Dmytryszyn v. Clements

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
June 11, 2013
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
ADAM DMYTRYSZYN,
Plaintiff - Appellant, No. 13-1003
v. (D. Colorado)
ROGER WERHOLTZ, Interim (D.C. No. 1:12-CV-03241-LTB)
Executive Director *; LIEUTENANT
BERNADETTE SCOTT; CAPTAIN T.
SCOTT; LIEUTENANT MAGELSON;
MAJOR BILDERAVA; CAPTAIN
BOLT; SUPERINTENDENT JAMES
FALK,
Defendants - Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT **
Before HARTZ, O’BRIEN, and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges.
*
Pursuant to Fed. R. App. 34(c)(2) Tom Clements is replaced with Roger
Werholtz as Executive Director of the Colorado Department of Corrections.
**
After examining the brief and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to honor the party’s request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and
collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent
with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Plaintiff Adam Dmytryszyn, a Colorado state prisoner, appeals from an
order by the United States District Court for the District of Colorado denying his
motion for a preliminary injunction against Defendants, who are all current or
former employees of the Colorado Department of Corrections. He alleged that
Defendants denied him his constitutional right of access to the courts by
confiscating a Department of Justice report containing information that would be
helpful to him in pursuing state postconviction remedies. Exercising jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1), we affirm because Dmytryszyn has not
demonstrated that his state postconviction claim is nonfrivolous.
Dmytryszyn wishes to challenge his state-court menacing conviction on the
ground that police used an improper procedure in interviewing witnesses to his
crime. To develop the basis for this claim, he requested a copy of a National
Institute of Justice report containing Department of Justice guidelines for law-
enforcement use of eyewitness evidence. But when a copy of the report addressed
to him arrived at the prison, prison officials refused to give it to him, contending
that it posed a threat to the safety and security of the prison. Dmytryszyn brought
suit in district court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging, among other things, that
the officials’ confiscation of the report violated his First Amendment right of
access to the courts. He moved for a temporary restraining order to prevent the
officials from destroying the report and a preliminary injunction requiring them to
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give him the report. The district court denied his motion, and Dmytryszyn
appealed.
We review for abuse of discretion the district court’s decision denying the
motion for a preliminary injunction. See Little v. Jones, 607 F.3d 1245, 1250
(10th Cir. 2010). To obtain a preliminary injunction, Dmytryszyn had to
demonstrate “(1) a likelihood of success on the merits; (2) a likelihood that [he
would] suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3) that the
balance of equities tips in [his] favor; and 4) that the injunction is in the public
interest.” Id. at 1251 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The first requirement is dispositive. To establish denial of access to the
courts, Dmytryszyn must show “actual injury from interference with his access to
the courts—that is, that [he] was frustrated or impeded in his efforts to pursue a
nonfrivolous legal claim concerning his conviction or his conditions of
confinement.” Gee v. Pacheco, 627 F.3d 1178, 1191 (10th Cir. 2010) (emphasis
added). Dmytryszyn has not adequately alleged such injury. He claims only that
he needs the confiscated report to provide persuasive authority that will help
establish his claim that “the police officer committed misconduct in [his] case” by
failing to “separate witnesses during questioning.” Aplt. Br. at 9.
Dmytryszyn fails, however, to explain how he can bring such a claim in a
motion for postconviction relief in Colorado state court. The Colorado Rules of
Criminal Procedure provide that in deciding a motion for postconviction relief,
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“[t]he court shall deny any claim that was raised and resolved in a prior appeal or
postconviction proceeding on behalf of the same defendant,” subject to certain
exceptions not implicated here. Colo. R. Crim. P. 35(c)(3)(VI). They also state
that “[t]he court shall deny any claim that could have been presented in an appeal
previously brought or postconviction proceeding previously brought,” id. at
35(c)(3)(VII) (emphasis added), again subject to exceptions not applicable to
Dmytryszyn’s claim. Dmytryszyn has not explained, nor can we imagine, why a
claim that police officers used improper interviewing techniques could not have
been raised on direct appeal. And if it was in fact raised, it must have been
denied and cannot be raised again in postconviction proceedings. Because a
Colorado court would be bound to reject Dmytryszyn’s claim if raised in a
postconviction motion, the claim is legally frivolous. Thus, the district court did
not abuse its discretion in denying Dmytryszyn’s motion for a preliminary
injunction.
We AFFIRM the district court’s denial of Dmytryszyn’s motion. We
GRANT his motion to proceed in forma pauperis. He is reminded of his
continuing obligation to make partial payments until the filing fee has been paid
in full.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Harris L Hartz
Circuit Judge
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