Clanton v. Cooper

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
NOV 17 1997
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
CAROLYN CLANTON,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
No. 96-7082
JODY COOPER,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Oklahoma
(D.C. No. CIV-95-426-B)
Charles K. Babb, Assistant Attorney General of Oklahoma, Oklahoma City, OK,
argued the cause for the appellant. W.A. Drew Edmondson, Attorney General of
Oklahoma, and Benjamin Gore Gaines, Assistant Attorney General of Oklahoma,
assisted on the brief.
Gene V. Primomo, Wilcoxen, Wilcoxen, & Primomo, Muskogee, OK, argued the
cause for the appellee. John H. Helm, Houston, TX, assisted on the brief.
Before BRORBY, HOLLOWAY, and EBEL, Circuit Judges.
EBEL, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiff-Appellee Carolyn Clanton (“Clanton”) was arrested for arson,
pursuant to a warrant issued by Defendant-Appellant Jody Cooper (“Cooper”), an
Oklahoma Fire Marshal Agent. The warrant was predicated on an oral statement
made by Clanton’s alleged accomplice, who later testified that his statement was
coerced by Cooper. In addition, after Clanton was arrested, Cooper falsely told
the arresting officers that Clanton was “possibly involved in a homicide still
under investigation,” and that Clanton was not eligible for bail, causing Clanton
to be imprisoned overnight. The arrest warrant was later quashed by a state court.
No charges were ever filed against Clanton.
Clanton then sued Cooper under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994 & Supp. 1997),
alleging that Cooper deprived her of her liberty under color of state law, by
causing her to be arrested without probable cause and by causing her to be falsely
imprisoned following the arrest. Cooper’s motion for summary judgment on the
ground of qualified immunity was denied. Cooper now appeals.
BACKGROUND
Several important facts in the present case are disputed. The following
statement of facts is set forth in the light most favorable to Plaintiff-Appellee
Carolyn Clanton, the nonmovant for summary judgment. See Kaul v. Stephan, 83
F.3d 1208, 1212 (10th Cir. 1996). All reasonable inferences from the factual
record have been drawn in favor of Clanton.
Around July 25, 1993, Carolyn Clanton, a Texas resident, arrived in the
City of Checotah, in McIntosh County, Oklahoma, to attend her recently deceased
-2-
mother's funeral, and to participate in the disposition of the mother’s estate.
Clanton’s mother had lived in a trailer house in Checotah owned by Clanton's
brother, Joe Burns. Although Clanton's stepfather Odie Sheffield still lived in the
trailer house, Burns had ordered Sheffield to remove himself and his belongings
from the trailer house immediately following the mother's death. Burns intended
to sell the trailer to another neighbor, Nadine Lawson.
That evening, several arguments ensued regarding the right to possession of
the trailer house. Odie Sheffield's relatives said that if he couldn't live in the
trailer they would burn it. By 11:30 p.m., the trailer had been emptied of
possessions. At that time, Clanton and her nephew Michael Eaves (“Michael”)
returned to the trailer, where they found that water was running from the washer
hookup, the lights were on, and the doors were wide open. Clanton then
borrowed a wrench from Nadine Lawson to stop the running water, secured the
premises, and left with Michael at about midnight. Clanton and Michael spent the
next one-and-one-half hours together at the Green Country Diner.
At about 12:20 a.m., while Clanton and Michael were in the Diner, the
trailer house was set on fire. Defendant-Appellant Jody Cooper, an Oklahoma
State Fire Marshal Agent, investigated the fire the following morning. Cooper
interviewed a number of witnesses, including Clanton, but did not solve the
crime. While being interviewed by Agent Cooper, Clanton expressed
-3-
dissatisfaction with the course of Cooper’s investigation. Clanton also told
Cooper that she would be traveling in Europe and would not be returning to the
United States until September, 1993.
In late August, 1993, the State Fire Marshal's office received a phone call
from Clanton's nephew Bobby Eaves (Michael's brother). Bobby Eaves
(“Bobby”) claimed to have information about the July 26 arson, and agreed to
meet with Agent Cooper on August 24, 1993. At this meeting, Bobby Eaves
signed a written statement alleging that his brother Michael had told him that
Michael and Clanton had committed the arson.
Two days later, Cooper visited Michael Eaves. At first, Michael denied any
involvement in the arson. Cooper then falsely told Michael that physical evidence
linked Michael to the crime, and that if Michael did not confess he would go to
jail for twenty-five years. Cooper “suggested” that Michael had burned the house
at Clanton's request, according to Clanton's plan, and with Clanton's assistance.
He further “suggested” that Clanton's motive was to collect the fire insurance
money. Finally, he told Michael that if Michael confessed along these lines,
Michael would “get off lightly.” Subsequently, Michael signed a Miranda waiver
form and gave a tape-recorded oral statement in which he confessed to the arson
and implicated his aunt, Carolyn Clanton.
-4-
Immediately after giving his oral statement, Michael was arrested for the
arson. Several days later, on August 31, 1993, Cooper signed a probable cause
affidavit in support of a warrant for Clanton's arrest. Although the district
attorney had never filed a sworn information (and therefore no charges had been
filed against Clanton), the arrest warrant was issued that same day. On September
2, 1993, Cooper disseminated the arrest warrant information nationally, through
the National Crime Information Center (NCIC) computer system.
Around September 13, 1993, upon her return from Europe, Clanton was
arrested by U.S. customs officers in Houston, Texas. She was then turned over to
the Houston police. When the Houston police contacted the McIntosh County,
Oklahoma Sheriff's Department to find out what to do with Clanton, they received
the following message through the NCIC computer system.
PLEASE PLACE A HOLD ON SUBJECT CAROLYN BURNS
CLAYTON [sic] FOR THIS DEPT SHE IS A WHITE FEMALE
DOB/121051 HGT/504 WGT 130 EYES/BRO HAI/BRO
SKN/LGT SHE IS CHARGED WITH ARSON OF RESIDENCE
ENDANGERED LIFE AND POSSIBLY ENVOLVED [sic] IN A
HOMICIDE STILL UNDER INVESTIGATION COURT WILL BE
MCINTOSH CO COURT AT EUFAULA OK WT NO IS AWF/93-6
DOW/083193 AND NO BOND IF PERSON WONT WAIVE
EXTRADITION WE WILL EXTRADITE
Clanton v. Cooper, No. CIV-95-426-B, slip op. at 8-9 (E.D. Okla. July 25, 1996)
(Order) (Burrage, J.). Consequently, Clanton was incarcerated for one to three
-5-
days 1 in the Harris County (Texas) jail. She was released on an “Own
Recognizance” bond only after the falsity of the “homicide” information was
established.
On September 23, 1993, Michael Eaves recanted the oral statement which
had been the sole evidence implicating Clanton in the arson. Michael alleged that
Cooper had coerced him into making the earlier statement by threatening to send
him to jail for twenty-five years unless he agreed to repeat back, in substance, a
confession supplied by Cooper. 2
On September 27, 1993, an Oklahoma trial court quashed the August 31,
1993 warrant for Clanton’s arrest. The court cited two grounds for quashing the
arrest: (1) no charges had ever been filed against Clanton by the D.A. (and no
grand jury had indicted her); and (2) probable cause for Clanton’s arrest could not
be established solely by a recanted oral statement of an alleged co-conspirator.
1
Clanton claims in her brief that her imprisonment lasted three days.
Cooper claims in his brief that Clanton’s imprisonment lasted only one day.
Similarly, in the argumentative section of Clanton’s brief, Clanton says that she
was released on September 14, 1994, implying that she was incarcerated for only
one day. Neither Cooper nor Clanton, however, cite to the record in support of
their respective assessments of the number of days Clanton was imprisoned.
Without any evidence to support either party’s claim, we simply cannot resolve
this conflict.
2
An Oklahoma state judge, later ruling on Michael's motion to suppress his
prior oral confession, found that the confession was given voluntarily. On
September 28, 1994, Michael pled guilty to second degree arson, and was given a
two-year suspended sentence.
-6-
To date, no charges have been filed against Clanton in connection with the July
26, 1993 arson.
On August 29, 1995, Clanton sued the City of Checotah, its police
department and police chief, the Oklahoma State Fire Marshal’s Office, its chief,
and Agent Cooper under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994) and under Oklahoma state law.
The gravamen of Clanton’s complaint was that the defendants had intentionally
manufactured false evidence against Clanton (Michael Eaves’s oral statement),
and had intentionally made false statements about Clanton (that she was “possibly
involved in a homicide still under investigation”), and that these intentional
actions had caused Clanton’s false arrest and subsequent imprisonment.
The district court exercised jurisdiction over Clanton’s federal civil rights
claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, 1343(a)(3) (1994), and over her pendent
state law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (1994). All Clanton’s claims
against all defendants other than Cooper were subsequently dismissed, either
voluntarily or by the district court. Cooper then moved for summary judgment on
the remaining claims against him, primarily on the grounds of qualified immunity.
Cooper argued that all of his actions were within the scope of his authority and
that he did not violate any “clearly established” law. The district court granted
Cooper’s motion for summary judgment with respect to Clanton’s state law
claims, but denied it with respect to Clanton’s federal Section 1983 claim.
-7-
Cooper now appeals the partial denial of his motion for summary judgment.
DISCUSSION
I. Jurisdiction
“Orders denying qualified immunity before trial are appealable to the extent
they resolve abstract issues of law.” Foote v. Spiegel, 118 F.3d 1416, 1422 (10th
Cir. 1997) (citing Behrens v. Pelletier, 116 S. Ct. 834, 842 (1996), and Johnson v.
Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 312-14 (1995)). More specifically:
a district court’s order denying a defendant’s motion for summary
judgment [is] an immediately appealable “collateral order” (i.e., a
“final decision”) under Cohen [v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp, 337
U.S. 541 (1949)], where (1) the defendant [is] a public official
asserting a defense of “qualified immunity” and (2) the issue
appealed concern[s], not which facts the parties might be able to
prove, but, rather, whether or not certain given facts show[] a
violation of “clearly established” law.
Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. at 311 (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 528
(1985), and Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)).
To the extent that the district court’s denial of the defendant’s motion for
summary judgment is predicated on “‘evidence sufficiency,’ i.e. which facts a
party may, or may not, be able to prove at trial,” the denial is not reviewable as a
“collateral order”. Id. at 313. Rather, “immunity appeals . . . [are] limited to
-8-
cases presenting neat abstract issues of law.” Id. at 317 3 (quotation marks and
citation omitted).
This court has recently summarized the practical effect of the Supreme
Court’s Behrens and Johnson decisions as follows:
A determination that the law allegedly violated by the defendant was
clearly established at the time of the challenged actions is an abstract
issue of law that is immediately appealable. A determination that
under either party's version of the facts the defendant violated clearly
established law is also immediately appealable. See Behrens, at -,
116 S. Ct. at 842; Johnson at 312-14, 115 S. Ct. at 2156-57;
Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 528, 105 S. Ct. at 2816-17. However,
government officials cannot appeal pretrial denial of qualified
immunity to the extent the district court's order decides nothing more
than whether the evidence could support a finding that particular
conduct occurred. See Behrens, at -, 116 S. Ct. at 842. An order
denying qualified immunity on summary judgment is not appealable
if it merely determines the facts asserted by the plaintiff are
sufficiently supported by evidence in the record to survive summary
judgment. See Johnson, at 312-14 115 S. Ct. at 2156-57.
Foote v. Spiegel, 118 F.3d at 1422; see also Wilson v. Meeks, 98 F.3d 1247, 1251
(10th Cir. 1996) (surveying Tenth Circuit cases applying the rules announced in
Behrens and Johnson).
With these principles in mind, we proceed to review whether, under
Clanton’s version of the facts, Cooper violated clearly established law. In making
3
The Supreme Court in Johnson overruled the Tenth Circuit’s prior line of
cases, which had held that appellate jurisdiction is always available to review
denials of qualified immunity claims. See Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. at 309
(overruling Austin v. Hamilton, 945 F.2d 1155, 1157, 1162-63 (10th Cir. 1991)).
-9-
this determination, we must scrupulously avoid second-guessing the district
court’s determinations regarding whether Clanton has presented evidence
sufficient to survive summary judgment. See Foote, 118 F.3d at 1422. Rather,
we review only whether Cooper’s conduct, as alleged by Clanton, violated clearly
established law. Id. On appeal, “we review the denial of qualified immunity de
novo.” Walter v. Morton, 33 F.3d 1240, 1242 (10th Cir. 1994) (citing Powell v.
Gallentine, 992 F.2d 1088, 1090 (10th Cir. 1993)).
II.
State government officials performing discretionary functions enjoy
qualified immunity from liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Harlow v. Fitzgerald,
457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Such immunity is “qualified” in that it does not obtain
when otherwise immune officials violate “clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.” Id.; Gehl
Group v. Koby, 63 F.3d 1528, 1533 (10th Cir. 1995); Hilliard v. City and County
of Denver, 930 F.2d 1516, 1518 (10th Cir. 1991). The Tenth Circuit has set forth
the following framework for analyzing the application of the qualified immunity
defense to claims brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983:
In analyzing qualified immunity claims, we first ask if a plaintiff has
asserted the violation of a constitutional right at all, and then assess
whether that right was clearly established at the time of a defendant's
actions. Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232, 111 S. Ct. 1789, 1793,
114 L. Ed. 2d 277 (1991). Once a public official raises a qualified
immunity defense, the plaintiff bears the burden of (1) coming
- 10 -
forward with sufficient facts to show that the defendant's conduct
violated the law; and (2) demonstrating that the relevant law was
clearly established when the alleged violation occurred. Pueblo
Neighborhood Health Ctrs., Inc. v. Losavio, 847 F.2d 642, 646 (10th
Cir. 1988).
Gehl Group, 63 F.3d at 1533; accord Lawmaster v. Ward, -- F.3d --, No. 96-5028,
1997 WL 577708, at #4 (10th Cir. Sept. 5, 1997).
If the defendant’s conduct as alleged by the plaintiff does not violate the
law, we need not reach the issue of whether the law was clearly established.
Gehl Group, 63 F.3d at 1533 (citing Hinton v. City of Elwood, Kan., 997 F.2d
774, 782 (10th Cir. 1993)). If, however, we are persuaded that the defendant’s
conduct violated the law, “the plaintiff must [also] show the right the defendant’s
conduct violated was clearly established such that a reasonable person in the
defendant’s position would have known the conduct violated the right.”
Lawmaster, No. 96-5028, 1997 WL 577708, at #4 (citing Garramone v. Romo, 94
F.3d 1446, 1449 (10th Cir. 1996)). “While the plaintiff need not show that the
specific action at issue has previously been held unlawful, the alleged
unlawfulness must be ‘apparent’ in light of preexisting law.” Medina v. City and
County of Denver, 960 F.2d 1493, 1497 (10th Cir. 1992) (quoting Hilliard, 930
F.2d at 1518). “The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a
reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right.”
Id. (internal quote marks omitted).
- 11 -
In the present case, Clanton alleges that Agent Cooper violated her clearly
established constitutional rights in three ways: (1) by knowingly including false
information in a sworn affidavit in support of a warrant for Clanton’s arrest; (2)
by knowingly transmitting over the NCIC computer system the false information
that Clanton was “possibly involved in a homicide” and was not entitled to bail;
and (3) by coercing Michael Eaves into making a false confession which
implicated Clanton. We now consider whether each of these instances of
Cooper’s alleged conduct, if proved, would violate clearly established law.
A. The Arrest Warrant
In her complaint, Clanton alleged that “Agent Jody Cooper, with
information he knew was false and unreliable, swore in an affidavit to untrue
facts, thereby securing an arrest warrant for Carolyn Clanton.” (Complaint at ¶
15, Aplt.’s App. at 4). The complaint further elaborates that: (1) “[t]he arrest
warrant for Carolyn Clanton was issued based solely on the affidavit of Agent
Jody Cooper which cited the uncorroborated statements of an alleged co-
conspirator”; (2) “[n]o underlying criminal charges were pending against Carolyn
Clanton at the time Agent Jody Cooper secured the warrant for Ms. Clanton’s
arrest”; and (3) “[t]he arrest warrant for Carolyn Clanton was issued without the
presentment, indictment, or information in violation of . . . the 5th Amendment of
the United States Constitution.” (Id. at 4-5). The district court found that these
- 12 -
allegations, if true, would constitute a violation of Clanton’s clearly established
constitutional rights. We agree.
It has long been clearly established that the Fourth Amendment’s warrant
requirement is violated when “a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or
with reckless disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant
affidavit” if the false statement is necessary to a finding of probable cause.
Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978); see also Kaul v. Stephan, 83
F.3d 1208, 1213 n.4 (10th Cir. 1996) (“A state officer is not automatically
shielded from Section 1983 liability merely because a judicial officer approves a
warrant.”) (citing Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 344-46 (1986)). Under Franks,
it is the deliberate falsity or reckless disregard “of the affiant, not of any
nongovernmental informant” that is unconstitutional. Franks, 438 U.S. at 171.
Thus, if Cooper relied in good faith on statements of Michael Eaves’s that turned
out to be false, there would be no Franks violation.
Here, however, Clanton has alleged that Cooper knowingly and
intentionally swore to the veracity of Michael Eaves’s confession, while knowing
that confession to be false: a classic Franks violation. The district court found
that there are triable issues of material fact as to whether Cooper in fact did so.
Clanton’s claim is clearly legally sufficient. Cooper argues that Clanton merely
“alleged in a conclusory fashion that Cooper knew Michael Eaves’ statements
- 13 -
were false, she came forward with no facts or factual allegations supporting that
argument.” However, the district court found there was a genuine dispute over
material facts and that is the kind of ruling that we lack jurisdiction to review in
an interlocutory appeal. Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. at 313. Thus, Cooper is not
entitled to qualified immunity on this general issue.
Cooper is, however, entitled to qualified immunity on Clanton’s three
subsidiary claims pertaining to the arrest warrant. Contrary to Clanton’s claim,
the finding of probable cause necessary to support an arrest warrant may be
predicated entirely on the confession of a self-confessed co-conspirator, without
running afoul of the Constitution. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 4(b) (“The finding of
probable cause may be based upon hearsay evidence in whole or in part.”); see
also Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 230-32 (1983) (“probable cause” is
determined under a “practical, nontechnical” totality of the circumstances test that
takes individual account of the veracity and the basis of knowledge of the persons
supplying the hearsay information). 4 Here, the mere fact that Cooper relied
entirely upon a hearsay statement from Michael Eaves would not violate
Clanton’s constitutional rights.
Clanton also claims that such a statement may not support an arrest
4
warrant under Oklahoma law. However, an action may not be maintained under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a state official’s failure to adhere to state law. Baker v.
McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 146 (1979).
- 14 -
In addition, Clanton claims that an arrest warrant cannot be valid where
charges have not yet been filed against the arrestee. However, the Fourth
Amendment guarantees that “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the . . . persons or
things to be seized.” U.S. Const. Amend. IV (emphasis added). The
constitutional prerequisite for a valid warrant is thus “probable cause, supported
by Oath or affirmation. . . . ” Id. There is simply no additional requirement that
charges must already have been filed before an arrest may issue.
In a related vein, Clanton claims that her Fifth Amendment rights were
violated because a warrant was issued for her arrest despite the fact that she was
never indicted. This claim largely overlaps with her Fourth Amendment claim,
and must be rejected for the same reasons. To the extent that Clanton’s Fifth
Amendment claim does not merely restate her Fourth Amendment claim, we note
that the Fifth Amendment right to grand jury indictment has never been
“incorporated” via the Fourteenth Amendment as a substantive restriction on state
criminal procedure, Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 688 n.25 (1972), and thus
may not be the basis of a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
In short, Clanton has stated a legally cognizable Section 1983 claim to the
extent that she has alleged that Cooper knowingly and intentionally swore to
untrue facts in an affidavit to obtain Clanton’s arrest warrant. Because the
- 15 -
district court found that there are triable issues of material fact as to the truth of
this allegation, we lack jurisdiction to consider Cooper’s interlocutory appeal on
this issue. However, Clanton’s subsidiary claims pertaining to the legality of the
arrest warrant are not cognizable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and Cooper is therefore
entitled to qualified immunity with respect to each of those claims.
B. The NCIC Transmission
Clanton also claims that Cooper violated Clanton’s constitutional rights
after Clanton was arrested, by knowingly and intentionally transmitting false
information to the Houston Police and thereby causing Clanton’s post-arrest/ pre-
bail detention to be extended. Specifically, Clanton claims that she could have
been released shortly after being arrested if Cooper’s teletype had not falsely
informed the Houston police that Clanton had “ENDANGERED LIFE AND
POSSIBLY ENVOLVED [sic] IN A HOMICIDE,” and that Clanton was not
eligible to be released on bond when, in fact, the warrant issued by the McIntosh
County District Court had set Clanton’s bond at $5,000.
This claim was not specifically stated in Clanton’s complaint. For this
reason, the district court expressed “reluctan[ce] to definitively address the
validity of this claim.” Clanton v. Cooper, slip op. at 9. Nonetheless, the court
held that Cooper did not enjoy qualified immunity from this claim, finding that,
“at the very least, a genuine issue of material fact exists with regard to the
- 16 -
circumstances surrounding the composing, authorizing, reviewing and
transmitting of the teletype message concerning the warrant for Plaintiff’s arrest,
thereby precluding summary judgment.” Id. The court apparently construed the
NCIC claim to fall within the general claims stated in Clanton’s complaint that
Cooper violated Clanton’s Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights against
unreasonable seizures and against deprivations of liberty without due process of
law.
Cooper responds that the transmission of his false statements over the
NCIC computer system caused no injury to Clanton, because “it is clear in this
case that Plaintiff was not arrested in Houston because of the allegedly false
statements, but instead was arrested because of the Arrest Warrant for Plaintiff in
connection with the crime of arson.” In support of this defense, Cooper notes that
“[t]he teletype itself states that Plaintiff was wanted for arson and does not state
that she is charged with anything else, and gives the warrant number and gives the
court the warrant was filed in.” In circumstances such as the present ones, where
no separate or additional detention or imprisonment is caused by a false NCIC
statement, Cooper argues, such a statement cannot be said to have caused a
deprivation of liberty or an unreasonable seizure. Finally, Cooper argues that his
false statements caused Clanton no injury because Texas courts are not bound by
Oklahoma bond settings, but rather are free to set bond as they see fit.
- 17 -
We cannot agree that Cooper’s false statements knowingly transmitted
through the NCIC, as a matter of law, could not have caused an injury to Clanton.
While Cooper is correct that Clanton would have been arrested on the arson
warrant with or without the false NCIC statements, there are certainly factual
issues as to whether she would have been quickly released on bond but for the
NCIC transmission. The warrant, after all, set bond at $5,000 and did not identify
Clanton as especially dangerous or possibly homicidal. Under these
circumstances, it is not unreasonable to infer that the NCIC transmission was the
proximate cause of Clanton’s extended incarceration at the Harris County jail.
The Fourteenth Amendment protects persons from being deprived of liberty
without due process of law. Cooper’s teletype allegedly caused Clanton to be
needlessly incarcerated for one to three days, without due process of law. The
teletype was literally dispatched “under color of state law.” It is thus hard to
imagine a more paradigmatic application of Section 1983 liability.
For this reason, we do not think that Clanton’s failure to cite cases clearly
establishing the unconstitutionality of knowingly transmitting false information
over the NCIC computer system is fatal to her claim. The purpose of the
requirement that the law be “clearly established” before its violation may waive
qualified immunity is to insure that officials may reasonably anticipate when their
actions might give rise to liability for damages. Lawmaster, No. 96-5028, 1997
- 18 -
WL 577708, at #8. “Consequently, it is the plaintiff’s burden to establish the
asserted right’s contours are sufficiently clear such that a ‘reasonable official
would understand that what he is doing violates that right.’” Id. (quoting
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. at 635, 640 (1987)).
Ordinarily, to carry this burden, a plaintiff must establish that there is a
Supreme Court or Tenth Circuit opinion on point, or that the clearly established
weight of authority from other courts has held the law to be as the plaintiff
maintains. Id. (citing Garramone v. Romo, 94 F.3d 1446, 1451 (10th Cir. 1996)).
This test is not rigid, however. Rather:
where the reasonableness inquiry necessarily turns on the cases’
particular facts such that the reasonableness determination must be
made on an ad hoc basis, we must allow some degree of generality in
the contours of the constitutional right at issue. We would be placing
an impracticable burden on plaintiffs if we required them to cite a
factually identical case before determining they showed the law was
‘clearly established’ and cleared the qualified immunity hurdle.
Thus, . . . we adopt the approach of requiring some but not precise
factual correspondence in demanding that officials apply general,
well-developed legal principles. . . . While qualified immunity was
meant to protect officials performing discretionary duties, it [] should
not present an insurmountable obstacle to plaintiffs seeking to
vindicate their constitutional rights.
Id. at 9 (internal citations omitted).
In the present case, we think that the knowing transmission of false
statements over the NCIC computer system, in order to cause unjustifiedly
extended incarceration of a suspect, is sufficiently similar to the swearing
- 19 -
knowingly (or with reckless disregard of the truth) of false information in a
warrant application, proscribed by Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), that
a reasonable official would have known it to be illegal. We therefore hold that
Cooper enjoyed no qualified immunity to engage in such activity.
C. Coerced Confession
Clanton alleges that Cooper initially violated Clanton’s constitutional rights
by “coercing” a false confession from Michael Eaves which implicated Clanton.
Specifically, Clanton claims that Michael Eaves’s confession was coerced
because: (1) Cooper falsely told Michael Eaves that physical evidence connected
Michael to the crime; and (2) Cooper told Michael that he would get a twenty-
five-year sentence if he didn’t confess, but would “get off lightly” if he confessed
to a pattern of events suggested by Cooper. If these facts, taken together, do not
amount to “coercion” under clearly established law, then Cooper is entitled to
qualified immunity. Before discussing the coercion issue, however, we must
determine whether Clanton may contest the voluntariness of Eaves’s confession.
We conclude that she may.
There are two types of constitutional protections that invoke exclusionary
rules. In the first category, the exclusion of unconstitutionally obtained evidence
is designed to protect the enjoyment of constitutional rights themselves. Thus, for
example, the Fourth Amendment protects the right to privacy by prohibiting
- 20 -
officers from bursting into a home (lacking consent or exigent circumstances) and
seizing evidence without a warrant; if the officers do so, the resulting evidence,
though accurate, will be suppressed to discourage such unconstitutional actions.
See, e.g., United States v. Moore, 91 F.3d 96 (10th Cir. 1996). In this category,
only the victims of the unconstitutional conduct may challenge the
unconstitutional nature of the officer’s actions, because only their rights have
been violated. See, e.g., United States v. Moffett, 84 F.3d 1291, 1293 (10th Cir.
1996) (citing Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 139-40 (1978)).
In the second category, a constitutional violation may assist officers in
gathering evidence, but the violation has both offended the Constitution and
rendered the evidence unreliable. A coerced confession fits into this category.
As stated by the Supreme Court in Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368, 385-86
(1964):
It is now inescapably clear that the Fourteenth Amendment forbids
the use of involuntary confessions not only because of the probable
unreliability of confessions that are obtained in a manner deemed
coercive, but also because of the ‘strongly felt attitude of our society
that important human values are sacrificed where an agency of the
government, in the course of securing a conviction, wrings a
confession out of an accused against his will,’ Blackburn v.
Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 206-207, and because of the ‘deep-rooted
feeling that the police must obey the law while enforcing the law;
that in the end life and liberty can be as much endangered from
illegal methods used to convict those thought to be criminals as from
the actual criminals themselves.’ Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315,
320-321.
- 21 -
Consequently, because the evidence is unreliable and its use offends the
Constitution, a person may challenge the government’s use against him or her of a
coerced confession given by another person. “Confessions wrung out of their
makers may be less reliable than voluntary confessions, so that using one person’s
coerced confession at another’s trial violates his rights under the due process
clause.” Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 20 F.3d 789, 795 (7th Cir. 1994). Further, “It
is unthinkable that a statement obtained by torture or by other conduct belonging
only in a police state should be admitted at the government’s behest in order to
bolster its case. . . . Yet methods offensive when used against an accused do not
magically become any less so when exerted against a witness.” LaFrance v.
Bohlinger, 499 F.2d 29, 34 (1st Cir. 1974). See also United States v. Merkt, 764
F.2d 266, 274 (5th Cir. 1985); United States v. Chiavola, 744 F.2d 1271, 1273
(7th Cir. 1984); Bradford v. Johnson, 476 F.2d 66, 66 (6th Cir. 1973) (per
curiam), aff’g 354 F. Supp. 1331 (E.D. Mich. 1972). Clanton may contest the
voluntariness of Eaves’s confession not based on any violation of his
constitutional rights, but rather as a violation of her own Fourteenth Amendment
right to due process.
Having established that Clanton has standing to contest the voluntariness of
Eaves’s confession, we consider whether Cooper is entitled to qualified immunity
for his conduct in eliciting the confession. The Fifth Amendment provides that
- 22 -
“[n]o person ... shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against
himself.” U.S. Const. amend. V. “To be admissible, a confession must be made
freely and voluntarily; it must not be extracted by threats in violation of due
process or obtained by compulsion or inducement of any sort.” Griffin v. Strong,
983 F.2d 1540, 1542 (10th Cir. 1993) (citing Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S.
503, 513 (1963)). To determine whether a confession was made freely and
voluntarily, the “totality of the circumstances” must be considered. Arizona v.
Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 285-86 (1991). In applying this test, we have
explained that:
The central consideration in determining whether a confession has
been coerced always involves this question: did the governmental
conduct complained of bring about a confession not freely self-
determined? Incriminating statements obtained by government acts,
threats, or promises that permit the defendant's will to be overborne
are coerced confessions running afoul of the Fifth Amendment.
Griffin, 983 F.2d at 1543 (internal citation, punctuation marks, and footnote
omitted).
It is well-settled that a confession is not considered coerced merely because
the police misrepresented to a suspect the strength of the evidence against him.
As Professor LaFave explains:
Although dictum in Miranda v. Arizona[, 384 U.S. 436 (1966),] was
highly critical of [police trickery and deception], as a general matter
it may be said that courts have not deemed such conduct sufficient by
itself to make a confession involuntary. One type of trickery
involves misrepresenting to the suspect the strength of the existing
- 23 -
case against him. . . . [L]ower courts have held confessions
admissible when they were prompted by such misrepresentations as
that the murder victim was still alive, that nonexistent witnesses have
been found, that the murder weapon had been uncovered, that
defendant’s prints were found at the crime scene, and that an
accomplice had confessed and implicated the defendant.
1 Wayne R. LaFave & Jerold H. Israel, Criminal Procedure § 6.2, at 446-47
(1984) (footnotes omitted) (citing Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969), and
lower court cases). Thus, Michael Eaves’ confession was not coerced just
because Cooper falsely told him that physical evidence connected him to the
crime.
However, Cooper also told Michael that he would get a twenty-five-year
sentence if he didn’t confess, but would “get off lightly” if he confessed to a
pattern of events suggested by Cooper. As Professor LaFave goes on to say
following the above-quoted passage, “[c]ourts are much less likely to tolerate
misrepresentations of law.” Id.
Under Supreme Court and Tenth Circuit precedent, a promise of leniency is
relevant to determining whether a confession was involuntary and, depending on
the totality of the circumstances, may render a confession coerced. See
Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 286-87 (confession coerced where informant threatened
defendant with violence and promised defendant protection from inmate
violence); Hutto v. Ross, 429 U.S. 28, 30 (1976) (per curiam) (confession
declared not involuntary, notwithstanding a plea bargain, because it was not the
- 24 -
result of any direct or implied promises or any coercion); Griffin, 983 F.2d at
1543 (“Where a promise of leniency has been made in exchange for a statement,
an inculpatory statement would be the product of inducement, and thus not an act
of free will.” (internal quote marks and citation omitted)); United States v. Garot,
801 F.2d 1241, 1245 (10th Cir. 1986) (“The question in ‘plea bargaining’
situations is . . . whether the promise was coercive in nature, i.e. whether the
accused was so gripped by the hope of leniency that he did not or could not freely
and rationally choose among the available courses of action.”); United States v.
Fountain, 776 F.2d 878, 885 (10th Cir. 1985) (“[T]he Fifth Amendment [] . . .
prohibits the admission of incriminating statements obtained by Government acts,
threats or promises which permit the defendant’s will to be overborne and thus
rendered involuntary.”).
All of these opinions were released before the events in this case. Thus, it
was clearly established at the time of the interrogation that a promise of leniency
may render a confession involuntary if it was sufficiently compelling and linked
to the confession so that it could be said that the defendant’s will was overcome
by the offer. Further, considering the totality of the circumstances adds the fact
that Cooper lied about the evidence against Eaves. Though the lies themselves
are not unconstitutional, a reasonable official should have been aware that adding
the lies to the apparent promises would make it more likely that the confession
- 25 -
would be considered involuntary. In addition, even though the Tenth Circuit has
not previously addressed the issue, given the authority from other circuits a
reasonable official would have known that using Eaves’s involuntary confession
against Clanton would violate her due process rights. See Seamons v. Snow, 84
F.3d 1226, 1238 (10th Cir. 1996) (the weight of authority of other circuit courts
suffices to clearly establish the law).
The district court concluded that “the totality of the circumstances
surrounding Eaves’ interrogation gives rise to an atmosphere which to this
Court’s conclusion that any statements arising from these circumstances cannot be
said to be ‘freely self-determined’ or of ‘free will.’” Under Johnson this is
sufficient to preclude our review on interlocutory appeal, because coercion is a
factual issue that must be evaluated on the entire record.
CONCLUSION
The district court’s decision to deny Cooper qualified immunity is
AFFIRMED.
- 26 -