Lyles v. Barnhart

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
May 23, 2006
FO R TH E TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
STEPH EN LY LES,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 04-7074
(D.C. No. 03-CV-418-W )
JO A NN E B. BA RN HA RT, (E.D. Okla.)
Commissioner, Social Security
Administration,
Defendant-Appellee.
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before PO RFILIO, B AL DOC K , and EBEL, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff Stephen Lyles appeals the district court’s order upholding the
Commissioner’s denial of his application for social security disability and
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and
collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and
judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and
conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
supplemental security income benefits. W e exercise jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291 and affirm.
Background
M r. Lyles claims disability since October 15, 1998, due to injuries
sustained in a motor vehicle accident, including a fractured hip with sequelae, a
splenectomy, hypertension, obesity, and depression. An administrative law judge
(ALJ) held a hearing at which M r. Lyles was represented by counsel. In addition
to M r. Lyles’ testimony, the A LJ received testimony from a vocational expert
about the jobs that could be performed by someone with M r. Lyles’ abilities and
limitations. The ALJ applied the five-part sequential evaluation process. See
Fischer-Ross v. Barnhart, 431 F.3d 729, 731 (10th Cir. 2005) (describing five
steps). He determined at step two that M r. Lyles did not have a severe mental
impairment, and at step five that he retained the residual functional capacity
(RFC) to perform a wide range of light-level exertional jobs that existed in the
local and national economies.
The Appeals Council denied review, thus making the ALJ’s decision the
final decision of the Commissioner. See Jensen v. Barnhart, 436 F.3d 1163, 1164
(10th Cir. 2006). The district court affirmed the Commissioner’s decision.
Legal Framework
W e review the Commissioner’s decision to ascertain whether it is supported
by substantial evidence in the record and to evaluate whether she applied the
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correct legal standards. Grogan v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 1257, 1261 (10th Cir.
2005). “Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla and is such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”
Id. W e do not reweigh the evidence or retry the case, but we “meticulously
examine the record as a whole, including anything that may undercut or detract
from the ALJ’s findings in order to determine if the substantiality test has been
met.” Id. at 1262.
In this context, “disability” requires both an “inability to engage in any
substantial gainful activity” and “a physical or mental impairment, which
provides reason for the inability.” Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 217 (2002)
(internal quotation marks omitted). The impairment must be a “‘medically
determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in
death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not
less than 12 months. . . .’” Fischer-Ross, 431 F.3d at 731 (quoting 42 U.S.C.
§ 423(d)(1)(A)).
On appeal, M r. Lyles asserts that the ALJ erred by failing to recognize his
severe mental impairments and failed to develop the record on this point. He also
contends that the ALJ failed to include all of his physical limitations in his RFC,
because the RFC assessment did not properly consider his left elbow condition or
his limited ability to stand or walk.
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M ental Impairm ents
According to M r. Lyles, the ALJ erred in finding at step two that he did not
have a severe mental impairment. He maintains that the evidence of his mental
impairment was sufficient to satisfy the step-two “de minimis” showing, see
Grogan, 399 F.3d at 1263, and to trigger the ALJ’s duty to develop the record.
The ALJ has a duty “to ensure that an adequate record is developed during
the disability hearing consistent with the issues raised” in the nonadversarial
setting of a disability hearing. Hawkins v. Chater, 113 F.3d 1162, 1164 (10th Cir.
1997) (quotation omitted). Even so, the burden is on the claimant to prove his
disability. Id. “Ordinarily, the claimant must in some fashion raise the issue
sought to be developed which, on its face, must be substantial. Specifically, the
claimant has the burden to make sure there is, in the record, evidence sufficient to
suggest a reasonable possibility that a severe impairment exists.” Id. at 1167(citations omitted). If he does so, then the ALJ’s duty to order a consultative
examination arises. Id. “Isolated and unsupported comments by the claimant are
insufficient, by themselves, to raise the suspicion of the existence of a
nonexertional impairment.” Id.At the beginning of the hearing, M r. Lyles’ attorney requested more
psychological testing for M r. Lyles. The ALJ decided to go ahead with the
testimony because it would help him decide whether further testing was indicated
and, if so, what kind of testing was required. During the hearing, the ALJ invited
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M r. Lyles and his counsel to obtain and submit additional psychological
documentation. The ALJ then ordered that the record be held open to permit the
receipt of these records, and M r. Lyles later provided them. Nevertheless,
M r. Lyles argues that the ALJ should have ordered further psychological testing.
The record evidence of M r. Lyles’ mental impairment consists of (1) two
brief m entions of depression in October 1998 and November 2000, which we
conclude are too remote in time and too brief to warrant consideration,
(2) a mental status exam performed by Larry Vaught, Ph.D., on M ay 24, 2001,
(3) a psychiatric review technique (PRT) form prepared by Janice Smith, Ph.D.,
on June 15, 2001, and (4) a mental RFC form prepared by R. Coffey, a licensed
counselor, on February 6, 2003.
Dr. Vaught diagnosed M r. Lyles with “Depressive Disorder, NOS,” and
“Social A nxiety (provisional).” R. at 285. He found that M r. Lyles had mild
difficulty in sustained concentration and persistence, and poor ability to perform
calculations. He noted that M r. Lyles reported that his social anxiety did not
prevent him from working. He concluded that M r. Lyles’ functioning was normal
in the areas of short-term memory, abstraction, and judgment for hypothetical
situations. 1
1
M r. Lyles asserts that Dr. Vaught’s opinion is not complete and therefore is
not persuasive. Because he does not explain why, we decline to consider this
argument. See Eateries, Inc. v. J.R. Simplot Co., 346 F.3d 1225, 1232 (10th Cir.
2003) (holding unsupported appellate argument insufficient to invoke appellate
review).
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Dr. Smith likewise opined that M r. Lyles suffered from “Depressive
Disorder NOS,” id. at 290, and “Social Anxiety (Provisional),” id. at 292. She
found no more than “mild” functional limitations, id. at 297, and concluded that
M r. Lyles’ mental impairment was “nonsevere,” id. at 301.
W e next consider the mental RFC assessment prepared by M r. Coffey.
Although he stated that M r. Lyles had mild, moderate, or marked limitations in all
areas of functioning, the ALJ properly discounted or disregarded this opinion for
two reasons: first, M r. Coffey’s opinions were not accompanied by a rationale or
diagnosis, and second, he was not an “acceptable medical source,” see 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.1513(a); 416.913(a) (listing types of medical sources who can provide
evidence of medically determinable impairments). In addition, M r. Coffey’s
opinion differed from those of Drs. Vaught and Smith.
M r. Lyles testified about his mental impairment. He stated that he took
medication that improved his mood swings, although he continued to have
nightmares every two or three months. In addition, he became nervous in crowds
and around strangers. Even so, he was able to go shopping and attend church.
W e conclude that the A LJ’s determination at step two that M r. Lyles’
mental impairment was not severe is supported by substantial evidence in the
record as a whole. Neither of the “acceptable medical sources,” Drs. Vaught and
Smith, indicated that M r. Lyles had a severe mental impairment, and the ALJ
properly discounted M r. Coffey’s opinion. Cf. Branum v. Barnhart, 385 F.3d
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1268, 1272 (10th Cir. 2004) (noting consultative psychological exam required
where only other records did not come from an acceptable medical source).
W e also determine that the evidence of M r. Lyles’ mental impairment was
insufficient to trigger the ALJ’s duty to develop the record further than he did
when he received the additional psychological evidence following the hearing,
because the evidence before the ALJ did not “suggest a reasonable possibility that
a severe impairment exist[ed].” Hawkins, 113 F.3d at 1167 (citations omitted).
Physical RFC
M r. Lyles next argues that the ALJ erred by not including all of his
physical limitations in his RFC determination. Specifically, he maintains that the
ALJ failed to consider the limitations imposed by his left elbow, and that the RFC
for light work requiring an ability to stand or walk for six hours in an eight-hour
day disregarded his treating physician’s opinion that he could not “be on his feet
all the time.” R. at 245.
The record establishes, as the ALJ recognized, that M r. Lyles sustained a
ligamentous injury to his left elbow in the 1998 car accident. This injury caused
degenerative changes with stiffness and limitation of motion, as diagnosed by
Drs. A llard, Taylor, and Elliott. But no medical expert indicated that this
condition was disabling. To prove disability, a claimant “must furnish medical
and other evidence of the existence of [a] disability.” Branum, 385 F.3d at 1271;
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see also Kelley v. Chater, 62 F.3d 335, 338 (10th Cir. 1995) (reviewing medical
evidence, noting that no physician had stated claimant was disabled).
M oreover, although M r. Lyles testified that his left elbow condition
prevented him from lifting a fifty-pound bag of cattle feed, the ALJ’s RFC
assessment required him to lift and carry up to twenty pounds occasionally, and
ten pounds frequently. Further, M r. Lyles testified that he could lift twenty
pounds for one-third of a work day and that he could lift the fifty-pound bag of
cattle feed with his right arm. Accordingly, we conclude that although M r. Lyles
had degenerative changes in his left elbow that caused stiffness and limited
the range of motion, he failed to meet his burden to show that this condition
was disabling.
Finally, we address M r. Lyles’ challenge to the ALJ’s determination that he
could “sit, stand or walk up to 6 hours in an 8 hour work day.” R. at 23. W e first
reject M r. Lyles’ interpretation that the ALJ left two hours of the work day
unaccounted for. Rather, we conclude that the ALJ determined that M r. Lyles
could stand or walk for six hours, with normal breaks; the remaining work time
would be spent sitting. This is the schedule indicated by Dr. Rutter’s physical
RFC assessment, which the ALJ gave “great weight” because it was consistent
with the medical evidence of record. Id. at 18.
M r. Lyles argues that the ALJ disregarded the opinion of his treating
physician, Dr. Allard. In his report of April 1999, Dr. Allard stated,
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it would be a great idea for [M r. Lyles] to be able to go back to
school and learn a trade that would not require him to be on his feet
all the time. He has no particular restrictions . . . but I think it would
be impossible for him to be on his feet 8 hours a day, 40 hours a
week, doing any type of manual labor for any length of time.
R. at 245. Contrary to M r. Lyles’ assertion, the ALJ considered Dr. Allard’s later
opinion, made in October 1999, that M r. Lyles had no particular restrictions.
Id. at 16. That opinion concurs with Dr. Rutter’s February 2003 physical RFC
assessment which, in turn, is consistent with Dr. Feigel’s June 2001 physical RFC
assessment. M oreover, the ALJ “is not required to discuss every piece of
evidence in the record” as long as he “discuss[es] the uncontroverted evidence he
chooses not to rely on, as well as significantly probative evidence he rejects.’”
Threet v. Barnhart, 353 F.3d 1185, 1190 (10th Cir. 2003) (quoting Clifton v.
Chater, 79 F.3d 1007, 1010 (10th Cir. 1996)). W e conclude that the A LJ’s
decision complies with this rule.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Bobby R. Baldock
Circuit Judge
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