United States v. Cardenas

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
June 30, 2005
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee, No. 04-2337
v. (D. of N.M.)
MARTIN ANTONIO-CARDENAS, (D.C. No. CR-04-1529-BB)
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before KELLY , O’BRIEN , and TYMKOVICH , Circuit Judges. **
On August 5, 2004, appellant Martin Antonio Cardenas entered into a plea
agreement on a charge of possessing with the intent to distribute 50 kilograms or
more of marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C), and
18 U.S.C. § 2. The plea agreement provided that “the defendant knowingly
waives the right to appeal any sentence within the applicable guideline range as
*
This order is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of
the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the
citation of orders; nevertheless, an order may be cited under the terms and
conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
**
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge
panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material
assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th
Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
determined by the Court after resolution of any objections by either party to the
presentence report . . . [i]n other words, the defendant waives the right to appeal
the sentence imposed in this case except to the extent, if any, that the court may
depart upwards from the applicable sentencing guideline range[.]” Cardenas also
admitted he violated his supervised release by reentering the United States after
deportation, and was sentenced to an additional twelve months for this offense,
with the sentence to run consecutively to his sentence for drug possession.
Despite his appeal waiver, Cardenas now wishes to appeal on the grounds
that his sentence violates United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005). His
counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California , 386 U.S. 738 (1967),
asserting counsel could discern no non-frivolous issues for appeal and therefore
wished to withdraw. We grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and dismiss the
appeal as barred by the appeal waiver.
I. Cardenas’s Plea Waiver
We have “both statutory and constitutional subject matter jurisdiction over
appeals when a criminal defendant has waived his appellate rights in an
enforceable plea agreement.” United States v. Hahn , 359 F.3d 1315, 1324 (10th
Cir. 2004). In Hahn , we adopted a three-prong analysis for reviewing appeals
brought after a defendant entered into such a waiver: “(1) whether the disputed
appeal falls within the scope of the waiver of appellate rights; (2) whether the
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defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his appellate rights; and (3) whether
enforcing the waiver would result in a miscarriage of justice[.]” Id. at 1325.
Applying the first prong, we conclude this appeal falls within the scope of
Cardenas’s broad waiver, in which he clearly acknowledged he was waiving the
right to appeal except where the court departed upward from the applicable
Guideline range. Applying the second prong, nothing in the record indicates
Cardenas entered into his plea agreement unknowingly or involuntarily. To the
contrary, he was represented by competent counsel, acknowledged he understood
the provisions of the agreement, and did not dispute the agreement at his
sentencing. Finally, as to the third prong, there is also no evidence that enforcing
the waiver would be a miscarriage of justice. Hahn ’s standard with respect to the
third prong is demanding: we find it is met only in circumstances such as “(1)
where the district court relied on an impermissible factor such as race, (2) where
ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with the negotiation of the waiver
renders the waiver invalid, (3) where the sentence exceeds the statutory
maximum, or (4) where the waiver is otherwise unlawful.” Id. at 1327. We agree
with defense counsel that Cardenas’s waiver presents none of these issues.
Therefore, Cardenas’s appeal waiver is enforceable and we DENY his
appeal.
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II. Booker Issues
Although we have already determined Cardenas has waived appeal, we
briefly address the merits of his Booker argument. According to counsel’s Anders
brief, Cardenas wishes to appeal on the grounds that his sentence for a supervised
release violation should have been run concurrently with his sentence for drug
possession. Cardenas bases this theory on the Supreme Court’s decision in
Booker , which rendered portions of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines advisory.
However, as counsel points out, Booker has no effect on sentences for supervised
release violations. Such sentences are imposed pursuant to Chapter VII of the
Guidelines, which were, prior to Booker , already considered advisory. See United
States v. Lee , 957 F.2d 770 (10th Cir. 1992). Accordingly, the consecutive
sentence imposed by the district court was not pursuant to the then “mandatory”
Guidelines scheme addressed in Booker .
As to the merits of the district court’s decision to run Cardenas’s sentences
consecutively, we have held that when imposing a sentence for a supervised
release violation, a district court must simply consider the various factors listed in
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). See United States v. Kelley , 359 F.3d 1302, 1302-04 (10th
Cir. 2004). In this case, the record shows the district court adequately considered
these factors.
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Accordingly, Cardenas’s sentence is affirmed and the case is dismissed.
Entered for the Court
Timothy M. Tymkovich
Circuit Judge
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