Cheadle v. Dinwiddie

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
May 20, 2008
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
DARRYL A. CHEADLE,
Petitioner-Appellant, No. 08-6045
v. (W.D. of Okla.)
WALTER DINWIDDIE, Warden, (D.C. No. CV-07-939-C)
Respondent-Appellee.
ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY *
Before LUCERO, TYMKOVICH, and HOLMES, Circuit Judges. **
Darryl A. Cheadle seeks a certificate of appealability (COA) to challenge
the district court’s denial of habeas corpus relief to him under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
The district court denied all three of Cheadle’s constitutional claims. Proceeding
*
This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of
the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its
persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
**
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge
panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material
assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th
Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
pro se, 1 Cheadle now seeks a COA from this court to appeal each of the three
grounds raised below.
We conclude Cheadle is not entitled to relief under § 2254 and therefore
DENY his request for a COA.
I. Background
Cheadle was convicted of four offenses in Oklahoma state court: two
counts of robbery with a firearm, and one count each of felon in possession of a
firearm and aggravated attempt to elude a police officer. The jury sentenced
Cheadle to 2,000 years on each of the robbery counts, and 1,000 years on each of
the other two counts, the four sentences to run consecutively. The Oklahoma
court therefore imposed a cumulative sentence of 6,000 years imprisonment.
After his conviction and sentencing, Cheadle appealed to the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals (OCCA). The OCCA affirmed the convictions, but modified
the sentence to life imprisonment on each count. The two robbery sentences were
to run consecutively, and the two additional counts were to run concurrently with
the robbery counts.
Cheadle filed an application for post-conviction relief, which was denied by
the state district court. He appealed the denial to the OCCA, which affirmed.
Cheadle then filed a petition for habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
1
Because Cheadle proceeds pro se, we review his pleadings and filings
liberally. See Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520–21 (1972); Hall v. Bellmon,
935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).
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§ 2254. He asserted three grounds for relief: (1) ineffective assistance of
appellate counsel, 2 (2) denial of the right to a speedy trial, and (3) denial of the
right to an impartial tribunal. All three of the claims had previously been
presented to the OCCA. Adopting the magistrate judge’s report and
recommendation, the district court concluded Cheadle was not entitled to habeas
relief on any of the claims. This request for a COA followed.
II. Discussion
To obtain a COA, Cheadle must make a “substantial showing of the denial
of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S.
322, 327 (2003). This standard is satisfied by demonstrating that “reasonable
jurists could debate whether . . . the petition should have been resolved in a
different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve
encouragement to proceed further.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)
(internal quotation marks omitted). “[A] claim can be debatable even though
every jurist of reason might agree, after the COA has been granted and the case
has received full consideration, that petitioner will not prevail.” Miller-El, 537
U.S. at 338.
Cheadle seeks a COA from this court on three grounds. First, he argues his
appellate counsel provided constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel.
2
The magistrate judge determined Cheadle’s ineffectiveness claim,
although alluding to errors made by trial counsel, was actually an ineffective
assistance of appellate counsel claim. The district court adopted this conclusion.
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Second, he asserts he was denied a speedy trial in violation of the Sixth
Amendment. Third, he claims he was denied his due process right to an impartial
tribunal.
For substantially the same reasons as set forth in the magistrate judge’s
report and recommendation, which was adopted by the district court, we conclude
Cheadle is not entitled to habeas relief.
Ineffective Assistance
Cheadle claims his appellate counsel provided ineffective assistance of
counsel because appellate counsel (1) failed to argue to the OCCA that Cheadle’s
trial counsel was ineffective, and (2) failed to challenge the OCCA’s sentence
modification from 6,000 years imprisonment to life imprisonment. Neither of
these arguments is persuasive.
Cheadle first argues his trial counsel was obviously ineffective. He asserts
trial counsel (1) should have objected to the introduction of evidence of his prior
felony convictions, and (2) should have requested a specific jury instruction
regarding his eligibility for parole. On the first point, Cheadle admits that he
stipulated to his prior felony convictions and the felonies were included in the
Information filed against him. [See Aplt. Br. 4.] It is unclear what a later
objection by trial counsel to the admission of that evidence could have done. On
the second point, Cheadle fails to show any constitutional violation arising from
his counsel’s failure to request a particular instruction regarding parole.
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Although the OCCA recently changed its position with regard to whether the jury
can be instructed on how much time a defendant must serve before parole
eligibility, that court did not base its change on anything in the United States
Constitution, nor did it apply the new rule retroactively. See Anderson v.
Oklahoma, 130 P.3d 273, 283 (Okla. Crim. App. 2006) (“A trial court’s failure to
instruct on [parole eligibility after serving 85% of a sentence] in cases before this
decision will not be grounds for reversal.”). In sum, Cheadle has not shown
appellate counsel was constitutionally ineffective for failing to critique the work
of trial counsel.
Cheadle next argues appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to
challenge the OCCA’s modification of his sentence as violating due process.
Cheadle was originally sentenced to a total of 6,000 years imprisonment on four
counts. On direct appeal, the OCCA modified that sentence to give Cheadle two
terms of life imprisonment for his two robbery counts, to run concurrently with
two terms of life imprisonment on his two other counts. As the magistrate judge
noted, the OCCA’s modification was both authorized under Oklahoma law and in
accord with due process. See Okla. Stat. tit. 22, § 1066 (2006) (“The appellate
court may reverse, affirm or modify the judgment or sentence appealed from, and
may, if necessary or proper, order a new trial or resentencing.”); Carbray v.
Champion, 905 F.2d 314, 318 (10th Cir. 1990) (“[I]f a state appellate court has
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authority to exercise its own discretion and to modify a jury sentence on appeal as
a matter of state law, no due process violation occurs.”).
Cheadle’s appellate counsel had no grounds upon which to challenge the
OCCA’s sentence modification.
Speedy Trial
Cheadle alleges he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial.
We agree with the district court that the balance of factors weighs against such a
finding. “A Sixth Amendment speedy trial claim is assessed by balancing: (1) the
length of the delay, (2) the reason for the delay, (3) whether the defendant
asserted his right to a speedy trial, and (4) whether the delay prejudiced the
defendant.” Jackson v. Ray, 390 F.3d 1254, 1260 (10th Cir. 2004) (citing Barker
v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972)).
We are troubled by the unusually long delay in this case—30 months
between arrest and trial. A 12-month delay typically triggers closer review in
Oklahoma. E.g., Ellis v. Oklahoma, 76 P.3d 1131, 1136–37 (Okla. Crim. App.
2003). But Cheadle has given us no reason to disagree with the lower court’s
conclusion that after balancing the four factors, no Sixth Amendment problem can
be found. The Oklahoma trial court concluded that although Cheadle was
incarcerated for 30 months before his trial, he was not prejudiced by that delay
and most of the delay was a result of Cheadle’s own actions and the crowded state
court docket. R., Vol I at 137–38. Moreover, the record clearly shows Cheadle
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changed counsel twice before trial, and his case was quite complex. The delay
leading up to trial was therefore understandable and reasonable.
Given the deference the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of
1996 (AEDPA) requires us to give to the OCCA’s application of law, we see no
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.
Impartial Tribunal
Finally, Cheadle argues the Oklahoma trial court was biased. We agree
with the district court that Cheadle has failed to meet the high burden of proving
actual bias. See Welch v. Sirmons, 451 F.3d 675, 699–700 (10th Cir. 2006); see
also United States v. Lowe, 106 F.3d 1498, 1504 (10th Cir. 1997) (“To state a due
process claim that a judge was biased, defendant must show either that actual bias
existed, or that an appearance of bias created a conclusive presumption of actual
bias.”). Cheadle complains about the Oklahoma trial court’s refusal to read his
pro se motions (even though he was represented by counsel), decision to run his
four counts consecutively (even though this is standard practice), and decision to
not credit him for time served (even though the court has wide discretion to do
so). Cheadle fails to show how any of these trial court decisions violated the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The decisions were within the
discretion of the trial court under Oklahoma law and do not implicate Cheadle’s
constitutional right to an impartial tribunal.
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III. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, we DENY Cheadle’s request for a COA.
We GRANT his motion to proceed in forma pauperis.
Entered for the Court,
Timothy M. Tymkovich
Circuit Judge
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