United States v. Farias

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS March 6, 2008
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
No. 07-4147
(D. Utah)
v.
(D.C. Nos. 2:07-CV-366-DAK and
2:05-CR-791-DAK)
JOSE JUAN FARIAS,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER DENYING REQUEST FOR
CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
Before KELLY, ANDERSON, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
This matter is before the court on Jose Juan Farias’s pro se requests for a
certificate of appealability (“COA”) and for permission to proceed on appeal in
forma pauperis. Farias, a federal prisoner, seeks a COA so he can appeal the
district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion. 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c)(1)(B). 1 This court grants Farias’s request to proceed on appeal in
forma pauperis. Because, however, he has not “made a substantial showing of the
1
The district court did not issue Farias a COA within thirty days of the
filing of his notice of appeal. Accordingly Farias’s request for a COA in the
district court is deemed denied. 10th Cir. R. 22.1(C).
denial of a constitutional right,” id. § 2253(c)(2), this court denies his request for
a COA and dismisses this appeal.
Farias pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or
more of a mixture containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(a). His plea agreement contained
waivers of both appellate and collateral-attack rights. Farias nevertheless brought
the instant § 2255 motion claiming his plea agreement was obtained through
ineffective assistance of counsel. In particular, Farias asserted (1) he did not
knowingly waive his right to directly appeal his sentence and (2) he was coerced
into pleading guilty based on his counsel’s promise that he would receive a ten-
year sentence.
The district court dismissed Farias’s § 2255 motion with prejudice. The
district court began by recognizing that although waivers of collateral-attack
rights were generally enforceable, an exception existed for challenges involving
claims of ineffective assistance with regard to entering the plea or negotiating the
agreement. United States v. Cockerham, 237 F.3d, 1179, 1183 (10th Cir. 2001).
The district court nevertheless concluded Farias’s conclusory allegations of
ineffective assistance were directly contrary to his statements in the plea
agreement and thus insufficient to state a claim. In signing the plea agreement,
Farias specifically acknowledged he had been advised of and understood the
limitations on his direct appeal and collateral-attack rights. He further expressly
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acknowledged that it was the district court alone that would impose a sentence
and acknowledged the district court’s sentence could differ from any sentence
estimated by the prosecution or defense counsel. When measured against these
specific statements in the plea agreement, Farias’s conclusory allegations of
ineffective assistance were clearly insufficient. Lasiter v. Thomas 89 F.3d 699,
702 (10th Cir. 1996) (holding conclusory allegations of ineffective assistance of
counsel are insufficient to overcome solemn declarations on the part of a movant,
like those present in this case, that a plea is knowing and voluntary).
The granting of a COA is a jurisdictional prerequisite to Farias’s appeal
from the denial of his § 2255 motion. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336
(2003). To be entitled to a COA, Farias must make “a substantial showing of the
denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To make the requisite
showing, he must demonstrate “reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for
that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different
manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to
proceed further.” Id. (quotations omitted). In evaluating whether Farias has
satisfied his burden, this court undertakes “a preliminary, though not definitive,
consideration of the [legal] framework” applicable to each of her claims. Id. at
338. Although Farias need not demonstrate his appeal will succeed to be entitled
to a COA, he must “prove something more than the absence of frivolity or the
existence of mere good faith.” Id.-3-
Having undertaken a review of Farias’s appellate filing, the district court’s
order, and the entire record before this court pursuant to the framework set out by
the Supreme Court in Miller-El, we conclude Farias is not entitled to a COA. The
district court’s resolution of Farias’s § 2255 motion is not reasonably subject to
debate and the issues he seeks to raise on appeal are not adequate to deserve
further proceedings. Accordingly, this court DENIES Farias’s request for a COA
and DISMISSES this appeal.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Elisabeth A. Shumaker, Clerk
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