United States v. Orozco

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
February 28, 2007
FO R TH E TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
U N ITED STA TES O F A M ER ICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 06-4168
(D.C. No. 1:05-CR -133-TS)
R IG O BER TO O RO ZC O, (D. Utah)
also known as Alejandro Perez,
also known as Alejandro Garcia,
also known as Antonio Cruz,
Defendant-Appellant.
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before KELLY, HA RTZ, and HO LM ES, Circuit Judges.
Defendant Rigoberto Orozco pled guilty to passport fraud in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 1542 (Count One) and aggravated identity theft in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 1028A (Count Two). In his plea agreement, defendant agreed to
waive his right to appeal. Nonetheless, defendant has filed a notice of appeal.
*
This panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not
materially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2);
10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral
argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and
10th Cir. R. 32.1.
The government has now moved to enforce defendant’s appeal waiver under
United States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315 (10th Cir. 2004) (en banc). W e grant the
motion and dismiss the appeal.
Defendant stated in his plea agreement that:
I knowingly, voluntarily and expressly waive my right to appeal any
sentence imposed upon me, and the manner in which the sentence is
determined, on any of the grounds set forth in Title 18, United States
Code, Section 3742 or on any ground whatever, except I do not
waive my right to appeal (1) a sentence above the maximum penalty
provided in the statute of conviction . . . and (2) a sentence above the
high-end of the guideline range as determined by the district court at
sentencing, or, in the event that no such determination is made by the
district court, a sentence above the high-end of the guideline range as
set forth in the final presentence report.
Plea Agreement at 3-4 (dated April 4, 2006).
The district court imposed a sentence of seven months on Count One and
twenty-four months on Count Two, to be served consecutively. This sentence was
below the maximum statutory penalty of ten years for Count One and at the
statutory mandatory minimum of two years for Count Two. Further, the sentence
was w ithin the twenty-eight to thirty-four month advisory guideline range for both
convictions.
Under Hahn, we consider “(1) whether the disputed appeal falls within the
scope of the waiver of appellate rights; (2) whether the defendant knowingly and
voluntarily waived his appellate rights; and (3) whether enforcing the waiver
would result in a miscarriage of justice.” Id. at 1325. The miscarriage-of-justice
-2-
prong requires the defendant to show (a) his sentence relied on an impermissible
factor such as race; (b) ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with the
negotiation of the appeal waiver rendered the waiver invalid; (c) his sentence
exceeded the statutory maximum; or (d) his appeal waiver is otherwise unlawful
and the error “seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of
judicial proceedings.” Id. at 1327 (quotation omitted). The government’s motion
addresses these considerations, explaining why none undermines defendant’s
appeal waiver here.
Defendant concedes that he knowingly and voluntarily entered his plea,
including the appeal waiver, and that the sentencing issues to be raised on appeal
fall within the scope of his w aiver. He contends, however, that the waiver is
“otherw ise unlawful” under Hahn’s miscarriage-of-justice prong because the
district court did not give any reasons for “rejecting a non-G uidelines” sentence.
Defendant’s Response at 1. Defendant contends that the sentencing judge could
have imposed the sentence “based solely upon his adoption of the Sentencing
Guidelines recommendation, without any explicit consideration of the other
sentencing factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3355.” Id. at 2. He contends the district
court therefore imposed the Guidelines mandatorily in violation of United States
v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
Defendant’s argument is without merit; this court rejected a similar
argument in United States v. Porter, 405 F.3d 1136, 1144 (10th Cir.),
-3-
cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 550 (2005) (upholding appeal waiver as valid where
district court treated the Guidelines as mandatory in violation of Booker). The
miscarriage-of-justice exception defendant invokes looks to w hether “the waiver
is otherwise unlawful,” Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1327 (quotation omitted and emphasis
added), not whether some other aspect of the proceeding may have involved legal
error. Defendant’s position that his appeal waiver should be excused due to
alleged error in the determination of his sentence entails w hat Hahn noted as “the
logical failing[] of focusing on the result of the proceeding, rather than on the
right relinquished, in analyzing whether an appeal waiver is [valid].” Id., 359
F.3d at 1326 n.12. “[T]he relevant question . . . is not whether [defendant’s]
sentence is unlawful . . . , but whether . . . his appeal waiver itself [is]
unenforceable.” Porter, 405 F.3d at 1144.
Defendant has not asserted any claim that his appeal waiver itself was
unlawful, much less shown that enforcement of the waiver would seriously affect
the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of the judicial proceedings. In this
regard, we note (1) that the plea agreement clearly set out the maximum sentence
defendant faced and explained the appellate rights he relinquished in exchange for
the benefits offered by the government, and (2) that the sentence imposed by the
district court complies with the terms of the agreement and the understanding
expressed by the defendant at the plea hearing. See id. at 1145.
-4-
The government’s motion to enforce the waiver is GRANTED and the
appeal is DISM ISSED. The mandate shall issue forthwith.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
PER CURIAM
-5-