United States v. Aguirre

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
August 21, 2007
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
U N ITED STA TES O F A M ER ICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
No. 07-2076
v. (D.C. No. CR-00-1424 BB)
(D .N.M .)
JOSE AGU IRRE,
Defendant - Appellant.
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before KELLY, M U RPH Y, and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges. **
Defendant-Appellant Jose Aguirre appeals the district court’s denial of his
motions for the equitable return of seized personal property under Fed. R. Crim.
P. 41(g). M r. Aguirre was indicted along with thirteen co-defendants on various
drug charges on October 17, 2000. He contends that the Drug Enforcement
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
**
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge
panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material
assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th
Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Agency (DEA) seized certain of his personal property 1 (valued at $6,500) when
agents arrested him in Albuquerque in November 2003. M r. Aguirre pleaded
guilty on M arch 30, 2004, and was sentenced to 87 months’ imprisonment on June
2, 2004. He filed a series of duplicate Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(g) motions, the first on
November 27, 2006, nearly three years after his arrest.
On February 23, 2007, the government prosecutor who handled the case
stated in the government’s response that she:
has made a diligent effort to determine what, if any, property was
seized from the defendant at the time of his arrest. Unfortunately,
this is a huge case with thousands of pages of reports and discovery.
Additionally, all of the case agents involved in this case have left Las
Cruces. Undersigned counsel has contacted them, but they have no
memory of exactly what happened at the time of the defendant’s
arrest or what might have been taken. Both the DEA and FBI have
searched their files and have been unable to discover any items
which they seized from the defendant. . . .
She also indicated that the government was not in possession of any such
property, which would have been destroyed at the end of the case or returned to
M r. Aguirre.
On M arch 9, 2007, the district court issued a one-page order denying the
motion based on the representations of the prosecutor that the government no
longer possessed the property. Thereafter, on M arch 21, 2007, M r. Aguirre’s
reply to the government’s response was filed, indicating that it had been deposited
1
M r. Aguirre contends that DEA agents seized, inter alia, an automobile,
power and hand tools, a cellular telephone, and cash.
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in the prison mailbox on M arch 12. On appeal, M r. Aguirre argues that the
district court made an improper factual determination that the government no
longer possessed the property based only on the government’s unverified
response, w hich lacked affidavits and was not supported by sworn testimony. He
argues that, even if the government has disposed of his property, the district court
may still aw ard “equitable damages.” Finally, he requests that if this court
concludes his Rule 41(g) motion is improper, we construe his motion as a claim
for damages under the Federal Tort Claims Act, a remedy suggested to him by the
government prosecutor.
W hile we do not question that the prosecutor accurately represented her
conversations with the case agents, the DEA, and the FBI to the district court, she
has no first-hand knowledge concerning what items were or were not taken from
M r. Aguirre, nor does she have first-hand knowledge of whether the government
still possesses those items. Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(g) states the district court “must
receive evidence on any factual issue necessary to decide the motion.” M r.
Aguirre’s motion raised a colorable claim that the DEA seized certain items of his
property, and he described the property in sufficient detail to merit factual
inquiry. Unfortunately, the district court relied only on the government’s
unverified response in reaching its factual determination that the government did
not possess any of M r. Aguirre’s property. Factual allegations in unverified
pleadings are not “evidence” to be considered in a factual inquiry. See In re
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Grand Jury Subpoena, 419 F.3d 329, 336 (5th Cir. 2005); Jupiter v. Ashcroft, 396
F.3d 487, 491 (1st Cir. 2005); M edina v. Pacheco, 161 F.3d 18 (Table), 1998 W L
647784, at *3 n.5 (10th Cir. 1998). Consequently, we must vacate the district
court’s order denying the motions and remand the case for a factual determination
based on evidence. 2
SO O RD ER ED .
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
2
On remand, the district court should consider M r. Aguirre’s reply.
Incidentally, the reply appears timely filed under the prison mailbox rule in
conjunction with the federal and local rules. See Fernandez v. Artuz, 402 F.3d
111, 113-14 (2d Cir. 2005) (collecting cases that have extended the prison
mailbox rule to a host of quasi-civil proceedings); Crook v. Comm’r of Internal
Revenue Serv., 173 F. App’x. 653, 655-56 (10th Cir. 2006) (same); see also
D.N.M . LR-Civ 7.6(a) (14 day reply time); Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(e) (addition of 3
days for mailing).
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