Balander v. Hermes Consolidated Inc.

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS October 7, 2008
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
SUNDAI BALANDER,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
and No. 08-8023
(D.C. No. 2:06-CV-00078-CAB)
KRISTIE ADRIAN, individually and (D. Wyo.)
as parent and Guardian of Z. Brooks;
TESSA BOGGS; BARRY BULTENA;
GLORIA BULTENA; DONALD
CLINTON; GRACE CLINTON; VIDA
DAHL; SHIRLEY DEMERRITT;
TERRY ELLIOTT; JANET ELLIOTT;
MICHELLE HAMBY; MICHAEL
HAWLEY, individually and as parent
and guardian for J. Hawley; ROBIN
HAWLEY, individually and as parent
and guardian of J. Hawley; RICHARD
HENKLE, parent and natural guardian
and next friend of R.M. Henkle, R.J.
Henkle, S. Henkle, A.M. Henkle, A.L.
Henkle; LAURIE HENKLE, parent
and natural guardian and next friend of
R.M. Henkle, R.J. Henkle, S. Henkle,
A.M. Henkle, A.L. Henkle; STEVEN
HILL, individually and as parent and
guardian of J. Hill; DORIS HILL,
individually and as parent and
guardian of J. Hill; AMY HUGHES,
individually and as parent and
guardian of D. Hughes; CATHY
JONES; JUANITA MILLS;
VERNARD MILLS; DARRELL
PETTY, individually and as legal
custodian on behalf of S. Petty;
JEAN PETTY, individually and as
legal custodian on behalf of S. Petty;
AMANDA PURVIANCE; TODD
PURVIANCE; JUSTINE RUSSELL;
FRANK SCHRODER; LYNNDA
SCHRODER; DEBRA SOLIS,
individually and as parent and
guardian of A. Solis; SUSAN
VARNER, individually and as parent
and guardian of T. Varner; CAROL
WOLFE; ANDREW WRIGHT,
individually and as parent and
guardian of J. Wright and T. Wright;
LETEA WRIGHT, individually and as
parent and guardian of J. Wright and
T. Wright; RUTH MIRANDA,
Plaintiffs,
v.
HERMES CONSOLIDATED INC.,
doing business as Wyoming Refining
Company,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA, PORFILIO, and TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
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Plaintiff-appellant Sundai Balander, proceeding pro se, appeals the district
court’s order enforcing a settlement between all plaintiffs and defendants in the
underlying case based on a 2002 accidental release of catalyst from an oil
refinery. Ms. Balander maintains that her attorney exceeded his authority in
entering a settlement agreement on her behalf because she interprets the
agreement to waive or release rights she never intended to relinquish.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Because we conclude that
the district court did not abuse its discretion in enforcing the settlement, we
affirm.
Background
Plaintiffs in the underlying lawsuit are residents of Newcastle, Wyoming.
Defendant operates an oil refinery in Newcastle. Plaintiffs sought damages based
on the discharge of thirty-three tons of catalyst from the refinery’s fluid catalytic
cracking unit on March 24, 2002. The litigation was settled through mediation
for a lump sum payable to the plaintiffs as a group, with a special master to
decide how much of the settlement sum each plaintiff would receive.
Before attending the mediation session, the plaintiffs’ lead attorney Jeremy
Michaels sent a letter to each plaintiff explaining the mediation process and
requesting him or her to opt out if he or she did not wish to be bound by any
settlement reached through mediation. Thereafter, the plaintiffs’ attorneys held a
meeting to further explain the process and to answer plaintiffs’ questions. They
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reviewed the mediation process and informed the plaintiffs that they intended to
settle the entire case for all plaintiffs if they could secure a sufficient sum.
Ms. Balander attended the meeting and expressed her intention not to be bound by
a settlement that released the refinery from future damages for any future events;
prevented her from advocating for state or federal agencies to impose clean-up
requirements on the refinery; or kept her from speaking about problems with the
refinery, past, present, or future.
The settlement provided that defendant would pay the lump-sum settlement
amount only after every plaintiff signed the settlement agreement. Ms. Balander
refused to sign. Consequently, two of the forty-four signing plaintiffs brought a
motion to enforce the settlement agreement. 1 Ms. Balander responded, asserting
that she had not given the plaintiffs’ attorneys authority to enter into such a broad
settlement on her behalf, and requesting to be excluded from the settlement.
The district court held a hearing on March 7, 2008, and heard statements by
the various attorneys for the parties and by Ms. Balander. In particular,
Mr. Michaels, the plaintiffs’ lead attorney who effected the settlement through
mediation, stated that all of the plaintiffs authorized him to settle the case.
Another attorney informed the court that Ms. Balander expressed at the
pre-mediation meeting that she did not want to be restricted from speaking out
1
Four other plaintiffs also initially refused to sign the settlement agreement,
but they later acquiesced.
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against the refinery, but did not withdraw Mr. Michaels’ representation of her in
the lawsuit. Ms. Balander stated that her goal was to require the refinery to
install scrubbers, and that she interpreted the settlement agreement to release all
future claims, as well as past ones, to which she did not agree. 2 At the conclusion
of the hearing, the district court found that Ms. Balander was bound by the
settlement, and ordered her to sign the settlement agreement by March 14, 2008,
or her claims would be dismissed with prejudice. Ms. Balander did not sign, and
the district court entered an order dismissing her claims with prejudice and
compelling her to abide by the confidentiality terms of the settlement.
Ms. Balander appeals. She argues to this court that she authorized her
attorneys to settle only her claims relative to the 2002 catalyst release, and she
believes the settlement agreement exceeded that authority. She also asserts that
the order requiring her to sign the settlement agreement violated her
constitutional rights to choose which documents she will sign and to avoid being
a party to an oppressive precedent. Ms. Balander does not challenge the district
court’s remedy for her refusal to sign the settlement agreement. She requests the
following relief on appeal: (1) a sign under the bridge at the southwest corner of
the refinery warning children to keep out of allegedly contaminated water;
2
Although Ms. Balander complains on appeal that the district court restricted
her opportunity to state her position, she does not apprise this court what more
she would have said if given the opportunity. Moreover, she stated her position
in written pleadings which are part of the record.
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(2) better oversight of the refinery’s emissions and practices by federal and state
agencies; (3) leave to opt out of the settlement agreement so she can pursue action
to require the refinery to operate safely and cleanly, or an order vacating the
settlement agreement and mandating new mediation; and (4) a monetary award to
be paid by defendant, the other plaintiffs, and their attorneys to compensate her
for her expenses in collecting evidence, as well as for her mental and emotional
stress.
Discussion
“A trial court has the power to summarily enforce a settlement agreement
entered into by the litigants while the litigation is pending before it.” United
States v. Hardage, 982 F.2d 1491, 1496 (10th Cir. 1993). This court reviews the
decision to enforce a settlement for an abuse of discretion. Shoels v. Klebold, 375
F.3d 1054, 1060 (10th Cir. 2004). “An abuse of discretion occurs when the
district court based its decision on an erroneous conclusion of law or where there
is no rational basis in the evidence for the ruling.” Id. (quotation omitted).
“[T]he resolution of factual issues and conflicting evidence [is] solely within the
province of the district court.” Plaza Speedway Inc. v. United States, 311 F.3d
1262, 1270 (10th Cir. 2002) (quotation omitted). State law controls any issues
concerning the formation of a purported settlement agreement. Shoels, 375 F.3d
at 1060. Settlements are favored by both Tenth Circuit and Wyoming law. See
Desktop Direct, Inc. v. Digital Equip. Corp., 993 F.2d 755, 758 (10th Cir. 1993),
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aff’d, 511 U.S. 863 (1994); Peters Grazing Ass’n v. Legerski, 544 P.2d 449, 456
(Wyo. 1975).
Ms. Balander concedes that she authorized her attorneys to settle her
monetary interests in the underlying litigation. 3 She contends that she did not
authorize them to release her rights to complain to state and federal agencies
about emissions from the refinery, to influence legislation relative to the refinery,
to require the refinery to install scrubbers, to talk about past or future acts or
circumstances involving the refinery, or to sue for damages caused by future
emissions. But Ms. Balander has not demonstrated that the settlement agreement
infringes those rights, particularly in the face of opinions to the contrary
expressed by all attorneys for plaintiffs in this case and the district court. The
issue properly presented on appeal is whether Ms. Balander authorized her
attorneys to engage in the settlement reached with the defendant. The record
provides ample support for the district court’s finding that she did.
As for Ms. Balander’s requests for a warning sign at the bridge, better
oversight by state and federal agencies, reimbursement for her expenses, and
compensation for her mental and emotional stress, she has not shown that she
presented these issues to the district court and requested a ruling, so we do not
address them. See Ecclesiastes 9:10-11-12, Inc. v. LMC Holding Co., 497 F.3d
1135, 1141 (10th Cir. 2007) (“An issue is preserved for appeal if a party alerts the
3
She maintains that she never sought money in the litigation.
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district court to the issue and seeks a ruling.”). Moreover, even if these theories
are related to issues raised in the district court, we “will not consider a new
theory advanced for the first time as an appellate issue.” Id.
Ms. Balander’s Motion to Amend and Supplement the Record is denied.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Timothy M. Tymkovich
Circuit Judge
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