Muse v. United States

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT July 30, 2014
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
GENE L. MUSE, individually and as
Trustee of the GENE L. MUSE
REVOCABLE LIVING TRUST dated
12-17-08,
No. 13-6266
Plaintiff - Appellant, (D.C. No. 5:12-CV-01227-HE)
(W.D. Okla.)
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant - Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before MATHESON, EBEL, and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges.
Gene L. Muse, individually and on behalf of the Gene L. Muse Revocable
Living Trust dated 12-17-08 (the Trust), claims that the United States wrongfully
levied upon the Trust’s bank account to satisfy a tax lien on the assets of Dr. Muse’s
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
former practice, Northwest Institute of Sports Medicine & Orthopaedic Surgery, PC
(Northwest). He appeals from the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the
United States. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
The United States moved for summary judgment on the following facts:
Northwest arranged for a certain insurance policy to be issued in connection with an
employee welfare benefit plan. Eventually ownership of the policy was transferred to
the Muse Family Limited Partnership (the Partnership). After some years, the policy
would decline in value if it was not surrendered for the then-applicable surrender
value. As the deadline approached, the Partnership (through Dr. Muse as its
president) transferred the policy back to Northwest. Immediately, Northwest (also
through Dr. Muse) surrendered the policy. The proceeds were placed in Northwest’s
bank account, which was subject to a tax lien. When Dr. Muse discovered where the
proceeds had been deposited, he transferred them in turn to a Northwest retirement
plan account and then to the Trust’s account, where the United States found them.
(Apparently the Trust’s account is used for the Partnership.)
In response to the summary-judgment motion, Dr. Muse contended that the
transfer to Northwest was in error, as was the deposit of the funds into Northwest’s
bank account. He conceded that legal title to the policy was transferred to Northwest,
but asserted that he and the Partnership had always retained the equitable and
beneficial ownership of the policy and therefore of the resulting funds, so that the
funds were not properly subject to the tax lien. He also pointed out that he personally
-2-
had paid taxes relating to the policy because the Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
considered the payments for the benefit plan to be constructive dividends to him. But
his memorandum brief mainly addressed the United States’ factual allegations; it
cited no case law to support the creation of an equitable and beneficial interest or to
show that the levy was wrongful. The entire “Argument and Authorities” section of
the brief was three paragraphs, with only one addressing the issue of beneficial and
equitable ownership. Aplt. App. at 160-61.
The district court granted summary judgment to the United States, stating:
[P]laintiff’s response identifies no section of law that might afford a
basis for avoiding, as to him or his trust, the reach of the levy. . . .
[P]laintiff offers only two arguments, both unsupported by citation of
authority. He argues that, at some point, he personally paid the IRS to
settle tax obligations arising from issues as to the employee benefits
transactions, but offers no evidence or argument to explain how any
such payment creates equitable ownership or some other circumstance
that might warrant protection under the tax laws. He also argues that
the money was put into the Northwest account by mistake. However,
there is no suggestion that the insurance company did anything other
than disburse the money to the policy owner. There is no suggestion
that the money was deposited anywhere other than where Northwest
instructed.
Id. at 181 (footnote omitted).
On appeal, Dr. Muse contends there is a genuine dispute of material fact
concerning the equitable and beneficial title to the policy and the funds. He faults the
district court for not “indicat[ing] the nature of the property rights of Northwest and
Plaintiff-Appellant under Oklahoma law,” Aplt. Br. at 15, and he asserts that the facts
would allow a jury to find that a resulting trust was created under Oklahoma law. In
-3-
support, his opening brief offers three pages of legal discussion, including citations to
Oklahoma and federal case law.
The problem, however, is that Dr. Muse supplied none of this legal analysis to
the district court. As stated, his district-court response cited no case law, and it never
mentioned the term “resulting trust.” Generally, a litigant cannot seek reversal on
appeal based on an argument that he did not present in the district court.
See Tele-Commc’ns, Inc. v. Comm’r, 104 F.3d 1229, 1232-33 (10th Cir. 1997). This
court “should not be considered a second-shot forum, a forum where secondary,
back-up theories may be mounted for the first time. Parties must be encouraged to
give it everything they’ve got at the trial level.” Id. at 1233 (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted); see also Lyons v. Jefferson Bank & Trust, 994 F.2d 716,
722 (10th Cir. 1993) (“issues not passed upon below” and therefore not preserved for
appeal include “a situation where a litigant changes to a new theory on appeal that
falls under the same general category as an argument presented at trial” and “a theory
that was discussed in a vague and ambiguous way” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
It is well-established that with regard to tax liens, “state law controls in
determining the nature of the legal interest which the taxpayer has in the property,”
and then, “[o]nce the court rules that property or the rights to it exist under state law,
the consequences are governed by federal law.” United States v. Cache Valley Bank,
866 F.2d 1242, 1244 (10th Cir. 1989) (per curiam). Rather than simply asserting
-4-
before the district court that he and the Partnership had an equitable and beneficial
interest in the policy, making the levy wrongful, it was Dr. Muse’s job to identify
Oklahoma authority supporting the existence of an equitable and beneficial interest in
the policy and proceeds, and federal authority establishing that such equitable and
beneficial interest exempted the proceeds from the reach of the tax lien. Instead of
furnishing such authority, he left it to the district court to determine the legal
significance of his factual assertions. Such inadequately developed arguments failed
to preserve his resulting-trust issue for appeal. See Tele-Commc’ns, Inc., 104 F.3d
at 1233-34 (holding that appellant failed to preserve argument where she presented a
single paragraph below, but later expanded the issue to a ten-page appellate
argument, “replete with examples and citations”).
An argument forfeited in the district court may be considered on appeal under
the plain-error standard. See Richison v. Ernest Grp., Inc., 634 F.3d 1123, 1130
(10th Cir. 2011). But it is the appellant’s burden to argue the plain-error factors, and
failure to do so “surely marks the end of the road for an argument for reversal not
first presented to the district court.” Id. at 1130-31. Dr. Muse has made no effort to
show his resulting-trust argument satisfies the plain-error standard, even though the
United States argued in its response brief that he failed to raise that argument in the
district court. The argument therefore also is forfeited on appeal. See id. at 1131;
McKissick v. Yuen, 618 F.3d 1177, 1189 (10th Cir. 2010).
-5-
Dr. Muse having forfeited his arguments, we are left with a situation in which
the owner of an insurance policy exercised its right to surrender the policy and placed
the proceeds in its bank account, which was subject to a tax lien. The proceeds then
were transferred, eventually, to the Trust’s account. Once property is subject to a tax
lien, “no matter into whose hands the property goes, the property passes cum onere,
or with the lien attached.” Cache Valley Bank, 866 F.2d at 1244-45. Accordingly,
Dr. Muse has failed to show any issue for trial regarding whether the levy upon the
Trust’s bank account was wrongful. The district court’s grant of summary judgment
to the United States is affirmed.
Entered for the Court
Gregory A. Phillips
Circuit Judge
-6-