Fernandez v. Colvin

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT March 7, 2016
_________________________________
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
DANNY R. FERNANDEZ,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 15-1376
(D.C. No. 1:13-CV-03385-MSK)
CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting (D. Colo.)
Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant - Appellee.
_________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
_________________________________
Before BRISCOE, LUCERO, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
Danny R. Fernandez, proceeding on appeal pro se, seeks reversal of the district
court’s judgment upholding the decision of an administrative law judge (ALJ) to
deny his application for social security disability benefits. He seeks leave to proceed
on appeal in forma pauperis (IFP). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and
42 U.S.C. § 405(g). We grant the IFP request and affirm the judgment.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
ed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
I. Background
Mr. Fernandez, who was born in 1966, filed for disability insurance benefits in
1994, claiming he became disabled on February 7, 1991. His first hearing before an
ALJ was held on February 27, 1996, and the ALJ issued an unfavorable decision.
Shortly thereafter, Mr. Fernandez submitted a 1996 functional capacity evaluation
and a mental assessment, but the agency declined to consider them. He appealed to
the district court, which remanded for consideration of those documents. Three
additional administrative hearings were held on April 18, 2002, February 8, 2006,
and April 3, 2008, all resulting in unfavorable decisions and all remanded by the
district court to ensure that the 1996 functional capacity evaluation and mental
assessment had been considered. Following an unfavorable decision issued June 2,
2008, the district court again remanded with specific instructions to the ALJ. Those
instructions, issued on January 12, 2011, set the stage for this appeal, so we set them
out at length.
1. Upon remand, the case shall be assigned to an [ALJ] who has not
previously been assigned the Plaintiff’s claim and who has no
familiarity with the facts of that claim.
2. The record to be considered upon remand shall consist solely of
evidence regarding the Plaintiff’s condition and treatment occurring
during or prior to December 1997. No evidence of conditions or
treatment arising after December 1997 shall be considered, except as set
forth below.
3. The [ALJ] shall treat the following facts as established:
a. The Plaintiff’s onset date was March 13, 1996 and his last date of
insurance was December 31, 1996.
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b. The Plaintiff did not engage in any substantial gainful employment
between those dates.
c. Through December 31, 1996, the Plaintiff had the following severe
impairments: back pain; right knee instability, status post multiple
surgeries; depression; and left shoulder instability.
d. As of December 31, 1996, the Plaintiff did not have an impairment
or combination of impairments that met or exceeded any of the listed
impairments found in 20 C.F.R. 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1.
e. Absent consideration of his subjective symptoms between March 13,
1996 and December 31st, 1997, the Plaintiff’s residual functional
capacity would be that prescribed by the [ALJ] in the June 2, 2008
decision . . . .
4. Upon remand, the [ALJ’s] review shall be limited to the following
questions:
a. Whether, in light of the Luna and [Kepler] standards, the residual
functional capacity assessment should be modified in light of the
Plaintiff’s subjective complaints during the time period at issue?
b. If the residual functional capacity assessment is not modified by
those complaints, whether the Plaintiff was disabled consistent with
the [Social Security] Act during the relevant period?
c. If the residual functional capacity assessment is modified by the
Plaintiff’s subjective complaints, whether the Plaintiff, during the
time period at issue, was able to do his past relevant work or whether
there were a significant number of jobs in the national and regional
economy that he could perform?
If the [ALJ] is required to address the issue [in] (c) above, the [ALJ] may
receive such additional evidence as is necessary to resolve that issue.
Admin. R. at 896-98.
Meanwhile, on February 25, 2010, Mr. Fernandez filed an application for
supplemental security income (SSI) benefits. The ALJ assigned to hear the case
pursuant to the January 12, 2011 remand order (Remand Order) considered the new
SSI application together with the remanded issues pertinent to the application for
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disability benefits. After a hearing on December 5, 2011, the ALJ issued a decision
that was unfavorable as to Mr. Fernandez’s claim for disability benefits and favorable
as to his application for SSI benefits. Mr. Fernandez sought review in the district
court of only the unfavorable disability-benefits decision. The district court affirmed
the agency’s denial of disability benefits. Mr. Fernandez now appeals to this court,
alleging he was erroneously denied disability insurance benefits.
II. Discussion
“We review the district court’s decision de novo and independently determine
whether the ALJ’s decision is free from legal error and supported by substantial
evidence.” Fischer-Ross v. Barnhart, 431 F.3d 729, 731 (10th Cir. 2005).
“Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla and is such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Flaherty v.
Astrue, 515 F.3d 1067, 1070 (10th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). We
examine the record as a whole, but we do not reweigh the evidence. Id. We also do
not “substitute our judgment for that of the agency.” Bowman v. Astrue, 511 F.3d
1270, 1272 (10th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted).
We have liberally construed Mr. Fernandez’s pro se filings. See Erickson v.
Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam); Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux &
Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005). We do not, however, “take on the
responsibility of serving as the litigant’s attorney in constructing arguments and
searching the record.” Garrett, 425 F.3d at 840. Moreover, “pro se parties [must]
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follow the same rules of procedure that govern other litigants.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted).
On appeal Mr. Fernandez asserts the time period for which he is claiming
disability benefits was not limited to the period of March 13, 1996 through
December 31, 1997. He apparently argues that the applicable time period began in
1994, when he filed his initial application for disability benefits, and continued
beyond December 31, 1997. Mr. Fernandez does not claim that the ALJ failed to
follow the Remand Order when he limited his review to the time period of March 13,
1996 through December 31, 1997. To the extent Mr. Fernandez challenges the
Remand Order, we do not have jurisdiction to review that order because the time for
appealing it has long passed. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(1)(B) (providing that notice of
appeal from district court’s order was due within 60 days); Coll v. First Am. Title Ins.
Co., 642 F.3d 876, 886 (10th Cir. 2011) (holding litigant’s failure to file a timely
notice of appeal from district court order deprived appellate court of jurisdiction to
review the order).
Mr. Fernandez also argues that the ALJ should have considered the testimony
of the vocational expert (VE) who testified at his most recent hearing on December 5,
2011, rather than rely on the VE testimony from the April 3, 2008 hearing. The
Remand Order directed the ALJ to determine whether Mr. Fernandez’s residual
functional capacity (RFC) should be modified in light of his subjective complaints.
The ALJ conducted a thorough analysis of Mr. Fernandez’s complaints of pain and
depression. The ALJ determined, pursuant to Luna v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 161, 163-64
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(10th Cir. 1987), and Kepler v. Chater, 68 F.3d 387, 390 (10th Cir. 1995), that
Mr. Fernandez had established a pain-producing impairment by objective medical
evidence and that there was a loose nexus between the impairment and his subjective
allegations of pain. But the ALJ concluded that Mr. Fernandez had not established
the third requirement—to establish that his pain and depression were disabling.
Therefore, the ALJ determined that Mr. Fernandez’s RFC established at the April 3,
2008 hearing did not need to be modified. Consequently, the VE’s testimony at the
December 5, 2011 hearing concerning Mr. Fernandez’s abilities as of February 25,
2010, when he filed for SSI, was irrelevant to his condition before his insured status
expired on December 31, 1996. To be entitled to disability benefits, he was required
to establish his disability as of December 31, 1996. See Flaherty, 515 F.3d at 1069.
We also construe Mr. Fernandez’s brief as including a challenge to the ALJ’s
determination that his subjective complaints were not disabling. The ALJ was
instructed on remand to accept the RFC assessment from 2008, but to evaluate
whether the RFC should be modified after considering Mr. Fernandez’s subjective
complaints. As noted, the ALJ determined that the subjective complaints were not
disabling and did not warrant modifying the RFC.
The Remand Order directed the ALJ to consider only evidence dated before
December 31, 1997. The evidence pertaining to Mr. Fernandez’s subjective
complaints was as follows:
Mr. Fernandez had shoulder surgery in 1991 due to a work-related injury, with
good results. In a 1994 personal pain questionnaire, Mr. Fernandez said he had pain
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in his left shoulder and right knee that restricted his activities. He did not take
medication, but treated the pain with sports cream, hot baths, and ice packs. In spite
of his pain, he continued to ride a bike, hike, fish, play pool, and do housework. In
1996, he testified that his shoulder and knee pain did not respond to medication and
he spent most of the day lying down or sitting, but he was able to do yard work, play
pool, ride a bike, and walk for a couple of hours with intermittent resting.
In 1994, David Crosson, M.D., assessed Mr. Fernandez, concluding that
although he had an unstable right knee and some non-severe shoulder pain, he was
capable of performing sedentary work. Mr. Fernandez also reported low-back pain in
1994 and after treatment, his physicians reported significant improvement. In March
1996, Jolene Daulton, a physical therapist, evaluated Mr. Fernandez’s physical work
restrictions, opining that he was limited in his abilities to lift, walk, stand, sit, climb,
and bend. She did not attempt to evaluate his pain except to state that he reported
shoulder and back pain.
Mr. Fernandez underwent several surgeries to his right knee and made good
recovery following each surgery, although in February 1997, his treating physician,
Stewart Weinerman, M.D., indicated that Mr. Fernandez would probably have future
problems with his knee.1 In a March 1997 assessment, Dr. Weinerman noted no
shoulder restrictions and indicated that Mr. Fernandez could perform sedentary work.
1
As noted above, to be eligible for disability insurance benefits,
Mr. Fernandez had to establish that he was disabled before December 31, 1996. See
Flaherty, 515 F.3d at 1069. Dr. Weinerman’s 1997 prediction of future knee
(continued)
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As for psychological limitations, in July 1996, Steve Martin, M.D., completed
a consultative psychological evaluation. He diagnosed Mr. Fernandez with major
depression, moderate, and pain syndrome with psychological factors. Dr. Martin
recommended an antidepressant, which Mr. Fernandez refused, psychotherapy, and a
reduction in alcohol consumption. In 1997, Mr. Fernandez received treatment from
Jose G. Vega, Ph. D., whose treatment notes indicated that Mr. Fernandez’s
depression was situational and that Mr. Fernandez intended to return to the
workforce.
The ALJ found Mr. Fernandez’s claims of disabling pain not credible.
“Credibility determinations are peculiarly the province of the finder of fact, and we
will not upset such determinations when supported by substantial evidence.
However, findings as to credibility should be closely and affirmatively linked to
substantial evidence and not just a conclusion in the guise of findings.” Newbold v.
Colvin, 718 F.3d 1257, 1267 (10th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“[D]isability requires more than mere inability to work without pain.” Brown v.
Bowen, 801 F.2d 361, 362 (10th Cir. 1986).
The ALJ’s determination that Mr. Fernandez’s pain and depression were not
disabling is affirmatively linked to substantial evidence in the record, including the
medical and psychological reports, the opinions stating that he could perform
sedentary work, the ALJ’s observation that many of the medical reports did not
problems did not establish that Mr. Fernandez was disabled before December 31,
1996.
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indicate that Mr. Fernandez complained of severe pain, and Mr. Fernandez’s own
reports of daily activities. Thus, we will not upset this determination.
III. Conclusion
Mr. Fernandez’s request to proceed IFP is granted. The judgment of the
district court is affirmed.
Entered for the Court
Mary Beck Briscoe
Circuit Judge
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