Clemens v. Sutter

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
May 2, 2007
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
RO BERT J. CLEM EN S,
Petitioner-A ppellant,
v. No. 07-5004
JESSE T. SUTTER, (D.C. No. CV-06-014-K)
(N. D. Oklahoma)
Respondent-Appellee.
OR DER DENY ING A CERTIFICATE O F APPEALABILITY *
Before BRISCO E, M cK AY, and M cCO NNELL, Circuit Judges.
Robert J. Clemens, a state prisoner appearing pro se, seeks to appeal the
district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for a writ of habeas corpus
as time-barred. The matter is before this court on Clemens’ request for a
certificate of appealability (COA). Our jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. §§
1291 and 2253(a), and, because no “jurist[] of reason could conclude that the
District Court’s dismissal on procedural grounds was . . . incorrect,” Slack v.
M cD aniel, 529 U.S. 473, 485 (2000), we deny a COA and dismiss the matter.
On April 1, 2002, Clemens pled guilty in Oklahoma state court to
*
This order is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the
case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel.
manufacturing methamphetamine and was sentenced to twenty-one years of
imprisonment. Clemens made no effort to seek modification of his sentence until
January 22, 2003, when he filed a motion for judicial review, which was denied
the next day. Thereafter, on April 13, 2004, Clemens first challenged the validity
of his conviction by filing an application for state post-conviction relief seeking
an appeal out of time. That application was denied on M ay 12, 2004, and the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the state district court’s denial of
post-conviction relief on July 23, 2004. On July 14, 2005, Clemens filed a
petition for writ of habeas corpus in state district court, which was denied on
August 15, 2005. Then, on January 6, 2006, Clemens filed a petition under 28
U.S.C. § 2254 in federal court alleging numerous constitutional violations,
including ineffective assistance of counsel, and asserting actual innocence. The
federal district court denied Clemens’ petition as time-barred.
Clemens has appealed the denial of his § 2254 petition, and has filed an
application for a COA. A COA is a jurisdictional prerequisite to Clemens’
pursuit of this appeal. M iller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336 (2003). As such,
we construe Clemens’ appellate brief in support of his notice of appeal as
additional argument in support of his application for a COA. A COA may be
issued “only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a
constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). This requires Clemens to show
“that reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the
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petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues
presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Slack
529 U.S. at 484 (quotation omitted). W hen, as here, the district court’s ruling is
based on procedural grounds, the petitioner must demonstrate that “jurists of
reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the
denial of a constitutional right, and that jurists of reason would find it debatable
whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Id. at 478.
In pertinent part, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
imposes a one-year statute of limitations for § 2254 petitions, beginning on the
latest of (1) the date the judgment becomes final, (2) the date on which an
impediment created by the state in violation of the Constitution is removed, or (3)
the date on which the factual predicate of the claims presented could have been
discovered through due diligence. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)(A)-(B), (D). Because
Clemens failed to file a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, his conviction became
final on April 11, 2002, ten days after the entry of his judgment and sentence.
See Rule 4.2(A), Rules of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals, Title 22, Ch.
18 (requiring defendant to file an application to withdraw guilty plea within ten
days of the judgment and sentence in order to commence an appeal from any
conviction on a plea of guilty). Thus, Clemens had one year, from April 11, 2002
to April 11, 2003, to challenge his conviction. Clemens did not file his § 2254
petition until January 6, 2006, well after the one-year limitations period had
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expired.
Insofar as Clemens claims the one-year limitations period began at some
point after April 11, 2002, we disagree. Clemens argues that any procedural
default of the claims in his § 2254 petition is excusable under the cause and
prejudice test of Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991). This argument is
without merit. Clemens does not allege that he was unlawfully prevented from
filing a timely § 2254 petition, nor does he claim that despite his due diligence he
was unable to discover and seek timely redress of the issues he now attempts to
raise.
Nor is Clemens eligible for statutory tolling while his state post-conviction
claims were pending. Although “[t]he time during which a properly filed
application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the
pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of
limitation,” 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2), Clemens did not seek any post-conviction
relief until April 13, 2004, more than a full year beyond the April 11, 2003
deadline. 1 A collateral petition filed in state court after the limitations period has
1
As noted, C lem ens also sought judicial review under O kla. Stat. tit. 22, §
982a. Section 982a permits a state sentencing court to modify a sentence within
twelve months after imposition. Such motions seek discretionary review and their
denial is not appealable. As a result, motions to modify a sentence do not constitute
post-conviction proceedings that toll the limitations period. See, e.g., Bridges v.
Johnson, 284 F.3d 1201, 1203-04 (11th Cir. 2002) (finding petitioner’s application
before state sentence review panel seeking discretionary and non-appealable review
(continued...)
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expired no longer serves to toll the statute of limitations. See Fisher v. Gordon,
262 F.3d 1135, 1142-43 (10th Cir. 2001). Thus, Clemens’ post-conviction
proceeding commenced after the expiration of the limitations period did not toll
the limitations period. For the same reason, Clemens’ state habeas corpus
proceeding filed on July 14, 2005 did not toll the limitations period, because it
was filed more than two years after the expiration of the federal limitations
period.
W e also agree with the district court that equitable tolling is not applicable
here. Equitable tolling “is only available w hen an inmate diligently pursues his
claims and demonstrates that the failure to timely file was caused by
extraordinary circumstances beyond his control.” M arsh v. Soares, 223 F.3d
1217, 1220 (10th Cir. 2000). Clemens has not shown any extraordinary
circumstances beyond his control that prevented his filing of a timely petition.
Instead, Clemens implies that any procedural bar to his habeas claims should be
excused to prevent a fundamental miscarriage of justice because he is actually
innocent. To prevail on such a claim, Clemens “must demonstrate that, in light of
all the evidence, it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have
convicted him.” Bousely v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998) (citations
1
(...continued)
did not constitute post-conviction proceedings tolling the one-year limitations
period). And, even if Clemens’ § 982a petition did toll the limitations period for the
single day it w as pending, his § 2254 petition would still be untimely.
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omitted). He must also “support his allegations of constitutional error with new
reliable evidence – whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy
eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence – that was not presented at
trial.” Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 324 (1995). Here, Clemens’ claim of actual
innocence is vague, conclusory, and fails to identify evidence affirmatively
demonstrating his innocence. Accordingly, he has not shown the possibility of a
fundamental miscarriage of justice excusing the timeliness bar.
W e conclude that reasonable jurists would not debate the correctness of the
district court’s procedural ruling. Accordingly, we DENY Clemens’ application
for a COA and DISM ISS this matter.
Entered for the Court
M ary Beck Briscoe
Circuit Judge
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