Winslow v. Astrue

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
March 18, 2008
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
RODNEY E. WINSLOW,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 07-7060
(D.C. No. CIV-05-443-SPS)
MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, (E.D. Okla.)
Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TYMKOVICH, BALDOCK, and EBEL, Circuit Judges.
Rodney E. Winslow appeals from the district court’s order awarding
attorney’s fees pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice Act (EAJA), 28 U.S.C.
§ 2412, to himself, instead of directly to his counsel. We affirm.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and
collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent
with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
After the district court 1 remanded Mr. Winslow’s request for Social
Security disability benefits and Supplemental Security Income to the
Commissioner for further proceedings, Mr. Winslow moved for an award of
attorney’s fees in the amount of $5,611.90 as the prevailing party pursuant to the
EAJA and asked the court to award the fees directly to his counsel. Attached to
the motion was his affidavit assigning any right or interest in the award to his
counsel and asking that the fees be paid directly to counsel. The court granted an
award of fees to Mr. Winslow in the requested and unopposed amount, but denied
payment directly to counsel. The court noted that Mr. Winslow and counsel, as a
matter of private agreement, may provide for the payment of the fees to counsel,
but a private agreement did not provide the court the authority to ignore the clear
language of the EAJA, which requires payment of the fees to the prevailing party,
not counsel. See Aplt. App. at 46-48. Mr. Winslow appeals, arguing that the
court erred in failing to make the award of fees directly to counsel.
This court recently addressed in Manning v. Astrue, 510 F.3d 1246(10th Cir. 2007), whether attorney’s fees pursuant to the EAJA are payable to the
claimant or to the claimant’s attorney. Manning held, based on statutory
language, legislative history, and case law, that the attorney’s fees award under
the EAJA is to the prevailing party and not to that party’s attorney. Id. at
1
All district court proceedings were conducted before a magistrate judge
with the consent of the parties.
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1249-55. We agree with the district court that Mr. Winslow’s assignment of his
right in the fees award to counsel does not overcome the clear EAJA mandate that
the award is to him as the prevailing party. Thus, the district court correctly
declined to award the fees directly to counsel. 2
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s July 6, 2007 order.
Entered for the Court
Bobby R. Baldock
Circuit Judge
2
“Whether an award of attorneys’ fees under the [EAJA] ultimately
redounds to the benefit of counsel[, however,] depends upon the private
contractual arrangements between the attorney and the client.” Oguachuba v.
INS, 706 F.2d 93, 97 (2d Cir. 1983); see also Panola Land Buying Ass’n v. Clark,
844 F.2d 1506, 1511 (11th Cir. 1988) (“Historically, the client and the lawyer
make their fee arrangement, and the lawyer looks to the client for payment of the
legal fee. . . . In enacting the EAJA, Congress recognized and maintained the
attorney-client relationship as it has existed throughout our history.”). This
private contractual arrangement is a collateral matter the district court did not err
in declining to address when considering the EAJA fees motion.
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