Rigsby v. United States

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FEB 6 2004
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
JACK RIGSBY, SR.,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 03-3207
(D. Kan.)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, (D. Ct. No. 02-CV-3173-JTM)
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA, Chief Circuit Judge, and PORFILIO and BRORBY, Senior
Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the
citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under
the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Jack Rigsby, Sr., a federal inmate appearing pro se, appeals the district
court’s dismissal of his complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1)
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c). Mr.
Rigsby’s complaint asserts a cause of action for lost property under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1346(b)(1) of the Federal Tort Claims Act. We affirm the district court’s
dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
In his complaint, Mr. Rigsby alleged federal prison officials caused the loss
of his personal property when they packed, inventoried or placed it in a locker
while he was in detention. After reviewing the federal government’s motion to
dismiss and Mr. Rigsby’s reply thereto, the district court issued an order granting
the government’s motion to dismiss. In so doing, the district court concluded it
lacked subject matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c), which provides an
exception to the waiver of sovereign immunity under the Federal Tort Claims Act.
Specifically, the district court determined the exception applied because Mr.
Rigsby’s claim: 1) arose from the detention of goods by prison employees, 2)
who are law enforcement officers within the meaning of the exception.
Mr. Rigsby appeals the dismissal, claiming: 1) the district court’s ruling is
contrary to the congressional intent behind the Federal Tort Claims Act and
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Supreme Court decisions; 2) the district court incorrectly ruled prison employees
meet the definition of “law enforcement officers” within the meaning of the
exception outlined in 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c); and 3) the law of this circuit and
others is contrary to Federal Bureau of Prison policy and the Code of Federal
Regulations.
A court may only exercise jurisdiction when specifically authorized to do
so. See Castaneda v. INS, 23 F.3d 1576, 1580 (10th Cir. 1994). We review de
novo both a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, see U.S. West Inc. v.
Tristani, 182 F.3d 1202, 1206 (10th Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 1106(2000), and rulings on sovereign immunity and the applicability of an exception to
the Federal Tort Claims Act, see Steele v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, ___ F.3d
___, ____, 2003 WL 23019855 at *8 (10th Cir. Dec. 29, 2003). The Federal Tort
Claims Act, under 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1), waives the federal government’s
immunity from certain tort claims. See Elder v. United States, 312 F.3d 1172,
1176 (10th Cir. 2002). An exception to this waiver of sovereign immunity exists
under 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c) for any claim arising from the detention of any goods
or merchandise by any “law enforcement officer.” See Hatten v. White, 275 F.3d
1208, 1210 (10th Cir. 2002). This court has clearly determined prison employees
are “law enforcement officers” within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2680(c). See
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Steele, ___ F.3d at ___, 2003 WL 23019855 at *8; Hatten, 275 F.3d at 1210.
This determination comports with the broad interpretation given by other circuit
courts to the term “law enforcement officer” within the meaning of § 2680. See
United States v. Bein, 214 F.3d 408, 415 (3d Cir. 2000) (and cases cited therein),
cert. denied, 534 U.S. 943 (2001).
With these standards in mind, we have reviewed the pleadings, Mr.
Rigsby’s brief on appeal, and the district court’s decision, considering them in
light of the applicable law. The district court issued a comprehensive and well-
reasoned decision, which 1) clearly comports with the law in this circuit that
prison employees meet the definition of law enforcement officers within the
meaning of § 2680, and 2) correctly concludes it lacked subject matter
jurisdiction under that statute, because no sovereign immunity was waived. See
Steele, ___ F.3d at ___, 2003 WL 23019855 at *8; Hatten, 275 F.3d at 1210.
Despite Mr. Rigby’s contentions otherwise, he fails to provide a persuasive
argument the district court’s ruling is somehow contrary to the congressional
intent behind the Federal Tort Claims Act or a Supreme Court decision.
Moreover, even if his argument was persuasive, this panel is required to follow
circuit precedent, absent en banc reconsideration or a superseding contrary
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decision by the Supreme Court. See United States v. Hernandez-Rodriguez, 352
F.3d 1325, 1333 (10th Cir. 2003). Neither condition for disregarding circuit
precedent is presented here.
Finally, we reject Mr. Rigby’s assertion the law of this circuit is contrary to
Federal Bureau of Prison policy and the Code of Federal Regulations. In support,
he points out that the Federal Bureau of Prisons told him to file a lawsuit in the
district court if he was dissatisfied with the agency’s decision denying his
property claim, which he now asserts establishes his right to file a suit in federal
district court. Because we have previously addressed and rejected the same
argument on appeal, we decline to address it here. See Steele, ___F.3d at ___,
2003 WL 23019855 at *8.
For substantially the same reasons contained in the district court’s May 22,
2003 Order, and for the reasons stated herein, we AFFIRM the district court’s
dismissal of Mr. Rigby’s complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The
mandate should issue forthwith.
Entered by the Court:
WADE BRORBY
United States Circuit Judge
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