New England Health v. Woodruff

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
April 2, 2008
PUBLISH Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT
NEW ENGLAND HEALTH CARE
EMPLOYEES PENSION FUND, on
behalf of itself and all others similarly
situated; CLIFFORD MOSHER, on No. 06-1482
behalf of himself and all others (512 F.3d 1283)
similarly situated; TEJINDER SINGH,
on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated; SOTPAL SINGH,
on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated,
Plaintiffs - Appellees,
v.
ROBERT S. WOODRUFF; JOSEPH P.
NACCHIO,
Defendants - Appellants,
and
QWEST COMMUNICATIONS
INTERNATIONAL, INC.; DRAKE S
TEMPEST; JAMES A. SMITH;
ARTHUR ANDERSEN L.L.P.;
CRAIG D. SLATER; PHILIP F.
ANSCHUTZ,
Defendants - Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
(D.C. No. 01-cv-01451-REB-PAC, 02-cv-00333-REB-PAC, 02-cv-00507-REB-
PAC, 02-cv–00374-REB-PAC, 02-cv-00755-REB-PAC, 02-cv-00798-REB-
PAC, 02-cv-00658-REB-PAC, 01-cv-01799-REB-PAC, 01-cv-01472-REB-
PAC, 01-cv-01527-REB-PAC, 01-cv-01930-REB-PAC, 01-cv-01616-REB-
PAC, 01-cv-02083-REB-PAC)
Before KELLY, BALDOCK, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.
ORDER
Appellee Qwest Communications International Inc.’s petition 1 for panel
rehearing is denied by the panel. Judge Briscoe would grant panel rehearing for
the reasons stated in her dissent. Judge Baldock would grant panel rehearing to
hold that once appellants demonstrate plain legal prejudice as to one provision of
the settlement agreement, they have standing to object to all of the agreement’s
provisions. Judge Baldock continues to concur in the result of the panel opinion.
Because neither Judge Briscoe’s dissent, nor Judge Baldock’s view of standing
commands a panel majority, the petition for panel rehearing is denied.
The suggestion for en banc rehearing was transmitted to all judges of the
court who are in regular active service. No poll on the suggestion was requested
1
Lead Plaintiffs-Appellees New England Health Care Employees Pension
Fund, et al. have joined in the petition for panel rehearing and the petition for
rehearing en banc.
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and the suggestion is therefore denied.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
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06-1482, New England Health Care Employees Pension Fund v. Woodruff
BALDOCK, Circuit Judge, dissenting from the denial for panel rehearing.
In their Response to Appellees’ Petition for Rehearing and Petition for
Rehearing En Banc, Appellants argue that they are not required to demonstrate
standing as to each provision of the partial settlement agreement in challenging
the district court’s Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e) ruling. The Court’s opinion correctly
concludes Appellants have standing to challenge the district court’s approval of
the partial settlement agreement. In so doing, however, the Court considers
whether Appellants made this showing with respect to each provision of the
settlement Appellants object to on the merits (i.e., the Complete Bar Order, the
Reform Act Bar Order, and the so-called Contractual Provisions). See New
England Health Care Employees Pension Fund v. Woodruff, 512 F.3d 1283, 1288-
89 (10th Cir. Jan. 16, 2008). Because that portion of the opinion is susceptible to
misinterpretation, and because of standing’s fundamental importance, we should
grant the petition to clarify this portion of the Court’s opinion. The denial of the
Petition is otherwise well-taken.
As Appellants aptly note in their Response to the Petition, once they
demonstrate “plain legal prejudice” under any provision of the partial settlement
agreement, they have standing to challenge the district court’s approval of that
settlement on any ground. By addressing whether the Contractual Provisions
prejudice Appellants, after concluding Appellants made the requisite showing of
plain legal prejudice as to the Complete Bar Order and the Reform Act Bar Order
provisions, I fear the Court’s decision — as presently written — risks muddying
our standing jurisprudence. 1 Lower courts and litigants could easily interpret the
majority opinion’s extended standing discussion to mean Appellants must
demonstrate “plain legal prejudice” as to each provision of the settlement
agreement they wish to challenge on the merits. This is incorrect.
While no court of appeals has expressly addressed this precise issue —
indeed, few courts have addressed non-settling defendants’ standing to contest
partial settlement agreements at all — core tenets of our standing jurisprudence
demonstrate that Appellants need only demonstrate “plain legal prejudice” under
one provision of the partial settlement agreement to have standing to challenge
the district court’s approval of the agreement. 2 In re Integra Realty Res., Inc.,
1
The portion of the majority opinion that concerns me is as follows:
As to the Complete Bar and the Reform Act Bar, clearly, Mr.
Nacchio and Mr. Woodruff have standing to challenge these
provisions . . . . Further, in this case, the Contractual Provisions
clearly impact Mr. Nacchio and Mr. Woodruff's contribution and
indemnification rights . . . . They have therefore suffered the
requisite plain legal prejudice sufficient to confer standing with
respect to both the Contractual Provisions and the Bar Orders.
New England Health Care Employees Pension Fund, 512 F.3d at 1288-89(emphasis added).
2
See, e.g., Eichenholtz v. Brennan, 52 F.3d 478, 487 (3d Cir. 1995)
(holding that non-settling defendants had standing to challenge the district court’s
approval of the underlying partial settlement agreement after concluding that non-
settling defendants made the requisite “plain legal prejudice” showing as to one
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262 F.3d 1089, 1103 (10th Cir. 2001) (“‘Prejudice’ in this context means ‘plain
legal prejudice,’ as when ‘the settlement strips the party of a legal claim or cause
of action.’” (emphasis added) (quoting Agretti v. ANR Freight Sys., 982 F.2d
242, 246 (7th Cir. 1992)) (additional quotation omitted). Any doubt is dispelled
when we focus upon the “case-or-controversy” at bar. Here, Appellants appeal
the district court’s approval of the underlying settlement agreement as a whole,
rather than any particular provision. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e) (“[T]he court may
approve [the proposed settlement] only after . . . finding that it is fair, reasonable,
and adequate.”).
Admittedly, 4 Newberg on Class Action § 11:55 (4th ed. 2002) counsels
otherwise:
[N]onsettling defendants in a multiple defendant litigation context
have no standing to object to the fairness or adequacy of the
settlement by other defendants, but they may object to any terms that
preclude them from seeking indemnification from the settling
defendants. Nonsettling defendants also have standing to object if
they can show some formal legal prejudice to them, apart from loss
of contribution or indemnity rights.
provision of the agreement); see also, e.g., Alumax Mill Prods., Inc. v. Congress
Fin. Corp., 912 F.2d 996, 1001-02 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that a non-settling
defendant has standing “to object where it can demonstrate that it will sustain
some formal legal prejudice as a result of the settlement,” but declining to
expressly consider whether each objection to the partial settlement agreement
raised by the non-settling defendant met this standard (emphasis added)); Waller
v. Fin. Corp. of Am., 828 F.2d 579, 582 (9th Cir. 1987) (recognizing that “a non-
settling defendant [has standing] to object where it can demonstrate that it will
sustain some formal legal prejudice as a result of the settlement” (emphasis
added)).
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(emphasis added), cited with approval in In re Integra Realty Res., Inc., 262 F.3d
at 1103. The scant case law that exists on this subject cites this language
frequently. See, e.g., In re Integra Realty Res., Inc., 262 F.3d at 1103; In re
Viatron Computer Sys. Corp. Litig., 614 F.2d 11, 14 (1st Cir. 1979); In re Beef
Indus. Antitrust Litig., 607 F.2d 167, 172 (5th Cir. 1979). Notwithstanding
courts’ reliance on Newberg’s language, whether it deserves great weight is
entirely another matter.
Tellingly, any substantive analysis demonstrating the merits of this position
is, at best, elusive. See, e.g., In re Rite Aid Corp. Sec. Litig., 146 F. Supp. 2d
706, 716 n.12 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (noting that whether nonsettling defendants, who
had standing to challenge a Bar Order, also had “the right to object to the
settlement as having been obtained by unfair conduct . . . is a . . . close[]
question,” but electing to “merely note th[e] issue and move on”). Indeed, tracing
this language to its origin in the first edition of Newberg on Class Actions, it
appears Newberg — without independent analysis — relies on several district
court cases for his conclusion. See 3 Newberg on Class Actions § 5660b at 564-
65 (1977). Review of the cases cited by Newberg also reveals no substantive
analysis of this issue. While presumably Newberg’s perspective is best
understood in light of “[p]ublic policy strongly favor[ing] the pretrial settlement
of class action lawsuits,” see In re U.S. Oil & Gas Litig., 967 F.2d 489, 493 (11th
Cir. 1992), Article III standing represents “the irreducible constitutional
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minimum” requirements for maintaining a “case-or-controversy.” See Lujan v.
Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). “At its core . . . constitutional
standing requires a court to ask not only whether an injury has occurred, but
whether the injury that has occurred may serve as the basis for a legal remedy in
the federal courts.” See Bd. of County Comm’rs. v. Geringer, 297 F.3d 1108,
1112 (10th Cir. 2002). Put simply, I believe Newberg’s view is mistaken because
it conflates the standing and merits analysis.
Additionally, whether Appellants must demonstrate standing as to each
provision of the partial settlement agreement is also the point at which the
majority and dissent diverge. Clearly, the dissent to the Court’s opinion is correct
that “[t]o have standing under Article III, Non-Settling Defendants ‘must
demonstrate standing for each claim that [they] seek[] to press.’” See New
England Health Care Employees Pension Fund, 512 F.3d at 1292 (quoting
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 126 S. Ct. 1854, 1867 (2006)). But applying that
general principle here requires careful consideration of this matter’s procedural
posture. Again, the Appellants’ appeal is not to any particular portion of the
partial settlement. Quite clearly, Appellants appeal from the district court’s Fed.
R. Civ. P. 23(e) approval of the parties’ partial settlement agreement as a whole.
As such, Appellants’ objections to the settlement agreement’s Complete Bar
Order, Reform Act Bar Order, and Contractual Provisions are not separate
“claims,” which Appellants “seek[] to press.” See DaimlerChrysler, 126 S. Ct. at
-5-
1867; see Black’s Law Dictionary 240 (7th. ed. 1999) (defining a “claim” as,
inter alia, “[a]n interest or remedy recognized at law; the means by which a
person can obtain a privilege, possession, or enjoyment of a right or thing;
CAUSE OF ACTION”). Rather, the ultimate issue presented by Appellants on
appeal is whether the district court abused its discretion in concluding the
settlement agreement, as a whole, “is fair, reasonable, and adequate.” See Fed. R.
Civ. P. 23(e); see also Rutter & Wilbanks Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 314 F.3d 1180,
186 (10th Cir. 2002).
In my view, by demonstrating that the partial settlement agreement causes
them plain legal prejudice in any regard, Appellants satisfy the requirements of
standing to challenge the approval of the agreement. See Eichenholtz, 52 F.3d at
482 (“Where the rights of third parties are affected, it is not enough to evaluate
the fairness of the settlement to the settling parties; the interests of such third
parties must be considered.”). The Court’s opinion perpetuates ambiguity in an
area of the law that desperately needs clarification. As such, I respectfully
dissent from the denial of panel rehearing. 3
3
Further, given that Appellants demonstrated “plain legal prejudice” by
the Bar Order or the Complete Bar Order, the dissent’s understanding of the
Contractual Provisions’ effect — however correct for Rule 23(e) purposes — goes
to the merits, not standing. See New England Health Care Employees Pension
Fund, No. 06-1482, Dissenting Op. at 1-8.
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FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
January 16, 2008
PUBLISH Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT
NEW ENGLAND HEALTH CARE
EMPLOYEES PENSION FUND, on
behalf of itself and all others similarly
situated; CLIFFORD MOSHER, on
behalf of himself and all others No. 06-1482
similarly situated; TEJINDER SINGH,
on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated; SOTPAL SINGH,
on behalf of himself and all others
similarly situated,
Plaintiffs - Appellees,
v.
ROBERT S. WOODRUFF; JOSEPH P.
NACCHIO,
Defendants - Appellants,
and
QWEST COMMUNICATIONS
INTERNATIONAL, INC.; DRAKE S
TEMPEST; JAMES A. SMITH;
ARTHUR ANDERSEN L.L.P.;
CRAIG D. SLATER; PHILIP F.
ANSCHUTZ,
Defendants - Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
(D.C. No. 01-cv-01451-REB-PAC, 02-cv-00333-REB-PAC, 02-cv-00507-REB-
PAC, 02-cv–00374-REB-PAC, 02-cv-00755-REB-PAC, 02-cv-00798-REB-
PAC, 02-cv-00658-REB-PAC, 01-cv-01799-REB-PAC, 01-cv-01472-REB-
PAC, 01-cv-01527-REB-PAC, 01-cv-01930-REB-PAC, 01-cv-01616-REB-
PAC, 01-cv-02083-REB-PAC)
Herbert J. Stern of Stern & Kilcullen, LLC, Roseland, New Jersey, and David
Meister of Clifford Chance, US, LLP, New York, New York (James Miller and
David Cook of Clifford Chance, US, LLP, New York, New York; and Jeffrey
Speiser and Joel M. Silverstein of Stern & Kilcullen, LLC, Roseland, New Jersey,
with them on the briefs), for Defendants-Appellants.
David R. Boyd of Boies, Schiller & Flexner LLP, Washington, D.C. (Jonathan D.
Schiller, Alfred P. Levitt, and Jorge Schmidt P. of Boies, Schiller & Flexner LLP,
Washington, D.C.; Terence C. Gill of Sherman & Howard, LLC, Denver,
Colorado, with him on the brief), for Defendant-Appellee Qwest Communications
International Inc.
Michael J. Dowd of Lerach Coughlin Stoia Geller Rudman & Robbins LLP, San
Diego, California (Keith F. Park, Spencer A. Burkholz, and Thomas E. Egler of
Lerach Coughlin Stoia Geller Rudman & Robbins LLP, San Diego, California;
Sanford Svetcov and Susan K. Alexander of Lerach Coughlin Stoia Geller
Rudman & Robbins LLP, San Francisco, California, with him on the brief), for
Plaintiffs-Appellees.
Before KELLY, BALDOCK, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.
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KELLY, Circuit Judge.
Defendants-Appellants Joseph P. Nacchio and Robert S. Woodruff, the
former Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of Qwest
Communications International, Inc. (“Qwest”), respectively, appeal the district
court’s approval of a class action settlement in a securities fraud case. The
settlement was negotiated between the Plaintiff-Appellee class, including lead
plaintiffs New England Health Care Employees’ Pension Fund, Clifford Mosher,
Tejinder Singh, and Sotpal Singh (collectively “Plaintiffs”), and Defendant-
Appellee Qwest, including eleven of its officers. Mr. Nacchio and Mr. Woodruff
were not included in the approved settlement. Our jurisdiction arises under 28
U.S.C. § 1291 and we remand to the district court so that it might make
appropriate findings and conclusions with respect to Mr. Nacchio and Mr.
Woodruff’s objections to the settlement.
Background
This case began on July 27, 2001 with a class action complaint alleging
various federal securities laws violations by employees of Qwest. Aplt. App. at
41. Several other complaints were subsequently filed, and the operative
complaint is Plaintiffs’ fifth amended complaint filed on February 6, 2004 which
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includes fourteen former Qwest employees and Arthur Andersen accountants as
defendants (Arthur Anderson LLP joins Qwest’s brief and contributed to the
settlement). Id. at 87, 179-385; Aplt. Br. at 4; Aplee. Br. at 2 n.1. After
“difficult” and “arms’ length” negotiations with mediators, Aplt. App. at 710,
Qwest and eleven of its officers came to a settlement agreement with the Plaintiff
class, and Plaintiffs filed an unopposed motion for preliminary approval of a
stipulation for partial settlement on November 23, 2005. Id. at 153, 1057-1109;
Pl. Br. at 3-4.
Mr. Nacchio and Mr. Woodruff were not included in the settlement
negotiations but were informed that they would be included if they would pay
personally into any settlement fund. Aplt. App. at 880-81. Plaintiffs believed
that Mr. Nacchio and Mr. Woodruff were especially culpable and should not be
allowed to join a settlement in which only Qwest would pay. Id. Mr. Nacchio
and Mr. Woodruff were not so inclined and therefore were not included in the
final settlement. Id. at 881. Both Mr. Nacchio and Mr. Woodruff have
agreements with Qwest that require Qwest to indemnify them for any reasonable
amounts they might pay in settlement of a lawsuit against them as former
directors or officers. Id. at 554, 655-56; Aplt. Br. at 7.
The settlement includes three provisions that are at issue in this appeal.
Aplt. Br. at 7-8. The first, as required by Section 21D of the Private Securities
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Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PSLRA”), 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4, bars contribution
claims between and among the Released Persons and Non-Settling Defendants
(defined to include Mr. Nacchio and Mr. Woodruff) “based on, relating to, or
arising out of the Released Claims.” Aplt. App. at 1009. This is the Reform Act
Bar. 1 See id.
The second states, in relevant part, that “the Non-Settling Defendants . . .
are . . . permanently barred, enjoined, and restrained from commencing,
prosecuting, or asserting any claim, if any, however styled, whether for
indemnification, contribution, or otherwise and whether arising under state,
federal, or common law, against the Released Persons based on, arising out of, or
relating to the Released Claims.” Id. This is the Complete Bar. See id. at 1010.
The third provision includes two separate provisions that are grouped and
addressed together as the Contractual Provisions. Id. at 1010-11; Aplee Br. at 12.
The first states that “the Class will not settle any claim or judgment against a
Non-Settling Defendant without obtaining from the Non-Settling Defendant the
release of any and all claims the Non-Settling Defendant may have against any of
the Released Persons based on, arising out of, relating to, or in connection with
1
In the Reform Act Bar and the Complete Bar described below, the
definitions of the terms “Non-Settling Defendants” and “Released Persons”
include parties who were not before the district court. Aplt. App. at 10 (“Non-
Settling Defendant” defined to explicitly include Mr. Nacchio and Mr. Woodruff);
id. at 11-12 (definition of “Related Parties”).
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the Released Claims or the subject matter thereof.” Aplt. App. at 1011. The
second orders that “to the extent (but only to the extent) not covered by the
Reform Act Bar Order and/or the Complete Bar Order, the Lead Plaintiffs, on
behalf of themselves and the Class, further agree that they will reduce or credit
any settlement or judgment (up to the amount of such settlement or judgment)
they may obtain against a Non-Settling Defendant by an amount equal to the
amount of any settlement or final, non-appealable judgment that a Non-Settling
Defendant may obtain against any of the Released Persons based on, arising out
of, relating to, or in connection with the Released Claims or the subject matter
thereof.” Id. at 1010.
The district court preliminarily approved the partial settlement on January
5, 2006, id. at 156, and, after a motion by Plaintiffs and briefing by the parties, a
hearing on final approval of the settlement was held on May 19, 2006. Aplt. App.
at 934-94. Mr. Nacchio and Mr. Woodruff objected to the settlement on several
grounds. Id. at 952-58. All parties were heard at this hearing. Id. at 934-94. On
September 29, 2006, the district court entered its Partial Final Judgment and
Order of Partial Dismissal with Prejudice (“PFJ”), overruling Mr. Nacchio and
Mr. Woodruff’s objections “[b]ased on the reasons stated, arguments advanced,
and authorities cited by Qwest in its reply.” Id. at 173, 1004. The district court
held that the settlement was “fair, reasonable, and adequate” to the extent Fed. R.
Civ. P. 23(e)(1)(C) applies to Mr. Nacchio and Mr. Woodruff. Id. at 1005. The
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district court entered its final Judgment on October 2, 2006. Aplt. App. at 174,
1044. 2 Mr. Nacchio and Mr. Woodruff’s appeal followed. Id. at 178, 1051.
Discussion
Mr. Nacchio and Mr. Woodruff attack the district court’s approval of the
settlement on several grounds, but we need only address whether they have
standing to challenge the settlement and whether the district court provided
sufficient findings and conclusions pursuant to the PFJ for appellate review. We
hold that Mr. Nacchio and Mr. Woodruff have standing and remand the case for
the district court to provide a more extensive explanation for its decision.
I. Standing
It is well established that any party, including the court sua sponte, can
raise the issue of standing for the first time at any stage of the litigation,
including on appeal. Rector v. City and County of Denver, 348 F.3d 935, 942
(10th Cir. 2003). Qwest did not object to Mr. Nacchio and Mr. Woodruff’s
standing in the district court but now challenge it. Aplee. Br. at 25 n.11.
“Whether a plaintiff has standing is a legal question, which we review de
novo.” Lippoldt v. Cole, 468 F.3d 1204, 1216 (10th Cir. 2006). Federal courts
2
An Order Granting Qwest’s Unopposed Motion Seeking Relief from
Judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(a) followed on January 8, 2007, correcting an
error in the PFJ that is not being appealed. Aplt. App. at 177, 1052.
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may only hear actual “Cases” or “Controversies,” U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl.1,
and a plaintiff bears the burden of proving standing. See Bronson v. Swensen,
500 F.3d 1099, 1106 (10th Cir. 2007). A plaintiff must prove (1) it has suffered
an “injury in fact” that is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or
imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical; (2) the injury is fairly traceable to the
challenged action of the defendant; and (3) it is likely, as opposed to merely
speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision. Id.In order to have standing to challenge a settlement, non-settling parties
must demonstrate that they have been prejudiced by the settlement. In re Integra
Realty Res., Inc. (In re Integra I), 262 F.3d 1089, 1102 (10th Cir. 2001). “Plain
legal prejudice sufficient to confer standing upon a non-settling litigant in a class
action has been found to include any interference with a party’s contract rights or
a party’s ability to seek contribution or indemnification.” Id. (quoting Agretti v.
ANR Freight Sys., 982 F.2d 242, 247 (7th Cir. 1992)) (internal brackets omitted).
“A party also suffers plain legal prejudice if the settlement strips the party of a
legal claim or cause of action, such as a cross claim or the right to present
relevant evidence at trial.” Id. at 1102-03.
Qwest argues that Mr. Nacchio and Mr. Woodruff do not have standing to
challenge the Contractual Provisions, the Complete Bar, or the Reform Act Bar.
See Aplee. Br. at 25-30. First, it argues that the Contractual Provisions simply
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reflect an agreement in which Plaintiffs will not collect money from Mr. Nacchio
and Mr. Woodruff for which Qwest and the other Released Persons are ultimately
liable, and that Mr. Nacchio and Mr. Woodruff are not deprived of any claims or
legal rights. Id. at 25. Thus, Mr. Nacchio and Mr. Woodruff cannot show they
have suffered an “injury in fact.” Id. at 26-27. Similarly, Mr. Nacchio and Mr.
Woodruff cannot show an “injury in fact” with respect to “independent claims”
(claims related to the same factual situation as the settlement but not based upon
liability to Plaintiffs) and claims by “non-parties who were not before the court”
that are barred by the Complete Bar and the Reform Act Bar. Id. at 28. Mr.
Nacchio and Mr. Woodruff, Qwest argues, have not identified any particular
“independent claims” or “non-parties,” the claims of non-parties that would be
barred, or how they have standing to represent any non-parties’ interests. Id.
Qwest suggests that any “independent claims” could be brought once they
actually develop. Id. at 29-30.
We disagree. As to the Complete Bar and the Reform Act Bar, clearly, Mr.
Nacchio and Mr. Woodruff have standing to challenge these provisions: both Bar
Orders strip Mr. Nacchio and Mr. Woodruff of their contribution and
indemnification rights, in addition to certain independent claims. Further, in this
case, the Contractual Provisions clearly impact Mr. Nacchio and Mr. Woodruff’s
contribution and indemnification rights by requiring them to release their claims
against Qwest and then lose the benefit of any possible indemnification in a
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settlement with Plaintiffs. As fail-safe protection for Qwest, Plaintiffs, in
addition to obtaining a release from Mr. Nacchio and Mr. Woodruff, must lower
any agreed settlement amount by the indemnity amount Mr. Nacchio and Mr.
Woodruff could receive from Qwest, making it impossible for Mr. Nacchio and
Mr. Woodruff to receive any indemnification from a settlement with Plaintiffs.
Such an arrangement, in addition to the Bar Orders that eliminate certain
independent claims and claims against non-parties, essentially strip, and, in any
event, palpably interfere with, Mr. Nacchio and Mr. Woodruff’s preexisting rights
and potential legal claims. They have therefore suffered the requisite plain legal
prejudice sufficient to confer standing with respect to both the Contractual
Provisions and the Bar Orders. See id.; see also TBG, Inc. v. Bendis, 36 F.3d
916, 929 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding that “the court should not purport to bar claims
it has no power to bar, even if it thinks that there really are no such claims”).
The dissent argues that Mr. Nacchio and Mr. Woodruff do not have
standing to challenge the Contractual Provisions because the Contractual
Provisions represent “a private contractual agreement” between Plaintiffs and
Qwest that does not divest Mr. Nacchio and Mr. Woodruff of any preexisting
rights or legal claims. As noted, the Contractual Provisions interfere with Mr.
Nacchio and Mr. Woodruff’s indemnification claims against Qwest. Our
precedent in this regard, upon which the dissent relies, clearly held that “‘plain
legal prejudice . . . has been found to include any interference with a party’s
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contract rights or a party’s ability to seek contribution or indemnification.’” In re
Integra I, 262 F.3d at 1102 (quoting Agretti, 982 F.2d at 247) (emphasis added).
In In re Integra I, the opt-out parties lacked standing on a claim that immediate
payment of settlement amounts would make it more difficult for the opt-out
parties to defend their cases. In contrast, the Contractual Provisions here
interfere with Mr. Nacchio and Mr. Woodruff’s ability to seek indemnification
and therefore come within the terms of our precedent. 3
3
Notably, the instant matter is readily distinguishable from cases in which
courts have held that non-settling defendants failed to demonstrate that the
settlement agreements they sought to challenge “legal[ly] prejudice[d]” them.
See In re Integra I, 262 F.3d at 1102. Unlike those non-settling defendants whose
interests were found to be “merely the loss of some practical or strategic
advantage in litigating their case[s],” here the Contractual Provisions effectively
vitiate and—at minimum, palpably interfere with—Mr. Nacchio and Mr.
Woodruff’s legal rights. See id. at 1103 (no legal prejudice demonstrated by non-
settling defendants who objected to settlement by alleging, “[a]t most,” that the
settlement “placed them at a tactical disadvantage” in the litigation); Skull Valley
Band of Goshute Indians v. Nielson, 376 F.3d 1223, 1234 (10th Cir. 2004)
(narrowly construing the facts in In re Integra I, 376 F.3d at 1101-03); see also
Agretti, 982 F.2d at 246 (no legal prejudice demonstrated by non-settling
defendant who objected to settlement under which the non-settling defendant: (1)
“still ha[d] all of its rights under the contract and may protect those rights through
any contractual provisions or legal action”; and (2) was not “precluded in any
manner from enforcing its rights”), Mayfield v. Barr, 985 F.2d 1090, 1093 (D.C.
Cir. 1993) (no legal prejudice demonstrated by non-settling defendant who chose
to opt out and, thus, “did not involuntarily lose his individual claim”), and Waller
v. Fin. Corp. of Am., 828 F.2d 579, 583-84 (9th Cir. 1987) (no legal prejudice
demonstrated by non-settling defendant who objected to settlement that did “not
cut off or in anyway affect any” of the non-settling defendant’s claims), all cited
in In re Integra I, 262 F.3d at 1102.
The dissent contends that Agretti actually supports a lack of standing and
the absence of legal prejudice in this case. We disagree. It bears noting that
Agretti did not analyze standing in terms of a loss of indemnification or
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II. The District Court’s Analysis
The district court’s approval of a class action settlement is reviewed for an
abuse of discretion. Shoels v. Klebold, 375 F.3d 1054, 1060 (10th Cir. 2004).
“[W]henever a district judge is required to make a discretionary ruling that is
subject to appellate review, we have to satisfy ourselves, before we can conclude
that the judge did not abuse his discretion, that he exercised his discretion, that is,
that he considered the factors relevant to that exercise.” United States v.
Cunningham, 429 F.3d 673, 679 (7th Cir. 2005). Mr. Nacchio and Mr. Woodruff
argue that, because the district court approved the challenged provisions merely
on the basis of “the reasons stated, arguments advanced, and authorities cited by
Qwest in it reply,” without any independent reasoning or analysis, the case must
be remanded for an explanation with more particularity. Aplt. Br. at 19. For a
contribution rights. Rather, the employer argued that the settlement invalidated
its contract with the union, violated its due process rights, was unlawful and
against public policy. The court rejected these grounds because the contract was
unaffected by the settlement agreement and the employer retained all of its
contractual and legal rights because the union only was required to make some
“unilateral declarations.” 982 F.2d at 247-48.
The settlement here requires Plaintiffs to do more than simply make
unilateral declarations. The Contractual Provisions mandate that Plaintiffs must
obtain a release of any indemnification claims Mr. Nacchio and Mr. Woodruff
have against Qwest in a settlement with them and must reduce the settlement
amount by any amount Mr. Nacchio and Mr. Woodruff might still receive as an
indemnity from Qwest. This is not a “declaration” but rather an agreement
requiring Plaintiffs to interfere with Mr. Nacchio and Mr. Woodruff’s ability to
seek indemnification from a settlement. See In re Integra I, 262 F.3d at 1102.
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slightly different reason, we agree.
We recognize that findings of fact and conclusions of law supplied by a
party and adopted verbatim by a district court will not automatically render a
decision reversible and are held to the normal appellate standards. See Anderson
v. City of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564, 571-72 (1985). This case,
however, is different. The district court in Anderson provided a clear listing of
its findings of fact and conclusions of law for appellate review. 557 F.Supp. 412(D.N.C. 1983). The district court here, after summarizing Mr. Nacchio and Mr.
Woodruff’s contentions and explaining the challenged provisions, simply
“overrule[d]” Mr. Nacchio and Mr. Woodruff’s objections, noting only that the
provisions were “either legally required, or [were] legally appropriate” in the case
“[b]ased on the reasons stated, arguments advanced, and authorities cited by
Qwest in its reply.” Moreover, the district court’s order did not address a
supplemental brief filed by Mr. Nacchio and Mr. Woodruff (apparently filed
without objection) responding to that reply. Aplt. App. 924-933; Aplt. Reply Br.
at 7-8.
This is insufficient. When it comes to page after page of complex legal
argument, we need to know what path the district court followed. Qwest’s reply
contains twenty-one pages of text and eight exhibits spanning one hundred thirty-
three pages. Aplt. App. at 681-840. The reply is argument to the district court
- 13 -
and was not intended to represent any findings or conclusions for an appellate
court to review. “We prefer to assess the justification [for a bar order] in the first
instance on the basis of concrete facts found by the district court, and with the
assistance of the district court’s full consideration and discussion of all of the
relevant facts of the instant case and a full discussion of the relevant persuasive
authorities and the underlying reasons and policies justifying whatever order the
district court ultimately approves.” AAL High Yield Bond Fund v. Deloitte &
Touche LLP, 361 F.3d 1305, 1312 (11th Cir. 2004). On remand, the district court
should illuminate its overruling of Mr. Nacchio and Mr. Woodruff’s objections.
The dissent relies upon In re Integra Realty Res. (Integra II), 354 F.3d
1246, 1268-69 (10th Cir. 2004) to suggest that we should decide the case on the
current record. Just as we are unwilling to exercise the discretion of the district
court, we are unwilling to guess at the path the district court followed in resolving
serious legal issues, as opposed to factual matters. We need something to show
how, and on what basis, the court analyzed Mr. Nacchio and Mr. Woodruff’s
objections, in a form other than Qwest’s argument. A remand of this case is the
only way to ensure that we get it.
The district court here, in addition to addressing any matters it might find
appropriate, should determine whether the contribution bar order mandated by the
PSLRA is exclusive. Deloitte, 361 F.3d at 1312 n.14. If the district court
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determines that the PSLRA bar order is not exclusive, then it should address the
persuasive authorities, reasons, and policies for and against the imposition of a
broader bar order that would bar claims arising from liability to plaintiffs other
than the instant plaintiffs or would bar truly independent claims. Id. The district
court should address any particular fact or circumstance relevant to its resolution
and state why it is relevant, id., keeping in mind that “the court should not
purport to bar claims it has no power to bar, even if it thinks that there really are
no such claims.” Bendis, 36 F.3d at 929. Finally, after engaging in this analysis,
the district court should determine whether the settlement is “fair, reasonable, and
adequate” under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2). See Deloitte, 361 F.3d at 1312 n.14.
REMANDED.
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06-1482, New England Health Care Employees Pension Fund, et al. v. Woodruff,
et al.
BRISCOE, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
Because the majority errs (1) in its determination that Joseph Nacchio and
Robert Woodruff (“Non-Settling Defendants”) have standing to contest the two
Contractual Provisions, and (2) in its decision to remand to the district court for a
more detailed analysis of Non-Settling Defendants’ objections, I respectfully
dissent.
I.
I agree with the majority that Non-Settling Defendants have standing to
contest the Complete Bar Order and the Reform Act Bar Order. I disagree,
however, that they have standing to contest the two Contractual Provisions.
The Contractual Provisions protect the Settling Defendants and other
Released Persons in the event that the Bar Orders fail to do so. The first of the
Contractual Provisions is an indemnification clause. It provides, in essence, that
if Plaintiffs obtain a settlement or judgment against Non-Settling Defendants, and
Non-Settling Defendants successfully recover some of that liability from any of
the Released Persons, then Plaintiffs will subtract that amount from the settlement
or judgment against Non-Settling Defendants. 1 Similarly, the second of the
1
The first Contractual Provision provides, in relevant part:
To the extent (but only to the extent) not covered by the Reform Act
Contractual Provisions contains an agreement by Plaintiffs not to settle any claim
or judgment against Non-Settling Defendants without obtaining a release of any
claims Non-Settling Defendants may have against the Released Persons. 2
Bar Order and/or the Complete Bar Order, the Lead Plaintiffs, on
behalf of themselves and the Class, further agree that they will
reduce or credit any settlement or judgment (up to the amount of
such settlement or judgment) they may obtain against a Non-Settling
Defendant by an amount equal to the amount of any settlement or
final, non-appealable judgment that a Non-Settling Defendant may
obtain against any of the Released Persons based upon, arising out
of, relating to, or in connection with the Released Claims or the
subject matter thereof. In the event that a settlement is reached
between Lead Plaintiffs or the Class and a Non-Settling Defendant,
or final judgment is entered in favor of Lead Plaintiffs or the Class
against a Non-Settling Defendant before the resolution of that Non-
Settling Defendant’s potential claims against any Released Person,
any funds collected on account of such settlement or judgment shall
not be distributed, but shall be retained by the Escrow Agent pending
the resolution of any potential claim by the Non-Settling Defendant .
. . against such Released Person(s) as provided in Paragraphs 11.3
and 11.4 of this Stipulation. . . . Inclusion of this Paragraph 11.3 in
the Judgment is material to Settling Defendants’ decision to
participate in this Stipulation.
Stip. of Partial Settlement, ROA, Vol. III, at 1091-92, ¶ 11.3.
2
The full language of the second Contractual Provision reads:
The Class will not settle any claim or judgment against a Non-
Settling Defendant without obtaining from the Non-Settling
Defendant the release of any and all claims the Non-Settling
Defendant may have against any of the Released Persons based upon,
arising out of, relating to or in connection with the Released Claims
or the subject matter thereof, provided that each Settling Defendant
shall execute and provide to the Non-Settling Defendant a release in
a form that is satisfactory both to the Settling Defendants and the
Non-Settling Defendant. Inclusion of this Paragraph 11.4 in the
Judgment is material to Settling Defendants’ decision to participate
-2-
Non-Settling Defendants do not have standing to challenge these
provisions. To have standing under Article III, Non-Settling Defendants “must
demonstrate standing for each claim that [they] seek[] to press.” DaimlerChrysler
Corp. v. Cuno, 126 S. Ct. 1854, 1867 (2006). In a closely analogous situation, we
recently explained:
Non-settling defendants generally have no standing to complain
about a settlement, since they are not members of the settling class. .
..
Courts have recognized a limited exception to this rule where
nonsettling parties can demonstrate they are “prejudiced” by a
settlement. However, it is not sufficient for [the non-settling
defendants] to show merely the loss of some practical or strategic
advantage in litigating their case. “Prejudice” in this context means
“plain legal prejudice,” as when the settlement strips the party of a
legal claim or cause of action.
In re Integra Realty Res., Inc. (In re Integra I), 262 F.3d 1089, 1102 (10th Cir.
2001) (citations, alterations, and some internal quotation marks omitted).
Contrary to the majority’s misreading of the Contractual Provisions, they
do not “essentially strip” or “palpably interfere with” Non-Settling Defendants’
“preexisting rights and potential legal claims.” (Majority Op. at 10.) Rather, the
Contractual Provisions simply provide for a private contractual agreement
between Plaintiffs and the Released Persons, whereby Plaintiffs agree not to
in this Stipulation.
Stip. of Partial Settlement, ROA, Vol. III, at 1092, ¶ 11.4.
-3-
negotiate a settlement with Non-Settling Defendants that prejudices the Released
Persons—and to indemnify the Released Persons if they do. Even if the practical
effect of the Contractual Provisions is to decrease Plaintiffs’ incentive to settle
with the Non-Settling Defendants, this “show[s] merely the loss of some practical
or strategic advantage in litigating their case,” rather than any “plain legal
prejudice.” In re Integra I, 262 F.3d at 1102.
By paraphrasing the terms of the second Contractual Provision as
“mandat[ing] that Plaintiffs must obtain a release,” (Majority Op. at 12 n.3), the
majority omits the simple fact that Non-Settling Defendants remain in control of
whether they will, or will not, enter into a settlement with Plaintiffs in the first
place. Non-Settling Defendants have choices. Unless and until Non-Settling
Defendants agree to a settlement with Plaintiffs, the question of a release does not
arise. As for the first Contractual Provision, which the majority describes as
“mandat[ing] that Plaintiffs . . . must reduce the settlement amount by any amount
[Non-Settling Defendants] might still receive as an indemnity from Qwest,”
(Majority Op. at 12 n.3), this provision merely guarantees that Plaintiffs will not
indirectly recover additional amounts from the Released Persons, over and above
the $400 million that the Released Persons have already agreed to pay under the
Settlement. This provision ensures that, if Plaintiffs recover $X from Non-
Settling Defendants, and Non-Settling Defendants later recover that amount ($X)
from the Released Persons (via, for instance, an action for indemnification), then
-4-
Plaintiffs will reduce their recovery against Non-Settling Defendants to nothing.
This agreement is solely between Plaintiffs and the Released Persons. It
guarantees the Released Persons that their total liability will be $400 million—no
more, no less—and provides them with the peace of mind that settling parties
both expect and require. Non-Settling Defendants are not prejudiced by either
Contractual Provision.
The majority’s standing analysis, moreover, is infinitely open-ended, and
its perfunctory attempt to reconcile its holding with In re Integra I is
unpersuasive. (Majority Op. at 11.) The majority relies upon an isolated
statement from In re Integra I that “‘[p]lain legal prejudice . . . has been found to
include any interference with a party’s contract rights or a party’s ability to seek
contribution or indemnification.’” In re Integra I, 262 F.3d at 1102 (quoting
Agretti v. ANR Freight Sys., Inc., 982 F.2d 242, 247-48 (7th Cir. 1992)).
However, the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Agretti—from which the above-quoted
language was lifted verbatim—shows exactly why Non-Settling Defendants do
not have standing to contest the Contractual Provisions in this case. In Agretti,
982 F.2d at 244, two defendants—ANR and Local Union No. 710—had
previously agreed upon a labor contract, and a majority of the members of Local
710 had ratified the contract. Several members of Local 710, though, brought a
class action against ANR and Local 710, arguing, among other things, that the
ratification process was improper. Id. at 244-45. Eventually, the plaintiff class
-5-
reached a settlement with Local 710, which “required Local 710 to declare the . . .
ratification vote and ANR’s implementation of the profit sharing plan void; . . .
and required Local 710 to assist the plaintiffs and cooperate with them for the rest
of the litigation against ANR.” Id. at 245. The non-settling defendant, ANR,
objected to the settlement, arguing that “it suffer[ed] plain legal prejudice because
the settlement invalidate[d] its contracts with Local 710 and violate[d] its due
process rights,” and that its “contract rights [were] invalidated by the settlement .
. . because the settlement require[d] a repudiation of the contract between Local
710 and ANR.” Id. at 247. The Seventh Circuit flatly rejected this argument:
We do not believe that ANR’s rights are legally prejudiced by this
provision or any other one in the settlement. Local 710 is not
repudiating the contract, the settlement simply requires it to make
some unilateral declarations. ANR still has all of its rights under the
contract and may protect those rights through any contractual
provisions or legal action. Nor is ANR precluded in any manner
from enforcing its rights under the contract with Local 710. While
Local 710 is required under the settlement to declare the ratification
vote and implementation of the profit sharing plan void, ANR may
continue to assert its position that the vote and profit sharing plan are
valid and enforceable.
Id. at 247-48.
Like ANR, Non-Settling Defendants here are not “legally prejudiced” by
the Contractual Provisions. Id. at 247. The Contractual Provisions “simply
require[] . . . some unilateral declarations” by parties other than Non-Settling
Defendants. Id. at 247-48. Non-Settling Defendants “still ha[ve] all of [their]
-6-
rights under the[ir indemnification] contract[s] and may protect those rights
through any contractual provisions or legal action.” Id. at 248. “Nor [are Non-
Settling Defendants] precluded in any manner from enforcing [their] rights under
the[ir] contract[s] with [Qwest].” Id. Even with the Contractual Provisions in
force, Non-Settling Defendants “may continue to assert [their] position that [their
indemnification rights are] valid and enforceable.” Id. Thus, under the Seventh
Circuit’s decision in Agretti, which we relied upon verbatim in In re Integra I,
262 F.3d at 1102, the majority’s standing analysis fails, and Non-Settling
Defendants lack standing to challenge the Contractual Provisions here. 3 See also
In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 921 F.2d 1330, 1333 (3d Cir. 1990) (holding that non-
settling defendants lacked standing to challenge a similar provision).
In their briefs, Non-Settling Defendants appear to recognize that their
standing argument is weak as to the Contractual Provisions, and they assert a
scattershot of alleged injuries resulting from the Contractual Provisions. None of
the alleged injuries, however, is sufficient to confer standing. For instance, Non-
Settling Defendants contend, in passing, that the provisions were a breach of
Qwest’s “Bylaws, contracts with Non-Settling Defendants and obligations of good
3
Indeed, it is ironic that the majority has to go through such lengths to
distinguish the facts of Agretti, (Majority Op. at 12 n.3), considering that the
majority relies upon Agretti verbatim for its legal standard. Compounding the
error, the majority’s attempt to distinguish Agretti ends up being nothing more
than “a distinction without a difference.”
-7-
faith and fair dealing,” as well as a tortious interference with their
indemnification rights. Non-Settling Defendants’ Reply Br. at 24-25. Non-
Settling Defendants, though, provide no legal authority for such claims and do not
explain how the Contractual Provisions rise to such a level. See Am. Airlines v.
Christensen, 967 F.2d 410, 415 n.8 (10th Cir. 1992) (“It is insufficient merely to
state in one’s brief that one is appealing an adverse ruling below without
advancing reasoned argument as to the grounds for the appeal.”).
II.
The majority also errs in vacating the district court’s order and remanding
for more detailed analysis by the district court.
The district court’s consideration and analysis, while not perfect, were
more than adequate in this case. In a recent case, we addressed an almost
identical situation as the one we face here, where objectors “argue[d] that the
district court did not adequately support its approval of the Settlement by
explaining the reasons for its approval and for its rejection of the objections that
were raised.” In re Integra Realty Res., Inc. (In re Integra II), 354 F.3d 1246,
1268 (10th Cir. 2004) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). We
explained:
To be sure, “‘a reviewing court [must] have some basis for
distinguishing between well-reasoned conclusions arrived at after a
comprehensive consideration of all relevant factors, and mere
boilerplate approval phrased in appropriate language but unsupported
-8-
by evaluation of the facts or analysis of the law.’” Newman v. Stein,
464 F.2d 689, 692 (2d Cir. 1972) (quoting Protective Comm. for
Indep. Stockholders of TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc. v. Anderson, 390
U.S. 414, 434 (1968)). However, while more extensive explanation
by the district court may have been helpful to our review, we will not
overturn the district court’s decision on the basis of a “merely
formal” deficiency as long as the decision finds support in the
record. Protective Comm., 390 U.S. at 437.
Id. (alteration in original). Because the district court in that case (1) “considered
all prior proceedings in the case and all objections and submissions that were
made in connection with the proposed settlement,” (2) reviewed “materials [that] .
. . included all written objections to the settlement,” (3) “heard objections” at the
settlement fairness hearing, and (4) “was aware of all the issues that appellants
now argue should have been considered when determining the settlement’s
fairness,” we held that “the district court did not abuse its discretion by approving
the settlement.” Id. at 1268-69.
Here, as in In re Integra II, the district court reviewed and considered all of
the submissions and materials. See Hearing Transcript, ROA, Vol. III, at 939
(explaining that the “reasons stated, arguments advanced and authorities already
cited” have been “carefully read and considered by the court, and its most
competent and able staff”); Dist. Ct. Order, ROA, Vol. III, at 1004 (“I have
reviewed carefully the Stipulation, Nacchio and Woodruff’s objections, Qwest’s
-9-
reply to the objections of Nacchio and Woodruff, and the applicable law.”). 4
Here, as in In re Integra II, the district court entertained objections at a fairness
hearing. As Appellee Qwest notes, “[c]ounsel for both Nacchio and Woodruff
attended the hearing, and counsel for Nacchio presented argument on behalf of
both of them.” Appellee Qwest’s Br. at 21; see Hearing Transcript, ROA, Vol. III,
at 934-35, 952-58. Here, as in In re Integra II, 354 F.3d at 1269, the district court
was “aware of all the issues that Non-Settling Defendants now argue should have
been considered when determining the settlement’s fairness,” particularly in light
of the parties’ extensive briefing on those issues.
Given the district court’s obligation to analyze the settlement and ensure its
fairness towards all parties involved—not just Non-Settling Defendants—the
district court’s analysis of Non-Settling Defendants’ objections in two-and-a-half
pages of a twelve-page opinion was reasonable. See Linney v. Cellular Alaska
P’ship, 151 F.3d 1234, 1243 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that the district court
appropriately “outlined . . . objections, gave his responses, and stated why he
believed the settlement to be fair, reasonable, and adequate in a 16-page Order
4
The majority is incorrect that the district court never read or considered
Non-Settling Defendants’ Supplemental Brief. At the fairness hearing, which
occurred after Non-Settling Defendants submitted their Supplemental Brief, the
district court instructed the parties that their “papers” had been “carefully read
and considered by the court, and its most competent and able staff.” Hearing
Transcript, ROA, Vol. III, at 939. To be fair, the district court did not say, “I
have read your Supplemental Brief,” but we usually do not require a district court
to provide such an explicit acknowledgment of a party’s submission to the court.
- 10 -
and a 7-page Judgment”). Even if the district court’s adoption of Qwest’s Reply
Brief for its “reasons stated, arguments advanced, and authorities cited,” Dist. Ct.
Order, ROA, Vol. III, at 1004, was more cursory than we might prefer, the
referenced Reply Brief nevertheless contained appropriate legal and factual
support for the district court’s conclusions and analysis, and we can adequately
discern the basis for the district court’s decision. See Protective Comm. for
Indep. Stockholders of TMT Trailer Ferry, Inc. v. Anderson, 390 U.S. 414, 437
(1968) (“If, indeed, the record contained adequate facts to support the decision of
the trial court to approve the proposed compromises, a reviewing court would be
properly reluctant to attack that action solely because the court failed adequately
to set forth its reasons or the evidence on which they were based.”).
Moreover, the record on appeal contains all of the briefs that the parties
submitted to the district court, as well as the transcript of the hearing in front of
the district court and the decision of the district court—not to mention a fresh set
of briefs totaling almost 200 pages. Given the detail of this record and the district
court’s specific adoption of the reasoning and authorities cited in Qwest’s Reply
Brief as its ruling, we have very little difficultly in framing the issues at hand or
in discerning the district court’s rulings on those issues. Vacating and remanding,
simply to force the district court to combine all of its reasoning and support into
one document, would create needless delay in a case that is already over six years
old.
- 11 -
The majority relies almost entirely on the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in
AAL High Yield Bond Fund v. Deloitte & Touche LLP, 361 F.3d 1305, 1312
(11th Cir 2004), in which the court vacated a bar order in a securities litigation
settlement and remanded for “the assistance of the district court’s full
consideration and discussion of all of the relevant facts of the instant case and a
full discussion of the relevant persuasive authorities and the underlying reasons
and policies justifying whatever order the district court ultimately approves.”
Admittedly, AAL High Yield Bond Fund provides support for vacating and
remanding to the district court. However, the district court in AAL High Yield
Bond Fund appears to have undertaken less analysis than the district court did
here, and the issues in the instant case are appropriately framed and defined for
appeal. Moreover, as explained supra, our own decision in In re Integra II is
controlling here and strongly favors our accepting the district court’s ruling for
review without requiring further explication, the Eleventh Circuit’s decision
notwithstanding.
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