Halpin v. Simmons

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
March 19, 2007
FO R TH E TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
D O N A LD EU G EN E H A LPIN ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 06-3034
(D.C. No. 01-CV-3188-M LB)
CHARLES E. SIM M ONS, Secretary (D . Kan.)
of K ansas Department of Corrections;
M ICHAEL W . M OORE, Secretary of
Florida D epartment of Corrections;
ROBERT M . PORTER, Interstate
Compact Coordinator for Florida
Department of Corrections; PATTI
DYESS, Assistant Administrator for
Florida D epartment of Corrections;
ELLEN B. ROBERTS, Classification
Services, Bureau of Inmate
Classification and M anagement for
Florida D epartment of Corrections;
NADIN E K. BELK, Prison Health
Services Administrator at Lansing
Correctional Facility; CH AR LES
HAVNER, Prison Health Services
Dentist; ELIZABETH L. RICE, Unit
Team M anager, Lansing Correctional
Facility; STA TE O F KANSAS,
Defendants,
and
W ILLIA M L. CUM M INGS, Deputy
Secretary of Kansas Department of
Corrections; DA VID R . M CK UN E,
W arden of Kansas Department of
Corrections; PRISONER HEALTH
SERVICES, INC.; AKIN AYENI,
Prison Health Services State M edical
Director for Kansas Department of
C orrections; STEPH EN D A Y AN,
Prison Health Services M edical
Physician; SA NDIP N AIK, Prison
Health Services M edical Physician;
ANGELA GOEHRING, Senior Health
Services A dministrator, Prison Health
Services, Inc.; CA RLOS PETIT,
Prison Health Services M edical
Physician; JAM ES R. BAKER, Prison
Health Services M edical Physician;
DUANE M UCKENTHALER, Unit
Team M anager, Lansing Correctional
Facility,
Defendants-A ppellees.
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before TY M K O VIC H, A ND ER SO N, and BALDOCK , Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff-appellant Donald Eugene Halpin, a prisoner appearing pro se,
appeals from the district court’s order granting summary judgment to
defendants-appellees on his claim that they were deliberately indifferent to his
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent w ith Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
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serious medical needs in violation of the Eighth Amendment. W e have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm in part and vacate and remand in
part.
This is the second appeal in this case. Appellant was convicted in 1980 in
Florida and was originally housed there. He was transferred in July 1997 to
Lansing, Kansas, and w as moved back to Florida in December 2003. He had tw o
heart attacks while originally in Florida and arrived in Kansas already sick and on
m edication. H e also developed a serious skin infection and sinus problems. H e
filed suit in M ay 2001, asserting various claims related to his health care against
numerous defendants in Kansas and Florida. After the district court dismissed the
complaint, we held in the prior appeal that appellant had stated a claim for
deliberate indifference, and we remanded this sole claim. On remand, appellant
filed an amended complaint and the case proceeded to the summary judgment
stage. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. In a sixty-two
page memorandum and order, the district court analyzed the record and granted
summary judgment to appellees.
Appellant argues in this appeal that the district court erred by: (1) granting
summary judgment to appellees; (2) failing to give him notice before he filed his
brief in opposition of the requirements of summary judgment, including that he
needed an affidavit from a medical expert; (3) granting summary judgment prior
to the completion of discovery; (4) denying his repeated requests for appointment
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of counsel; and (5) denying him leave to file a second amended complaint adding
claims asserting the denial of medical treatment by the Kansas defendants after
the filing of this lawsuit and that defendants retaliated against him for filing this
lawsuit.
W e consider appellant’s last issue first. The magistrate judge denied
appellant leave to amend on the ground that he failed to show that he had
exhausted administrative remedies on the claims he wished to add, as was
required at the time of the magistrate judge’s order by Steele v. Federal Bureau of
Prisons, 355 F.3d 1204, 1210 (10th Cir. 2003); overruled by Jones v. Bock,
127 S. Ct. 910 (Jan. 22, 2007). See R., Doc. 124, at 1-3. The requirement that
inmates specially plead or demonstrate exhaustion was recently rejected by the
Supreme Court in Jones v. Bock, 127 S. Ct. at 921. See Smith v. Cowman,
No. 06-3272, slip op. at 3 (10th Cir. M ar. 1, 2007). Appellees argue that
appellant’s argument is waived because he did not file objections to the
magistrate judge’s order denying leave to amend. Because the magistrate judge’s
order did not inform appellant that a failure to object on any issue would result in
a waiver, however, our waiver rule does not apply. See R., Doc. 124;
M orales-Fernandez v. INS, 418 F.3d 1116, 1119 (10th Cir. 2005). W e vacate the
denial of appellant’s motion for leave to file a second amended complaint and
remand the matter for reconsideration in light of Jones v. Bock, 127 S. Ct. 910.
See Smith, No. 06-3272, slip op. at 3.
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W e are otherwise unpersuaded by appellant’s claims of error. W e review
the grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standard as the
district court under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). M acKay v. Farnsworth, 48 F.3d 491,
492 (10th Cir. 1995). W e will affirm if the district court correctly determined
that “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law .” Rule 56(c). W hether the district court
was required to provide appellant advance notice of the requirements of opposing
summary judgment is a legal question that we also review de novo. Dang v.
U N U M L ife Ins. C o. of A m., 175 F.3d 1186, 1189 (10th Cir. 1999). W e review a
district court’s discovery rulings for an abuse of discretion. The Procter &
Gamble Co. v. Haugen, 427 F.3d 727, 742-43 (10th Cir. 2005). W e also review
the denial of a motion for appointment of counsel for an abuse of discretion. Hill
v. SmithKline Beecham Corp., 393 F.3d 1111, 1115 (10th Cir. 2004).
W e reject appellant’s argument that the district court should have provided
him advance notice of the requirements of opposing appellees’ motion for
summary judgment, including that he needed an affidavit from a medical expert.
The authorities upon which appellant relies are from other circuits, not this court,
and, in any event, they require only that a district court provide notice to a pro se
prisoner litigant of the general requirements of summary judgment, as stated in
Rule 56(e) and also in plain English. See Neal v. Kelly, 963 F.2d 453, 456-57
(D .C. Cir. 1992); Timms v. Frank, 953 F.2d 281, 283-85 (7th Cir. 1992).
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Rule 56(e) states generally that “the adverse party’s response, by affidavits or as
otherw ise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is
a genuine issue for trial.” Appellant’s cited authorities do not require a district
court to provide specific notice to a pro se prisoner litigant that he needs an
affidavit from a medical expert. See Neal, 963 F.2d at 456-57; Timms v. Frank,
953 F.2d at 283-85.
Our ow n case, Jaxon v. Circle K Corp., 773 F.2d 1138, 1140 (10th Cir.
1985), also should not be read that broadly. Although we stated in Jaxon that
“[d]istrict courts must take care to insure that pro se litigants are provided with
proper notice regarding the complex procedural issues involved in summary
judgment proceedings,” id. (quotation omitted), all we required in that case was
that the district court grant a continuance so that the pro se litigant would have “a
meaningful opportunity to remedy the obvious defects in his summary judgment
materials,” when the litigant had asked for more time to do so, id. (quotation
omitted). Appellant has past litigation experience from many other lawsuits he
has filed, and his filings in this case demonstrate that he already knew, without
any special prior notice from the district court, that he needed to produce
evidence in support of his opposition to appellees’ motion for summary judgment.
See M cPherson v. Coombe, 174 F.3d 276, 281 (2d Cir. 1999). W e are
unpersuaded in the circumstances of this case that any special notice was
required.
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W e are likew ise unconvinced that the district court granted summary
judgment prior to the completion of discovery. Appellant participated in a
scheduling conference that produced an extensive scheduling order. R., Doc. 71.
Appellant acknowledges that the deadline for completion of discovery was
October 28, 2005. Aplt. Opening Br. at 14. Although he asserts that he requested
more time for discovery, id. at 13, he does not point to any order granting his
request and extending the deadline. Therefore, we cannot conclude that the
district court abused its discretion.
Appellant also argues that the district court erred by denying his repeated
requests for appointment of counsel. Appellees argue that the issue is waived
because appellant failed to object to the magistrate judge’s rulings. Although the
magistrate judge denied appellant’s first motion for counsel, the district court
denied the second motion by implication of granting summary judgment to
appellees. R., Doc. 269. The district court ended the case by entering judgment,
R., Doc. 270, before the magistrate judge entered her order purporting to deny as
moot a number of motions, including appellant’s motion for appointment of
counsel, id., Doc. 271. Therefore, appellant’s challenge to the denial of counsel
is not waived. Nevertheless, we find no abuse of discretion in the district court’s
implicit denial of appellant’s motion for counsel, since the district court correctly
determined that there were no triable issues of fact. 28 U.S.C. § 1915 does not
require the district court to appoint counsel.
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Finally, with regard to the grant of summary judgment, we have carefully
reviewed the parties’ materials in light of the applicable law . W e are
unpersuaded by appellant’s claims of error and affirm the grant of summary
judgment for substantially the same reasons as those set forth in the district
court’s thorough and well-written memorandum and order.
AFFIRM ED in part and VACATED in part and REM ANDED for additional
proceedings.
Entered for the Court
Timothy M . Tymkovich
Circuit Judge
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