McNulty v. Sandoval County

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
March 27, 2007
FO R TH E TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
K A TH ER IN E M C NU LTY ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 06-2121
(D.C. No. CIV-05-221 W J/AC T)
SA NDOVAL COUNTY; and the (D . N.M .)
SA N D O VA L C OU N TY BO A RD OF
CO UNTY CO M M ISSIONERS,
Defendants-Appellees.
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before HO LM ES, M cKA Y, and BROR BY, Circuit Judges.
Katherine M cNulty appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment
to her former employer on her claims of retaliation in violation of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). W e have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291, and we AFFIRM .
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and
collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent
with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
I.
Sandoval County, New M exico employed M s. M cNulty as a personnel
coordinator. Among her duties was teaching defensive driving to county
employees, as required by the county’s insurance policies. Such training sessions
were considered effective only when taught by an instructor certified by the
National Safety Council (NSC), and in the summer of 2003, M s. M cNulty’s NSC
certification was revoked because she failed to pay the NSC certain monies she
owed for teaching defensive driving to non-county employees on her own time.
In October 2003, her supervisor, Tammie Gerrard, learned of the problem and
asked her to correct it. Because M s. M cNulty did not have the money to pay the
NSC, she did not regain her certification, and another employee had to conduct
the county’s training sessions. During the period from August 2002 to November
2003, M s. M cNulty also was given oral and written reprimands for failing to
return telephone calls, failing to complete workers’ compensation paperwork, and
failing to follow procedures and directions.
In June 2004, M s. M cNulty filed a written report complaining about
harassment by the county’s finance director, Leroy Arquero, stretching back to
the spring of 2002. A few weeks later she supplemented her initial statement with
another written statement. In these complaints, M s. M cNulty cited about ten or
twelve incidents of harassment. For example, she complained that M r. Arquero
was verbally abusive to employees, including her. In M arch 2002, “he was
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disrespectful and verbally abusive, including derogatory references to my gender
and intelligence.” Aplt. App., Vol. II at 290. In January 2003, he failed to move
out of a doorway to an office she needed to enter, and as she attempted to pass
through, “he made contact with [M s. M cNulty’s] body in a manner that was
clearly inappropriate.” Id. at 292. In the summer of 2003, he summoned her and
M s. Gerrard to a meeting at short notice and did not provide them with handouts.
Another incident was in fall 2003 when M r. Arquero and two or three others w ere
on an elevator. M s. M cNulty said she would wait for the next elevator, and as the
doors closed she heard laughter. She assumed M r. Arquero had made a remark
about her. In June 2004, another employee reported to her that M r. Arquero had
spoken about her in a “venomous” manner, id. at 293-94, and M s. M cNulty said
he through “eye contact and body language” treated her with “obvious hostility
and disrespect” when she encountered him by the reception desk, id. at 287.
On July 9 and August 3, M s. Gerrard issued written reprimands to
M s. M cNulty. The July 9 reprimand addressed M s. M cNulty’s insubordination
and violation of county policies regarding smoking in vehicles. The August 3
reprimand addressed M s. M cNulty’s failure to timely report claims to the
county’s insurance carrier, causing the insurer to deny the claims, and her failure
to timely transmit notice of a lawsuit to the insurer.
On August 12, M r. Arquero complained in writing that M s. M cNulty had
comm itted racial harassment against him. He indicated that she had used a racial
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slur about him a year and a half earlier. He complained that she was difficult to
deal with, which he attributed to her racial prejudice. He also complained that
her decision to complain only about him, and not the three white employees who
were also involved in the fall 2003 elevator incident, showed her racial bias. The
county investigated both M s. M cNulty’s and M r. Arquero’s complaints.
On August 20, 2004, M s. Gerrard issued M s. M cNulty a notice of proposed
discipline based on her failure to regain her N SC certification. After a
pre-discipline hearing, by notice dated September 10, M s. M cNulty was
suspended without pay for three days and ordered to bring her certification
current by October 1. M s. Gerrard also ordered her to prepare a list of employees
who had taken defensive driving classes from her while she lacked her
certification. On the same day, M s. M cNulty filed a complaint of sex
discrimination and retaliation with the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC). During the remainder of September and October she did
not comply with either of M s. Gerrard’s orders. A county hearing officer upheld
the suspension.
On November 8, M s. Gerrard issued M s. M cNulty a notice of proposed
discipline that indicated the county was considering terminating her employment
for four reasons: (1) her continued failure to reinstate her NSC certification and
to provide the list of employees whose training was not effective; (2) her failure
in October 2004 to assist another employee in locating paperwork required to
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complete the leasing of a fleet of vehicles; (3) her continued failure from April
2004 to November 2004 to complete paperwork necessary for an insurance claim;
and (4) the county’s belief that she had used racial slurs about M r. A rquero.
After receiving the notice, M s. M cNulty sent a check to the NSC to bring her
certification current. The check was never cashed, and M s. M cNulty never
regained her NSC certification. After holding a pre-discipline hearing, the county
terminated her employment on November 16, 2004, for the four reasons listed in
the notice of proposed discipline. Another county hearing officer upheld that
decision as well.
M s. M cNulty brought claims against the county and its commissioners for
sexual harassment and retaliation under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2, 2000e-3;
for violations of her constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and for
violations of state statutes and state common-law causes of action. After
defendants answered her first amended complaint, she sought to further amend
her complaint to add M r. Arquero and M s. Gerrard as defendants under Title VII
and § 1983 and to add new claims under Title VII and New M exico’s public
records law . The district court denied her motion to amend and granted summary
judgment to defendants. It held that her quid pro quo sexual harassment claim
was barred for failure to timely file a complaint with the EEOC. It further held
that her hostile work environment sexual harassment claim failed because most of
the conduct she complained about did not constitute discriminatory, unwelcome
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sexual conduct, and the conduct that did qualify was not pervasive or sufficiently
severe. W ith regard to her retaliation claim, the court determined that she had not
shown the defendants’ actions were pretext for discrimination, and that even
assuming the fourth ground for termination constituted evidence of retaliation, the
evidence as a whole showed that the defendants would have made the same
decision even if the retaliatory ground had not been considered. Finally, it
disposed of her remaining federal claims and declined to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims, dismissing them w ithout
prejudice. M s. M cNulty appeals the grant of summary judgment to defendants on
her retaliation claims and the court’s refusal to allow her to amend her complaint.
II.
On appeal, M s. M cNulty has abandoned the majority of her claims.
Focusing primarily on the district court’s rejection of her Title VII retaliation
claim under a mixed-motive analysis, she argues the district court erred in three
ways: (1) allowing defendants to rely on a mixed-motive analysis, which is an
affirmative defense that was not raised in their answ er and was not adequately
raised in their written summary judgment submissions; (2) finding that no
reasonable jury could have found in M s. M cNulty’s favor; and (3) not allowing
her to amend her complaint.
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A.
M s. M cNulty first complains that defendants did not raise a mixed-motive
analysis until oral argument on their summary judgment motion. She argues that
the district court erred in employing this untimely-raised affirmative defense in
granting summary judgment to defendants. W e review this issue for abuse of
discretion. See Ahmad v. Furlong, 435 F.3d 1196, 1202 (10th Cir. 2006)
(applying abuse-of-discretion standard of review to the question “whether an
affirmative defense may first be raised in a motion for summary judgment”).
W hile M s. M cNulty is correct that the Supreme Court has described the
mixed-motive approach as “most appropriately deemed an affirmative defense,”
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 246 (1989), modification by statute
recognized in Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 98-102 (2003), this court
has indicated that a mixed-motive analysis should be employed whenever it is
appropriate, not necessarily only when the defendant invokes it. In Thom as v.
Denny’s, Inc., 111 F.3d 1506, 1511-12 (10th Cir. 1997), the defendant asserted
that a mixed-motive instruction was not appropriate and did not request one.
Noting Price Waterhouse’s affirmative-defense characterization, this court
nevertheless stated “it does not follow from that statement that a mixed-motives
instruction is only available when requested by the defendant.” Id. at 1512.
Quoting the Second Circuit, it continued:
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“Price Waterhouse is thus a defense. How ever, for tactical reasons,
it is often only the plaintiff who asks for a Price Waterhouse
instruction . . . . W e thus believe that the plaintiff will be entitled to
a burden-shifting instruction on the Price Waterhouse defense w here
the evidence is sufficient to allow a trier to find both forbidden and
permissible motives.”
Id. (quoting Ostrowski v. Atl. M ut. Ins. Cos., 968 F.2d 171, 181 (2d Cir. 1992)).
The district court interpreted M s. M cNulty’s arguments and the evidence
presented before it as requiring a mixed-motive analysis. Given that defendants
cited four reasons for terminating M s. M cNulty’s employment, and that one of the
reasons w as arguably retaliatory while the others w ere unquestionably legitimate
performance-based concerns, that interpretation was reasonable. 1 W e do not find
the district court abused its discretion by considering the mixed-motive approach.
B.
M s. M cNulty also argues that there was insufficient evidence that
defendants would have terminated her employment even in the absence of the
retaliatory ground (the fourth ground for termination cited in the notice of
discipline). She contends that the fourth ground must have been “the straw that
1
M s. M cNulty contends that the fourth ground for discharge, that she used a
racial slur in reference to M r. Arquero, was retaliatory because M r. Arquero only
filed his complaint of racial harassment in response to her complaint of sexual
harassment. W e are not convinced that, even assuming M r. Arquero’s complaint
was prompted by M s. M cNulty’s complaint, the county’s investigation of
M r. Arquero’s complaint and its acting on the results of its investigation
constitute retaliatory action by the county for purposes of Title VII. Like the
district court, however, we assume for purposes of our decision that these
statements may be direct evidence of retaliation.
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broke the camel’s back” because the other three grounds were either addressed by
the three-day suspension or occurred before that suspension was issued.
M s. M cNulty’s argument rests on a fundamental misconception. As the
district court explained, the first three grounds for termination cited in the notice
of discipline were not the same conduct underlying the three-day suspension. The
suspension was based on M s. M cNulty’s failure to regain her certification since
M s. Gerrard’s initial request in October 2003. In contrast, the first ground for
termination was based on M s. M cNulty’s continued failure, from September 10
through November 8, 2004, to regain her certification. M oreover, the second
ground for termination cited conduct in October 2004, which had not happened
when the suspension was imposed in September. The third ground for
termination cited conduct continuing from April to November 2004; again, the
latter portion of that period was after the September suspension. Consequently,
there is no indication that the fourth ground was “the straw that broke the camel’s
back.”
As the district court concluded, no reasonable jury could conclude that
M s. Gerrard would not have terminated M s. M cNulty’s employment in the
absence of M r. Arquero’s allegations. M s. M cNulty failed to follow
M s. Gerrard’s repeated instructions to regain her NSC certification, and thus she
was unable to perform one of her job duties. She was disciplined for failing to
perform other job duties several times in 2002 and 2003, before she ever filed her
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complaints of discrimination, and her failures to fulfill her job responsibilities
continued in 2004. The district court’s grant of summary judgment on this issue
is affirmed.
C.
Finally, M s. M cNulty argues that the district court erred in refusing to
allow her to amend her complaint. W e review this issue for abuse of discretion.
Las Vegas Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Far W. Bank, 893 F.2d 1182, 1185
(10th Cir. 1990). “A court properly may deny a motion for leave to amend as
futile when the proposed amended complaint would be subject to dismissal for
any reason, including that the amendment would not survive a motion for
summary judgment.” Bauchman ex rel. Bauchman v. W. High Sch., 132 F.3d 542,
562 (10th Cir. 1997).
Several factors are typically considered by the courts in determining
whether to allow amendment of a complaint. These include whether
the amendment will result in undue prejudice, whether the request
was unduly and inexplicably delayed, was offered in good faith, or
that the party had sufficient opportunity to state a claim and failed.
W here the party seeking amendment knows or should have known of
the facts upon which the proposed amendment is based but fails to
include them in the original complaint, the motion to amend is
subject to denial.
Las Vegas Ice & Cold Storage Co., 893 F.2d at 1185 (quotation omitted).
On August 5, 2005, almost four months after she filed her first amended
complaint and about six weeks after defendants filed their answ er, M s. M cNulty
sought to add new claims and new defendants. For her new claims, she alleged
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that defendants violated the New M exico Inspection of Public Records A ct,
N.M . Stat. §§ 14-2-1 to 14-2-12, by refusing to produce tapes of her
administrative hearing and that defendants further retaliated against her, in
violation of Title VII, by including in their answer their counterclaim for a
preliminary injunction. Concerning the new defendants, she alleged that
M r. Arquero and M s. Gerrard qualified as “employers” under Title VII and were
liable for the alleged Title VII violations as well as violations under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. The district court held a hearing on the motion before denying it, stating:
I’m going to deny the motion to amend at this time. It seems to me
that this is too late in the proceeding to bring up matters that have
been known all along, that even though they may or may not be
stronger, based on subsequent depositions and interrogatories, it’s a
timing issue, that’s very significant with the discovery deadline in
the next week or two. And, frankly, I’m also not impressed with the
claims that I’m hearing. They sound more like matters of evidence
rather than claims against new parties. I don’t believe 10th Circuit
law allows individual defendants in a Title 7 claim, so that would be
totally futile based on my understanding of 10th Circuit law, and
other than having a punitive damage target, I’ve not heard any
subsequent legal reason to bring in the individual defendants. I will
deny the motion.
Aplt. App., Vol. III at 577.
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying M s. M cN ulty’s
motion to amend. Concerning the proposed new defendants, the district court
correctly noted that it generally is improper to name persons in their individual
capacity in a Title VII suit. See Sauers v. Salt Lake County, 1 F.3d 1122, 1125
(10th Cir. 1993) (“Under Title VII, suits against individuals must proceed in their
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official capacity; individual capacity suits are inappropriate.”). And the record
reveals no reason why the proposed § 1983 claims against M r. Arquero and
M s. Gerrard could not have been included in the original or first amended
complaints.
Regarding the proposed new Title VII claim against the existing
defendants, amendment would have been futile. M s. M cNulty sought to allege a
discrete retaliatory act, but because she did not exhaust her administrative
remedies for such claim, the district court would not have been able to entertain
it. See Martinez v. Potter, 347 F.3d 1208, 1211 (10th Cir. 2003) (noting that
discrete acts that occur after the filing of the EEOC charge require separate
exhaustion of administrative remedies). Finally, concerning the proposed new
state records law claim, even if the district court had allowed the amendment, it
ultimately dismissed most of M s. M cNulty’s state law claims – including another
public records act claim – w ithout prejudice, leaving her free to pursue those
claims in state court. Because the proposed claim would also have been
dismissed, any error in not allowing the amendment would not justify reversal of
the decision.
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III.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
W ade Brorby
Circuit Judge
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