Meyer v. Gibson

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
AUG 15 2001
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
PATTIE MEYER, Executrix of the
Estate of Virginia Vogelsberg,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
No. 00-6404
v. (D.C. No. 00-CV-372-M)
(W.D. Okla.)
ROBERT GIBSON, M.D.; THE
GIBSON CLINIC, INC.,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before SEYMOUR and McKAY , Circuit Judges, and BRORBY , Senior Circuit
Judge.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Plaintiff/appellant Pattie Meyer, executrix of Virginia Vogelsberg’s estate,
appeals from summary judgment granted in favor of defendants/appellees Robert
Gibson and the Gibson Clinic, Inc. on her state-law claim for medical
malpractice. Ms. Meyer contends that the district court erred by requiring expert
medical testimony to establish a causal connection between Dr. Gibson’s
allegedly negligent treatment of Ms. Vogelsberg and the conditions that ultimately
caused her death. Our jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and, although
we agree with the district court that evidence supplied by a medical expert is
necessary to establish a causal connection, record evidence satisfied that
requirement for summary judgment purposes in this case.
The district court’s jurisdiction arose from the diversity of the parties.
Therefore, the court was obliged to apply the most recent statement of applicable
Oklahoma law by that state’s highest court. See Wood v. Eli Lilly & Co. , 38 F.3d
510, 513 (10th Cir. 1994). We review de novo the district court’s grant of
summary judgment, applying Oklahoma substantive law. See Charter Canyon
Treatment Ctr. v. Pool Co. , 153 F.3d 1132, 1135 (10th Cir. 1998). Under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), summary judgment is proper only if the evidence, viewed in
the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment, shows that
there are no genuine issues as to any material fact, and that the moving party is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See id.-2-
It is undisputed that Ms. Vogelsberg died of renal failure and cardiac arrest
and that she had a history of metastatic breast cancer that had spread to her lungs,
insulin-dependent diabetes mellitus, renal dysfunction with proteinuria, and
coronary artery disease. Ms. Vogelsberg admittedly suffered from renal
dysfunction and heart problems before she received laetrile treatments. However,
Ms. Meyer appears to claim that Dr. Gibson failed to properly monitor or evaluate
Ms. Vogelsberg’s diabetic condition while administering laetrile, neglecting to
notice that Ms. Vogelsberg’s conditions had worsened and needed medical
intervention, and that this lack of treatment resulted in her total renal failure and
cardiac arrest.
In a motion for summary judgment, Dr. Gibson obtained an affidavit from a
medical expert, Dr. Burdick, opining that Dr. Gibson’s care and treatment did not
cause or contribute to Ms. Vogelsberg’s death. Dr. Gibson argued that Ms. Meyer
could not establish a prima facie case of medical malpractice because she had not
timely identified a medical expert to testify about causation and that she could not
survive summary judgment for failure to submit a medical-expert affidavit
establishing causation.
Expert medical testimony is necessary to establish causation in medical
malpractice cases in Oklahoma unless the negligence is so grossly apparent that
laymen would have no difficulty in realizing it. See Boxberger v. Martin , 552
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P.2d 370, 373 (Okla. 1976). As the district court noted, “the origin of the injury
in this case is obscure and is not readily apparent to a layman,” Appellant’s App.
at 90, especially in light of Ms. Vogelsberg’s pre-existing and serious medical
conditions.
Despite apparently failing to comply with pre-trial orders to identify trial
witnesses and exhibits by September 1, 2000, however, Ms. Meyer submitted with
her untimely-filed summary judgment response an order from the Oklahoma State
Board of Medical Licensure and Supervision (Board). The order was entered
after a hearing on charges that Dr. Gibson’s medical license should be revoked in
part because of his “[f]ailure to provide necessary on-going medical treatment.”
Okla. Stat. tit. 59 § 509. The Board specifically concluded on “clear and
convincing evidence” that Dr. Gibson failed to monitor and control Ms.
Vogelsberg’s diabetic condition and renal impairment, “resulting in the patient’s
total renal failure and subsequent death.” Appellant’s App. at 69, 71 (order
revoking Dr. Gibson’s medical license). Counsel submitted this document to the
district court with the following statement: “While recognizing the difficulty in
admission of these records at trial, the underlying facts reported in these
documents are essentially undisputed.” Id. at 45 (Plaintiff’s response to motion
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for summary judgment). 1
Counsel also argued that, under Boxberger , causation
may also “be proved by circumstantial evidence if the evidence has sufficient
probative force to constitute the basis for a legal inference.” Boxberger , 552 P.2d
at 574.
Dr. Gibson objected to admission of this evidence solely on the basis that it
was generated following the treatment of Ms. Vogelsberg. 2
Counsel for Ms.
Meyer did not bring to the court’s attention Boxberger’s statement that “[e]xpert
medical testimony is not required to establish the cause of an objective injury
where there is competent evidence, without such testimony, to establish the cause
with reasonable certainty.” Id. at 573. Nor did counsel emphasize to the district
court that the Board is composed of seven licensed physicians and two laypersons,
see Okla. Stat. tit. 59 § 481, and that the order was signed by a physician.
Perhaps because of these failures and the fact that plaintiff’s counsel’s brief was
not a model of clarity, the district court did not rule on the admissibility of the
order or mention it in the order granting summary judgment. We conclude,
1
Orders from administrative agencies are admissible under Fed. R. Evid.
803(8)(C), the public records exception to the hearsay rule. See Perrin v.
Anderson , 784 F.2d 1040, 1046 (10th Cir. 1986) (holding that court properly
admitted Oklahoma Department of Public Safety shooting report pursuant to this
Rule).
2
Following counsel’s logic, Dr. Burdick’s affidavit also would not be
admissible because it, too, was generated following the treatment of the decedent.
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however, that counsel submitted enough evidence and argument to warrant a
ruling that the order could substitute for expert witness testimony on the issue of
causation. Cf. Perrin v. Anderson , 784 F.2d 1040, 1046 (10th Cir. 1986)
(affirming admission of Oklahoma Department of Public Safety shooting report as
evidence that officer acted within professional guidelines of proper police
conduct); Robertson v. LaCroix , 534 P.2d 17, 21 (Okla. App. 1975) (noting that
“extrajudicial admission of a party opponent has the same legal competency as
direct expert testimony to establish the requisite elements of a prima facie case of
negligence in a medical malpractice action”). We therefore reverse the summary
judgment in favor of defendants.
Ms. Meyer collaterally interposes issues of alleged procedural unfairness in
Dr. Gibson’s failure to produce all of the medical records relating to
Ms. Vogelsberg’s treatment and in his expert witness’s reliance on those records
in arriving at his conclusion that Dr. Gibson’s treatment did not cause or
contribute to Ms. Vogelsberg’s death. We note, as did the trial court, that
Ms. Meyer did not compel production of those documents. She also did not
request an extension of time in which to obtain the documents, gather more
rebuttal evidence or affidavits, or obtain a medical expert, even though she bore
the burden of proof on the issue of causation. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f).
[W]here the non moving party will bear the burden of proof at trial
on a dispositive issue, that party must go beyond the pleadings and
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designate specific facts so as to make a showing sufficient to
establish the existence of an element essential to that party’s case in
order to survive summary judgment.
McKnight v. Kimberly Clark, Corp. , 149 F.3d 1125, 1128 (10th Cir. 1998)
(quotations omitted). Having failed to compel documents or to request extensions
of time in which to obtain medical records, Ms. Meyer cannot be heard to
complain of any perceived procedural unfairness.
We REVERSE the judgment of the United States District Court for the
Western District of Oklahoma and REMAND for further proceedings consistent
with this opinion.
Entered for the Court
Monroe G. McKay
Circuit Judge
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