Barocio v. Jones

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
June 21, 2007
FO R TH E TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
M ER CE B AR OC IO ,
Petitioner-A ppellant,
No. 06-6293
v. (D.C. No. 05-CV -1259-HE)
(W .D. Okla.)
JUSTIN JONES,
Respondent-Appellee.
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before BR ISC OE, SE YM OU R, and A ND ER SO N, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner M erce Barocio, an Oklahoma state prisoner appearing pro se,
filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 alleging that
prison officials arbitrarily reduced his earned-credit level w ithout due process.
The district court referred the matter to a magistrate judge, who recommended
that the petition be denied. Over petitioner’s written objections, the district court
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and
collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent
with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
adopted the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation (R& R) and denied the
petition. This court granted a certificate of appealability and ordered the
respondent to file a brief, which he has done. Exercising jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 2253, we grant petitioner’s motion to proceed in form a pauperis and
affirm the district court’s judgment.
I. Background
Before turning to the particular facts of this case, we first outline the
relevant provisions of Oklahoma’s inmate-classification system. Under that
system, “every inmate of a state correctional institution shall have their term of
imprisonment reduced monthly, based upon the class level to which they are
assigned.” O kla. Stat. tit. 57, § 138(A). There are four class levels. An inmate
in Level II, III, or IV earns credits each month toward early release, whereas an
inmate in Level I earns no credits. See id., § 138(D)(2)(b). “Each earned credit
is equivalent to one . . . day of incarceration.” Id., § 138(A). To be assigned to
Level IV, the highest level, an inmate must have been incarcerated for eight
months and must have received an “outstanding” evaluation in a number of
different behavioral categories, including work performance. Id., § 138(D )(1)(d).
The inmate’s adjustment review committee has the discretion to demote an inmate
from Level IV if it determines that the inmate’s performance in any of the
behavioral categories falls below “outstanding.” See id., § 138(B), (D)(3), (F).
Because classification in Level II requires a “good” evaluation in the behavioral
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categories, an inmate w ho receives a “poor” evaluation in a behavioral category
can be demoted to Level I. See id., § 138(D). The adjustment review committee
is to evaluate each inmate’s class level and performance “[a]t least once every
four . . . months” to “determine whether or not the class level for the inmate
should be changed.” Id., § 138(F).
The policy of the Oklahoma D epartment of Corrections (ODOC) in effect
when petitioner’s earned-credit level was reduced further provided that demotions
to Level I may occur “whenever deemed appropriate by the facility/unit
classification committee.” ODOC Policy OP-060107, ¶ I.C.2.a. (eff. Dec. 29,
2004). The policy also indicates that assignment to Level I may occur in a
limited number of mandatory circumstances, including “removal from a job . . .
assignment due to nonperformance or misconduct related to the job.” Id.,
¶ I.C.2.a.3. The policy contemplates that such job “[f]ailures will be documented
by an offense report . . . . Assignment to Level I in lieu of an offense report can
only be done by the facility classification comm ittee.” Id.
Against this backdrop, we now turn to the facts of this case. W hile a
Level-IV prisoner at the Lawton Correctional Facility, a private prison in
Oklahoma, petitioner worked in a garment factory in the Oklahoma Correctional
Industries (OCI). As petitioner’s work supervisor, Tom Lewis, later described
events, he told petitioner on February 9, 2005, “to turn in a job change because he
was having trouble coming to work and staying all day.” R., Doc. 15, Ex. 1.
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A prison officer, Howard Trahan, apparently told petitioner’s unit manager,
Clifford Barnard, that petitioner w as fired from his job with the OCI. See id.,
Ex. 4. On February 14, petitioner’s facility classification comm ittee/unit team 1
(Unit Team) completed an Intra-Facility Assignment Form, which showed a
change in job status from “OCI” to “Job Pool,” effective February 21, 2005, and
which noted that, “Per T. Lewis I/M fired he won’t come [t]o work.” Id., Ex. 2
at 1. Apparently after meeting with petitioner, the Unit Team completed a “New
Arrival/Adjustment Review/Earned Credit Level” form dated February 16
(Adjustment Review Form), which states: “Demote to level 1 due to being fired
from his job and refusing to go to work.” Id., Ex. 2 at 3 (typeface altered). O n
the Adjustment Review Form, the Unit Team rated petitioner’s “Current Patterns
of Behavior” as follows: staff— poor; program participation— outstanding;
job— poor; other inmates— outstanding; personal hygiene— good; living
area— good. Id., Ex. 2 at 2.
Several weeks later, M r. Lew is sent a memorandum to M r. Bernard
explaining that petitioner “was-not [sic] written-up nor fired” but that “[b]y
mutual agreement it was determined that [he] was not cut out for the kind of
work” done in the garment factory. Id., Doc. 1, Attach. at 1 (emphasis omitted).
M r. Lewis opined that petitioner’s “level should not have been dropped nor any
1
The term “adjustment review comm ittee” used in the relevant statute and
ODOC policy appears synonymous w ith “facility classification committee/unit
team.”
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sanctions levied against him in any way.” Id. M r. Bernard replied that the Unit
Team had not issued petitioner a misconduct for being fired, but demoted him to
Level I based on his statement that he did not like his assigned job. Id., Doc. 15,
Ex. 3. M r. Bernard further clarified the reasons for reducing petitioner’s class
level: petitioner “requested this job assignment,” “the unit team feels that when
an inmate’s supervisor requests the inmate be reassigned for failing to come to
work, the inmate was fired for a work related misconduct,” and “[t]he unit team
feels that this action is warranted to ensure that [petitioner] understands the
importance of going to work when he is scheduled to work.” Id. M r. Bernard
also made it clear that petitioner w ould be reassigned to a new job and could earn
a promotion to a higher class level if he performed well. See id.
Petitioner’s Request to Staff, seeking reinstatement to Level IV, was denied
for substantially the same reasons stated in M r. Bernard’s m emorandum to
M r. Lewis. See id., Doc. 1, Attach. at 4. After his administrative grievances were
denied as untimely, petitioner filed the present habeas action, and the district
court referred it to a magistrate judge. In her R& R, the magistrate judge reasoned
that because petitioner’s demotion to level one was not mandatory and automatic
under ODOC policy, he could not demonstrate a liberty interest in remaining at
Level IV. The district court adopted the R& R, and petitioner appealed.
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II. Discussion
Petitioner raises five arguments on appeal: (i) the district court erred in
rendering judgment without conducting an evidentiary hearing to resolve factual
disputes; (ii) the district court’s reasoning was inconsistent to the extent the court
acknowledged M r. Bernard’s statement that petitioner was fired for work-related
misconduct but found that the demotion to Level I was discretionary; (iii) the
district court erred in relying solely on the absence of a written misconduct, and
overlooked the fact that M r. Bernard avoided this established procedure in order
to skirt any due process requirements; (iv) the duration of petitioner’s reduction
to Level I is immaterial; and (v) O klahoma inmates have a liberty interest in their
classification level under Wilson v. Jones, 430 F.3d 1113 (10th Cir. 2005), cert.
denied, 127 S. Ct. 158 (2006). W e will address the last argument first because it
affects our consideration of the others, and we will consider the other arguments
in order of analytical convenience. W e review the district court’s findings of fact
for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. Burger v. Scott, 317 F.3d 1133,
1137 (10th Cir. 2003). W e construe petitioner’s pro se pleadings and other papers
liberally, but we do not act as his advocate. See Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106,
1110 & n.3 (10th Cir. 1991).
In Wilson v. Jones, we held that a m isconduct conviction that was the sole
reason for a mandatory reduction of an inmate’s classification to Level I under
Oklahoma’s inmate-classification scheme implicated a liberty interest because
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prison officials had absolutely no discretion in demoting the inmate. See Wilson,
430 F.3d at 1120-21. In such circumstances, we held, the misconduct conviction
inevitably affected the duration of the inmate’s sentence under Sandin v. Conner,
515 U.S. 472, 487 (1995), see Wilson, 430 F.3d at 1120, and therefore his due
process rights were violated under Wolff v. M cDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974),
because he was convicted of misconduct without any evidence, see Wilson,
430 F.3d at 1124.
In contrast, the circumstances surrounding the end of petitioner’s
employment at the garment factory, while apparently an important factor in the
Unit Team’s decision, did not require the Unit Team to demote him. The Unit
Team considered his work performance as one factor in its decision. Notably, the
Unit Team also considered petitioner’s performance in other behavioral
categories, including his “poor” score in the “staff” category, which itself was a
sufficient basis for the Unit Team to demote petitioner, in its discretion, to
Level I regardless of his work performance. Therefore, the circumstance
surrounding the end of his employment at the garment factory was not the sole
and mandating cause of his demotion, and Wilson is inapplicable. See Cardoso v.
Calbone, No. 06-6266, ___ F.3d ___, 2007 W L 1739694, at *3 (10th Cir. June 18,
2007) (rejecting the “argument that Wilson recognized an unconditional liberty
interest in an Oklahoma prisoner’s credit-earning classification” and holding that
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discretionary inmate-classification decisions in Oklahoma do not implicate a
liberty interest).
Petitioner’s remaining arguments do not compel a different conclusion.
Because petitioner was not actually removed from his job, his level reduction was
not mandated by ODOC Policy OP-060107, ¶ I.C.2.a.3. It therefore follows that
no offense report or written misconduct was required, and the magistrate judge
justifiably relied on the absence of any such writing in support of her
determination that the demotion was discretionary. Any erroneous view the Unit
Team may have had that petitioner was, in fact or in effect, removed from his job
within the meaning of ODOC Policy OP-060107, ¶ I.C.2.a.3., as suggested by the
written comments on the Intra-Facility Assignment Form and the Adjustment
Review Form, does not give rise to a liberty interest subject to due process
protections under Wilson. Nor does it suggest that the Unit Team avoided issuing
a misconduct to petitioner in order to skirt any due process requirements that
might attend a mandatory demotion. The fact remains that he was not fired, and
therefore w e do not view the magistrate judge’s conclusion that the U nit Team’s
decision was discretionary as inconsistent with her acknowledgment of the Unit
Team’s written comments that petitioner w as demoted because he was fired.
Again, the Unit Team considered other factors in reaching its decision that
permitted discretionary demotion to Level I regardless of petitioner’s work
performance. Thus, we agree with the magistrate judge that any factual dispute
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about petitioner’s absences from work were not critical to the disposition of his
claims, and consequently we reject his argument that he was entitled to an
evidentiary hearing concerning M r. Bernard’s “determination” of his work
performance.
Finally, we agree with petitioner that the potentially minimal duration of
his reduction to Level I is an immaterial distinction from Wilson, where the
inmate was not permitted to be promoted above Level II for two years even if he
earned such a promotion, see Wilson, 430 F.3d at 1116. But in view of our
conclusion that petitioner’s case does not fall within Wilson, the significance the
magistrate judge placed on this distinction was harmless.
The judgment of the district court is A FFIRM ED. Petitioner’s motion to
proceed in form a pauperis on appeal is granted, and he is reminded of his
obligation to continue making partial payments until his filing fee is paid in full.
Entered for the Court
M ary Beck Briscoe
Circuit Judge
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