Epperson v. Mullin

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
October 30, 2009
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
DAVID JOE EPPERSON,
Petitioner - Appellant, No. 08-5152
v. N.D. Oklahoma
MIKE MULLIN, Warden, (D.C. No. 4:04-CV-00550-CVE-PJC)
Respondent - Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before MURPHY, BALDOCK, and HARTZ, Circuit Judges.
David Joe Epperson (Defendant) was convicted in Oklahoma state court of
child abuse and sentenced to life in prison. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals (OCCA) affirmed his conviction and sentence on direct appeal. He then
filed an application for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma. The district court denied
relief. Defendant sought from this court a certificate of appealability (COA),
which we granted, thereby providing jurisdiction to hear this appeal. See
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (requiring a COA to appeal denial of relief under
section 2254).
On appeal Defendant raises the following challenges to his conviction: (1)
there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction; (2) the prosecutor’s
alleged misstatement of the evidence during closing argument denied him his due-
process right to a fair trial; and (3) he was denied effective assistance of trial
counsel because his counsel (a) failed to present evidence that Defendant’s ten-
year-old son Geoffrey was responsible for the victim’s injuries and (b) failed to
call Defendant as a witness in his own defense. The OCCA rejected all these
challenges on Defendant’s direct appeal from his conviction. Affording the
OCCA’s decision the deference it is due under the Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), see id. § 2254(d), (e), we affirm the district
court’s denial of relief.
I. BACKGROUND
Defendant and his ten-year-old son Geoffrey lived with his girlfriend
Deanna Sanders and her sons, two-year-old Michael Franklin and six-year-old
Nathan Sanders. On June 6, 1998, Sanders left the three children in Defendant’s
care while she went to work. Michael looked healthy at the time. A few hours
later Sanders received a page from Defendant asking her to come home because
something was wrong with Michael. Upon her return, Sanders found Michael
pale, unresponsive, and barely breathing. She told Defendant to call 911. An
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ambulance arrived and Sanders told the paramedic that Michael had fallen and hit
his head on the curb, the same account that Defendant had given the 911
dispatcher. When the paramedic voiced skepticism, she said that other children
had told her that Michael may have imbibed alcohol. Michael was taken to the
hospital and treated for a life-threatening brain injury. He survived, but is
permanently disabled. A doctor who treated him concluded that he had suffered
from a severe blow to the head, the force of which was comparable to that from a
high-impact car crash.
Tulsa Police Officer Philip Forbrich interviewed Defendant and Sanders
together at the hospital that afternoon. Both signed waivers giving permission to
search their house, and Forbrich obtained a signed statement from Defendant
providing his version of what had happened. Tulsa Police Sergeant Gary Stansill
and Department of Human Services (DHS) investigator David Collins then
interviewed Defendant at the hospital; and later that night Defendant was
interviewed by officers at the Tulsa police station. The interviews began about
5:20 p.m. and ended about 1:00 a.m. The police also interviewed Sanders
separately at the hospital at about 7:00 p.m.
Defendant was charged with child abuse, convicted, and sentenced to life
imprisonment. On his direct appeal to the OCCA, he obtained an order for an
evidentiary hearing on his claim that trial counsel was ineffective for failure to
use available evidence of Geoffrey’s culpability. The hearing judge concluded
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that Defendant was not denied effective assistance of counsel and the OCCA,
concurring with that conclusion and denying Defendant’s other claims, affirmed
the conviction and sentence. Defendant did not seek postconviction relief in state
court, but filed an application for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in federal
district court. He now appeals the district court’s denial of relief.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
AEDPA provides that when a claim has been adjudicated on the merits in a
state court, a federal court can grant habeas relief only if the applicant establishes
that the state-court decision was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme
Court of the United States,” or “was based on an unreasonable determination of
the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”
28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), (2). As we have explained:
Under the “contrary to” clause, we grant relief only if the state court
arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court
on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently
than the Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.
Gipson v. Jordan, 376 F.3d 1193, 1196 (10th Cir. 2004) (brackets and internal
quotation marks omitted). Relief is provided under the “unreasonable
application” clause only if the state court identifies the correct governing legal
principle from the Supreme Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that
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principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case. Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted). Thus, a federal court may not issue a habeas writ simply because it
concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision
applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. See id. Rather,
that application must have been unreasonable. The federal court also must
presume that the state court’s fact-finding was correct; the applicant has the
burden to rebut that presumption by clear and convincing evidence. See 28
U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Defendant was convicted of child abuse. Under Oklahoma law the
elements of child abuse are (1) willfully or maliciously (2) injuring or using
unreasonable force upon (3) a child under 18. Okla. Stat. tit. 10, § 7115 (Supp.
1996). Evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction if, “‘after viewing [it] in the
light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found
the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Dockins v.
Hines, 374 F.3d 935, 939 (10th Cir. 2004) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S.
307, 319 (1979)). Therefore, under AEDPA our task is to determine “whether the
OCCA’s conclusion that the evidence was sufficient constituted an unreasonable
application of the Jackson standard.” Diestel v. Hines, 506 F.3d 1249, 1267 (10th
Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). On Defendant’s appeal the OCCA
held that “the evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the State, was
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sufficient to exclude every reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt.” Aplt.
App. at 79. Because the sufficiency-of-evidence standard applied by the OCCA is
at least as strict as that in Jackson, we review its decision with AEDPA deference.
See Patton v. Mullin, 425 F.3d 788, 795 (10th Cir. 2005) (we grant AEDPA
deference to state-court decisions that applied a legal standard either identical to
the federal standard or more favorable to the habeas applicant than the federal
standard).
The issue at trial was what happened to Michael while Sanders, his mother,
was at work. Defendant was the children’s sole caretaker at the time, yet he did
not call 911 until Sanders returned home and asked him to do so. Neither he nor
any of the children testified at trial. But before trial Defendant gave several
statements regarding the pertinent events. In the interest of clarity, we begin with
a chronological account of Defendant’s statements after the 911 call. We then
summarize the other trial evidence concerning Geoffrey before discussing the
expert medical testimony presented by the parties.
Officer Forbrich testified regarding what Defendant told him in the hospital
on the day that Michael was injured. Defendant and Sanders, who were together
at the time, said that Michael had possibly fallen and hit his head. Defendant
signed a statement explaining:
I was mowing the lawn and doing yardwork. The children were
playing around the driveway. When I finished I asked [Michael,]
who was by the garage door[,] if he would like a drink. He shook his
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head yes and we walked into the house. I fixed him a drink and he
drank it. He wanted more and I fixed another one. He took it and
drank some but was lethargic. He then acted like he was going to
sleep. I tried to wake him and he acted very tired. I laid him on the
bed and turned the fan on him. He was totally asleep and wouldn’t
come to. I called his mom and she came home. She said call the
ambulance [and] I did.
I am not sure if Nathan told me before or after I called [Sanders], but
he says [Michael] fell and hit his head on the culvert by the house.
Supp. R., Vol. 1 at 128.
Collins, the DHS investigator, testified regarding the interview that he and
Stansill, the police sergeant, had conducted with Defendant that day at the
hospital. The interview, which began at 5:20 p.m., lasted over an hour. Collins
said that before the interview, Defendant knew that Collins was there to
investigate child abuse. Defendant told Collins and Stansill that the three
children had played in the yard while he mowed the lawn and were never out of
his sight for more than two minutes. He said that he called Sanders after noticing
that Michael looked pale and lethargic. Defendant mentioned that Geoffrey was
violent and aggressive. He said that Geoffrey had killed animals and was abusive
to other children, and that the previous night Geoffrey had pushed his cousin into
a fireplace, causing a concussion that required a visit to the emergency room.
Defendant added that Geoffrey had been treated for abusive behavior in the past
and was scheduled for additional in-patient treatment in two days. Nevertheless,
Defendant said that Geoffrey could not have hurt Michael.
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Stansill, who was called as a witness by Defendant, testified about
Defendant’s statements regarding Geoffrey when he was questioned at the police
station on the night of the episode by Stansill and two or three other police
officers (but not Collins). According to Stansill, Defendant was reluctant to
discuss the possibility that Geoffrey could have injured Michael. In fact, Stansill
thought that a detective may have been the first to mention Geoffrey (although
Collins said that in his interview with Defendant, Defendant had not been
prompted before describing Geoffrey as violent). Near the end of the interview,
however, Defendant acknowledged that Geoffrey may have injured Michael, and
he said that earlier in the day he had seen Geoffrey swinging a metal rod (a rebar)
in Michael’s presence, an event Defendant had not previously mentioned.
Defendant stated that he had taken rebar away and put it in the garage. About
1:00 a.m., Stansill, Defendant, and a detective went to Defendant’s house and
retrieved the rebar.
Sanders testified that when Defendant returned from the police station, he
told her that he had seen Geoffrey swinging a rebar. (Before the police interview,
Defendant had told her only that Michael had fallen in the yard, taken a drink,
and become sleepy.) Finally, Collins testified that his investigation found that
two days after Michael’s injury, Defendant had checked Geoffrey into a
psychiatric clinic and told the clinic that Geoffrey had severely injured a two-
year-old boy.
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At trial the defense elicited evidence corroborating Defendant’s pretrial
statements concerning Geoffrey’s violent tendencies. Collins testified that his
examination of Geoffrey’s school records and interview with Geoffrey’s case
manager convinced him that Defendant had not been lying when he said that
Geoffrey was violent. He further testified that Geoffrey had told him that he,
Geoffrey, was the one who had injured Michael (though Collins expressed
skepticism because he “[did not] think [Geoffrey] knows what he says most of the
time,” id., Vol. 2, Part 2 at 312). Also, the defense introduced a two-page
assessment of Geoffrey conducted by The Brown Schools at Shadow Mountain
(the Brown Schools Assessment). It was dated August 5, 1998, two months after
Michael’s injury. The assessment described Geoffrey as violent and suffering
from delusions, noting that Geoffrey had kicked and head-butted staff members at
a shelter, and that he “[a]dmits to physical abuse to sibling—caused brain
damage” because the “[two-year-old] wanted to be hurt.” Id., Vol. 1 at 131–32.
The assessment stated that Geoffrey presented an immediate potential danger to
himself and others.
The state’s case was founded largely on medical evidence suggesting that
Geoffrey could not have caused Michael’s injuries (leaving Defendant as the only
potential culprit) and that Defendant’s description of events was inconsistent with
Michael’s brain injury. Dr. Phillip Barton, who examined Michael in the
emergency room, testified that it “takes a tremendous amount of force to cause” a
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skull fracture like Michael’s. Id., Vol. 2, Part 1 at 43. In his opinion Michael’s
subdural hematoma was an injury that requires application of great force. For it
to have been caused by a fall, Dr. Barton explained, the drop had to have been
about 40 to 50 feet, so Michael could not have just fallen into a culvert (as
Defendant had described). Dr. Robert Block, who also examined Michael at the
hospital, testified that given the gravity of his injuries, Michael would have been
rendered “immediately unconscious” by the impact, id. at 194, and thus could not
have drunk anything afterwards.
Both doctors further testified that being hit by a rebar—or any other object
denser than Michael’s skull—would have left markings such as lacerations. No
such injuries were found on Michael. According to Dr. Block, Michael’s injuries
indicated an impact with a flat surface.
The defense rebuttal of this medical testimony was limited. The defense
medical expert, a certified forensic pathologist, testified that Michael’s injury
“could have rendered him unconscious very quickly,” id., Part 2 at 379, but that
Michael also could have remained conscious for some time after the impact. He
said that Defendant’s description of Michael’s being drowsy and asking for a
drink was “entirely consistent” with clinical findings. Id. at 387–88. He
acknowledged, however, that a rebar would probably have left a visible pattern
injury.
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Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, we
hold that the OCCA reasonably decided that a rational jury could find Defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Defendant was Michael’s sole caretaker when
the child was injured. The brain injury was probably caused by a very severe
blow—a blow unlikely to be inflicted by a ten-year-old. Defendant’s explanation
of how Michael may have been injured was contrary to medical evidence. And
medical experts testified that the child’s injury was inconsistent with Defendant’s
account of Michael’s having a drink and being lethargic. Under AEDPA, we
cannot disturb the OCCA’s decision.
C. Prosecutorial Misconduct
Defendant complains that he was denied his due-process right to a fair trial
by a comment in the state’s closing argument that misstated the evidence. The
comment occurred when the prosecutor was describing the weaknesses of the
defense theory that Geoffrey was the one who had caused Michael’s injury. The
defense had offered into evidence the Brown Schools Assessment conducted two
months after Michael’s injury. The assessment stated that Geoffrey had admitted
to “physical abuse to sibling—caused brain damage.” Id., Vol. 1 at 131. The
prosecutor noted that Dr. Block had testified that the quoted language came from
the person preparing the assessment, not Geoffrey. She pointed out that
Defendant had told Sanders about Geoffrey after the police interview, and that
when he placed Geoffrey in a psychiatric facility, he said that Geoffrey had hurt
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Michael. The prosecutor then suggested that Defendant had tried to convince
Geoffrey to take the blame, observing that “maybe it’s possible for [Geoffrey] to
be convinced by his own father that he had something to do with the injury to
Michael.” Id., Vol. 2 at 494. This suggestion was improper, Defendant contends,
because the prosecutor knew that Defendant had no contact with Geoffrey in the
month following Michael’s injury.
Defendant raised this issue on appeal to the OCCA. The OCCA decision
on the point was terse: “We find . . . that the alleged statement did not amount to
prosecutorial misconduct. Price v. State[, 518 P.2d 1281 (Okla. Crim. App.
1974)].” Aplt. App. at 79. Price states the following with regard to final
argument:
[W]e have thoroughly reviewed the closing argument of the
prosecutor and are of the opinion that the complained of argument
was reasonable argument of the evidence introduced in this case. . . .
The right of argument contemplates a liberal freedom of speech, and
the range of discussion, illustration, and argumentation is wide.
Counsel for both the State and defendant have a right to discuss fully
from their standpoint the evidence, and the inferences and deductions
arising therefrom.
518 P.2d at 1283 (internal quotation marks omitted).
As a preliminary matter, Defendant argues that in rejecting his claim, the
OCCA did not address federal constitutional law and that therefore federal review
of his due-process claim should be de novo. We disagree. Even though a state-
court decision cites no federal law, it is accorded AEDPA deference if the state
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court rejected the claim under a standard either identical to the federal standard or
more favorable to the applicant than the federal standard. See Patton, 425 F.3d at
795. A prosecutor’s comments deny the defendant due process under the federal
constitution only if they deprive him of a fair trial. See Duvall v. Reynolds, 129
F.3d 768, 794 (10th Cir. 1998). In evaluating such a due-process challenge to a
prosecutor’s comment, Duvall said: “The prosecutor is allowed a reasonable
amount of latitude in drawing inferences from the evidence during closing
summations” and such comments do not make the trial fundamentally unfair. Id.
at 795 (internal quotation marks omitted). This approach mirrors that in Price.
We discern no difference between the state-law test applied by the OCCA and the
constitutional due-process standard in Duvall, and therefore grant AEDPA
deference to the OCCA resolution of the claim of prosecutorial misconduct.
Accordingly, the issue before us is whether the OCCA could reasonably
determine that the prosecutor’s statement was a fair comment on the evidence.
We think it could. Defendant argues that the prosecutor knew that Defendant had
no contact with Geoffrey during the month following Michael’s injury. But there
was trial testimony that a few days after the incident, Defendant put his son in a
psychiatric facility, telling the facility that Geoffrey had injured a two-year-old.
There was certainly motive and opportunity at that time for Defendant to tell
Geoffrey that he was responsible for Michael’s injury. We therefore must deny
relief on this issue.
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D. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Defendant contends that his trial counsel, Larry Oliver, was ineffective in
two respects: 1 (1) failure to present at trial the evidence in his possession that
Geoffrey had violent propensities and (2) failure to have Defendant testify. A
party claiming ineffective assistance “must establish (1) that his ‘counsel’s
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness,’ and (2) that
there is ‘a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different.’” DeLozier v. Sirmons, 531
F.3d 1306, 1320 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668, 688, 694 (1984)). “[W]e ‘indulge in a strong presumption that counsel’s
conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is,
the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the
challenged action might be considered sound trial strategy.’” Id. (quoting
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689).
The OCCA rejected Defendant’s ineffectiveness claims on the merits.
Because such claims are mixed questions of law and fact, United States v.
Orange, 447 F.3d 792, 796 (10th Cir. 2006), to obtain habeas relief Defendant
1
In his brief in this court Defendant also complained that Oliver was
ineffective because he did not wear his hearing aid during trial and could not hear
what was happening in the courtroom. At oral argument, however, defense
counsel conceded that he cannot sustain his burden on appeal on this ground.
Accordingly, we need not address it.
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must show that the OCCA unreasonably applied the law or determined the facts.
He makes no such showing.
1. Failure to Use Evidence
Defendant challenges Oliver’s failure to use at trial the available evidence
of Geoffrey’s violent propensities. He alleges that counsel should have called
witnesses to testify and presented documents, such as psychiatric records,
detailing Geoffrey’s violent behavior. According to Defendant, Oliver essentially
used none of this evidence. Only “bits and pieces were tossed out during cross-
examination of a state’s witness, almost always accompanied by hearsay
objections from the prosecution.” Aplt. Br. at 24. Had the jury heard the omitted
evidence, Defendant contends, he would have been acquitted.
On direct appeal to the OCCA, Defendant raised this ineffectiveness claim
and sought an evidentiary hearing to determine whether trial counsel failed to use
available evidence that Geoffrey had been the one who injured Michael. The
OCCA granted the hearing. Defendant called the only witness at the hearing,
Shirley Wilson, who had been Oliver’s cocounsel at Defendant’s trial.
Wilson testified that a variety of documents describing Geoffrey’s
psychiatric history and behavioral problems should have been introduced at trial.
These documents included school records of Geoffrey’s suspensions for
aggressive behavior from 1994 to 1998; three sets of records, dated 1998, from
The Brown Schools at Shadow Mountain regarding Geoffrey’s behavior,
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diagnosis, medication, and treatment; five sets of records from Laureate
Psychiatric Clinic, dated between 1996 and 1998, detailing Geoffrey’s behavior,
diagnosis, medication, and treatment; and DHS records from 1998 regarding
Geoffrey. She also said that the defense had subpoenaed several of Geoffrey’s
relatives and teachers to testify to his behavior, such as killing puppies and
getting suspended from school for aggression, but that they were not called to
testify.
On cross-examination by the state, however, Wilson admitted that Oliver
had presented various evidence of Geoffrey’s violent propensities. This included
evidence of specific instances of aggression, such as killing animals and shoving
another child into a fireplace. She acknowledged that Collins, the DHS
investigator, testified that during his investigation he had examined Geoffrey’s
school reports and determined that Geoffrey was violent. Aplt. App. at 213. She
also acknowledged that Oliver introduced into evidence the rebar that Geoffrey
allegedly used on Michael and that Collins testified that Geoffrey had admitted to
causing Michael’s head injury. In addition, the state elicited that Oliver had
introduced into evidence the Brown Schools Assessment, which stated that
Geoffrey had admitted to causing brain damage to Michael and had explained that
the two-year-old had wanted to be hurt. The assessment also reported that
Geoffrey had been treated multiple times at Laureate Psychiatric Clinic. Wilson
conceded that the defense team had thought that presenting all the documents that
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it had gathered would have been overkill and had been concerned about “the
evidence being cumulative.” Id. at 207.
The hearing judge concluded that Oliver’s alleged failure to use certain
evidence was not deficient. She explained:
Any failure to use certain documents during the course of the trial
was legitimate trial strategy premised upon any number of
considerations including, but not limited to, the documents being
cumulative of other evidence introduced, the documents not being
relevant to the issues at trial, and/or the information contained in the
documents being otherwise available.
Id. at 91. The judge ruled that Defendant was not deprived of his constitutional
right to counsel. Id.
The OCCA, affirming the hearing judge’s evidentiary findings and
conclusions, held that the “alleged instances of ineffective assistance of counsel
were strategic decisions.” Id. at 79. Because the OCCA’s decision was clearly
reasonable, we reject this claim of ineffective assistance.
2. Failure to Have Defendant Testify
Defendant also complains in this court that Oliver was ineffective because
he “did not have Mr. Epperson testify.” Aplt. Br. at 29. He had raised an
identical claim before the OCCA, but did not seek an evidentiary hearing on the
issue. In rejecting Defendant’s ineffectiveness claim, the OCCA did not
distinguish the failure to call Defendant as a witness from the failure to use
evidence of Geoffrey’s violent propensities. It said merely, “[T]he alleged
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instances of ineffective assistance of counsel were strategic decisions, which we
will not second-guess on appeal.” Aplt. App. at 79.
The OCCA’s rejection of this claim was reasonable. Defendant indicates
that had he testified, he would have denied injuring Michael and described
Geoffrey’s violent disposition. But Oliver had already presented the jury with
substantial evidence of Defendant’s prior denials and of Geoffrey’s psychiatric
problems. He could have reasonably decided that Defendant’s testimony would
add nothing new. Moreover, there were dangers in Defendant’s testifying. The
Brown Schools Assessment of Geoffrey contains a note that Defendant was
verbally and physically abusive to Geoffrey. Counsel therefore had cause to fear
that any accusatory mention of Geoffrey by Defendant would open him up to
cross-examination on this subject. Under these circumstances, the OCCA could
reasonably decide that counsel’s decision not to have Defendant testify was
objectively reasonable.
At oral argument before this court, Defendant suggested a somewhat
different claim based on his failure to testify. He contended that counsel
prevented him from testifying. We do not analyze such a contention as we do
tactical or strategic decisions by counsel. “A criminal defendant has a
constitutional right to testify in his own behalf at trial.” Cannon v. Mullin, 383
F.3d 1152, 1171 (10th Cir. 2004). Therefore “[t]he decision whether to testify
lies squarely with the defendant; it is not counsel’s decision.” Id. No matter how
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unwise it may be for a defendant to testify, it is ineffective assistance of counsel
to prevent the defendant from exercising his right to do so. See id.But this claim is not properly before us. Defendant did not raise it in his
briefs in this court. Nor has he provided a factual basis for the claim. To
establish an ineffectiveness claim predicated on violation of the right to testify, a
habeas applicant must show that he did not know that he had a right to testify and
would have wanted to, or that he requested to testify and that counsel refused his
request. See id. at 1170–71 (habeas petitioner’s affidavit alleged that counsel
refused petitioner’s multiple requests to testify); cf. United States v. Meacham,
567 F.3d 1184, 1188 (10th Cir. 2009) (upholding denial of defendant’s motion for
a new trial because the motion “does not claim that Mr. Meacham was unaware of
his constitutional right to testify at trial” and that to obtain an evidentiary hearing,
“a defendant must assert more than the bare conclusion that counsel ‘refused to
let’ the defendant testify.”). At oral argument defense counsel stated that either
his client or Wilson had described in an affidavit Defendant’s desire to testify.
But the record contains no such affidavit. We therefore reject this claim.
III. CONCLUSION
We AFFIRM the district court’s denial of habeas relief.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Harris L Hartz
Circuit Judge
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