Lyons v. Zavaras

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
January 16, 2009
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
JOSEPH LYONS,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
No. 08-1133
v. (D.C. No. 07-CV-02569-ZLW)
(D. Colo.)
ARISTEDES ZAVARAS, Executive
Director, Colorado Department of
Corrections; CORRECTIONS
CORPORATION OF AMERICA,
Defendants - Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA, KELLY, and McCONNELL, Circuit Judges. **
Plaintiff Joseph Lyons, a state inmate appearing pro se, appeals from the
district court’s order denying his motion to reconsider the district court’s prior
order of dismissal. Mr. Lyons is in the custody of the Colorado Department of
Corrections (CDOC) at the North Fork Correctional Facility at Sayre, Oklahoma.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
**
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge
panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material
assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th
Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Mr. Lyons’ primary complaint is that his transfer from a CDOC facility in
Colorado to a private prison in Oklahoma violates various Colorado statutes, and
that, as a result, the CDOC has effectively released him from custody and the
private prison is now detaining him illegally.
Mr. Lyons initiated these proceedings by filing pro se a complaint pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 on December 11, 2007. 1 R. Doc. 3. He then amended his
complaint on January 4, 2008. 1 R. Doc. 5. In its order of dismissal, the district
court construed the complaint liberally and concluded that the relief Mr. Lyons
sought was release from custody; accordingly, it treated the complaint as
asserting habeas claims under § 2254. Lyons v. Zavaras, No. 07-cv-02569, 2008
WL 357030, at *1 (D. Colo. Feb. 8, 2008). Without requiring exhaustion of the
federal constitutional claims, the court then dismissed the complaint because Mr.
Lyons’ state law claims were not cognizable in a federal habeas action and his
constitutional claims lacked any arguable merit. Id. (relying upon 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(b)(2)). Then, on March 13, 2008, Mr. Lyons filed a “Motion to Proceed
With the Plaintiff’s Original 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Filing, and Objection to Order.” 1
R. Doc. 14. The district court treated this as a motion to reconsider pursuant to
Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) because it was filed more than ten days after the order of
dismissal. Lyons v. Zavaras, No. 07-cv-02569, 2008 WL 852657, at *1 (D. Colo.
Mar. 28, 2008). The district court then denied the motion because Mr. Lyons
could not pursue release from custody in a § 1983 action. Furthermore, the court
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noted that Mr. Lyons’ state law claims could not be asserted in a § 1983 action
and his constitutional claims lacked merit. Id. On appeal, Mr. Lyons argues that
the district court erred in re-characterizing his § 1983 claims as arising under
habeas, and that he is entitled to relief under Colorado, Oklahoma, and federal
law.
The district court properly treated Mr. Lyons’ March 13 motion as falling
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) because motions for reconsideration that are served
more than ten days after the final judgment are construed to be motions pursuant
to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) rather than Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). See Manco v.
Werholtz, 528 F.3d 760, 761 (10th Cir. 2008). Relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)
“is extraordinary and may only be granted in exceptional circumstances.” Davis
v. Kan. Dep’t of Corrs., 507 F.3d 1246, 1248 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting Amoco
Oil Co. v. U.S. Env’t Prot. Agency, 231 F.3d 694, 697 (10th Cir. 2000)) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Where the motion to reconsider was filed more than
ten days after the entry of final judgment and the notice of appeal was filed more
than thirty days after entry of final judgment, this court can “review only the
district court’s order of denial and not the underlying judgment itself.” Van
Skiver v. United States, 952 F.2d 1241, 1243 (10th Cir. 1991); see Carpenter v.
Williams, 86 F.3d 1015, 1016 (10th Cir. 1996). Therefore, we review only the
denial of Rule 60(b) relief, and will reverse only if the district court abused its
discretion. See Butler v. Kempthorne, 532 F.3d 1108, 1110 (10th Cir. 2008).
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The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mr. Lyons’ motion
for reconsideration. While Mr. Lyons seeks to bring this action on behalf of all
prisoners who were transferred to the private prison, a pro se litigant may not
represent other pro se litigants in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1654; Fymbo v.
State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 213 F.3d 1320, 1321 (10th Cir. 2000). Moreover,
this case is governed squarely by Montez v. McKinna, 208 F.3d 862, 864-65 (10th
Cir. 2000), and Rael v. Williams, 223 F.3d 1153, 1154 (10th Cir. 2000). In
Montez, we construed a similar claim as one challenging the execution of a state
sentence and arising under 28 U.S.C. § 2241. Montez, 208 F.3d at 865-66. We
determined that no federal constitutional right was implicated by such a transfer
and that state-law claims could not be brought in a habeas action under § 2241. 1
Id. In Rael, we reaffirmed that challenges based upon various contractual and
state law provisions are state law claims not cognizable in a § 2241 action
challenging a prison transfer. Rael, 223 F.3d at 1154. In both cases, we required
an inmate to obtain a certificate of appealability (COA) to proceed on appeal.
Rael, 223 F.3d at 1155; Montez, 208 F.3d at 868-69.
We acknowledge that Mr. Lyons’ main contention is that he is not actually
seeking release from custody; rather, he argues, he has already been released by
the CDOC because he was transferred to a private prison which, he alleges, does
1
Other circuits have relied upon § 2254. See White v. Lambert, 370 F.3d
1002, 1008-09 (9th Cir. 2004).
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not have a legal contract with the CDOC to house inmates and is therefore simply
detaining him illegally. Given our precedent, however, such a challenge is
properly construed to arise under § 2241. See Montez, 208 F.3d at 865 (noting
that the inmate challenged the continuing validity of the state sentence given the
transfers).
Accordingly, we construe Mr. Lyon’s notice of appeal as a request for
COA. Fed. R. App. P. 22(b)(2); 10th Cir. 22.1(A). See 28 U.S.C. §
2253(c)(1)(A). However, there are no grounds on which to issue a COA because
we conclude that Mr. Lyons has failed to make “a substantial showing of the
denial of a constitutional right,” and the district court’s result is not reasonably
debatable based upon our precedent. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2); Slack v.
McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000).
We DENY the request for a COA, DENY IFP status, and DISMISS the
appeal.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
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