Leech v. Hines

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
October 25, 2005
TENTH CIRCUIT
Clerk of Court
JERALD LEECH,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v. No. 05-6120
(D.C. No. CIV-04-0306-T)
REGINALD HINES, (W.D. Okla.)
Respondent-Appellee.
ORDER DENYING A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY
Before BRISCOE , LUCERO , and MURPHY , Circuit Judges.
Jerald Leech, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, requests a certificate of
appealability (“COA”) to appeal the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254 habeas petition. For substantially the same reasons set forth by the district
court, we DENY a COA and DISMISS.
After buying more than an ounce of methamphetamine from a police
informant as part of a sting operation, and telling the informant that he was going
to sell the drugs, Leech was arrested for Trafficking in a Controlled Dangerous
Substance in violation of Okla. stat. tit. 63, § 2-415. He was convicted and
sentenced to twenty years imprisonment.
Leech filed a direct appeal to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals
(“OCCA”). He claimed the police engaged in sentencing entrapment by having an
informant give him enough methamphetamine for a trafficking conviction and that
the trial court committed reversible error when it failed to instruct on the lesser
offense of possession. The appeal did not claim ineffective assistance of trial
counsel. The OCCA rejected his appeal, but reduced his sentence to ten years
imprisonment. Leech v. State, 66 P. 3d 987 (Okla. Crim. App. 2003)
In an application for post-conviction relief filed in state court, Leech
claimed that he should have been given the opportunity to present the defense of
sentencing entrapment to the jury, that he was denied effective assistance of trial
counsel because his lawyer failed to present sentencing entrapment evidence to
the jury, and that he was denied effective assistance of appellate counsel because
his appellate counsel failed to raise the issue of ineffective assistance of trial
counsel on direct appeal. His application was rejected, but the Oklahoma courts
failed to address the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel claim.
Leech then brought a petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
The district court denied his petition and Leech’s subsequent application for a
COA. Leech now seeks a COA from this court and presents the same arguments
2
he presented to the district court. 1
A habeas petitioner is not entitled to relief if his claim has been adjudicated
on the merits by a state court unless that state court’s decision was “contrary to,
or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” or was “based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the
State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). If the state court did not
adjudicate a petitioner’s claim on the merits, “we review questions of law de novo
and questions of fact for clear error.” Cook v. McKune, 323 F.3d 825, 830 (10th
Cir. 2003).
In his habeas petition, Leech claims that his right to present a defense
under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was denied because
1
Leech’s petition was filed after April 24, 1996, the effective date of the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”); as a result, AEDPA’s
provisions apply to this case. See Rogers v. Gibson, 173 F.3d 1278, 1282 n.1
(10th Cir. 1999) (citing Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320 (1997)). AEDPA
conditions a petitioner’s right to appeal a denial of habeas relief under § 2254
upon a grant of a COA. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A). A COA may be issued “only
if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional
right.” § 2253(c)(2). This requires Leech to show “that reasonable jurists could
debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been
resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to
deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473,
484 (2000) (quotations omitted). Because the district court denied Leech a COA,
he may not appeal the district court’s decision absent a grant of COA by this
court.
3
the defense of sentencing entrapment was not presented to the jury. Further, he
claims that he was in fact entrapped into buying the methamphetamine. He also
claims that he was denied effective assistance of both trial and appellate counsel.
Leech’s Fourteenth Amendment rights were not violated. Under Oklahoma
law, when “the defense of entrapment is fairly raised by the evidence, the burden
of proof is upon the State to show beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was
not entrapped and the jury must be so instructed.” Lee v. State, 655 P.2d 1046,
1047 (Okla. Crim. App. 1982). This rule covers sentencing entrapment. Leech,
66 P.3d at 990. Although it is settled law that defendants have no constitutional
right to present the defense of entrapment, United States v. Russell, 411 U.S. 423,
433 (1973), this Circuit has not made clear whether the failure of a state court to
issue a jury instruction for entrapment when proper under state law is a violation
of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment that can be raised as part
of a habeas petition. See Vega v. Suthers, 195 F.3d 573, 583 (10th Cir. 1999)
(declining to reach “that distinct and possibly more troubling question.”). The
Ninth Circuit has held that a failure to grant an instruction for entrapment when
justified under state law can violate the Fourteenth Amendment. Bradley v.
Duncan, 315 F.3d 1091, 1099 (9th Cir. 2002).
We need not reach this issue because a state court, the OCCA, considered
the evidence and held that Leech was not entitled to a jury instruction about
4
sentencing entrapment. The OCCA held that there was not enough evidence to
warrant a jury instruction on either of the elements of sentencing entrapment.
Leech, 66 P.3d at 990 (“[I]f requested, the instruction would have properly been
refused as not being supported by any evidence”). Given the lack of evidence in
the record of either of the elements of sentencing entrapment, this determination
was not an “unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence
presented.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). As such, Leech fails to raise a cognizable
federal habeas corpus claim for violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Leech also claims that he was in fact entrapped into buying enough
methamphetamine to warrant a trafficking conviction. The OCCA considered and
rejected this argument. Leech, 66 P.3d at 990 (“There is no evidence of
entrapment in the record.”). Habeas relief is not appropriate because that decision
does not violate federal law and is not based on an unreasonable determination of
the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.
Finally, Leech raises two ineffective assistance of counsel claims. The first
is that his trial counsel failed to raise the sentencing entrapment defense. In
denying Leech’s motion for post-conviction relief, the OCCA examined the issue
and found that this claim was barred on procedural grounds. Leech also claims
that the failure to allege ineffective assistance of trial counsel on direct appeal
rendered appellate counsel’s representation ineffective. The OCCA did not
5
review this argument, so we review the questions of law de novo and questions of
fact for clear error. Cook, 323 F.3d at 830.
The two inquiries are bound up in one. All ineffective assistance of
counsel claims must meet the test announced by the Supreme Court in Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-91 (1984), which requires habeas petitioners to
show constitutionally deficient performance by demonstrating that counsel’s
conduct was objectively unreasonable and resulted in prejudice by demonstrating
a “reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result
of the proceeding would have been different.” For a petitioner to prove
constitutionally deficient performance of appellate counsel, a petitioner must
show either that the issue that was not appealed is “so plainly meritorious that it
would have been unreasonable to winnow it from even a strong appeal” or that,
when considered in the context of the rest of the appeal and with deference given
to the professional judgment of the attorney, it was unreasonable not to appeal
that issue. Cargle v. Mullin, 317 F.3d 1196, 1202 (10th Cir. 2003). “[I]f the
issue is meritless, its omission will not constitute deficient performance.” Id.In this case, appellate counsel did not err in failing to press the ineffective
assistance of trial counsel claim because it is meritless. Leech argues that his
trial counsel was deficient because he did not call Leech to the stand, did not
conduct a proper investigation, and did not argue that a police videotape of the
6
transaction provided exculpatory evidence. None of these arguments are
availing. Counsel attempted to establish the sentencing entrapment claim through
cross-examination and in his closing statement. Leech was informed of his right
to testify. There is nothing in the record, and nothing alleged, indicating that
there was evidence that Leech’s counsel missed because of a lack of
thoroughness. Leech’s allegations that his trial counsel was ineffective do not
come close to meeting the rigorous standard for constitutionally deficient
performance set forth in Strickland. Because Leech’s ineffective assistance of
trial counsel claim is meritless, his appellate counsel was not ineffective for
failing to press this argument on appeal.
For the reasons set forth above, Leech’s request for a COA is DENIED and
the appeal is DISMISSED. Leech’s motion to proceed in forma pauperis is
granted.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Carlos F. Lucero
Circuit Judge
7