United States v. Salazar-Garcia

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
September 20, 2006
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
__________________________ Clerk of Court
U N ITED STA TES O F A M ER ICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 05-4100
(D. Utah)
SA NTOS SA LAZAR-GARCIA, aka (D.Ct. No. 2:04-CR-198-PGC)
Rafael Lopez-Parra, aka Julian Torres,
aka Jose Rafael Garcia-Perez, aka
Daniel Casaress, aka Jose Lopez,
Defendant - Appellant.
____________________________
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before KELLY, O’BRIEN, and TYM KOVICH, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
On April 7, 2004, Santos Salazar-G arcia and his common-law wife, Gloria
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the
citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under
the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Barragan-Cerna, were indicted on two counts of possession of controlled
substances with intent to distribute in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 18
U.S.C. § 2. Barragan-Cerna pled guilty to one count of the indictment, leaving
Salazar-Garcia as the sole defendant at trial. The government then filed a
superseding indictment against Salazar-G arcia, adding charges for conspiracy to
distribute marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 and illegal reentry after
deportation in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. After a two day trial, the jury
returned a guilty verdict on all four counts. Salazar-Garcia was sentenced to 240
months imprisonment. On appeal, he argues the trial court erred by admitting at
trial a comment Salazar-Garcia made to his wife while they were being detained.
W e AFFIRM .
I. Background
Salazar-Garcia and Barragan-Cerna were stopped by a Utah Highway Patrol
trooper for speeding. After checking Salazar-G arcia’s license (subsequently
determined to contain a fictitious name) and vehicle registration, the officer
realized the vehicle was not registered to either Salazar-Garcia or Barragan-
Cerna. During the course of the stop, both Salazar-Garcia and Barragan-Cerna
appeared nervous. The officer also observed the vehicle had been freshly painted
and had new carpeting. He also noticed loose screws sitting in the vehicle and a
strong odor of car fresheners and coffee grounds. The officer asked Salazar-
Garcia if there were drugs in the car, which he denied. The officer then obtained
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Salazar-Garcia’s consent to search the vehicle. W hile examining the rear of the
vehicle, the officer discovered a hidden compartment containing drugs, later
determined to be 51.81 kilograms of marijuana and eleven kilograms of cocaine.
The officer arrested the pair and advised them of their rights. They were
transported to the Juab County Jail, where they were searched and detained in
separate holding cells. Two D rug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents,
with the aid of a Spanish interpreter, were set to interview Salazar-Garcia and
Barragan-Cerna separately, starting with Barragan-Cerna. As Barragan-Cerna
was escorted from her holding cell, she passed Salazar-Garcia’s cell which was
across the hall. Salazar-Garcia shouted something to Barragan-Cerna in Spanish.
The interpreter informed the DEA agents that Salazar-Garcia had told Barragan-
Cerna “not to say anything.” (V ol. IV. at 79.) The DEA agents apparently did
not record the encounter in their notes and informed the government attorney of
this statement only a week before trial. Salazar-G arcia w as subsequently
interview ed by the DEA agents and provided some information about himself
before invoking his right to remain silent.
Prior to trial, Salazar-Garcia objected to the government’s plan to introduce
his comm ent to Barragan-Cerna as evidence of a guilty mind. Relying on Doyle
v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976), Salazar-G arcia argued the statement was inherently
ambiguous and should be excluded under Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence as it was more prejudicial than probative. The district court rejected
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Salazar-Garcia’s argument and ruled the statement admissible, subject to a
limiting instruction. At trial, the government introduced the statement through
one of the DEA agents who was escorting Barragan-Cerna and to whom the
statement was translated. In its instructions to the jury, the district court stated
Salazar-Garcia “had a right to remain silent and was advised of that right. He
could also inform other people of that right. If you find that he made this
statement, and further that his intent was to inform M s. Barragan-Cerna of her
legal rights, you should completely disregard the statement.” (Vol. I, Doc. 97 at
19.)
II. Discussion
On appeal, Salazar-Garcia repeats the arguments made to the district court.
He invokes the reasoning of Doyle in support of his argument that his comm ent
should have been excluded under Rule 403 because statements about a
defendant’s right to silence are inherently ambiguous and therefore not
sufficiently probative to outweigh their prejudicial effect.
W e review decisions to admit evidence under Rule 403 for an abuse of
discretion. United States v. Rodriguez, 192 F.3d 946, 949 (10th Cir. 1999).
“U nder the abuse of discretion standard, we w ill not overturn the district court’s
decision unless we are firmly convinced that the district court made a clear error
of judgment or exceeded the bounds of permissible choice in the circumstances.”
United States v. M agleby, 241 F.3d 1306, 1315 (10th Cir. 2001) (quotations
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omitted), cert. denied, 126 S.Ct. 1879 (2006). In doing so, “we defer to the trial
court’s judgment because of its first-hand ability to view the witness or evidence
and assess credibility and probative value.” M oothart v. Bell, 21 F.3d 1499, 1504
(10th Cir. 1994).
Rule 403 allows a court to exclude relevant evidence “if its probative value
is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time,
or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.” F ED . R. E VID . 403. “The trial
court has broad discretion to determine w hether prejudice inherent in otherwise
relevant evidence outweighs its probative value.” United States v. Youts, 229
F.3d 1312, 1319 (10th Cir. 2000). “Evidence is not unfairly prejudicial simply
because it is detrimental to a party’s case.” M agleby, 241 F.3d at 1315; see also
United States v. M artinez, 938 F.2d 1078, 1082 (10th Cir. 1991) (same). Unfair
prejudice “refers to relevant evidence that has ‘an undue tendency to suggest
decision on an improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily an emotional
one.’” Stump v. Gates, 211 F.3d 527, 538 (10th Cir. 2000) (quoting 1972
Advisory Committee’s N otes to F ED . R. E VID . 403). “W e have stated on
numerous occasions that the exclusion of relevant evidence under Rule 403 is an
extraordinary remedy to be used sparingly.” Wheeler v. John Deere Co., 862 F.2d
1404, 1408 (10th Cir. 1988) (quotations omitted).
In Doyle, the Supreme Court held that a defendant’s post-arrest post-
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M iranda warning silence could not be used against him at trial, even to impeach.
426 U.S. at 617-18 (discussing M iranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966)). The
Supreme Court reasoned that a defendant’s post-M iranda warning silence was
“insolubly ambiguous” because “[s]ilence in the wake of these warnings may be
nothing more than the arrestee’s exercise of [his] M iranda rights.” Id. at 617.
However, as Salazar-G arcia concedes, this is not an actual Doyle situation
because Salazar-Garcia’s words, not his silence, are being used against him. 1
Rather, Salazar-Garcia attempts to extend the reasoning of Doyle to cases where a
defendant comments on his, or another’s, right to silence. The First Circuit
confronted a similar argument in United States v. Lopez-Lopez and held that
“[w ]hen an accused is given his M iranda rights, and then waives those rights by
voluntarily making statements, he may not rely on Doyle to object to the
admission of those statements simply because the statements refer to the act of
keeping silent.” 282 F.3d 1, 12 (1st Cir. 2002) (upholding the admission of one
defendant’s terse “don’t answer” comment to another defendant). W e agree and
find Doyle inapposite to this case.
This outcome is especially appropriate w here, as here, the defendant’s
comment was not about his or another party’s right to remain silent, but rather a
1
We highlight that we are not confronted in this case with the express invocation
of the right to silence by a defendant. At best, it is a comment about the existence of
another’s right to silence.
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comm and to a co-defendant “not to say anything.” (Vol. IV at 79.) W hile the
former might be insolubly ambiguous, the latter clearly allows for the possibility
that the defendant is urging a co-conspirator not to reveal incriminating
information. Thus, a jury is free to infer a guilty mind from a statement by one
defendant to another to not say anything to the police. See Lopez-Lopez, 282 F.3d
at 13 (comment by one defendant that the other should not answer questions
“tends to be incriminating” but is not “powerfully” so).
Salazar-Garcia concedes his comment to Barragan-Cerna “may infer some
knowledge of guilt but certainly does not present conclusive evidence of his state
of mind.” (Appellant’s Br. at 10.) But providing “conclusive evidence” of a
defendant’s state of mind is not the standard for admissibility. Salazar-Garcia’s
comment to Barragan-Cerna is undoubtedly relevant. See F ED . R. E VID . 401
(“‘Relevant evidence’ means evidence having any tendency to make the existence
of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.”) (emphasis
added). And Salazar-G arcia provides no basis, other than his unsuccessful Doyle
challenge, to establish that the probative value of admitting his comment is
substantially outweighed by any unfair prejudice resulting from its admission.
See M agleby, 241 F.3d at 1315 (“Evidence is not unfairly prejudicial simply
because it is detrimental to a party's case.”).
Finally, Salazar-Garcia attempts to attack the main trial evidence
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establishing his state of mind: Barragan-Cerna’s testimony. He invites us to
examine Barragan-Cerna’s credibility by alleging “she had significant motives to
lie.” (Appellant’s Br. at 13.) W e decline to inquire into Barragan-Cerna’s
credibility or to weigh the value of her testimony in the context of this trial. “It is
not the role of an appellate court to consider the credibility of the witnesses or
weigh the conflicting evidence, as these matters are within the exclusive province
of the jury.” United States v. M agallanez, 408 F.3d 672, 682 (10th Cir. 2005),
cert. denied, 126 S.Ct. 468 (2006).
A FFIR ME D.
Entered by the C ourt:
Terrence L. O ’Brien
United States Circuit Judge
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