Rogers v. City County Health Department

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FEB 20 2002
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
DIANA ROGERS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 01-6065
(D.C. No. 99-CV-1574-T)
CITY-COUNTY HEALTH (W.D. Okla.)
DEPARTMENT OF OKLAHOMA
COUNTY; J. DON HARRIS, D.D.S.;
PAUL DUNGAN,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before MURPHY , McKAY , and BALDOCK , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Plaintiff Diana Rogers is appealing the district court’s entry of summary
judgment in favor of defendants City-County Health Department of Oklahoma
County (Health Department), J. Don Harris (Harris), and Paul Dungan (Dungan).
We affirm the district court’s entry of summary judgment on: (1) plaintiff’s claim
of quid pro quo sexual harassment under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (Title VII); (2) plaintiff’s claim of hostile work
environment racial discrimination under Title VII; and (3) plaintiff’s claim of
racial discrimination under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We reverse the district court’s
entry of summary judgment on: (1) plaintiff’s claim of hostile work environment
sexual harassment under Title VII; (2) plaintiff’s claim of sexual harassment
under § 1983; and (3) plaintiff’s state-law claims against defendant Harris.
I.
Plaintiff is a Hispanic female who was employed by the Health Department
from 1991 until March 1999. In 1997, plaintiff was placed in an office area with
her African-American supervisor, Carolyn Harris, 1
and two African-American
co-workers, and she alleges that they harassed her and subjected her to a hostile
work environment based on her race or national origin. Plaintiff alleges that she
1
It is unclear from the record whether Carolyn Harris was plaintiff’s
supervisor for the entire time that plaintiff claims she was subjected to a hostile
work environment. However, we will assume that this was the case for purposes
of resolving the issues in this appeal.
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complained about the harassment to upper-level supervisors in the Health
Department, including defendant Dungan, the director of the Department, but that
nothing was done to correct the situation.
Plaintiff further alleges that defendant Harris, the chairman of the Health
Department, sexually harassed her on two separate occasions. The first incident
occurred on February 17, 1999, when plaintiff was meeting with defendant Harris
to discuss her problems with Carolyn Harris. Plaintiff alleges that defendant
Harris told her during the meeting that he would help arrange for her workplace
to be moved to a different building and for her to receive a raise of $1,000.00
per month. Plaintiff alleges that defendant Harris then grabbed her by the neck
and forcibly kissed her, pushing his tongue into her mouth. Plaintiff claims she
pushed defendant Harris away, telling him she was happily married and that what
he was doing was wrong. The second incident occurred during a subsequent
meeting between plaintiff and defendant Harris on March 2, 1999. Plaintiff
secretly tape recorded her conversation with defendant Harris at the second
meeting, and the written transcripts of the tape recording, both plaintiff’s and
defendants’ versions, confirm that defendant Harris began kissing plaintiff at the
conclusion of the meeting and that he continued to kiss her even after she asked
him to stop. The transcripts also confirm that defendant Harris admitted to
having kissed plaintiff at the prior meeting on February 17.
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Plaintiff did not return to her job at the Health Department after the
incident on March 2. Instead, she submitted a written grievance to the
Department, alleging both sexual harassment and a racially hostile work
environment. The Department never responded to her grievance, and plaintiff
eventually filed suit against defendants in the United States District Court for the
Western District of Oklahoma. In her amended complaint, plaintiff asserted
claims against defendants for sexual harassment and racial discrimination under
Title VII and § 1983, and she also claimed she was constructively discharged
from the Health Department. In addition, plaintiff asserted state-law claims
against defendant Harris for battery and intentional infliction of emotional
distress. The district court entered summary judgment in favor of defendants on
all of plaintiff’s claims, and this appeal followed.
II.
“We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo,
applying the same legal standard used by the district court.” Simms v. Okla.
ex rel. Dep’t of Mental Health & Substance Abuse Servs. , 165 F.3d 1321, 1326
(10th Cir. 1999). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with
the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.”
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Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). “When applying this standard, we view the evidence and
draw reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party.” Simms , 165 F.3d at 1326.
A. Plaintiff’s Title VII Claims
1. Hostile Work Environment Sexual Harassment
To survive summary judgment on her claim of hostile work environment
sexual harassment, plaintiff must show that “a rational jury could find that the
workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult, that
is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [her] employment and
create an abusive working environment.” See Penry v. Fed. Home Loan Bank of
Topeka , 155 F.3d 1257, 1261 (10th Cir. 1998) (quotation omitted). In addition,
plaintiff must show that the harassing conduct was “both objectively and
subjectively abusive.” Turnbull v. Topeka State Hosp. , 255 F.3d 1238, 1243
(10th Cir.) (quotation omitted), petition for cert. filed , 70 U.S.L.W. 3361(U.S. Nov. 8, 2001) (No. 01-692). However, plaintiff “need not demonstrate
psychological harm, nor is she required to show that her work suffered as a result
of the harassment.” Penry , 155 F.3d at 1261. Instead, the existence of sexual
harassment must be determined “in light of the record as a whole and the totality
of [the] circumstances, such as the nature of the sexual advances and the context
in which the alleged incidents occurred.” Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson , 477 U.S.
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57, 69 (1986) (quotations omitted). Under this standard, “an isolated incident
may suffice if the conduct is severe and threatening.” Turnbull , 255 F.3d at 1243.
The district court found that plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case
of sexual harassment based on a hostile work environment because the two
kissing incidents involving defendant Harris were the only incidents of alleged
sexual harassment she encountered during the eight years she was employed at the
Health Department. Construing the factual record and all inferences therefrom in
favor of plaintiff, we disagree with the district court’s analysis and we hold that
defendant Harris’s conduct was sufficiently severe and threatening so as to create
a genuine issue of material fact for trial concerning whether plaintiff was
subjected to a hostile work environment. See Davis v. United States Postal Serv. ,
142 F.3d 1334, 1337, 1341-42 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding that incidents of
unwelcome hugging and kissing and other physical contact by plaintiff’s
co-worker, one of which could be described as a physical assault, were sufficient
to support a jury finding of a hostile work environment).
In contrast to Davis , this case does not involve repeated incidents of
unwelcome intimate physical conduct. Nonetheless, this case presents an equally
troubling scenario because the alleged harasser is not simply a co-worker as in
Davis , but is instead the highest ranking official in the Health Department.
Further, defendant Harris physically forced himself on plaintiff in a sexual and
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intimate manner at a time when she was specifically requesting his assistance in
addressing issues related to her work. A jury could conclude that his conduct was
particularly severe and threatening given this context. Accordingly, the district
court erred by entering summary judgment on plaintiff’s claim of hostile work
environment sexual harassment.
Plaintiff alleges she was constructively discharged from the Health
Department as a result of the sexually hostile work environment. The district
court did not address plaintiff’s constructive discharge claim, and it will need to
determine on remand whether plaintiff has sufficient evidence to support such
a claim. Because it found no actionable sexual harassment, the district court also
did not address whether there is a basis under Title VII for imposing direct or
vicarious liability against the Health Department, and that issue will need to be
addressed on remand as well. In remanding plaintiff’s hostile work environment
claim to the district court, we intend no comment on these issues.
2. Quid Pro Quo Sexual Harassment
We agree with the district court that plaintiff failed to establish a prima
facie case of quid pro quo sexual harassment under Title VII. “The gravamen of
a quid pro quo sexual harassment claim is that tangible job benefits are
conditioned on an employee’s submission to conduct of a sexual nature and that
adverse job consequences result from the employee’s refusal to submit to the
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conduct.” Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co. , 833 F.2d 1406, 1414 (10th Cir. 1987). It is
undisputed that defendant Harris kissed plaintiff at the meetings on February 17
and March 2, 1999, and that he initiated this intimate physical contact after telling
plaintiff he would assist her in obtaining a transfer and salary increase. However,
there is no evidence that defendant Harris subjected plaintiff to any adverse job
consequences because she refused to submit to his sexual advances. In fact,
plaintiff never returned to her job after the second meeting with defendant Harris,
and we have held that a defendant may refute a claim of quid pro quo sexual
harassment “with proof that no negative employment action was taken by the
employer, i.e., that the employee resigned .” Smith v. Cashland, Inc. , 193 F.3d
1158, 1160 (10th Cir. 1999) (emphasis added). Accordingly, the district court
properly entered summary judgment on plaintiff’s quid pro quo claim. 2
2
Plaintiff claims she was constructively discharged as a result of the hostile
work environment caused by defendant Harris’s sexual harassment and that her
constructive discharge was an adverse job consequence that will support her quid
pro quo claim. We disagree. By definition, a claim of quid pro quo sexual
harassment must be supported by a negative employment action that is separate
and distinct from the underlying sexual misconduct ( i.e. , a demotion), and
plaintiff effectively resigned before any such action could be taken against her.
As a result, while plaintiff may assert a constructive discharge claim as part of
her hostile work environment claim if there is sufficient evidence to show that a
reasonable person in her position would have felt compelled to resign, see Penry ,
155 F.3d at 1264, an issue we leave for the district court to determine on remand,
she cannot survive summary judgment on her quid pro quo claim based on
a constructive discharge theory.
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3. Hostile Work Environment Racial Discrimination
The district court found that “[t]here is evidence that [Carolyn] Harris
yelled or cursed at co-workers, including plaintiff, bumped into employees in the
hall, hit plaintiff while they were standing near the coffee pot, [and] threw papers
and pencils at plaintiff and other employees.” Aplt. App. at 452. Plaintiff also
alleges that the other two African-American employees in her work area engaged
in similar conduct. Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate, however, that Ms. Harris
or the other two employees singled her out for abuse because of her race.
We therefore agree with the district court that plaintiff failed to establish a
prima facie case of racial discrimination based on a hostile work environment.
While the record indicates that two other employees of the Health
Department had also complained that Ms. Harris treated them in an abusive
manner, see Aplt. App. at 301-26, plaintiff has likewise made no showing that
Ms. Harris singled out these employees for abuse because of their race. In fact,
one of the employees testified that she believed Ms. Harris was only being
“inconsiderate,” see id. at 305, while the other employee testified about three
occasions when Ms. Harris acted in an unprofessional manner, but gave no
indication that her conduct was motivated by any sort of racial animus, see id.
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at 310-26. 3
Thus, the entry of summary judgment was proper on plaintiff’s claim
of hostile work environment racial discrimination, including any related
constructive discharge claim. See Bolden v. PRC Inc. , 43 F.3d 545, 551-52
(10th Cir. 1994) (affirming summary judgment on hostile work environment and
constructive discharge claims where plaintiff failed to establish that he and other
employees were singled out for abuse by their co-workers because of their race).
B. Plaintiff’s § 1983 Claims
1. Sexual Harassment
The district court entered summary judgment on plaintiff’s claim that her
civil rights were violated as a result of defendant Harris’s alleged sexual
harassment, finding that her § 1983 claim is based on the same evidence as her
Title VII claim. In light of our determination that plaintiff has sufficient evidence
to support a claim of hostile work environment sexual harassment under Title VII,
we reverse the entry of summary judgment on the sexual harassment aspect of
plaintiff’s § 1983 claim and remand the claim to the district court for
reconsideration. See, e.g., Starrett v. Wadley , 876 F.2d 808, 814 (10th Cir. 1989)
3
In opposition to defendants’ motion for summary judgment, plaintiff also
submitted evidence showing that three other employees of the Health Department
had complained that another African-American supervisor had discriminated
against them based on their race. See Aplt. App. at 289-99. However, the alleged
discrimination did not begin until March 1, 1999, see id. at 298, and plaintiff has
failed to demonstrate the relevance of this evidence to her hostile environment
claim.
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(holding that sexual harassment is actionable under the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment).
2. Racial Discrimination
Plaintiff alleges that the Health Department and defendants Dungan and
Harris are liable under § 1983 because she put them on notice of the alleged racial
discrimination she was experiencing, but they failed to correct the situation and
thereby violated her right to equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth
Amendment. This claim is without merit because there is no underlying
unconstitutional racial discrimination to support either municipal or supervisory
liability in this case. We therefore affirm the entry of summary judgment on the
racial discrimination aspect of plaintiff’s § 1983 claim.
C. Plaintiff’s State-Law Claims
Although the district court did not specifically address the state-law claims
which plaintiff has asserted against defendant Harris, the district court granted
summary judgment against plaintiff “on all claims asserted.” Aplt. App. at 453.
In light of our decision to reverse the district court’s dismissal of part of
plaintiff’s Title VII claims, we reverse the entry of summary judgment on
plaintiff’s state-law claims and remand the claims to the district court for further
proceedings consistent with 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
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The judgment of the United States District Court for the Western District of
Oklahoma is AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED
for further proceedings consistent with this order and judgment.
Entered for the Court
Monroe G. McKay
Circuit Judge
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