Price v. United States

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
DEC 16 2004
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee, No. 04-7058
v. (D.C. Nos. 03-CV-273-WH and
98-CR-10-S)
JOSHUA PRICE III, (E.D. Okla.)
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER
Before EBEL, MURPHY and McCONNELL, Circuit Judges.
Defendant-Appellant Joshua Price appeals 1 from the district court’s
decision denying him 28 U.S.C. § 2255 relief from his federal drug convictions
and resulting sentences. Price was convicted of one count of conspiring to
distribute cocaine, violating 21 U.S.C. § 846 and § 841(a)(1); six counts of
distributing cocaine, violating 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); twelve counts of using a
communication facility to commit a felony, violating 21 U.S.C. § 843(b), and two
counts of possessing a firearm after a prior conviction, violating 18 U.S.C.
§ 922(g). See United States v. Price, 265 F.3d 1097, 1100 (10th Cir. 2001). Price
1
The district court granted Price’s request to proceed in forma
pauperis. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915.
was sentenced to life imprisonment for his conspiracy conviction and for each of
the six distribution convictions; forty-eight months for each of the twelve
convictions for using a communication facility; and 120 months for each of his
firearm-possession convictions. See id. at 1101. These sentences run
concurrently. (R. doc. 20 at 2.)
Before appealing the denial of 28 U.S.C. § 2255 relief, Price must first
obtain a certificate of appealability (COA). See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B). Price
will be entitled to a COA only if he make a “substantial showing of the denial of
a constitutional right.” Id. § 2253(c)(2). To make this showing, he must establish
that “reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the
petition should have been resolved [by the district court] in a different manner or
that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed
further.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483-84 (2000) (quotations omitted).
In his § 2255 motion, Price raised a number of claims alleging his trial
attorney had been ineffective. He seeks a COA now only on those claims alleging
his trial attorney was ineffective in failing to 1) object to the district court’s using
U.S.S.G. § 2A1.1 to calculate his sentence; 2) object to the “aggravating factors”
charged in count one (conspiracy), and in counts six and eight (distributing
cocaine); 3) object to the Government’s presenting hearsay testimony at a pretrial
evidentiary hearing; and 4) investigate and call defense witnesses during that
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pretrial evidentiary hearing. 2 (R. doc. 1 at 5-6, 8; doc. 14 at 2.) Price also raises
two new claims under Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). Further, he
challenges the district court’s refusal to conduct an evidentiary hearing. For the
following reasons, we conclude that, for each of these claims, Price has failed to
make a “substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right” sufficient to
warrant granting a COA. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).
In denying Price § 2255 relief on his ineffective-assistance claims, the
district court erred in holding that Price was responsible for his retained
attorney’s ineffectiveness. See United States v. Sanders, 372 F.3d 1183, 1185
(10th Cir. 2004) (declaring that Plaskett v. Page, 439 F.2d 770 (10th Cir. 1971),
was no longer good law in light of Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335 (1980)).
Further, the district court erred to the extent it held that Price had procedurally
defaulted his ineffective-assistance claims by not raising them on direct appeal.
See Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 503-04 (2003). Nonetheless, after
2
In the district court, Price also asserted claims alleging trial counsel
failed to 1) object when the Government did not request a special verdict form;
2) test the adversarial process because the Government failed to meet its burden
of proving Price distributed illegal drugs; 3) argue 21 U.S.C. § 841 is
unconstitutional as applied to Price; and 4) move to dismiss the count charging
Price with unlawfully possessing a .45 caliber weapon. (R. doc. 1 at 5-6, 8; doc.
14 at 2.) Price does not request a COA or otherwise reassert these claims on
appeal. We, therefore, deem Price to have waived these claims.
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considering Price’s ineffective-assistance claims, we conclude they do not warrant
a COA.
To establish a claim for ineffective assistance, Price must show both that
1) counsel’s performance was deficient and 2) the deficient performance
prejudiced Price’s defense. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687
(1984). Counsel’s performance will be deficient if it is objectively unreasonable.
See id. at 687-88. And counsel’s deficient performance will be prejudicial if
“there is a reasonable likelihood that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Id. at 694.
Price first argues that his trial attorney provided ineffective representation
during a pretrial evidentiary hearing. “Before trial, the prosecution filed a motion
to admit the out of court statements” of a government informant, Ebon Sekou
Lurks. Price, 265 F.3d at 1100. At that time, Lurks was unavailable because he
had been murdered. 3 See id. at 1100-01. The Government argued that Price “had
waived any hearsay or Confrontation Clause objections to the statements by
murdering Lurks and thus procuring Lurks’ unavailability as a witness.” Id. at
1100. After a hearing, the district court held that “the government had
3
It does not appear that the Government ever charged Price with
Lurks’s murder. Nor does it appear that the jury in this federal prosecution had to
consider whether Price murdered Lurks.
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demonstrated by a preponderance of the evidence that [Price] had procured the
unavailability of Lurks as a witness, and in so doing had waived his hearsay and
Confrontation Clause objections to the out of court statements.” Id. at 1101. The
district court, therefore, permitted the Government, at trial, to introduce Lurks’s
out of court statements.
Price now contends his attorney provided ineffective assistance during this
pretrial evidentiary hearing in three ways. First, Price asserts counsel should have
objected to the Government’s using hearsay testimony at the hearing. Because
hearsay testimony is admissible at a pretrial suppression hearing, see United
States v. Miramonted, 365 F.3d 902, 904 (10th Cir. 2004), defense counsel was
not objectively unreasonable for failing to object to the hearsay.
Price next asserts defense counsel should have investigated and presented
several witnesses at the pretrial hearing who would have testified that someone
else killed Lurks. In particular, Price contends counsel should have called Billy
Joe Spencer and Joe Pierce, who would have testified that it was Keith Titsworth
who killed Lurks. (Aplt. (2d) br. at 11.) 4 At the hearing, defense counsel elicited
testimony from FBI Agent Matthew Schneck that Spencer had identified
Titsworth as the killer. (R. doc. 6 at 8; Aplt. (2d) br. at 10.) Price has failed to
4
Price filed two opening briefs with this court, one dated May 25,
2004, and one dated September 2, 2004. We refer to the May brief as Price’s first
brief, and the September brief as his second brief.
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show how defense counsel’s not calling Spencer to testify to this same
information prejudiced Price’s defense. See James v. Gibson, 211 F.3d 543, 557
(10th Cir. 2000).
Further, according to Pierce’s sworn written statement, which Price himself
submitted in support of his § 2255 motion, Pierce denied ever indicating that
Titsworth was involved in the murder. (R. doc. 6, ex. 2.) Price, therefore, has
also failed to establish how counsel’s not calling Pierce prejudiced Price’s
defense.
Price asserts that his defense attorney should have interviewed Leonard
Jackson and Keith Titsworth, both of whom had been identified as suspects in
Lurks’s murder. (Aplt. (1st) br. at 6-7; Aplt. (2d) br. at 11.) Price, however, has
not asserted what information, beneficial to his defense, that defense counsel
would have obtained from interviewing these two men.
Additionally, Price asserts defense counsel should have called Crystal
Hayner to testify that Lurks had had trouble with some Hispanic males and that
Lurks told Hayner not to hang around Lurks because he was going to die. (Aplt.
(1st) br. at 6.) We cannot say, however, that, had counsel presented this
testimony, there is a reasonable probability that there would have been a different
outcome at either the suppression hearing or the trial. See Kimmelman v.
Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 368, 389, 390-91 (1986) (considering, in addressing
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whether trial counsel’s failure to suppress evidence prejudiced defense, whether
there was reasonable probability that, if evidence had been suppressed, jury would
have had reasonable doubt that defendant was guilty); see also United States v.
Owens, 882 F.2d 1493, 1498 (10th Cir. 1989).
Finally, Price claims defense counsel should have called his co-defendant
Sonya Parker, see United States v. Cherry, 217 F.3d 811, 813 (10th Cir. 2000), as
a witness to rebut Agent Schneck’s testimony. (Aplt. (2d) br. at 9-10.) The
evidence presented at the hearing indicated that
[t]he police . . . obtained a search warrant for the residence at which
[Price] was believed to be staying. Upon executing the search
warrant, the police found Price, a gun belonging to Price, and Price’s
blood-stained tennis shoe. DNA testing indicated a very high
probability that the blood on Price’s tennis shoe was from Lurks.
Price, 265 F.3d at 1100. According to Price, Agent Schneck testified at the
pretrial hearing that Parker, who Price describes as his live-in friend (Aplt. (1st)
br. at 4.), told police that the shoe belonged to Price. (R. doc. 6 at 13, 14; doc. 14
at 3.) In support of his § 2255 motion, Price submitted Parker’s sworn statement
that she never told police officers that the shoe belonged to Price. (Rec. doc. 6 at
14, ex. 1.) Even if defense counsel had presented Parker’s testimony to this
effect, however, we still cannot conclude that the trial court would have excluded
Lurks’s out-of-court statements. More to the point, Price has failed to show that,
had the trial court excluded Lurks’s out-of-court statements, the jury would not
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have convicted Price on these federal charges. See Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at
390-91; Owens, 882 F.2d at 1498. For these reasons, Price’s claims alleging
defense counsel was ineffective during the pretrial evidentiary hearing do not
warrant COA.
Next, Price asserts that his attorney was ineffective because he “failed to
object to the aggravating factors in counts one, six and eight.” (Aplt. (1st) Br. at
3.) Count one charged Price with conspiring to distribute cocaine, while counts
six and eight charged him with distributing cocaine or crack cocaine. Price
appears to be arguing that, because these counts did not specify the type and
quantity of drugs involved, and because the jury instructions did not require the
jury to make those findings, these convictions and the resulting sentences must be
vacated. This court addressed that issue on Price’s direct appeal. Reviewing for
plain error, this court held that, although the district court erred, the fact that
“[t]he quantity of drugs was not listed in the indictment nor submitted to the jury
to be found beyond a reasonable doubt” did not affect Price’s substantial rights. 5
5
On direct appeal, Price argued his life sentences violated Apprendi v.
New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), because the trial court had not instructed the
jury to find the quantity of drugs involved. See Price, 265 F.3d at 1101. This
court held that, because the jury never found any specific quantity of drugs, the
district court had erred in imposing seven life sentences for the conspiracy and
distribution convictions. See id. at 1108. The district court, instead, should have
sentenced Price to no more than twenty years on these seven convictions. See id.Nevertheless, this court held that this error did not affect Price’s substantial rights
(continued...)
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See Price, 265 F.3d at 1108-09. In light of that determination, Price cannot now
establish that counsel’s failure to object prejudiced his defense. See United
States v. Bailey, 286 F.3d 1219, 1222-23 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding that, since
sentencing error due to failure to instruct jury on specific drug quantity did not
affect defendant’s substantial rights under plain-error analysis, defendant also
could not establish prejudice sufficient to overcome procedural default); see also
United States v. Cook, 45 F.3d 388, 395 (10th Cir. 1995) (holding defendant who
established prejudice under Strickland also established prejudice sufficient to
excuse procedural default).
Price also asserts that his attorney was ineffective at sentencing for failing
to challenge the district court’s applying U.S.S.G. § 2A1.1 to increase his base
offense to forty-three, based upon Price’s involvement in Lurks’s murder. Price
5
(...continued)
because U.S.S.G. § 5G1.2(d) would have required the district court “to impose
twenty-year terms on [Price’s] seven drug convictions and to run those sentences,
as well as [his] sentences on the other convictions, consecutively, resulting in a
total consecutive sentence of 208 years.” Price, 265 F.3d at 1109.
It does appear that, on direct appeal, this court only addressed whether the
district court’s failure to instruct on the quantity of drugs created reversible
sentencing error. In his § 2255 motion, Price challenges the district court’s
decision not to instruct on both the quantity and type of drugs. Nonetheless, this
court’s reasoning on direct appeal would still appear to hold true.
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contends that § 2A1.1 only applies to murders occurring within the territorial or
maritime jurisdiction of the United States.
Sentencing guidelines § 2D1.1(d)(1) required the district court, in
calculating Price’s sentence for the drug trafficking conspiracy, to apply, by cross
reference, the guideline for homicide, § 2A1.1, “[i]f a victim was killed under
circumstances that would constitute murder under 18 U.S.C. § 1111 had such
killing taken place within the territorial or maritime jurisdiction of the United
States.” Section 2D1.1(d)(1) clearly does not require that the murder actually
take place within the territorial or maritime jurisdiction of the United States.
Furthermore, “courts are not bound at sentencing by the terms of a criminal
liability statute” such as 18 U.S.C. § 1111. United States v. Fortier, 180 F.3d
1217, 1229 (10th Cir. 1999). Defense counsel, therefore, was not objectively
unreasonable in failing to object to the district court’s decision to apply U.S.S.G.
§ 2A1.1.
After the district court denied Price § 2255 relief, the Supreme Court
decided Blakely v. Washington, 124 S. Ct. 2531 (2004). Price now argues to this
court that Blakely requires us to vacate his sentences because the jury never found
the type and quantity of drugs for which the district court sentenced him, and
never found that Price killed Lurks, justifying the district court’s applying
U.S.S.G. § 2A1.1.
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Ordinarily this court will not consider issues raised for the first time on
appeal. See United States v. Cooper, 375 F.3d 1041, 1051 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 2004 WL 2380728 (2004). In any event, “[i]n Blakely, a direct criminal
appeal, the Supreme Court held that the State of Washington’s sentencing
procedures violated the defendant’s constitutional right under the Sixth
Amendment because facts essential to his sentence were not proven to a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt or admitted by him.” Leonard v. United States, 383
F.3d 1146, 1147 (10th Cir. 2004). “The Court, however, did not invalidate the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines or hold that Blakely applies to the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines.” Leonard, 383 F.3d at 1147. Further, even if Blakely
does apply to the federal guidelines, it will not apply retroactively to cases on
collateral review. See United States v. Mora, 293 F.3d 1213, 1219 (10th Cir.
2002) (holding Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), does not apply
retroactively to initial habeas petitions). For these reasons, Price’s
Blakely arguments do not warrant a COA.
Lastly, Price asserts the district court erred in refusing to conduct an
evidentiary hearing on his ineffective-assistance claims. Because “the [§ 2255]
motion and the files and the records of the case conclusively show that [Price] is
entitled to no relief,” 28 U.S.C. § 2255, the district court did not err in refusing to
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conduct an evidentiary hearing. See United States v. Lopez, 100 F.3d 113, 119
(10th Cir. 1996).
For these reasons, Price has failed to establish that he is entitled to a COA
on any of his claims. We, therefore, DENY a COA and DISMISS his appeal.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
David M. Ebel
Circuit Judge
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