United States v. Aros

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
February 9, 2007
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
U N ITED STA TES O F A M ER ICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
No. 06-8031
v. (D.C. No. 05-CV-16-ABJ)
(D . W yo.)
DANIEL R ICH ARD ARO S,
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER
DENYING CERTIFICATE O F APPEALABILITY
Before KELLY, M U RPH Y, and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges.
Defendant-Appellant Daniel Richard A ros, a federal inmate appearing pro
se, seeks a certificate of appealability (COA) allowing him to appeal the district
court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion to vacate, set aside, or correct his
sentence. The district court denied the motion as time-barred under the one-year
limitation period of § 2255. Because we determine that M r. Aros has not made a
“substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right,” id. § 2253(c)(2);
Slack v. M cDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483-84 (2000), we deny a COA and dismiss the
appeal.
M r. Aros w as convicted following a jury trial of conspiracy to traffic in
methamphetamine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(A) & 846.
He was sentenced to 188 months’ imprisonment, five years’ supervised release, a
$2,000 fine, and a $100 special assessment. His conviction and sentence w ere
affirmed on direct appeal. United States v. M artinez, 77 F.App’x 490 (10th Cir.
2003). He filed the instant § 2255 motion on January 13, 2005, claiming that (1)
his sentence was enhanced without an admission by him or a jury finding, (2) his
counsel was ineffective for not presenting Apprendi issues on direct appeal, and
(3) the trial court gave an improper jury instruction in light of Apprendi. See
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). The § 2255 motion was filed by
M r. Aros’s trial counsel, and M r. Aros claims that this attorney agreed to file the
motion for him but not to represent him in the § 2255 proceedings.
The district court held that M r. Aros’s conviction became final on January
8, 2004, the day the 90-day period to seek certiorari from the United States
Supreme Court following our affirmance had expired. See Sup. Ct. R. 13.
Absent other statutory grounds for tolling, M r. Aros had one year from that date
to file a § 2255 motion; his filing on January 13, 2005, was therefore untimely.
He contends that we should consider the limitations period equitably tolled
because his trial counsel lulled him into a false sense of security by agreeing to
timely file his § 2255 motion, causing him not to file on his own. I R. Doc. 20,
Ex. A. Equitable tolling requires an inmate to show both extraordinary
circumstances beyond his control responsible for the late filing and diligent
pursuit of his claims. Clark v. Oklahoma, 468 F.3d 711, 714 (10th Cir. 2006).
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The district court determined that, even assuming the facts asserted by M r. Aros
were accurate, the attorney error described did not constitute extraordinary
circumstances. W e do not think the district court’s conclusion that this motion is
time-barred and not saved by equitable tolling is reasonably debatable. The
mistake in this case is in the same league with ordinary attorney errors which
consistently have been found not to warrant equitable tolling. See Rouse v. Lee,
339 F.3d 238, 248-49 (4th Cir. 2003) (en banc) cert. denied, 541 U.S. 905 (2004);
M odrowski v. M ote, 322 F.3d 965, 967-68 (7th Cir. 2003); see also United States
v. M artin, 408 F.3d 1089, 1093 (8th Cir. 2005) (“[S]erious attorney misconduct,
as opposed to mere negligence, may warrant equitable tolling.”) (quotation marks
omitted). W e agree with the district court that M r. Aros bore the risk of untimely
filing in this case, particularly given that trial counsel declined to represent him.
W e DENY a COA and IFP status, and we DISM ISS the appeal.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
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