her employment with U. S. West was “at will” employment,
citing Hartbarger v. Frank Paxton Co., 857 P.2d 776 (N.M.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1118(1993), and that U. S. West’s at-will provision in its Code of Business Ethics, which Pettis
had read, made any expectations of continued employment unreasonable.
Petits’ basic position on appeal is that summary judgment was improper because
there were genuine issues of material fact which precluded summary judgment. Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(c) provides, in part, as follows:
“. . . The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that
the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law
. . . .”
In Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986), the Supreme Court stated
that “the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after
adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case, and on
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which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” In Catrett, the Court went on to
add that Rule 56 does not require that “the moving party support its motion with affidavits
or other similar materials negating the opponent’s claim.” Id. at 323. (Emphasis in
original.)
In Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986), the Supreme Court
stated that where a defendant in a “run-of-the-mill civil case” files a pre-trial motion for
summary judgment, “the judge must ask himself not whether he thinks the evidence
unmistakably favors one side or the other but whether a fair-minded jury could return a
verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence presented.” (Emphasis added.) In Anderson, the
Court also stated that “summary judgment will not lie if the dispute about a material fact is
‘genuine,’ that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for
the nonmoving party.” Id. at 248. See also Carey v. U.S. Postal Serv., 812 F. 2d 621, 623
(10th Cir. 1987).
As stated, on appeal Pettis’ basic position is that the case was not “ready” for
summary judgment. This is not our view of the matter. Under the authorities above cited,
our study of the record convinces us that the action taken by the district court was proper.
In short, we agree with the district court’s analysis of the matter and its granting of
summary judgment in favor of U. S. West on claims 1, 2, 3 and 5 of the complaint. As
indicated, the district court, inter alia, dismissed claim 4 of the complaint against both U.
S. West and Hedge on August 29, 1996, and Pettis’ brief in this court makes no challenge
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to that order. Pettis’ brief in this court challenges only the district court’s ruling of June 3,
1997.
Judgment affirmed.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Robert H. McWilliams
Senior Circuit Judge
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