Morkel v. Davis

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT March 15, 2013
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
KIRSTEEN DIDI MORKEL, f/k/a
Kirsteen Didi Blocker,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
No. 11-4166
v. (D.C. No. 2:10-CV-01176-CW)
(D. Utah)
LYNN W. DAVIS, in his official
capacity as Utah Fourth District Court
Judge; SANDRA DREDGE, in her
official capacity as Special Master,
4th District Court; KELLY PETERSON,
in his official capacity as Guardian ad
Litem; KRISTIN GERDY, in her official
capacity as attorney for Michael Blocker;
RON WILKINSON, in his capacity as
attorney for Michael Blocker; MICHAEL
BLOCKER,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before LUCERO, TYMKOVICH, and HOLMES, Circuit Judges.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of this
appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Kirsteen Morkel challenges the district court’s dismissal of her claims brought
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and § 1985 seeking injunctive, declaratory, and monetary
relief against several parties involved in a state-court child custody case. We have
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Morkel brought suit in the district court alleging that the judge, special master,
and guardian ad litem (hereinafter “State Defendants”), along with two attorneys
representing her former husband (hereinafter “Attorney Defendants”), conspired to
deprive her of her constitutional rights in a Utah divorce and child custody case
involving Michael Blocker, her former husband.1 Specifically, Morkel asserts that
the appointed special master, Sandra Dredge, violated her rights by engaging in
ex parte communications with Blocker and the Attorney Defendants, issuing orders
reserved for a judge, and otherwise engaging in actions designed to prevent Morkel
from seeing her child. She alleges that the appointed guardian ad litem, Kelly
Peterson, also engaged in ex parte communications and did not act in Morkel’s
child’s best interests. And she alleges that Dredge and Peterson conspired with the
Attorney Defendants to deny Morkel her constitutionally-protected parental rights,
particularly with respect to an order issued by Dredge suspending Morkel’s visitation
rights for nine weeks.
1
Morkel has withdrawn her appeal as to her dismissed claims against the judge, who
has since recused himself in the state court action. Aplt. Reply Br. at 1.
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After Morkel filed her complaint in federal court, the State Defendants and
Attorney Defendants moved separately to dismiss all claims. Morkel then sought to
amend her complaint. Both sets of defendants opposed the motion to amend. The
district court held a hearing on all the motions and dismissed the original complaint
for failure to state a claim. The court further concluded that granting Morkel leave to
amend her complaint would be futile because the amended complaint still failed to
state a claim, the defendants were all protected by various immunities and, in any
event, application of the Rooker-Feldman and Younger doctrines prevented the court
from exercising subject-matter jurisdiction over the claims. The district court
declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims
and entered judgment in favor of the defendants. Morkel appeals.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Rooker-Feldman
As a threshold matter, we must determine whether Morkel’s claims survive the
jurisdictional bar of Rooker-Feldman. See Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413(1923); D.C. Cir. v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine
prohibits a losing party in state court “from seeking what in substance would be
appellate review of the state judgment in a United States district court, based on the
losing party’s claim that the state judgment itself violates the loser’s federal rights.”
Knox v. Bland, 632 F.3d 1290, 1292 (10th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks
omitted). This doctrine has a narrow scope, however, and applies only when a state
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court judgment is final. See Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp.,
544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005); Guttman v. Khalsa, 446 F.3d 1027, 1032 (10th Cir. 2006)
(“Rooker-Feldman applies only to suits filed after state proceedings are final.”). We
review the application of Rooker-Feldman de novo. Miller v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l
Trust Co., 666 F.3d 1255, 1260 (10th Cir. 2012).
The State Defendants and Attorney Defendants contend that Morkel’s
complaint asked the district court to review the basis of the state court’s rulings, an
action prohibited by Rooker-Feldman. The defendants point to two orders in
particular: the state court’s order granting custody to Morkel’s former husband; and
the later instruction by special master Dredge suspending Morkel’s visitation for nine
weeks. But as noted above, Rooker-Feldman applies only when a federal court is asked
to review the final decisions of a state court. Here, the state-court proceedings were
ongoing when Morkel brought suit in federal court. The state-court orders impacted by
her federal lawsuit are thus not final and consequently fall outside the scope of
Rooker-Feldman. We must conclude that the district court erred in dismissing the case
under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. But this does not end our inquiry—“we are free to
affirm a district court decision on any grounds for which there is a record sufficient
to permit conclusions of law, even grounds not relied upon by the district court.”
Wells v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 257 F.3d 1132, 1149-50 (10th Cir. 2001) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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B. Younger Doctrine
As noted above, the district court also relied on the Younger abstention doctrine as
grounds for dismissal. The Supreme Court’s decision in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37(1971), and its progeny established that federal district courts must abstain from
exercising jurisdiction when three conditions are satisfied: (1) there are ongoing state
proceedings; (2) the state court offers an adequate forum to hear the plaintiff’s claims
from the federal lawsuit; and (3) the state proceeding involves important state interests.
See Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432
(1982). When these conditions are met, the application of Younger is mandatory.
Weitzel v. Div. of Occupational and Prof’l Licensing of Dep’t of Commerce, 240 F.3d
871, 875 (10th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he district court must abstain once the conditions are
met, absent extraordinary circumstances.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). We
review de novo a district court’s decision to abstain under the Younger doctrine. Brown
ex rel. Brown v. Day, 555 F.3d 882, 887 (10th Cir. 2009). We conclude that all three
Younger requirements are met in this case.
First, the record reflects that the state custody proceedings were ongoing when
Morkel filed her federal lawsuit.2 It is acknowledged in numerous places throughout the
2
The pending state proceedings need not be a single trial that resolves all
issues. In Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 424, 435 (1979), the Supreme Court reversed
a district court’s holding that because a juvenile action is “multifaceted” and involves
no single judicial proceeding it cannot be considered pending litigation for the
purposes of Younger. The Supreme Court stated that so long as the plaintiffs had the
(continued)
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complaint—including Morkel’s request for injunctive relief—and was demonstrated at
the district court’s hearing on the motions to dismiss. Citing Brown v. Day, Morkel
nevertheless argues that Younger’s first prong is not satisfied because hers is not the type
of case the Younger doctrine embraces. In Brown, 555 F.3d at 888, we recognized that
the “ongoing proceeding” prong asks both “whether there is an ongoing proceeding and
whether it is the type [of case] afforded Younger deference.” We considered the critical
distinction between remedial proceedings, to which Younger does not apply, and coercive
proceedings, to which it does apply. Morkel argues that because the state-court
proceeding does not involve the State as a party, it is not a coercive proceeding under
Brown. But the remedial-coercive distinction outlined in Brown came in the unique
context of applying Younger to administrative proceedings. Morkel’s state case is not an
administrative proceeding and thus, the State need not be a party for Younger to apply.
See, e.g., Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 10 (1987) (applying Younger doctrine
to state-court suit involving two private parties). This court and other circuits have
consistently applied Younger to child custody cases. See Chapman v. Barcus,
372 F. App’x 899 (10th Cir. 2010); Hunt v. Lamb, 220 F. App’x 887 (10th Cir. 2007);
Leonoff v. Oklahoma, 60 F. App’x 233 (10th Cir. 2003); Parent v. New York,
485 F. App’x 500 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 133 S. Ct. 652 (2012); D.T.B. ex rel.
O’Callaghan, 280 F. App’x 151 (3d Cir. 2008); Mann v. Conlin, 22 F.3d 100, 105-106
opportunity to raise their claims in the state proceedings, the federal district court
must abstain under Younger. Id. at 425.
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(6th Cir. 1994); S.P. ex rel. Parks v. Native Vill. of Minto, 443 F. App’x 264 (9th Cir.
2011); Liedel v. Juvenile Court of Madison Cnty., 891 F.2d 1542 (11th Cir. 1990).
Second, Morkel has not demonstrated that Utah state courts are an inadequate
forum for raising her constitutional claims, which she may do by appealing the final
orders or filing an interlocutory appeal. State courts are generally equally capable of
enforcing federal constitutional rights as federal courts. See Middlesex Cnty. Ethics
Comm., 457 U.S. at 431. And when constitutional challenges impact state proceedings,
as they do here, “proper respect for the ability of state courts to resolve federal
questions presented in state-court litigation mandates that the federal court stay its
hand.” Pennzoil Co., 481 U.S. at 14. Moreover, Morkel need not even file an appeal in
order to be redressed—her primary contentions about her civil rights being violated
revolve around the conduct of the special master, the special master’s orders, the
guardian ad litem, and her former husband’s attorneys. Those are matters that can be
raised with the state trial court judge. To the extent that Morkel has already raised her
constitutional concerns in the state trial court, that court’s decisions are not “inadequate”
for Younger purposes simply because the court did not rule in her favor. It is Morkel’s
burden to establish that state law prevents her from presenting her federal claims in
the state proceedings. See J.B. ex rel. Hart v. Valdez, 186 F.3d 1280, 1292 (10th Cir.
1999). She has failed to do so.
Finally, the resolution of child custody matters has been acknowledged as an
important state interest. See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 12-13
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(2004) (“ [T]he whole subject of the domestic relations of husband and wife, parent
and child, belongs to the laws of the States and not to the laws of the United States.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)). In Morrow v. Winslow, 94 F.3d 1386, 1393,
(10th Cir. 1996), we noted that comity considerations of the Younger doctrine are
particularly vital in child custody proceedings, which are “an especially delicate subject
of state policy.” The reasons for abstention are only strengthened when we consider that
Utah has a continuing power to modify Morkel’s child custody arrangements, including
both permanent and temporary parent-time arrangements. See Utah Code Ann.
§§ 78B-13-101-318.
Morkel argues that Younger should not apply because she does not seek to enjoin
any state court proceedings. She asserts that she seeks only to enjoin “the unlawful
conduct” of the defendants. Aplt. Opening Br. at 32. But that is a fiction. In her
complaint, she asked the district court to enjoin the defendants from “continuing to deny
her the free association of her child” and to enjoin the special master from “enforcing any
orders she made.” App. Vol. II at 310-311. Hence, Morkel both implicitly and explicitly
asked the district court to intervene in the state custody proceedings, which the Younger
doctrine expressly proscribes. The district court’s abstention is therefore proper.
However, dismissal of Morkel’s claims for injunctive and declarative relief should be
without prejudice because it is based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Brereton
v. Bountiful City Corp., 434 F.3d 1213, 1216 (10th Cir. 2006) (“A longstanding line
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of cases from this circuit holds that where the district court dismisses an action for
lack of jurisdiction, as it did here, the dismissal must be without prejudice.”)
C. Monetary Damages
In addition to injunctive and declaratory relief, Morkel seeks monetary
damages against special master Dredge and guardian ad litem Peterson that does not fall
within the purview of Younger abstention. To the extent that it had jurisdiction over
those claims, the district court dismissed the claims against Dredge because it found he
was protected by quasi-judicial immunity and against Peterson because it found he was
not a state actor. We agree.
With respect to Dredge, non-judicial officers may be afforded the same
absolute immunity enjoyed by judges when a claim is based on duties performed in
furtherance of the judicial process. Whitesel v. Sengenberger, 222 F.3d 861, 867
(10th Cir. 2000). Here, the judge in the state custody proceeding assigned Dredge to act
as the special master, giving her the authority to alter the parent-time schedule up to eight
nights per month. All of the conduct about which Morkel complains involved the duties
assigned to Dredge as a special master. Although Morkel argues that Dredge cannot be
protected by quasi-judicial immunity because she acted without any colorable claim of
jurisdiction, this is only a conclusory allegation wholly unsupported by the facts. Even if
Dredge’s actions were in error or were done maliciously, they were nevertheless acts
performed in furtherance of the judicial process and are protected. See Stump v.
Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57, 362 (1978).
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As to Peterson, guardians ad litem are not state actors for purposes of § 1983
because they give their “undivided loyalty to the minor, not the state.” Meeker v.
Kercher, 782 F.2d 153, 155 (10th Cir. 1986) (per curiam). Consequently, Peterson is
not subject to suit under § 1983, and dismissal was appropriate. Garcia v. LeMaster,
439 F.3d 1215, 1217 (10th Cir. 2006) (“To state a valid cause of action under § 1983,
a plaintiff must allege . . . the defendant was acting under color of state law.”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
III. CONCLUSION
We affirm the district court’s dismissal of Morkel’s claims for damages. We
affirm the district court’s dismissal of Morkel’s claims for injunctive and declaratory
relief on the basis of Younger, but remand to the district court with instructions to
modify the dismissal of those claims to be “without prejudice.”
Entered for the Court
Jerome A. Holmes
Circuit Judge
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