Cook v. Barnhart

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
APR 16 2003
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
ERMA L. COOK,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 02-7108
(D.C. No. 01-CV-602-P)
JO ANNE B. BARNHART, (E.D. Oklahoma)
Commissioner of the Social Security
Administration,
Defendant - Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRISCOE , PORFILIO , and ANDERSON , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Claimant Erma L. Cook appeals from an order of the district court
affirming the Commissioner’s determination, at step four of the five-part
sequential process for determining disability, that she is not entitled to social
security benefits. See Williams v. Bowen , 844 F.2d 748, 750-52 (10th Cir. 1988)
(discussing the five-step sequential process). After reviewing the
Commissioner’s decision to determine “whether the factual findings are supported
by substantial evidence and whether correct legal standards were applied,”
we affirm. See Kelley v. Chater , 62 F.3d 335, 337 (10th Cir. 1995).
Claimant applied for supplemental security income payments and disability
insurance benefits in February 1997. She had an acute cerebrovascular accident,
or stroke, with right side involvement on January 12, 1997. Additionally, she has
blood-pressure problems, non-insulin dependent diabetes, and high cholesterol.
After an administrative hearing at which a vocational expert (VE) testified, an
administrative law judge (ALJ) ruled against claimant. The ALJ found that
claimant was severely impaired by the latent effects of cerebrovascular disease
and hypertension but that the severity of her impairments did not meet a listing
requirement. Further, the ALJ determined that claimant was not disabled because
she retained the residual functional capacity (RFC) to perform a wide range of
light work and could, therefore, return to her past relevant work as a case
-2-
manager, sheltered workshop coordinator, bakery sales clerk/cashier, store clerk,
or store manager.
On appeal, claimant first challenges the ALJ’s determination, at step
three of the sequential analysis, that she did not meet a listed impairment under
20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1. Specifically, she contends that substantial
evidence shows that she actually met the requirements of listing 11.04, applicable
to a central nervous system vascular accident impairment. The relevant listing
requires the existence of “[s]ignificant and persistent disorganization of motor
function in two extremities, resulting in sustained disturbance of gross and
dexterous movements, or gait and station” for “more than 3 months post-vascular
accident.” The cross-referenced § 11.00(C) states that the assessment of such an
impairment “depends on the degree of interference with locomotion and/or
interference with the use of fingers, hands, and arms.”
The records of claimant’s treating physician show that on January 12, 1997,
claimant was hospitalized for an acute cerebrovascular accident resulting in
right-sided muscular weakness. On April 14, 1997, claimant walked with
a pronounced limp, using a cane but not an orthotic brace. She also had some
trouble using her right hand. The physician opined that, in spite of her weakness
and coordination problems, claimant should be able to perform occupations that
did not require long periods of standing or walking. A consultative physician
-3-
conducted an examination on May 31, 1997, and found that claimant was
neurologically intact, with no sensory deficits in her extremities. A third
physician examined claimant on October 1, 1998. This physician determined that
claimant was fifty percent disabled due to a right-leg limp, decreased right-hand
grip strength, and decreased range of motion of the neck, but believed that she
could be trained for work that did not include manual labor. Based on the
physicians’ reports and the ALJ’s decision to discount claimant’s testimony to
the extent it conflicted with the medical record, we conclude that substantial
evidence supports the ALJ’s determination that claimant’s post-stroke impairment
was not of such a degree as to meet listing 11.04.
Claimant next contends that the ALJ failed to make the required analysis
at step four of the five-step analysis. She essentially argues that her alleged
impairments were more serious or severe than determined by the ALJ. The record
provides medical documentation, claimant’s statements concerning her physical
condition and the demands of her past relevant work, and testimony from a VE.
We may not reweigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for that of the
agency. Casias v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs ., 933 F.2d 799, 800 (10th Cir.
1991). It is clear from our reading of this record that the ALJ performed the
proper analysis under step four, and that his findings are supported by substantial
-4-
evidence. Thus, the ALJ properly found that claimant could perform a wide range
of light work and could therefore return to her past relevant work.
AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Stephen H. Anderson
Circuit Judge
-5-