Varela v. Moya

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
September 3, 2008
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
MAURICIO ARCHIE VARELA,
Petitioner - Appellant, No. 08-2043
v. (D. New Mexico)
STANLEY MOYA, Warden; (D.C. No. 6:07-cv-00456-BB-LCS)
ATTORNEY GENERAL FOR THE
STATE OF NEW MEXICO,
Respondents - Appellees.
ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
Before BRISCOE, MURPHY, and HARTZ, Circuit Judges.
Mauricio “Archie” Varela, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks a
certificate of appealability (COA) so that he may appeal the denial by the United
States District Court for the District of New Mexico of his application for relief
under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (requiring COA for state
prisoner to appeal). His application, liberally construed, raised three claims: (1)
that his right to due process was violated when the state court retroactively
defined “shooting at a dwelling” to include fatal shootings; (2) that his Sixth
Amendment right to confront the witnesses against him was violated when the
trial court admitted the written statement of an alleged co-conspirator who
testified that he did not remember making the statement; and (3) that his trial
counsel was ineffective in failing to raise the Sixth Amendment issue. The
district court denied his application, and denied his request for a COA. We
likewise deny his request for a COA and dismiss the appeal.
Mr. Varela was the driver in a drive-by shooting that claimed the life of the
father of a rival gang member. He was convicted by a jury in New Mexico state
court of accessory to first-degree felony murder and conspiracy to commit
shooting at a dwelling. The New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed those
convictions, although it set aside some enhancements and his conviction on
another charge. See State v. Varela, 993 P.2d 1280 (N.M. 1999). On remand he
was sentenced to life imprisonment plus 11 years.
A COA will issue “only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of
the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). This standard
requires “a demonstration that . . . includes showing that reasonable jurists could
debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been
resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to
deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473,
484 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). In other words, an applicant must
show that the district court’s resolution of the constitutional claim was either
“debatable or wrong.” Id.Mr. Varela’s first claim is that he was denied due process by the state
courts’ retroactive application of a new interpretation of the offense of “shooting
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at a dwelling.” Under New Mexico law a defendant is guilty of felony murder if
he commits “the killing of one human being . . . without lawful justification or
excuse . . . in the commission of or attempt to commit any felony.” N.M. Stat.
§ 30-2-1 (1978). The predicate felony for Mr. Varela’s felony-murder conviction
was “shooting at a dwelling.” That offense is defined as follows:
Shooting at a dwelling or occupied building consists of
willfully discharging a firearm at a dwelling or occupied
building. Whoever commits shooting at a dwelling or
occupied building that does not result in great bodily
harm to another person is guilty of a fourth degree
felony. Whoever commits shooting at a dwelling or
occupied building that results in injury to another person
is guilty of a third degree felony. Whoever commits
shooting at a dwelling or occupied building that results
in great bodily harm to another person is guilty of a
second degree felony.
Id. § 30-3-8A. Mr. Varela argues that the New Mexico courts improperly applied
to him a new construction of the offense of “shooting at a dwelling . . . that
results in great bodily harm,” when they ruled in his case that death is great
bodily harm. This might be a relevant argument if he were challenging a
conviction for a shooting that caused great bodily harm. But the conviction he is
challenging is a conviction of felony murder, and any felony can be the predicate
offense. If, as he contends, due process required the state court to rule that death
is not great bodily harm, then Mr. Varela was guilty of a shooting that did not
cause great bodily harm, which is a fourth-degree felony. Accordingly, even if
the state court committed error, he was not prejudiced thereby. No reasonable
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jurist could debate that the district court erred in denying Mr. Varela’s due-
process claim.
Mr. Varela’s second claim concerns the admission into evidence of a
written statement by a co-conspirator, Michael Gonzales, who testified at trial but
claimed not to remember making the written statement. Mr. Varela’s trial counsel
objected to the statement as hearsay, but did not argue that admitting the
statement violated Mr. Varela’s right to confrontation. The trial court admitted
the statement under an exception to the hearsay rule. On appeal the New Mexico
Supreme Court ruled that the written statement was inadmissible hearsay, but also
ruled that the error was harmless, because the statement was cumulative of
Gonzales’s testimony. See Varela, 993 P.2d at 1289–90.
Mr. Varela now argues that admission of Gonzales’s statement violated his
right to confront his accuser. But the law is undisputably to the contrary. The
Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed that “when the declarant appears for
cross-examination at trial, the Confrontation Clause places no constraints at all on
the use of his prior testimonial statements.” Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S.
36, 59 n.9 (2004). Because Gonzales testified, there was no confrontation-clause
violation.
Mr. Varela’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim therefore is also
baseless, because counsel is not ineffective for failing to raise a meritless issue.
See Sperry v. McKune, 445 F.3d 1268, 1275 (10th Cir. 2006).
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CONCLUSION
We DENY Mr. Varela’s request for a COA and DISMISS the appeal.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Harris L Hartz
Circuit Judge
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