United States v. Burch

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
PUBLISH
MAR 4 1999
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 97-1442
STEVE A. BURCH,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO
(D.C. Nos. 97-WY-1508-CB & 93-CR-249-CAB)
Submitted on the briefs:
Henry L. Solano, United States Attorney, Andrew A. Vogt, Assistant United
States Attorney, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Steve A. Burch, pro se.
Before BALDOCK , EBEL , and MURPHY , Circuit Judges.
MURPHY , Circuit Judge.
Defendant-appellant Steve A. Burch appeals the district court’s denial of
his application for a writ of habeas corpus, which was construed as a motion to
vacate, set aside or correct his sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Because
defendant has shown an unresolved factual question regarding the United States’
jurisdiction over this case, and the government’s evidence is insufficient to permit
us to take judicial notice of where the offense was committed, we vacate the
judgment and remand the case for further proceedings. 1
Defendant is an enrolled member of the Southern Ute Indian Tribe. On
August 4, 1993, defendant was indicted by a federal grand jury for the crime of
manslaughter, in connection with the death of an infant which occurred in the
Meadowbrook Trailer Park, space #39, in Ignacio, Colorado. The town of Ignacio
is located entirely within the boundaries of the Southern Ute Indian Reservation.
After a jury trial, defendant was convicted and sentenced to seventy-nine months’
incarceration. His conviction was affirmed by this court in United States v.
Burch , No. 94-1293, 1995 WL 94653 (10th Cir. Feb. 28, 1995) (unpublished order
and judgment).
In July 1997, defendant filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus,
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, alleging the United States lacked subject matter
jurisdiction over the crime for which he was convicted. Because the petition
1
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination
of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
-2-
attacked the validity of defendant’s underlying conviction, it was construed as
a motion pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The government’s response relied on
defendant’s stipulation that the crime occurred within the exterior boundaries of
the Southern Ute Indian Reservation to establish federal jurisdiction over the
charged crime pursuant to the Indian Major Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1153(a).
In defendant’s reply, he clarified for the first time that his challenge to federal
jurisdiction rested upon the operation of Public Law 98-290, § 5, which granted
the State of Colorado criminal and civil jurisdiction within the boundaries of the
town of Ignacio, Colorado. See Pub. L. No. 98-290, 98 Stat. 201 (1984), set out
in the Historical and Statutory Notes following 25 U.S.C. § 668. The district
court denied defendant’s motion because the crime occurred within the boundaries
of the Southern Ute Indian Reservation and thus was within the exclusive
jurisdiction of the United States pursuant to the Indian Major Crimes Act.
On appeal, defendant argues that the State had exclusive jurisdiction over
the offense because it occurred in Ignacio, Colorado, and therefore the United
States lacked jurisdiction to try him under the Indian Major Crimes Act. The
government argues that (1) notwithstanding the provisions of Public Law 98-290,
the fact that the offense was committed by an Indian in Indian country gave the
United States exclusive jurisdiction pursuant to the Indian Major Crimes Act;
(2) Colorado never took the steps necessary to assume jurisdiction over Indians
-3-
in Indian country pursuant to 25 U.S.C. § 1321(a); and (3) even if Colorado has
jurisdiction over offenses committed within the town of Ignacio, the offense in
this case was committed outside the town boundaries.
Challenges to a district court’s subject matter jurisdiction may be raised
at any time, including in a § 2255 motion for collateral review of a federal
conviction. See United States v. Cuch , 79 F.3d 987, 990 (10th Cir. 1996).
Subject matter may not be conferred on a federal court by stipulation, estoppel,
or waiver. See Insurance Corp. of Ireland, Ltd. v. Compagnie des Bauxites
de Guinee , 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982). We review jurisdictional issues de novo.
See Cuch , 79 F.3d at 990.
“Criminal jurisdiction over offenses committed in ‘Indian country,’
18 U.S.C. § 1151, is governed by a complex patchwork of federal, state, and
tribal law.” Negonsott v. Samuels , 507 U.S. 99, 102 (1993) (quotations omitted).
Historically, based on principles of federal preemption and Indian sovereignty,
“criminal offenses by or against Indians have been subject only to federal or tribal
laws, except where Congress in the exercise of its plenary and exclusive power
over Indian affairs has expressly provided that State laws shall apply.”
Washington v. Confederated Bands & Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation ,
439 U.S. 463, 470-71 (1979) (quotation and citation omitted). In this case, we
-4-
must examine the relationship between the Indian Major Crimes Act, codified at
18 U.S.C. § 1153, and several public laws which were enacted subsequently.
The Indian Major Crimes Act was enacted in 1885 to establish
exclusive federal jurisdiction over certain enumerated felonies committed by
“[a]ny Indian . . . against the person or property of another Indian or other
person . . . within the Indian country.” Id. § 1153(a). “Indian country” is defined
to include, inter alia , “all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under
the jurisdiction of the United States Government.” Id. § 1151(a). The crime for
which defendant was convicted, manslaughter, is one of the offenses enumerated
in the Act. See id. § 1153(a).
In 1953, Congress enacted Public Law 280, ch. 505, 67 Stat. 588 (1953),
which conferred upon certain states, known as the “mandatory states,” criminal
jurisdiction over offenses committed by or against Indians in identified portions
of Indian country. See 18 U.S.C. § 1162. The law provided that § 1152 (enclave
jurisdiction) and § 1153 (major crimes jurisdiction) would not apply to the areas
of Indian country identified in the statute. See id. § 1162(c). The statute also
gave the option to other states to assume jurisdiction over Indian country by
affirmative legislative action. See § 7 of Pub. L. No. 280, 67 Stat. at 590,
repealed by Pub. L. No. 90-284, § 403(b), 82 Stat. 79 (1968). This law was
amended in 1968 to omit the requirement of affirmative legislative action and to
-5-
require the consent of the Indian tribe by special election before a state could
assume jurisdiction. See Pub. L. No. 90-284, §§ 401(a), 406, 82 Stat. 78, 80
(1968), codified at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321(a), 1326. Colorado was not one of the
states originally identified in Public Law 280, and, prior to 1984, had not assumed
criminal jurisdiction in Indian country through the necessary procedures. See
People v. Luna , 683 P.2d 362, 363-65 (Colo. Ct. App. 1984) (holding State did
not have criminal jurisdiction over offenses committed by Indians in Ignacio,
Colorado, because it had not taken the action necessary to assume jurisdiction
under Public Law 280).
In May 1984, six weeks after the Luna decision, Congress enacted Public
Law 98-290, which represented a negotiated agreement between “[t]he Southern
Ute Indian Tribe and the State of Colorado, together with the involved local
governments.” 130 Cong. Rec. 10,290 (1984). Section 5 of the law provides
The State of Colorado shall exercise criminal and civil
jurisdiction within the boundaries of the town of Ignacio, Colorado,
and any other municipality which may be incorporated under the laws
of Colorado within the Southern Ute Indian Reservation, as if such
State had assumed jurisdiction pursuant to the Act of August 15,
1953 (67 Stat. 588), as amended by the Act of April 11, 1968
(82 Stat. 79).
Pub. L. No. 98-290, § 5, 98 Stat. at 202. The question in this case, then, is
whether Public Law 98-290 removed from the United States jurisdiction over
Indian Major Crimes Act offenses committed in the town of Ignacio.
-6-
In construing Public Law 98-290, “[o]ur task is to give effect to the will of
Congress.” Negonsott , 507 U.S. at 104 (quotation omitted). Based on both the
language of Public Law 98-290 and its legislative history, we conclude that
Congress intended to bestow upon the State of Colorado exclusive jurisdiction
over the offenses described in the Indian Major Crimes Act, if committed within
the boundaries of the town of Ignacio.
Public Law 98-290 provides that Colorado’s exercise of jurisdiction should
be “as if” the state had assumed jurisdiction pursuant to Public Law 280, as
amended. Public Law 280, in turn, grants the named states exclusive jurisdiction
over offenses occurring in identified portions of Indian country, expressly stating
that the Indian Major Crimes Act does not apply to those areas. See Pub. L. No.
280, § 2, 67 Stat. at 589 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1162(c)); see also United States
v. Hoodie , 588 F.2d 292, 294-95 (9th Cir. 1978) (vacating federal conviction
because exclusive jurisdiction granted to states under Public Law 280). We see
no reason why this provision would not apply to vest Colorado with exclusive
jurisdiction over the town of Ignacio. Cf. United States v. Felter , 546 F. Supp.
1002, 1017 (D. Utah 1982) (“Had Utah chosen to accept jurisdiction over the Ute
reservation [pursuant to Pub. L. 280], its authority–and the limits thereon–would
have been identical to those of Wisconsin or other ‘mandatory’ states.”), aff’d ,
752 F.2d 1505 (10th Cir. 1985). But see United States v. High Elk , 902 F.2d 660,
-7-
660 (8th Cir. 1990) (per curiam) (holding, without discussion, that the Indian
Major Crimes Act was repealed only in those states originally identified in Public
Law 280).
This conclusion is buttressed by statements made both in the House and
Senate Reports and in introducing the bill on the House floor. The House Report
for Public Law 98-290 states
H.R. 4176 would eliminate . . . uncertainty by confirming the
boundaries of the reservation and by clarifying the criminal
jurisdiction of the Federal Government, the State government,
and the tribe. Under the terms of the bill, the United States and the
tribe would retain their existing criminal and civil jurisdiction
over Indians anywhere within the boundaries of the reservation
except within the limits of any municipality incorporated under the
laws of the State of Colorado, in which case, the State would
exercise criminal and civil jurisdiction over all persons , Indian
and non-Indian, as if it had assumed such jurisdiction pursuant to
the provision of Public Law 83-280.
H.R. Rep. No. 98-716, at 2 (1984) (emphasis added). The Senate Report states
Within the town of Ignacio, which lies within the reservation, the
State and town shall have jurisdiction as if jurisdiction had been
assumed under Public Law 83-280. Within the remainder of the
reservation, the tribal and Federal law shall be applicable to Indians
who are members of a federally recognized Indian tribe anywhere
within the boundaries of the reservation.
S. Rep. No. 98-404, at 1 (1984) (emphasis added). In describing the bill to the
House of Representatives, Congressman Young reiterated that the United States
and the tribe would retain their existing criminal and civil jurisdiction over
Indians anywhere within the boundaries of the reservation “except within the
-8-
limits of incorporated municipalities where State jurisdiction would be exercised
over all parties. ” 130 Cong. Rec. 10,290 (1984) (emphasis added).
The Supreme Court’s decision in Negonsott , 507 U.S. at 105, holding that
the federal courts retained jurisdiction to prosecute Indians under the Indian
Major Crimes Act even after criminal jurisdiction had been granted to the State
of Kansas, does not require a contrary result. There, the Court was construing the
effect of the Kansas Act, codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3243, which expressly stated
that the grant of state jurisdiction “shall not deprive the courts of the United
States of jurisdiction over offenses defined by the laws of the United States
committed by or against Indians on Indian reservations.” Here, in contrast, the
jurisdiction granted by Public Law 98-290 to the State of Colorado contains no
such reservation of federal jurisdiction.
Further, because Congress directly granted to Colorado jurisdiction over the
town of Ignacio, the State was not required to take further action to assume
jurisdiction. State jurisdiction over offenses committed by or against Indians in
Indian country may be obtained in one of two ways: (1) by a direct congressional
grant; or (2) by a state’s assumption of optional jurisdiction pursuant to Public
Law 280. See Ross v. Neff , 905 F.2d 1349, 1352 (10th Cir. 1990).
A direct congressional grant of jurisdiction over Indian country does not
require any further action to vest the state with jurisdiction unless state law itself
-9-
prevents the state from exercising such jurisdiction. See, e.g. , Yakima Indian
Nation , 439 U.S. at 471-72 (explaining that direct jurisdictional grant to
mandatory states “effected an immediate cession of criminal and civil jurisdiction
over Indian country” to those states); People v. Miranda , 165 Cal. Rptr. 154,
155-56 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (holding congressional grant of jurisdiction over
Indian country vested California with jurisdiction without requiring state to enact
enabling legislation). Upon cession of such jurisdiction to a state, federal law no
longer preempts the state’s exercise of its inherent police power over all persons
within its borders, and the state is automatically vested with jurisdiction in the
absence of state law to the contrary. See Anderson v. Gladden , 293 F.2d 463,
467-68 (9th Cir. 1961) (holding no affirmative action required by State of Oregon
to assume jurisdiction over Indians in Indian country once such jurisdiction was
granted directly by Congress, deferring to Oregon’s determination in Anderson v.
Britton , 318 P.2d 291, 297-300 (Or. 1957), that state had inherent police power
over Indians in Indian country once federal preemption removed); Robinson v.
Wolff , 349 F. Supp. 514, 520 (D. Neb. 1972) (holding nothing in Public Law 280
required acceptance by state when jurisdiction granted directly, deferring to state
determination in Robinson v. Sigler , 187 N.W.2d 756, 759 (Neb. 1971), that state
law did not require affirmative action to accept return of inherent jurisdiction
over Indians and Indian country), aff’d , 468 F.2d 438 (8th Cir. 1972).
-10-
Here, Colorado’s admission into the Union invested it with criminal
jurisdiction over its citizens “throughout the whole of the territory within its
limits, including the Ute Reservation.” United States v. McBratney , 104 U.S.
621, 624 (1881). No Colorado statute or constitutional provision precludes it
from exercising jurisdiction over Indians in Indian country. See, e.g. , Arizona v.
San Carlos Apache Tribe , 463 U.S. 545, 561-62 (1983) (noting absence of
jurisdictional disclaimers in Colorado Enabling Act, in contrast to most western
states). Thus, upon enactment of Public Law 98-290, Congress removed any
federal bar to Colorado’s exercise of its criminal jurisdiction over offenses
committed by or against Indians within the town of Ignacio, and the State was not
required to take further action to invest itself with such jurisdiction. The cases
cited by the government, requiring positive state action to obtain jurisdiction over
offenses committed by or against Indians in Indian country, address assumptions
of optional jurisdiction under Public Law 280, and do not apply here. See United
States v. Baker , 894 F.2d 1144, 1146 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. Burnett ,
777 F.2d 593, 597 (10th Cir. 1985); Luna , 683 P.2d at 364. Based on the
foregoing, we conclude that when the offense underlying defendant’s conviction
occurred, the United States no longer had Indian Major Crimes Act jurisdiction
over offenses committed in the town of Ignacio.
-11-
We turn, then, to the government’s third argument in support of its
jurisdiction. The government argues that the designation “Ignacio, Colorado,”
was simply a mailing address, and that the offense actually occurred outside the
boundaries of the incorporated town. In support of its argument, the government
has submitted an affidavit by the Assessor of the County of La Plata certifying
that the Meadowbrook Trailer Park is located outside the boundaries of the town
of Ignacio, with attached photocopies of a tax record and a portion of a map. The
government has asked us to take judicial notice that the offense occurred outside
the boundaries of the town of Ignacio, and that, therefore, the United States had
jurisdiction over the offense pursuant to the Indian Major Crimes Act.
Judicial notice may be taken at any time, including on appeal. See Mills v.
Denver Tramway Corp. , 155 F.2d 808, 812 (10th Cir. 1946) (holding appellate
court has discretion to take judicial notice for the first time). A fact may be
judicially noticed if it is not subject to reasonable dispute because it is either
“(1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court or
(2) capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to sources whose
accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.” Fed. R. Evid. 201(b).
Whether an offense occurred within particular geographical boundaries is
an appropriate subject for judicial notice. See Government of the Canal Zone v.
Burjan , 596 F.2d 690, 693-95 (5th Cir. 1979) (taking judicial notice of
-12-
government maps to determine whether charged offenses occurred within
boundaries of Canal Zone); United States v. Lossiah , 537 F.2d 1250, 1251
(4th Cir. 1976) (approving trial court’s taking of judicial notice that town was
within Cherokee Indian Reservation); see also United States v. Stands , 105 F.3d
1565, 1575 (8th Cir.) (“[G]iven a particular piece of land, it is for the court, not
the jury, to determine whether that land is in Indian country.”), cert. denied ,
118 S. Ct. 120 (1997). The sources provided to the court in this case, however,
do not permit us to take such notice.
Although official government maps are generally an acceptable source for
taking judicial notice, see Government of the Canal Zone , 596 F.2d at 694, we
have not been provided such a map. Instead, we have been provided a photocopy
of a portion of a map of some place, with a handwritten identification of the place
as the “City of Ignacio,” a hand drawn city boundary, and a handwritten notation
that the subject property is outside the city limits. This is not a source whose
accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned. Further, because the map, without the
notations, does not show the boundaries of the town of Ignacio or the location of
the Meadowbrook Trailer Park, the facts sought to be noted are not readily
determinable from the map.
Moreover, given the record allegations that the offense was committed in
Ignacio, Colorado, the county assessor’s hearsay affidavit cannot be considered
-13-
a source whose accuracy is beyond reasonable question. See, e.g. , 21 Charles A.
Wright & Kenneth W. Graham, Jr., Federal Practice and Procedure , § 5108, at 514
(1977) (noting that a person cannot be source of indisputable accuracy under Rule
201(b)(2)); Association Against Discrimination in Employment, Inc. v. City of
Bridgeport , 647 F.2d 256, 277-78 (2d Cir. 1981) (holding photocopies of
employment roster and affidavit explaining significance of pages were not sources
of information whose accuracy could not be questioned, and could not support
judicial notice of city’s use of federal funds); Groundhog v. Keeler , 442 F.2d 674,
681 (10th Cir. 1971) (noting, in dicta, inappropriateness of taking judicial notice
of affidavit contents to contradict allegations in complaint).
To determine whether the United States had jurisdiction to charge and try
defendant, this case must be remanded for further proceedings. The district court
is instructed to determine whether the offense for which defendant was convicted
occurred inside or outside the boundaries of the town of Ignacio. If the court
intends to determine this issue by judicial notice, defendant must be given an
opportunity to be heard pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201(e).
The government’s motion to supplement the record is denied. The
judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Colorado is
VACATED, and the case is REMANDED for further proceedings.
-14-