Dixson-Thomas v. Oklahoma County Board of County Commissioners

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
September 18, 2008
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
JOANNE DIXSON-THOMAS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 07-6249
(D.C. No. 5:06-CV-00951-W)
OKLAHOMA COUNTY BOARD OF (W.D. Okla.)
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before HARTZ, EBEL, and O’BRIEN, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff Joanne Dixson-Thomas appeals from the entry of summary
judgment for her former employer, defendant Oklahoma County Board of County
Commissioners, in this wrongful termination suit alleging discrimination under
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213, and
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
retaliatory discharge under the Oklahoma Workers’ Compensation statute,
see Okla. Stat. tit. 85, § 5(A) . The district court held that the ADA claim failed
for two reasons: Ms. Dixon-Thomas did not make a prima facie showing that she
had a disability within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2); and the Board had,
in any event, terminated her for a reason—extended absence from a key position
in the County Court clerk’s office—that did not violate the ADA. The court held
that the latter reason for termination was likewise fatal to the § 5(A) claim and
that Ms. Dixson-Thomas had failed to demonstrate a triable issue as to whether
that reason was pretextual. On de novo review, see Justice v. Crown Cork & Seal
Co., 527 F.3d 1080, 1085 (10th Cir. 2008); Blackwell v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co.,
109 F.3d 1550, 1553 (10th Cir. 1997), we affirm.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The undisputed historical facts are set out in the district court’s order. We
summarize the facts that frame the issues to be resolved on this appeal.
Additional facts will later be introduced as necessary to our analysis of each
issue.
Ms. Dixson-Thomas worked at the Oklahoma County District Court Clerk’s
office as head of the docketing department, where she supervised docketing
personnel and also did keyboard entry herself. In accordance with written policy,
this was considered a “key” position that could not be left unfilled for an
extended period. On October 10, 2000, Ms. Dixson-Thomas did not report to
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work because of a problem with her wrist and arm, and has not returned to work
since. She sent a letter dated October 17 to her supervisor, James Merritt, telling
him that her doctor had instructed her to stay off work until various medical tests
were completed. Merritt responded by asking for a more definitive return date,
requesting that she periodically report in writing on her status and intent to return
to work, and advising that she held a key-employee position that would have to be
announced and filled within two weeks.
After Ms. Dixson-Thomas had been off work for over a month, she and
Merritt met to discuss the situation. At the meeting she was unable to confirm
whether she could return to work to perform her supervisory duties, nor would
Merritt confirm whether she had been terminated, though he did say that he would
be accepting applications for head of the docketing department. No one was hired
for the position, however, and Merritt temporarily assumed the supervisory duties
of the position. As requested, Ms. Dixson-Thomas periodically reported her
medical status and her continued intention to return to work. In the meantime,
she also filed a workers’ compensation claim, specifying “carpal tunnel” as a
cumulative injury resulting from “repetitive typing and lifting,” on November 27,
2000. Aplt. App. at 293 (internal quotation marks omitted).
By letter dated January 23, 2001, Merritt asked Ms. Dixson-Thomas to
consult with her doctor to determine whether she could return to work and
perform her supervisory duties or answer telephone calls. If she were approved
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for limited duty, he wanted her doctor to specify her limitations and capabilities
with regard to giving verbal directions to employees, answering calls, and sitting
and/or standing for eight hours. She submitted materials reflecting that her doctor
had put her on temporary total disability (TTD). Under the workers’
compensation scheme, this precluded her employer from terminating her “solely
on the basis of absence from work.” Okla. Stat. tit. 85, § 5(B).
That is how matters stood for some two years. The clerk’s office was
restructured, and docketing was combined with another department. This allowed
supervisory duties once performed by Ms. Dixson-Thomas to be shifted to other
personnel.
On February 27, 2003, Ms. Dixson-Thomas was released to work with
restrictions, including limited lifting, restricted pushing/pulling, and reduced
repetitive movements. She informed Merritt and inquired about returning to
work. He replied that she would need to submit an application and that he could
not discuss employment until her TTD status and workers’ compensation claim
were resolved. She did not submit an application. A few months later she filed
an administrative charge of discrimination citing disability as one of the grounds.
Ms. Dixson-Thomas settled her workers’ compensation claim on
November 18, 2003, and Merritt was advised of the settlement no later than
December 30, 2003. More than a month later, in response to an inquiry from
Ms. Dixson-Thomas about a benefits matter, the human resources department
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informed her that her employment with the clerk’s office had been terminated
effective December 31, 2003, over three years after she had first left work.
DISCUSSION
An indefinite or excessive absence is a legitimate reason for termination
under both the ADA, see Boykin v. ATC/VanCom of Colo., L.P., 247 F.3d 1061,
1065 (10th Cir. 2001) (citing cases), and state law (provided that the employee is
no longer on TTD and thereby unconditionally protected by Okla. State. tit. 85,
§ 5(B)), see Upton v. Okla. ex rel. Dep’t of Corr., 9 P.3d 84, 88 (Okla. 2000),
superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Glasco v. Okla. Dep’t of
Corr., 188 P.3d 177, 183-84 (Okla. 2008); Pierce v. Franklin Elec. Co., 737 P.2d
921, 924 (Okla. 1987), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Upton,
9 P.3d at 86. Ms. Dixson-Thomas acknowledges that “[t]hree years is admittedly
a long time,” but argues that her absence was not voluntary and therefore cannot
be deemed a “job abandonment.” Aplt. Br. at 19-20. We have never held,
however, that excessive absence justifies termination only if the employee has
“abandoned” her job.
The burden on the plaintiff to overcome a facially legitimate justification
for termination is the same under federal and state law: she must show that the
justification was pretextual, either by direct evidence of a wrongful motive or
indirectly by evidence that the proffered justification is unworthy of belief. See
Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981); Buckner v. Gen.
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Motors Corp., 760 P.2d 803, 807 (Okla. 1988). Indirect evidence may be a
showing of “such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or
contradictions in the employer’s proffered legitimate reasons for its action that a
reasonable factfinder could rationally find them unworthy of credence and hence
infer that the employer did not act for the asserted non-discriminatory reasons.”
Trujillo v. PacifiCorp, 524 F.3d 1149, 1158 (10th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation
marks omitted). In assessing whether Ms. Dixson-Thomas has presented evidence
creating a genuine issue of material fact, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), we must keep
in mind the compelling nature of the Board’s stated justification for her
termination—her three-year absence from a key position.
Ms. Dixson-Thomas contends that the pretextual nature of the Board’s
asserted justification is revealed by “evidence of inconsistency and disturbing
procedural irregularities” regarding her termination. As for inconsistency, she
notes that the Board has in these proceedings stated both that “the County
terminated her on December 31, 2003,” Aplt. App. at 8 (Defendant’s Motion for
Summary Judgment), and that “[she] was not terminated,” id. at 252 (Defendant’s
Answers to Plaintiff’s Interrogatories). But the unprofessional game of semantics
played by the Board’s counsel in answering interrogatories does not undermine
the client’s justification for termination.
As for procedural irregularities, Ms. Dixson-Thomas complains that (1) her
medical release from TTD was treated as a nullity during the pendency of the
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workers’ compensation proceedings, and (2) she was already being told that she
would have to apply for work in the clerk’s office when her employment status
still had not been resolved. On the first point she says:
It is important to note that Mr. Merritt told Ms. [Dixson-]Thomas she
could not return after [February 27, 2003] because she was “still
TTD.” She immediately clarified that she was no longer TTD and
referred to the provided doctor release. Merritt told her there was
nothing he could do and she should “talk to her attorney” and have
her attorney “contact the District Attorney.” Further, he advised her
to refrain from contacting him or other representatives of the Court
Clerk’s office. . . . “Your case is not over even though you have
been released by the doctor. Because the case is not completely
settled we consider you to be TTD and there is nothing I can do until
it is over.” Then, just one day after Mr. Merritt learned of the
settlement of the WCC [claim], Ms. [Dixson-]Thomas is summarily
terminated!
Aplt. Br. at 20-21 (record citations omitted). And on the second point she argues:
How can an existing employee be forced to “put in an
application” as a condition for continued employment all the while
not being told if she was fired or not fired yet remaining an employee
throughout the pendency of her underlying WCC case? The lack of
communication as to job status lends further credence to the pretext
argument. A law abiding employer would tell the employee exactly
what her job status was upon her release [from TTD]. There was no
reason to hide her job status from her. Doing so was disingenuous,
contradictory, and arguably calculated to disguise unlawful
discrimination. The death knell for summary adjudication purposes
was firing this employee just one day after learning she had settled
her [claim], and this after keeping her in the dark for a period of ten
months leading up to the discharge.
Id. at 22-23.
We are not persuaded that these points can demonstrate pretext. As noted
earlier, by 2003 Ms. Dixson-Thomas had been absent from a key position in the
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clerk’s office for over two years, during which time the office had been
restructured and her position abolished. Although this would clearly have
justified her termination, under state workers’ compensation law she could not be
terminated until her protective TTD status expired. This period of postponed
resolution continued beyond the date Ms. Dixson-Thomas obtained a work release
from her doctor, because the clerk’s office extended TTD protective status until
the conclusion of workers’ compensation proceedings. In this context Merritt’s
statement that the matter belonged in the hands of the parties’ attorneys made
perfect sense. For him to proceed on his own before the lawsuit was resolved
would have risked inadvertent violation of Ms. Dixson-Thomas’s rights or
imposition on the clerk’s office of some unintended responsibility. The statement
neither contradicts the proffered explanation for Ms. Dixson-Thomas’s
termination nor otherwise suggests an improper motive for the termination.
Likewise, the timing of the termination is not the least suspicious. It was the
earliest that the termination was clearly permissible under the workers’
compensation statute. Nor could pretext be inferred from the suggestion that
Ms. Dixson-Thomas submit an application or from the failure to tell her whether
or not she had been fired. Her status was complicated by both her being absent
from work and the requirements of the workers’ compensation statute. An
inability to resolve that status is not surprising, and we fail to see how the
inability suggests an improper motive.
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For “direct” evidence of an improper motive, Ms. Dixson-Thomas relies on
allegations of hostility toward her workers’ compensation claim—in particular,
Merritt’s statement, before he knew that she had filed a claim, “How do I know
that it was an on the job injury? As far as I know, you could have fell off a
horse.” Aplt. App. at 102, 111 (internal quotation marks omitted). She insists
that “[t]he tone and tenor of Mr. Merritt’s comment was calculated to intimidate
[her] and discourage her from pursuing a job injury claim.” Aplt. Br. at 5. But
there is no evidence of any effort to deny Ms. Dixson-Thomas’s workers’
compensation claim. Indeed, when specifically asked in her deposition if her
employer had fought against her claim for benefits, she could say only that she
did not know. 1 What we do know from our record is that her claim was resolved
by a settlement that gave her a $12,800 benefit and a $3,200 fee award.
1
She also refers to two clerk’s office documents that she says downplay the
obvious job-related nature of her injury. See Aplt. Br. at 17. Neither of these,
however, suggests an improper effort to oppose her claim. One is a short memo
written by Merritt when he received notice of her claim, summarizing the few
relevant dates and facts of which he was then aware. It recites that the last day
she worked was October 6, 2000; that her workers’ compensation form specified
October 10, 2000, as the day her injury occurred; and that she had not previously
reported a work-related injury. There is no evidence that this memo was
submitted in opposition to her claim. And, in any event, it simply recites
objective facts. The other is simply a note on a doctor’s statement that
Ms. Dixson-Thomas had submitted, stating that “[t]his doctor’s statement is dated
2 days before any claim by [her] that her condition was ‘workers’ comp’ related.
She signed her claim on Nov 22, 2000.” Aplt. App at 217. Again, this does not
show some wrongful effort to oppose her claim.
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In sum, we agree with the district court that Ms. Dixson-Thomas failed to
present a triable issue of improper motive. For this reason, we need not reach the
district court’s alternative rationale for rejecting the ADA claim—namely, that
Ms. Dixson-Thomas had no disability under 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C). 2
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Harris L Hartz
Circuit Judge
2
Under § 12102(2), as relevant here, “[t]he term ‘disability’ means . . . (A) a
physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major
life activities of such individual; . . . or (C) being regarded as having such an
impairment.” Ms. Dixson-Thomas alleged that she was regarded as having an
impairment that substantially limited her major life activity of working.
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