Brown v. Cessna Aircraft Co.

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
JUL 19 2004
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
ROBYN G. BROWN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 03-3213
(D.C. No. 01-CV-1372-MLB)
CESSNA AIRCRAFT COMPANY, a (D. Kan.)
Kansas corporation,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before SEYMOUR and ANDERSON , Circuit Judges, and KANE , ** Senior
District Judge.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
**
The Honorable John L. Kane, Senior District Judge, United States District
Court for the District of Colorado, sitting by designation.
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
Plaintiff Robyn G. Brown appeals from an order of the district court
granting judgment for defendant in this action brought pursuant to Title VII. We
affirm.
Ms. Brown was employed by defendant as a flight line mechanic from 1990
until 2000, when she was terminated for misuse of company time. In her
complaint, Ms. Brown alleged that she was sexually harassed by her supervisor
and a co-worker who made unwelcome comments to her. She also alleged that
she was not permitted to work overtime or to attend leadership training and was
punished for violating work rules, while other employees were not punished for
the same behavior. She alleged she was treated this way because of her sex.
After she was terminated, Ms. Brown filed a complaint with the EEOC.
At the pretrial conference, Ms. Brown sought to amend her complaint to
include a charge that defendant had retaliated against her by refusing to reinstate
her as directed by the Grievance Board. She alleged that defendant was motivated
to retaliate against her because she had filed a complaint of a sexually hostile
work environment with the EEOC. The district court did not allow the
amendment citing to the fact that the scheduling order had specifically provided a
deadline for filing any motions to amend, with which Ms. Brown had failed to
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comply. The court noted that Ms. Brown was aware of the facts that would give
rise to a claim for retaliation when she filed her complaint. Later, the district
court granted summary judgment to defendant on Ms. Brown’s hostile work
environment claim.
On appeal, Ms. Brown argues only that the district court should have
permitted her to amend her complaint. She contends that defendant was on notice
that she was also claiming retaliation when she filed her complaint and that her
retaliation claim was reasonably related to her claims before the EEOC.
We review the district court’s decision not to permit a motion to amend a
complaint for abuse of discretion. See Scott v. Hern , 216 F.3d 897, 906 (10th
Cir. 2000).
Ms. Brown admits that she knew of the facts underlying her proposed
amendment when she filed her complaint. She maintains that because she
included in the list of facts in her complaint the details of the Grievance Board’s
decision that she be rehired and defendant’s failure to comply with that decision,
defendant should have been aware that she would later use those facts to support
a claim of retaliation. We disagree. A defendant cannot be expected to prepare
to defend against claims not specifically raised by the plaintiff even if the
complaint may have contained facts which might contribute towards supporting
another claim.
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Further, Ms. Brown failed to comply with the district court’s scheduling
order setting forth the date by which any motions to amend had to be filed.
Untimeliness alone can provide a sufficient reason to deny a motion for leave to
amend, especially where the party seeking to amend knew, or should have known,
of the facts supporting the proposed amendment when the original complaint was
filed. Pallottino v. City of Rio Rancho , 31 F.3d 1023, 1027 (10th Cir. 1994).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Ms. Brown’s
motion to amend her complaint. The judgment of the district court is
AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Stephen H. Anderson
Circuit Judge
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