Kline v. IRS

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FEB 8 2002
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
In re:
KAREN MARIE KLINE,
Debtor. No. 01-2125
(D.C. No. CIV-00-177-JC/LCS)
(D. N.M.)
KAREN MARIE KLINE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE,
United States of America,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before LUCERO , PORFILIO , and ANDERSON , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Debtor Karen Marie Kline appeals the district court’s order affirming the
bankruptcy court’s approval of the Internal Revenue Service’s (IRS) proof of
claim, reflecting the estimated tax liability of Ms. Kline’s bankruptcy estate.
We affirm.
I. Background
Ms. Kline filed her petition for Chapter 11 Bankruptcy on May 27, 1997.
The IRS filed a timely proof of claim with the bankruptcy court in the amount of
$66,540.98, reflecting estimated tax liabilities for the tax years 1987, and 1993
through 1996. After receiving written objections and conducting a hearing on the
matter, the bankruptcy court denied Ms. Kline’s objection to the IRS claim
without prejudice. Ms. Kline subsequently filed a “Memorandum of Law
Regarding Income Taxes,” and a motion to alter, amend or set aside the court’s
judgment. The bankruptcy court denied that motion on January 31, 2000, finding
Ms. Kline had failed to refute the IRS’s prima facie evidence of its estimate of
tax due for the years in question.
Ms. Kline then appealed to federal district court. Upon review, the
magistrate judge found that although Ms. Kline testified that she received income
during 1987 and 1993 through 1996 without filing tax returns, she offered no
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evidence to refute the IRS’s proof of claim. After careful consideration of
Ms. Kline’s arguments, the magistrate judge concluded
the Bankruptcy Court construed the applicable statutes in Appellant’s
favor by denying her objection without prejudice to her ability to file
tax returns and challenge Appellee’s estimated tax liability.
Appellant’s failure to present any facts in support of her position did
not permit the Bankruptcy Court to rule in her favor. The
Bankruptcy Court correctly held that, on the evidence presented,
Appellee’s proof of claim was valid until such time as Appellant
filed tax returns.
R. Vol. 1, Doc. 18 at 6. The district court overruled Ms. Kline’s objections to the
magistrate judge’s proposed findings, and adopted the recommended disposition
affirming the bankruptcy court.
On appeal, the IRS states the only issue to be decided by this court is
simply whether the federal income tax laws apply to Ms. Kline. The implication
of that statement is that Ms. Kline is what was once designated by the IRS as an
“illegal tax protestor.” 1
Conversely, Ms. Kline works earnestly to avoid that
1
Section 3707 of the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 now
prohibits the IRS from designating taxpayers internally as “illegal tax protestors”
and requires the removal of existing designations after January 1, 1999. See
Internal Revenue Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-206,
112 Stat. 685, 778, § 3707 (1998). Prior to that Act, the IRS defined a “tax
protestor” as any individual who advocates and/or uses a tax protest scheme.
A tax protest scheme was further defined as any scheme without basis in law
or fact for the ostensible purpose of expressing dissatisfaction with the
substance, form, or administration of the tax laws be either interfering with tax
administration or attempting to illegally avoid or reduce tax liabilities. More
generally, a tax protestor has been defined as one who is characterized as such
(continued...)
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designation, framing the issues on appeal in terms of statutory construction,
IRS abuse, and burdens of proof. Both parties have requested sanctions from
this court.
II. Discussion
“We review de novo conclusions of law by the district court and the
bankruptcy court.” Phillips v. White (In re White), 25 F.3d 931, 933 (10th Cir.
1994). “The bankruptcy court’s findings of fact are not to be set aside unless
clearly erroneous.” Id.The only real difficulty with this appeal and the ensuing motions for
sanctions is that while Ms. Kline asserts she is not a “tax protestor” in the usual
sense, many of her arguments flow with typical protestor rhetoric. She claims she
is not a tax protestor, but is instead an IRS-abuse protestor. She acknowledges
that the income tax is not voluntary, but argues that she was forced to deny being
a taxpayer, and now refuses to file. She tends to recognize the validity of the
Internal Revenue Code (IRC) in general, but continues to argue that the courts
have yet to adequately prove to her that she is a taxpayer subject to the IRC’s
1
(...continued)
either by himself or by the courts, or whose return is characterized as a protest
return. See Ronald I. Mirvis, Annotation, Tax Protestor’s Failure to Submit,
or Submission of Erroneous or Incomplete Federal Income Tax Returns . . . ,
60 A.L.R. Fed. 158, 160 n.2. (1982).
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requirements. While refraining from an outright assertion that the federal income
tax laws as written are an unconstitutional direct tax that must be apportioned,
she nevertheless claims that the bankruptcy and district courts misapplied the
language and structure of the code, thus converting the tax laws into an
unconstitutional direct income tax.
That final argument, Ms. Kline’s primary argument on appeal, is articulated
as follows: although section 1 of the IRC correctly imposes a tax on the “taxable
income” of individuals, and although sections 6001 and 6011 require persons to
keep records and file a return for any tax for which that individual is liable,
Ms. Kline is not liable because “taxable income” is defined as gross income
minus certain allowable deductions for a taxable year which are made by election
of the taxpayer on the return. Had she filed a tax return, Ms. Kline argues, she
would have made herself liable to pay a tax. Because she did not file a tax return
or claim deductions, however, and because she denies being a “taxpayer” or
having a “taxable year,” she denies having taxable income and is therefore not
liable. Related to this argument, Ms. Kline claims that she is not liable for any
internal revenue tax because, without her filed returns, the government could only
prove she had “income” and not “taxable income” subject to the obligation in
section 1 of the IRC. See Aplt. Br. at 18-21; Reply Br. passim.
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Both of these arguments are circular, and similar to other frivolous
arguments that attempt through tautology to render the tax laws ineffective.
See, e.g., May v. Comm’r , 752 F.2d 1301, 1304 (8th Cir. 1985) (rejecting
argument that IRS erred in determination of “income” when no definition of
“income” is found in IRC); Martin v. Comm’r , 756 F.2d 38, 40 (6th Cir. 1985)
(rejecting as “baseless” argument from a debtor who filed tax forms with no
income information that he was technically not a taxpayer subject to IRC
obligations).
In the present case, both the bankruptcy court and the federal district court
correctly found these arguments, as well as Ms. Kline’s other, more general
claims regarding the constitutionality of the internal revenue laws, to be
unpersuasive. The bankruptcy court explained how Ms. Kline was subject to the
tax laws, and found that she had presented no evidence either to support her
objections to the claim or to refute the IRS’s income estimates for the years she
had failed to file a return. That court charitably denied her objections without
prejudice to allow her to file returns and provide some proof that those estimates
were erroneous. In greater detail, the district court carefully described the
relevant internal revenue code and bankruptcy code sections applicable to
Ms. Kline, and affirmed the bankruptcy court’s ruling. We have read the record
in this appeal and we agree with the district court that the bankruptcy court’s
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legal determinations and factual findings were not in error for substantially those
reasons set forth in the magistrate judge’s proposed findings and recommendation.
The remainder of Ms. Kline’s arguments on appeal are without merit.
Moreover, we urge her to exercise caution in presenting to a court or tribunal
future arguments that, although articulated differently from the arguments we
have consistently held to be frivolous, are independently baseless. Nevertheless,
in this particular case we are not entirely convinced that there has been a “clear
showing of bad faith which would require the imposition of damages upon
appellant.” Autorama Corp. v. Stewart , 802 F.2d 1284, 1288 (10th Cir. 1986)
(quotation omitted). Therefore, the IRS’s motion for sanctions pursuant to
Fed. R. App. P. 38 and 28 U.S.C. § 1912 is DENIED.
Ms. Kline’s motions for sanctions dated August 23, 2001, are DENIED.
All other open motions are DENIED, and the judgment of the United States
District Court for the District of New Mexico is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Stephen H. Anderson
Circuit Judge
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