United States v. Kaydahzinne

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
June 4, 2009
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
No. 08-2235
v. (D.C. No. 07-CR-01330-1)
(D.N.M.)
KAREN D. KAYDAHZINNE,
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before KELLY, LUCERO, Circuit Judges, and EAGAN **, District Judge.
Karen Kaydahzinne pleaded guilty in the District of New Mexico to one
count of assault resulting in serious bodily injury pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 2,
113(a)(6), and 1153. 1 R. Doc. 121 at 2; 1 R. Doc. 11. She was sentenced to
thirty-seven months’ imprisonment, three years’ supervised release, and ordered
to pay restitution totaling $158,399.17 to the Indian Health Service (“IHS”) and
Lemuel Rocha. 1 R. Doc. 146 at 2-3, 5. The district court ordered restitution to
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
**
The Honorable Claire V. Eagan, U.S. District Judge, United States
District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma, sitting by designation.
be made jointly and severally with her co-defendant, Corleen Chino, in monthly
installments of $2,000. 1 On appeal, she argues that the district court erred in
imposing a restitution amount and method of payment that are inconsistent with
her ability to pay. Our jurisdiction arises under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C.
§ 3742(a). We vacate the schedule-of-payments portion of Ms. Kaydahzinne’s
sentence and remand for the district court to determine an appropriate payment
schedule.
Background
The parties are familiar with the facts of this case, so we only briefly
summarize the relevant background here. According to the Presentence Report
(“PSR”), on June 4, 2007, Lemuel Rocha was stabbed multiple times within the
exterior boundaries of the Mescalero Indian Reservation. 2 R. at 2-3
(Addendum), 7-12 (PSR). Witnesses at the crime scene reported that Karen
Kaydahzinne and her codefendant, Corleen Chino, were responsible for the
stabbing. Id. at 7 (PSR). Ms. Kaydahzinne was arrested by FBI agents in Las
Cruces, New Mexico, that same day. Id.
As a result of the stabbing, Mr. Rocha suffered life-threatening injuries,
1
The Sentencing Transcript indicates monthly payments of $2,000, 3 R.
Doc. 158 at 11 (Sent’g Tr.); however, the district court’s judgment indicates
monthly payments of $2,099, 1 R. Doc. 146 at 5. We address this discrepancy
later in our discussion. See infra note 3.
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required extensive medical treatment, and was laid off from his job. Id. at 7, 11-
13, 24-25. The IHS paid $157,845.90 for medical services rendered to Mr.
Rocha. Id. at 24-25. In addition, Mr. Rocha and his family incurred travel
expenses in the amount of $253.27, and Mr. Rocha requested restitution in the
amount of $300 for clothing removed during medical treatment. Id. at 24.
An indictment against Ms. Kaydahzinne was filed on June 26, 2007,
charging her with (1) assault resulting in serious bodily injury in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 2, 113(a)(6), and 1153, and (2) assault with a dangerous weapon in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2, 113(a)(3), and 1153. 1 R. Doc. 11. She pleaded
guilty to the first count before a magistrate judge, and the government dismissed
the second. 1 R. Doc. 121 at 2, 5; see also 1 R. Doc. 11. The plea agreement
indicated that Ms. Kaydahzinne entered her plea freely and voluntarily, 1 R. Doc.
121 at 5, and that the maximum penalty the court could impose was:
a. ten years in prison;
b. a fine not to exceed $250,000 or twice the pecuniary gain to
the defendant or the pecuniary loss to the victim;
c. a mandatory term of supervised release for not less than three
(3) years that must follow any term of imprisonment. (If the
defendant serves a term of imprisonment, is then released on
supervised release, and violates the conditions of supervised
release, the defendant’s supervised release could be
revoked—even on the last day of the term—and the defendant
could then be returned to another period of incarceration and a
new term of supervised release.);
d. a mandatory special penalty assessment of $100.00; and
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e. restitution as may be ordered by the Court.
Id. at 2. The clerk’s minutes of the plea indicate that acceptance of the plea
agreement would be deferred until a final disposition hearing by a district judge,
1 R. Doc. 125; however, the sentencing transcript before the district court does
not indicate acceptance of the plea agreement. 2 Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(4); see
also Benchbook for U.S. District Court Judges 141 (5th ed.) (2007) (detailing
procedure for accepting or rejecting deferred plea agreement).
In addition to identifying the appropriate sentencing range, the PSR also
recommended restitution, to be made jointly and severally, in the amount of
$553.27 payable to Mr. Rocha and $157,845.90 payable to the IHS. 2 R. at 25
(PSR). The PSR further indicated that Ms. Kaydahzinne has an associate’s degree
in horticulture services, operations, management, and floral design, and that she
has further training in cosmetology and as a wild land fire fighter. Id. at 18. In
addition, prior to her incarceration, she was employed by a telemarketing firm in
New Mexico, earning $7.50 per hour. Id. at 19. She has total liabilities of
$10,046, and no assets. Id. at 19-21. The PSR concluded that Ms. Kaydahzinne’s
“current lack of employment and assets and the fact that she has several accounts
in collections . . . [indicate] she does not have the ability or resources to pay a
fine in this case.” Id. at 22. An Addendum to the PSR was made on September
2
We note that the district court’s minutes for the sentencing indicate that
the plea itself was accepted. See 1 R. Doc. 144 (Sentencing Minute Sheet).
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10, 2008, indicating Ms. Kaydahzinne’s objections to the PSR. Id. at 2-3
(Addendum). Specifically, she objected to the PSR’s recommendation that
restitution be made jointly and severally. Id.
On September 17, 2008, at the sentencing hearing, counsel for Ms.
Kaydahzinne reiterated her objection to restitution being made jointly and
severally, arguing that the district court should apportion only one-third of the
amount to Ms. Kaydahzinne based on her lesser degree of culpability. 3 R. Doc.
158 at 6, 8 (Sent’g Tr.). In addition, counsel indicated that, when imposing
restitution, the court
can consider an individual’s financial needs and lack of financial
earning ability. And it’s very clear, when Ms. Kaydahzinne gets out
of prison in two or three years, she’s not going to have very good job
prospects. She really has no foreseeability [sic] to pay such a
tremendous amount of restitution.
Id. at 6. The court responded, “I’m not really counting on that, frankly, as I sort
of indicated in the last sentencing,” referring to Ms. Chino’s hearing. Id.
Counsel concluded her remarks by requesting that the court “modify payments
and . . . reduce the amount of restitution.” Id. at 7.
The district court then sentenced Ms. Kaydahzinne. In pertinent part, the
court ordered her to pay $157,845.90 in mandatory restitution to the IHS, and
$553.27 to Mr. Rocha. 1 R. Doc. 146 at 5. Restitution was ordered to be made
jointly and severally with codefendant Corleen Chino, in monthly installments of
$2,000. Id.; see 3 R. Doc. 158 at 11 (Sent’g Tr.). However, the court declined to
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impose a fine because of Ms. Kaydahzinne’s “lack of financial resources.” 3 R.
Doc. 158 at 11 (Sent’g. Tr.); see also 2 R. at 27 (PSR). The court waived
penalties and interest on the amounts owed. 3 R. Doc. 158 at 11 (Sent’g Tr.).
On appeal, Ms. Kaydahzinne argues that the district court erred in imposing
a restitution amount and method of payment that were inconsistent with her
ability to pay. She requests that we vacate the restitution order and remand for
consideration of her financial circumstances in determining the restitution
payment schedule.
Discussion
Although the parties have not raised the effectiveness of Ms.
Kaydahzinne’s appellate waiver, we must note that there is no statement by a
judge that indicates her plea agreement was accepted by the district court.
“Under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, the district court
must accept a plea agreement before it becomes binding.” United States v.
Nichols, 267 Fed. App’x 789, 791 (10th Cir. 2008) (unpublished); see United
States v. Novosel, 481 F.3d 1288, 1292 (10th Cir. 2007). Without this
acceptance, a plea agreement remains “a mere executory agreement which . . .
does not deprive an accused of liberty or any other constitutionally protected
interest.” Novosel, 481 F.3d at 1292; see also Mabry v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 504,
507 (1984); United States v. Floyd, 1 F.3d 867, 870 (9th Cir. 1993); United States
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v. Gonzalez, 918 F.2d 1129, 1133 (3d Cir. 1990) (“It is axiomatic that a plea
agreement is neither binding nor enforceable until it is accepted in open court.”).
We have previously recognized that “[i]t is not unusual for a . . . judge taking a
plea to defer a decision on whether to accept a plea agreement when he knows
that a different district judge will sentence the defendant or when a presentence
report . . . will be forthcoming.” United States v. Mares-Martinez, 329 F.3d 1204,
1205 (10th Cir. 2003).
Just as in the companion case United States v. Chino, No. 08-2241, the
clerk’s minutes indicate that the magistrate judge who took the plea deferred
acceptance of the plea agreement until sentencing. 1 R. Doc. 125 (Plea Minute
Sheet). However, at the sentencing hearing, the district court made no mention of
the plea agreement, except to state that both defendants were “getting a pretty
good deal on the plea agreement, frankly,” and to acknowledge the waiver of
appeal. 3 R. Doc. 158 at 8, 11 (Sent’g Tr.). Nor did the district court refer to Ms.
Kaydahzinne’s plea agreement in its written judgment; the court simply checked a
box that indicated Ms. Kaydahzinne “pleaded guilty to count(s) 1 of Indictment.”
1 R. Doc. 146 at 1. The only other indication we have about acceptance is in the
clerk’s minutes for the sentencing, which include a box indicating that the plea
was “accepted” and that appeal rights had been waived under the plea agreement.
See 1 R. Doc. 144 (Sentencing Minute Sheet). Acceptance of the plea agreement
is unsupported by the transcript of the sentencing hearing, which is included in
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the record on appeal. See 3 R. Doc. 158 (Sent’g Tr.). It is axiomatic that the
clerk’s minutes cannot alter or add to what occurred in open court. However,
because the parties have not raised this issue on appeal, and the government does
not rely on the plea agreement, we need not make a determination on the
effectiveness of Ms. Kaydahzinne’s appellate waiver.
We now turn to the merits of Ms. Kaydahzinne’s appeal. “We review the
district court’s application of the [Mandatory Victims Restitution Act] de novo,
review its factual findings for clear error, and review the amount of restitution
awarded for abuse of discretion.” United States v. Gallant, 537 F.3d 1202, 1247
(10th Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. Serawop, 505 F.3d 1112, 1117 (10th Cir.
2007)). However, the parties agree that Ms. Kaydahzinne did not object to the
district court’s monthly payment plan, nor did she explicitly request a nominal
payment plan as provided for by 18 U.S.C. § 3664(f)(3)(B). Because she did not
raise these issues before the district court, we review the imposition of the $2,000
monthly payment plan for plain error. United States v. Ahidley, 486 F.3d 1184,
1188 (10th Cir. 2007); United States v. Overholt, 307 F.3d 1231, 1253 (10th Cir.
2002); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). To succeed on plain error review, there
must be (1) error, (2) that is plain, and (3) that affects substantial rights. Ahidley,
486 F.3d at 1188 n.4 (citing Johnson v. United States, 520 U.S. 461, 466-67
(1997)). If these three conditions are satisfied, we will exercise our discretion to
notice a forfeited error if it “‘seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public
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reputation of judicial proceedings.’” Id. (quoting Johnson, 520 U.S. at 467)
(brackets omitted). In Ms. Kaydahzinne’s case we find such error.
Under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996 (“MVRA”), when
imposing sentence upon a defendant convicted of a crime of violence, a district
judge is required to order restitution in addition to or in lieu of any other penalties
imposed. 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(1) & (c)(1)(A)(i); see also U.S.S.G. § 5E1.1.
The probation officer shall include in its PSR “information sufficient for the court
to exercise its discretion in fashioning a restitution order.” 18 U.S.C. § 3664(a).
In addition, the defendant shall provide to the probation officer an affidavit fully
describing her financial resources. Id. § 3664(d)(3). To determine the total
amount of restitution owed, the court must assess only the amount of the victims’
losses, “without consideration of the economic circumstances of the defendant.”
Id. § 3664(f)(1)(A). However, a district court sets the payment schedule of the
total amount owed “in consideration of—
(A) the financial resources and other assets of the defendant . . . ;
(B) projected earnings and other income of the defendant; and
(C) any financial obligations of the defendant; including
obligations to dependents.”
Id. § 3664(f)(2) (emphasis added). A district court may order a lump-sum
payment, partial payments at specified intervals, in-kind payments, or a
combination of interval and in-kind payments. Id. § 3664(f)(3)(A). In addition, a
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district court may order nominal periodic payments if “the economic
circumstances of the defendant do not allow the payment of any amount of a
restitution order, and do not allow for the payment of the full amount of a
restitution order in the foreseeable future under any reasonable schedule of
payments.” Id. § 3664(f)(3)(B). Finally, in the event of any material change in
the defendant’s economic circumstances that may affect defendant’s ability to
pay, the defendant shall notify the court and the Attorney General. Id. § 3664(k).
At such time, the court may modify the payment schedule as needed. Id.
A district court is “granted considerable discretion in structuring a payment
schedule.” Overholt, 307 F.3d at 1255; United States v. Wilson, 416 F.3d 1164,
1170 (10th Cir. 2005). Moreover, the plain language of the MVRA is clear: A
district court must only demonstrate on the record its consideration of the factors
set out in § 3664(f)(2) when setting a restitution payment schedule. See Ahidley,
486 F.3d at 1191. “[E]xtensive remarks are not necessary”; however, “we must
be able to discern from the record that this consideration has taken place.” Id.;
see also United States v. Lucien, 347 F.3d 45, 53-54 (2d Cir. 2003) (“[T]he record
must disclose some affirmative act or statement allowing an inference that the
district court in fact considered the defendant’s ability to pay.” (internal quotation
marks omitted)). In our review of the record, we will not “‘enter the zone of
appellate speculation’ as to whether a court has considered [the] § 3664(f)(2)
factors.” Ahidley, 486 F.3d at 1191 (quoting United States v. Kravchuk, 335 F.3d
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1147, 1159 (10th Cir. 2003)).
Consistent with the MVRA, which requires consideration of the
§ 3664(f)(2) factors, our case law indicates that a restitution payment schedule
should reflect a substantively reasonable and appropriate consideration of those
factors. See, e.g., id. at 1194 (vacating and remanding an immediate lump-sum
restitution payment with instructions for the district court to set an “appropriate
payment schedule with reference to the § 3664(f)(2) factors”); United States v.
Zunie, 444 F.3d 1230, 1238 (10th Cir. 2006) (same); Wilson, 416 F.3d at 1170-71(affirming a restitution payment schedule that was not “disproportionate to prison
wages”); United States v. Williams, 996 F.2d 231, 235 (10th Cir. 1993)
(affirming, in pre-MVRA case, restitution schedule where, “from an objectively
reasonable standpoint,” defendant “possibly may be able to pay the amount
ordered” (internal quotation marks omitted)); United States v. Rogat, 924 F.2d
983, 985 (10th Cir. 1991) (“A restitution order will be upheld if the evidence
indicates a defendant has some assets or earning potential and thus possibly may
be able to pay the amount ordered.”). In other words, the MVRA requirement
that district courts must merely consider the § 3664(f)(2) factors is not
perfunctory; we cannot uphold sentences that are imposed without a reasonable
basis.
In this case, various inconsistencies in the record establish plain error. The
district court’s decision to order a restitution payment schedule in the amount of
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$2,000 per month is not supported by, and is inconsistent with, the court’s
findings regarding Ms. Kaydahzinne’s inability to pay. The sentencing transcript
indicates the district court reviewed the PSR, which concluded that Ms.
Kaydahzinne was indigent, 3 R. Doc. 158 at 9 (Sent’g Tr.); heard counsel’s
argument that Ms. Kaydahzinne would not have “very good job prospects” upon
her release from prison and that she did not have any foreseeable ability “to pay
such a tremendous amount of restitution,” id. at 6; and declined to impose a fine
due to Ms. Kaydahzinne’s “lack of financial resources,” id. at 13. Yet, without
explanation, the district court ordered a restitution payment schedule of $2,000
per month. The district court acknowledged this inconsistency when it remarked
that it was “not really counting on” Ms. Kaydahzinne’s satisfaction of the
restitution order. Id. at 6. While a court may certainly comment on the
likelihood of repayment, see Rogat, 924 F.2d at 985-86, we are at a loss to
understand how the § 3664(f)(2) factors informed the fashioning of this payment
schedule in light of the district court’s other comments.
We believe that the apparent inconsistencies in the restitution phase of the
sentencing affect the fairness of and public regard for the proceedings and
therefore should be noticed as plain error. 3 See United States v. Olano, 507 U.S.
3In addition, we note the inconsistency between the district court’s oral
pronouncement of the payment schedule (requiring payments of $2,000 per
month), 3 R. Doc. 158 at 11 (Sent’g Tr.), and the written judgment (requiring
payments of $2,099 per month), 1 R. Doc. 146 at 5. In light of the remand, we
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725, 732-35 (1993). Without question, an objection by counsel could have
focused the district court on these issues, but a restitution order must reflect an
informed judgment consistent with the facts of the case and the law.
For the reasons stated above, we VACATE that portion of the judgment
establishing the schedule of payments and REMAND for the district court to
determine an appropriate payment schedule with reference to the § 3664(f)(2)
factors.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
probably need not address this issue, but note that “an orally pronounced sentence
controls over a judgment . . . when the two conflict.” United States v. Bowen,
527 F.3d 1065, 1080 (10th Cir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted); United
States v. Marquez, 337 F.3d 1203, 1207 n.1 (10th Cir. 2003).
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